NIEVES TINIO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. GREGORIO FRANCES, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

This action was brought by the heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas to annul
the sale of a homestead which had been inherited by them from said decedent.
Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land containing an area of 10.0709
hectares, more or less, in San Fabian, Santo Domingo, Nueva Ecija in the year
1917. His application was approved on June 22, 1917. He filed the corresponding
final proof papers in relation to the homestead and on June 15, 1943 the said
final proof was approved by the Director of Lands, who thereupon ordered the
issuance of a patent in his favor. (Exhibit A.) At the time of the issuance of
the above order, Sergio Nicolas had already died, so the order directs. the
issuance of the patent to Ms heirs, represented by his widow. In or about the.
year 1947 the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead to the defendants.
The above transfers were approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
on March 9, 1948 and thereafter the defendants secured the issuance of a
homestead patent in their favor. Original Certificate of Title No P-558 has been
issued also in their favor covering the said parcel of land.

The present action was commenced on April 27, 1953 to annul the conveyances
executed by plaintiffs to. defendants and to recover the land, together with the
frits of the land recelved by the defendants, as damages. The defendants alleged
the execution of the sales in their favor. After the issues had been joined the
parties presented an agreed statement of facts, the most pertinent parts of
which have already been get forth above. The trial court held that the transfer
or conveyance of the homestead made by the heirs ox the original homesteader was
a mere transfer of. the rights of the original homesteader to the iand
authorized under the provisions of Section 20 of the Public, Land Act (C. A.
141) ; therefore, as it was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, the conveyance was, valid. It held, that section 118 of the Public
Land Act is not applicable; that both Section 20 and. Section 118 being
apparently conflicting, they should be reconciled such that the prohibition,
contained in section 118 should be made to apply only if the patent had
already been issued, otherwise section 20 would be absolutely useless.
Against this judgment the appeal was prosecuted in this Court.

The provisions which affect, the conveyance sought to be annulled are as
follows:

“Sec. 20. If at any time after the approval of the application and before
patent is. issued the” applicant shall prove to the satisfaction of the Director
of Lands that he has complied with all the requirements of the law, but, cannot
continue with his homestead, through no fault of his own, and there is a bona
fide purchaser for the rights and improvements of the applicant on the land, and
that conveyance is not made for purposes of speculation, then the applicant,
with the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may
transfer his rights to the land and improvements to any person legally qualified
to apply for a homestead, and immediately after such transfer, the purchaser
shall file a homestead application to the land so acquired and shall succeed the
original homesteader in his rights and obligations beginning with the date of
the approval of said application of the purchaser. Any person who has so
transferred his rights may not again apply for a new homestead. Every transfer
made without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
shall be null and void and shall result in the cancellation of the entry and the
refusal of the patent.” (C. A. 141)

“Sec. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units,
or institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provision shall
not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the
application and for a term of five years from and after the date of the issuance
of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any
debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period but the improvements or
crop on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations,
or corporations.”

“No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and
before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not
be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.”
(Id.)

The legislative policy or intent is to conserve the land which a homesteader
has acquired under the Public Land Law, as above stated, for him and his heirs.
The legislative policy is so strong and consistent that the original period of
five years from the issuance of the patent, within which period conveyance or
sale thereof, by the homesteader or his heirs was prohibited (section 116 of Act
No. 2874) is now extended to 25 years if no approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce is secured (Sec. 118, par. 2, C. A. No. 141, as amended
by C. A. No. 456.) Provision has also been inserted authorizing the repurchase
of the homestead when properly sold by the homesteader within five years from
the date of the sale. (Sec. 119, C. A. No. 141.) This legislative intent and
policy is also sought to be carried out in Section 20, as may be seen from the
fact that transfer of homestead rights from a homesteader can only be justified
upon proof satisfactory to the Director of Lands that the homesteader cannot
continue with kis homestead through no. fault of his own. This is not the
only requirement; a previous permission of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce should first be obtained, as it is also expressly provided that any
transfer made without such previous approval is null and void and shall
result in the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the patent. As the
conveyances made under the provisions of section 20 of the Public Land Act, the
important question to be determined is whether said conveyances satisfy
requirements of said section 20 of the Act.

The stipulation of facts on this point is as follows:

“That the heirs of, Sergio Nicolas executed in or. about 1947 a transfer of
homestead rights over the land in question in favor of the defendants, which
transfer was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on March 9,
1948; that with the approval of said transfer of Homestead rights, the
defendants caused the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor, the title
being evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. P—558 of the land records
of Nueva Ecija.”

The above stipulation does not state expressly that the Director of Lands
had, after investigation, been satisfied that the applicant or homesteader “has
complied with all the requirements of the law, but cannot continue with the
homestead through no fault of his own.” Furthermore, according to’the
stipulation, the transfer was made in 1947 and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture in 1948 so that the conveyances were not made with the previous
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. So neither of the
requirements of section 20 has been complied with.

But it is suggested that in accordance with the presumption of regularity of
official acts the Director of Lands must have recommended the approval of the
transfer. Admitting arguendo that such is the case, the conveyances
still suffer from at least one fatal defect in that it does not appear that they
had to be made because the homesteader could not continue with his
homestead through no fault of his own. We may not and cannot indulge in
presumptions on this necessary requirement, because the order for the issuance
of the patent states just the opposite. The order for the, issuance of the
patent states expressly that the homesteader had already complied with all
the requirements of the law with respect to cultivation, possession and
otherwlse thus:

“(5) That an investigation for the purpose of verifying the statements
contataed in the final proof papers was conducted by a representative of the
Bureau of Lands, who found that the applicant has fully complied with the
residence and cultivation requirements of the law; and”
* * *

“* * *, the undersigned is of the opinion that the applicant has complied
with the requirements of law preliminary to the issuance of patent to the land
applied for and already surveyed.” (Exhibit A.)

The order for the issuance of a, patent as well as the statements of fact
therein contained, as above-quoted conclusively disprove the existence of the
requirement that the homesteader could not continue with the homestead through
no fault of his own.

In a legal sense, furthermore, when the Director of Lands issues the order
for the issuance of a patent after the approval of the final proof, the right of
the homesteader to the patent becomes absolute and then it becomes the
ministerial duty of the corresponding officials of the Government to issue said
patent. To all intents and purposes the order for the issuance of a patent is
the same in effect as the issuance of a patent itself (Balboa vs.
Ferrales, 51 Phil 499). And if the law (section 118, C. A. No. 114) prohibits
the sale or conveyance of a homestead after the issuance of a patent, the
prohibition should be extended, in view of the apparent policy of the law, to
the date on which the order for the issuance of the patent is issued, which in
this case is June 13, 1943.

Resuming what we have stated above, we find that the conveyances made by the
heirs of the homesteader to the defendants herein in the year 1947 do not comply
with. the first requirement of section 20 of the Public Land Act that the
Director of Lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he
(homesteader) could not continue with his homestead through no failt of his
own, and with the second that a conveyance must be made with the prior
or previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce; that
from the date of an order for the issuance of a patent for a homestead the
homesteader to all intents and purposes is considered as having the patent
actually issued to himself, in so far as the prohibition contained in section
118 of the Public Land Act, otherwise the intent and policy of the law may be
avoided by the homesteader by postponing the getting of his patent.

In accordance herewith the conveyances executed by the plaintiffs to the
defendants, are hereby declared null and void, the transfer certificate of title
issued m the name of the defendants (P-558 of the Office of the Register, of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija) ordered cancelled, and the possession of the land
returned, to the plaintiffs upon return to the defendants of the amounts
received as price for the sale.

No damages or costs. So ordered.

Paras C. J., Bengzon,.Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista
Angelo, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L..JJ., concur.