CLOTILDE CORREOS, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. LADISLAO VALENZUELA Y PEREZ AND EMILIO DIZON, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First In­stance of Manila in
Civil Case No. 51466 sentencing Ladislao Valenzuela
to pay the plaintiffs “the sum of P3,166.60 as actual
damages, plus P5,000.00 as moral damages and P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the costs of this suit.  In case of his failure to pay the said amounts
due to insolvency, the defendant Emilio Dizon shall
pay the same”.

Briefly stated, the
facts of the case are as follows:

At around 8:30 in the
morning on June 20, 1962,
the now deceased Exequiel Correos
alighted from a passenger jeepney at Plaza Lawton,
Sta. Cruz, Manila.  All of
a sudden, the passenger jeepney driven by appellant
Valenzuela and owned by Emilio Dizon, his
co-appellant, came from behind and bumped the rear part of the former, thus
pinning Correos between the two vehicles.  As a result he sustained body injuries
which ultimately caused his death
on July 5, 1962, after what
the lower court found to be “a prolonged and agonizing illness”.

Subsequently, his widow and the children filed the corresponding
action for damages.  The defendants – now
appellants – filed their answer in due time, but failed to appear on the day
set for the trial.  As a result, the
lower court allowed the plaintiffs to present their evidence before the Deputy
Clerk of Court appointed as Commissioner for the purpose.  On the basis of such evidence the decision
appealed from was rendered.  Be­fore its
rendition, however, or more specifically on November 3, 1962, the defendants
filed a motion to set aside the order of October 22 of the same year
authorizing the presentation of plaintiffs’ evidence before the Deputy Clerk of
Court, alleging as grounds therefor that their
counsel “was suddenly striken ill” on the
day set for the trial, and that his clients did not appear at said hear­ing
upon his own advice because he did not expect the presentation of the evidence
for the plaintiffs to ter­minate at that hearing.  The motion alleged further that the defendants had good, valid
and substantial defenses.  The motion was not verified nor was it
accompanied with affidavits of merit. 
Consequently, it was denied by the lower court.  An urgent motion for reconsideration filed by
the defendants on November 27 of the same year was likewise denied for lack of
merit.

In the present appeal the appellants contend that the lower court
erred:  in allowing the presentation of
evidence for the plaintiffs before a Commissioner; in not finding that the
sickness of defendants counsel constituted excusable negligence, and finally, in not granting the motion for relief
from judgment.

The proceedings before the Commissioner appointed by the lower
court for the presentation of plaintiffs’ evidence are valid and in accordance
with current court practice followed in default and similar cases.  It must be observed in this connection that
the rule invoked by appellants
refer to contentious cases where both parties are available for and ready to go to trial.

With regards to the
denial of appellants’ motion for relief from judgment, the record clearly shows
that their and their counsel’s inability or failure to appear on the day of the
trial was not excusable at all.  As a
matter of fact, their own motion for relief avers that appellants’ failure to
appear was due to the advice of their own attorney.  Moreover, their aforesaid motion was filed
without any supporting affidavit of merit. 
We have held consistently in this connection that it is not enough to
allege in a motion of that kind that the movant has a good and meritorious defense, because that is a mere conclusion and an expression of his own opinion as to the merit
of his case.  The rules require such
motion to be supported by affidavits not only proving the ground re­lied upon
but likewise the merits of movant’s case, which means
that it is the latter’s duty to submit to the court for
consideration, in the form of depositions or sworn statements, his testimony
and that of his wit­nesses, so that the court may be in a
position to decide whether the re-opening of the case would be for a useful
purpose or would be a mere empty and useless gesture.

WHEREFORE, the
decision appealed from being in accordance with law and the evidence, the same
is hereby affirmed.  With
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz
Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.