THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. PASCUAL LABATETE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

People versus Labatete

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Pascual Labatete, a criminal case in which the prosecution sought to correct a defective information after the trial court had already thrown the case out. The question is whether the fiscal may file an amended information that changes the very acts charged, or whether the amendment is barred because it would strip the accused of his defense of double jeopardy. The case matters because it fixes the line between a mere amendment of form and a substantial amendment that the Rules of Court do not allow once trial has begun, and because it explains when a termination of a case counts as an acquittal rather than a dismissal with the consent of the accused.

Procedural History

The original information was filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. The accused was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and trial began with the testimony of the offended party. The accused then moved to dismiss on the ground that the facts alleged did not constitute a crime. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the information. The fiscal moved for reconsideration, and the court denied it. The fiscal then presented an amended information, which the court at first admitted because no objection had been filed, but later reconsidered and refused to admit upon motion of the accused. The fiscal's motion to reconsider that refusal was likewise denied. The People appealed to the Supreme Court from the orders denying the admission of the amended information.

Facts

The original information alleged that in January 1953, in Del Gallego, Camarines Sur, the accused obtained four hundred pesos from Genoveva Malinao and gave as security the improvements and products of his property covered by Original Certificate of Title Number 484. When he failed to redeem within the stipulated term, he allegedly extended the period by six months, asking an additional one thousand nine hundred pesos, for a total of two thousand three hundred pesos. It was further alleged that in February 1956 he mortgaged the improvements and products, and the title as well, to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation for nine hundred fifty pesos without first discharging his debt to the complainant.

The information was read to the accused in January 1957, he pleaded not guilty, and trial commenced with the offended party on the witness stand. Her testimony was suspended when the accused moved to dismiss, arguing that the facts alleged did not constitute a crime because the properties mortgaged were merely the improvements and products, not the land itself, and the contract was unrecorded. The trial court agreed that the facts did not constitute estafa and dismissed the information.

After reconsideration was denied, the fiscal filed an amended information alleging that the accused gave as security the land itself under the certificate of title, not merely the products and improvements, and that he later mortgaged the property to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. The court first admitted it, then reconsidered and refused admission, prompting this appeal.

Issues

• Whether or not the amended information may be admitted after trial had begun, when it changes the facts and the ground of responsibility alleged against the accused.
• Whether or not the dismissal of the original information, upon motion of the accused, amounts to an acquittal that bars the amended information on the ground of double jeopardy.
• Whether or not the accused, by asking for the dismissal, waived his constitutional right against being prosecuted again for the same offense.

Applicable Provisions

Section 13 of Rule 106 provides:

Section 13. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of forms, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.

This is the rule governing the amendment, and it permits amendment during trial only as to matters of form and only when no prejudice results to the accused.

Section 9 of Rule 113 provides:

Section 9. Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

This is the jeopardy provision the Court construes, distinguishing acquittal from a dismissal with the express consent of the accused.

Section 28 of General Orders Number 58, the old rule, provided:

Section 28. A person can not be tried for an offense, nor for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, for which he has been previously brought to trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined, when the case is dismissed or otherwise terminated before judgment without the consent of the accused.

The Court cites it to show that the old rule attached jeopardy at the calling of a witness, while the present rule attaches it at the plea.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the amended information may not be admitted. Reading both informations together, the amendment changes the facts and the ground of responsibility, because the original alleged that only the improvements and products were mortgaged, while the amended information alleges that both the land and the products and improvements were mortgaged. This is a substantial amendment changing the acts imputed to the accused, which the rule does not allow, since amendment during trial is confined to matters of form and must be without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.

On the second issue, the Court held that the dismissal was in truth an acquittal. The trial court found that the accused could not be found guilty of any offense under the information, and whether that judgment is correct or incorrect, it bars the amended information. The Court explained that the phrase without the express consent of the accused can refer only to a dismissal or other termination, not to a conviction or acquittal, since an acquittal after trial is ordinarily granted upon motion of the accused. It also cautioned judges to be careful in the use of the term dismissal, and not to use it where there has been a trial on the merits and the evidence is insufficient, in which case the judgment should be one of acquittal.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the argument of waiver. The cases cited by the Solicitor General do not apply: one involved a dismissal that was actually an acquittal, and another involved a different offense. As for the Salico case, the Court expressly abandoned its principle, explaining that the judgment there was in fact a final judgment of acquittal, not a provisional dismissal entered with the consent of the accused.

Doctrine

An information may be amended in substance or form without leave before the plea, but after the plea and during trial only as to matters of form, by leave of court, and only when no prejudice results to the accused. An amendment that changes the acts imputed as the offense is substantial and cannot be admitted after trial has begun.

Under Section 9 of Rule 113, jeopardy attaches upon a valid plea, and a dismissal or termination without the express consent of the accused bars a second prosecution. A judgment rendered after trial on the merits, finding that the facts do not constitute an offense or that the evidence is insufficient, is an acquittal, not a dismissal, and it bars another prosecution regardless of whether it is correct.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the order denying the admission of the amended information, without costs. The People lost the appeal, and the accused was not prosecuted again.

Remember This

Memorize this line: an amendment that changes the facts or the ground of responsibility is substantial and cannot be admitted after the plea, and a termination after trial on the merits is an acquittal, not a dismissal, and bars a second prosecution. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between form and substance in amendments, and the meaning of dismissal without the express consent of the accused under the jeopardy rule.