JOSE V. IGNACIO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. BUENAVENTURA J. GUERRERO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL AND NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, RESPONDENTS.

This is a Petition for certiorari seeking the
annulment of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil
Case No. 28074.

The record of the case discloses that the herein petitioner Jose
V. Ignacio is the owner of a parcel of land located in Antipolo, Rizal province
with an area of about 3.6156 hectares. The petitioner has converted the tract of land into a quarry.

On the other hand, the herein respondent National Housing
Authority (NHA) is a government agency empowered by law to acquire private
lands for the purpose of housing development, resettlement projects and other
related services.

On December 5, 1977, the respondent NHA filed a Complaint for
expropriation against the petitioner and some 26 other parties who owned the
parcels of land ad­joining the aforementioned property of the petitioner.^[1]
The Complaint was instituted with the Court of First Instance of Rizal and was
docketed as Civil Case No. 28074.

The respondent NHA alleges in the Complaint that the parcels of
land sought to be expropriated would be used to accommodate the expansion of
the Government’s Bagong Nayon Housing Project in the said area. It is also alleged therein that the market
value of the property of the petitioner is about P36,160.00 as determined by
the Provincial Assessor.

The NHA sought authority from the trial court to take immediate
possession of the parcels of land in question. For this purpose, and pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1224, the NHA deposited with the Philippine Heart Center (Quezon City)
branch of the Philippine National Bank the amount of P158,980.00 to cover the
value of all the parcels of land sought to be expropriated, including
the property of the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.^[2]
He contended therein that the current fair market value of his property is
P723,000.00 and not P36,160.00 as alleged by the respondent NHA. The petitioner also stressed that the amount
of P36,160.00 which the respondent NHA considers to be just compensa­tion as
far as the property of the petitioner is concerned is unconscionable,
arbitrary, oppressive and repugnant to the concept of just compensation
embodied in the Constitution.

In its Order dated January 17, 1978, the trial court, with
respondent Judge Buenaventura J. Guerrero presiding therein, issued a writ of
possession over the properties sought to be expropriated, including that of the
petitioner, in favor of the respondent NHA.^[3]
The pertinent portions of the said Order are as follows:

“Plaintiff having deposited with the Philippine National Bank,
Heart Center Extension Office, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila, the amount
of P158,980.00 rep­resenting the total market value of the subject parcels of
land, let a writ of possession be issued.

“SO ORDERED.

“x x x.”

A Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order was filed with the
trial court.^[4]
The Motion stressed that the questioned Order violates the just compensation
provision of the Constitution.^[5]
Thereafter, the respondent NHA submitted its Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration.^[6]
The said Opposition is anchored on the arguments that the writ of possession
issued by the trial court was in accordance with the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1224, and that the questioned Order merely authorized the issuance
of the writ of possession to the NHA without prejudice to the right of the
property owners to be paid just compensation.

The petitioner also manifested to the trial court that pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, a court hearing for the
determination of the required just compensation is an indispensable requisite
before the NHA can take possession of the private property sought to be
expropriated.^[7]
In its Opposition to the said Manifestation,^[8]
the NHA replied that the provisions of Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules have
been repealed by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1259 and that,
accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession over the property sought to
be expropriated has become a matter of right on the part of the NHA upon the
filing of the Complaint for expropriation and the deposit of the amount of just
compensation as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1259 and in the other
Decrees relied upon by the NHA.

In its Orders dated February 10 and 24, 1978, the trial court
instructed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to submit their Comment on
the matter. In compliance with the
same, the OSG submitted its Comment dated March 27, 1978, maintaining the
consti­tutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1224.^[9]

In its Order dated June 28, 1978, the trial court denied the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner and his co-defendants in the
case.^[10]
The pertinent portions of the said Order are as follows:

“Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendants Lorenzo
Sumulong, Emilia Vidanes­-Balaoing and Jose Ignacio and (the) plaintiff’s
opposition as well as the comment of the Office of the Solicitor General and
finding (the) plaintiff’s opposition and the comment to be well-taken, for
reasons stated in said opposition and comment, the Motion for Reconsideration
of said defendants are (sic) hereby denied.

“x x x.”

Finding the action taken by the trial court to be unsatisfactory,
the herein petitioner elevated the case directly to this Court by way of a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.^[11]
The Petition was filed with this Court on October 12, 1978.

The herein petitioner maintains that the respondent Judge failed
to observe the provisions of Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court requiring
the court to first determine and fix the value of the real property sought to
be expropriated before issuing a writ of possession. The petitioner also argues that the courts have the exclusive
discretion to determine and fix the just compensation mandated by the
Constitution as regards the expropriation of private property.

The petitioner likewise maintains that Presidential Decree No.
1224 is unconstitutional in so far as it fixes just compensation for
expropriated private property and in so far as it deprives the property owner
of a day in court at least for the purpose of determining the public purpose
alleged by the respondent NHA and for the provisional determination of just
compensation in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

In sum, the petitioner contends that the trial court acted in
excess of its jurisdiction when it issued the writ of possession in question
and when it denied his Motion for Reconsideration.

On December 4, 1978, the respondents, represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General, submitted their Comment on the Petition wherein they
contended otherwise.^[12]
On December 12, 1978, the respondent NHA, represented by the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel, submitted another Comment on the Petition.^[13]

In the Resolution of this Court dated February 27, 1979, We gave
due course to the instant Petition.^[14]
The parties were instructed to submit their respective Memoranda. After the parties had complied with the said
instructions, the instant Petition was deemed submitted for decision on August
19, 1980.

After a careful examination of the entire record of the case, We
find merit in the instant Petition.

Contrary to the contentions of the respondent NHA, the challenged
Order of the trial court dated January 17, 1978 virtually fixed the market
value of the properties sought to be expropriated, including the property of
the petitioner, at P158,980.00, the value determined by the Provincial Assessor
and relied upon by the respondent NHA in its Complaint for expropriation. An inspection of the terms of the said Order
shows that the trial court has, in effect, declared the just compensation for
all the properties sought to be expropriated to be at P158,980.00.

In justifying the questioned Order, the respondent NHA invokes
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1224 which fixes just compensation for
expropriated private property as follows:

“In the determination of just compensation for such private
lands and improvements to be expropriated, the Government shall choose between
the value of the real property and the improvements thereon as declared by the
owner or administrator thereof from time to time, or the market value as may be
determined by the city or provincial assessor, whichever is lower.”

The respondent NHA admits that similar, if not identical
provisions can be found in expropriation laws such as Presidential Decree Nos.
76, 464, 794, 1259 and 1313. Presidential Decree No. 1533, one of the latest laws on eminent domain
proceedings, also carries a similar provision.

Unfortunately for the respondents, their justification cannot be
sustained.

In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay,^[15]
this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., declared the
provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decree Nos. 76, 464, 794
and 1533 unconstitutional encroachments on judicial prerogatives. The pertinent portions of the Decision of
this Court are as follows:

“The method of ascertaining just compensation under the
aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial
prerogatives. It tends to render this
Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitu­tion is reserved to it for
final determination.

“Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court
technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for
the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to
simply stating the lower value of the property as de­clared either by
the owner or the assessor. As a
necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint
commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the
taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that
a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the
decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or
charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and
that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the
two. The court cannot exercise its
discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could sub­stitute
for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation
is concerned.

“x x x.

“The basic unfairness of the decrees is readily apparent.

“Just compensation means the value of the property at the time
of the taking. It means a fair and
full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.

“x x x.

“Various factors can come into play in the valuation of
specific properties singled out for expro­priation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for
very wide areas cover­ing several barrios or even an entire town with the
exception of the poblacion. Individual
differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible
cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as ‘cogonal’ has been cultivated for
generations. Buildings are de­scribed
in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of
areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but can­not be absolute substitutes for
just compensation.

“To say that the owners are estopped to question the
valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is
illusory. The overwhelming mass of land
owners accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by
local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less analyze, the statements. The idea of expropriation simply never
occurs until a demand is made or a case (is) filed by an agency authorized to
do so.

“It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the
opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or
wrong. And it is repulsive to basic
concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor
bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property,
after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all
factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been
judiciously evaluated.

“x x x.

“The determination of ‘just compensation’ in eminent domain cases
is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a
party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private
property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute,
decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail
over the court’s findings. Much less
can the courts be precluded from looking into the ‘just-ness’ of the decreed
compensation.

“x x x.

This Court also observed in Export Processing Zone Authority
that the unconstitutional provisions found in Presidential Decree Nos. 76, 464,
794 and 1533 are likewise found in Presidential Decree Nos. 1224, 1259 and
1313, the laws relied upon by the respondents.

In a Motion filed with this Court on July 25, 1983, the Solicitor
General cited the case of National Housing Authority v. Reyes^[16]
as jurisprudence in favor of the respondents. We disagree.

While it can be said that in National Housing Authority
this Court implicitly upheld the constitutionality of some of the expropriation
laws relied upon by the respondent NHA, that ruling has been expressly
abandoned by this Court in Our pronouncement in Export Processing Zone
Authority. We quote the pertinent
portions of the Decision, viz:

“In the case of National Housing Authority v. Reyes
xxx, this Court upheld P.D. No. 464, as further amended by P. D. Nos. 794, 1224
and 1259. x x x.

“x x x, this Court ruled that under the conceded facts, there
should be a recognition that the law as it stands must be applied; that the
decree having spoken so clearly and un­equivocably calls for obedience; and
that on a matter where the applicable law speaks in no un­certain language, the
Court has no choice except to yield to its command. We further stated that ‘the courts should recognize that the rule
introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in sub­sequent decrees does not upset
the established concepts of justice or the constitutional provision on just
compensation for, precisely, the owner is allowed to make his own valuation of
his property.’

“While the Court yielded to executive prerogative exercised in
the form of absolute law-making power, its members, nonetheless, remained
uncomfortable with the implications of the decision and the abuse and
unfairness which might follow in its wake. For one thing, the President himself (President Marcos) did not seem as­sured
or confident with his own enactment. It
was not enough to lay down the law on determination of just compensation in
P.D. 76. It had to be repeated and
reiterated in P.D. 464, P.D. 794, and P.D. 1533. The provision is also found in P.D. 1224, P.D. 1259 and P.D.
1313. x x x.

“In the present petition, we are once again confronted with
the same question of whether the courts under P.D. 1533, which contains the
same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the
power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is
stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such
purpose.

“This time, we answer in the affirmative.

“x x x.

“We are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly
stated that the valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle
or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not
substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how
to arrive at such amount, x x x. The
doctrine we enunciated in National Housing Authority v. Reyes, x x x,
therefore, must necessarily be abandoned if we are to uphold this Court’s role
as the guardian of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the due process and
equal protection clauses and as the final arbiter over transgressions committed
against constitutional rights.”

On account of the foregoing discussions, Section 2, Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court still governs the procedure for ascertaining just
compensation, even on a provisional basis, in eminent domain proceedings, to
wit:

“SEC. 2. Entry of
plaintiff upon depositing value with National
or Provincial Treasurer. — Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter the
plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real
or personal property involved if he deposits with the National or Provincial
Treasurer its value, as provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by the
court having jurisdiction of the proceedings, to be held by such treasurer
subject to the orders and final disposition of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in
lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a
depository of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the National
or Provincial Treasurer, as the case may be, in the amount di­rected by the
court to be deposited. After such
deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to
forthwith place the plain­tiff in possession of the property involved.”

Pursuant to this cited provision of the Rules, it is imperative
that before a writ of possession can be issued by the court in expropriation
proceedings, the following requisites must be met: (1) There must be a Complaint for expropriation sufficient in
form and in substance; (2) A provisional determination of just compensation for
the properties sought to be expropriated must be made by the trial court on the
basis of judicial (not legislative or executive) discretion; and (3) The
deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must be complied with.

In conclusion, We find that the writ of possession issued by the
trial court has no valid legal basis. As such, the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it
issued the same. For this reason, the
corrective writ of certiorari should be, and is hereby issued as
prayed for.

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that
the questioned Orders of the trial court dated January 17, 1978 and June 28,
1978 are null and void for having been issued in excess of the court’s
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari
is GRANTED. The Orders of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 28074, dated January 17, 1978 and June 28, 1978 are
hereby annulled for having been issued in excess of the court’s jurisdiction. Let this case be remanded to the appropriate
trial court for further proceedings in conformity with this ruling. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

^[1]
Pages 12 to 19, Rollo.

^[2]
Pages 20 to 22, Rollo.

^[3]
Page 24, Rollo.

^[4]
Annex “D”, Petition, pages 26 to 31, Rollo. The Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
two individuals who were affected by the Order of the trial court. In his Manifestation dated February 9, 1978,
the herein petitioner adopted the said Motion as his own.

^[5]
Section 2, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, which was in effect at the time
the instant Petition was filed, provides that “Private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation.” This provision has
been retained in Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

^[6]
Pages 32 to 34, Rollo.

^[7]
Pages 38 to 41, Rollo.

^[8]
Pages 42 to 43, Rollo.

^[9]
Pages 44 to 48, Rollo.

^[10]
Page 64, Rollo.

^[11]
Pages 3 to 11, Rollo.

^[12]
Pages 79 to 99, Rollo.

^[13]
Pages 100 to 129, Rollo.

^[14]
Page 134, Rollo.

^[15]
G.R. No. 59603, April 29, 1987. Mr.
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee concurred in the result while Mr. Justice Pedro
L. Yap was on leave.

^[16]
G.R. No. 49439, June 29, 1983, 123 SCRA 245.