RE ADOPTION OF THE MINORS FRANCIS, ALEX, MARIA TERESA, JOSEPH, GREG AND GERMAN, ALL SURNAMED MILLENDEZ.  SINFOROSA T. MILLENDEZ, PETITIONER-APPELLANT.

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Sp. Proc. No. 337, denying the
petition of Sinforosa T. Vda.
de Millen­dez for the
adoption of her grandchildren, by reason of her disqualification under Article
335 of the new Civil Code.

On 15 February 1967, Sinforosa T. Vda.
de Millendez petitioned the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for
adoption of minors Francis Millendez, Alex Millendez, Maria Teresa Millendez,
Joseph Millendez, Greg Millendez
and German Millendez. 
It was alleged in the petition that the minors were the children of her
only son, Bobby Millendez, who had abandoned them for
over three years; that petitioner’s said
son had been with bad company and did not have the welfare and future of the
children at heart; that her said son in fact was disinherited by his father
(petitioner’s deceased husband) in his will,^[1] which will was duly probated by the court on
1 February 1965; that petitioner cherished and loved the minors as her
own children and the adoption was prompted by her sincere desire to protect
their welfare; that the minors’ natural mother, Hannah A. Millendez,
had consented to the petition; and that petitioner was financially capable of
making the adoption.  The petition was
published, and heard by the court.

In its order of 10 July
1967, the court denied the petition.  It was ruled that while the adoption would
benefit the minors, the same can not be granted on account of the express
prohibition of Article 335 of the new Civil Code.  Petitioner having a child – Bobby Millendez, the father of the minors – she is disqualified
under the law to adopt anybody.  At any
rate, the court pointed out, the purpose of the minors’ mother and grandmother
can still be achieved by the latter’s executing a will, or having Bobby Millendez declared a spendthrift.

Petitioner thus appealed to this Court, contending that the
circums­tances of this case warrant a liberal interpretation of Article 335 of
the new Civil Code.

The Civil Code expressly
provides:

“ART. 335.  The
following cannot adopt:

(1) Those who have legitimate, legiti­mated, acknowledged natural
children, or na­tural children by legal fiction;

x x
x              x
x x                 x x x

There can be no question, in view of the explicit provision of
the law, that petitioner-appellant having already a legitimate child, Bobby Millendez, is disqualified to adopt anyone.  In urging the removal of this case from the
legal prohibition, however, appellant points to the facts that her son has been
prodigal and has not provided her with filial love and respect; that he was
even disinherited by her husband, his own father, for having attempted on the
latter’s life; that her said son, Bobby Millendez,
had allegedly consented to the proposed adoption of his own children by herein
appellant; that it is appellant’s love for her grandchildren and her fear that
Bobby Millendez would just dis­sipate whatever
properties he might inherit from her, leaving nothing to the said children,
that prompted this petition for adoption. 
It is, therefore, maintained that with the foregoing facts, it would be
pre­cisely in pursuance of the purpose of adoption statutes – which is the
promotion of the welfare of the children – that the present petition for
adoption should be granted.

Adoption, as a privilege granted by law, can be exercised by any
person of age and in full possession of his civil rights.^[2]
It is, however, withdrawn from certain persons enumerated in Article 335 of the
Civil Code, among whom are those who have children of
their own, whether the children are legitimate, legitimated or
illegitimate.  And the provision, being
clear and explicit, had to be enforced although its suspension or waiver would
have worked to the benefit or well-being of the child proposed to be
adopted.  Thus, in one case, where after
the child was taken from his natural parents the adopting couple begot children
of their own, a petition subsequently filed to make formal the adoption of the
child was denied, on the ground that the adopters were already disqualified
because of the presence of their own children.^[3]
It is for the same reason that the petition of a step-father to adopt his
wife’s child had by a previous marriage was refused, because there were already
children of that second marriage.^[4]
For, while it is true that the intendment of adoption statutes is the promotion
of the welfare of the children, such that the modern trend is to encourage
adoption^[5]
by persons who can provide them with proper care and education,^[6]
adoption may be allowed only where it is possible without doing violence to the
terms of the statute.^[7]

It is of no significance in this case that appellant’s child has
consented to the adoption, or that such child has become wayward and led a
dishonorable life.  Article 335 of the
Civil Code creates a disqualification on the adopter himself, not on the child,
that there is nothing about the behaviour of the
latter short of his losing the status of a child (if there is any such means in
the law) that would remove the disqualification prescribed in the article.

The reason for the prohibition to adopt under Article 335 (1) of the Civil Code is not difficult
to find.  Not only would the adoption
introduce a foreign conflicting element into the family unit, but it would, in
the present case, result in the reduction of the legitime
of the son to the benefit of the prospective adoptees,
who are not forced heirs of the would-be adopter, thereby producing an indirect
disinheritance in a manner not authorized by law,^[8]
i.e., by a testament expressly stating the legal cause for the
disinheritance.  Not only this, but the
adoption would make the disinheritance of the son permanent and irrevocable,
contrary to the policy of the law that “a subsequent reconciliation between
the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to
disinherit and renders in­effectual any disinheritance that may have been
made”.^[9]
This same policy inspires Article 1033, that permits
an unworthy heir to succeed if the de cujus
should condone the unworthiness in writing. 
The consent of the son to the adoption of his own children by his mother
is likewise ineffective to circumvent the statutory bar, as by Article 905, of
the Civil Code, every renunciation of a future legitime
is void, and of no effect.

Appellant’s claim that no disqualification attaches to her having
one legitimate child because Article 335 speaks of “children”, is
equally devoid of merit.  The use of the
word “children” in the law does not mean that an adopter must have
more than one legitimate, legitimated or illegitimate child before the
disqualification to adopt shall attach. 
No such intention can be discerned from the provision.  The use of the word “children”, instead
of “child”, appears more to have been called for by grammatical
correctness than anything else, to complement the plural subject
“those”.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appealed from, the dismissal of the petition is affirmed,
with costs against the appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Ruiz Castro and Villamor, JJ., did not take part.

^[1]
The disinheritance was based on the son’s attempts on the life of the father.

^[2]
Article 334, Civil Code of the Philippines.

^[3]
In re-Adoption of Resaba, 95 Phil.
244.

^[4]
McGee vs. Republic, L-5387, 29
April 1954.

^[5]
Prasnik vs. Republic, L-8639, 23 March 1956, 98 Phil. 666.

^[6]
Santos, Jr. vs. Republic,
L-22523, 29 September 1967,
21 SCRA 379.

^[7]
Santos vs. Aranzanso, L-2382 8, 28 February 1966, 16 SCRA 344.

^[8]
Civil Code, Article 916.

^[9]
Civil Code, Article 922.