SPS. LOLITO CERELOS AND TERESITA CERELOS, PETITIONERS, VS. NINFA SALIGUMBA JOINED BY HER HUSBAND, REYNALDO SALIGUMBA, RESPONDENTS.
QUIJANO-PADILLA, J.:
The Antecedents
The instant controversy stemmed from a Complaint[6] for Unlawful Detainer filed by plantiffs-respondents Spouses Ninfa Saligumba and Reynaldo Saligumba against defendants-petitioners Lolito Cerelos and Teresita Cerelos before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court Cuartero-Dumarao (MCTC), Cuartero, Capiz, docketed as Civil Case No. 423, seeking to recover possession of a parcel of land, known as Lot No. 5960, situated in Brgy. Putian, Cuartero, Capiz (subject property), which allegedly is unlawfully possessed by the defendants-petitioners.
In their Complaint, plaintiffs-respondents alleged that they are the true and lawful owners of the subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-18653[7] consisting of an area of ninety nine thousand nine hundred ninety one (99,991) square meters, more or less. The subject property, which is covered by Tax Declaration No. 94-091-0108,[8] is still registered under the names of its previous owners, Andres Anuncio and Nida Falco-Anuncio (Spouses Anuncio), but the same was sold to plaintiffs-respondents on March 5, 2007 as per Deed of Absolute Sale[9]. They have already paid the property taxes due thereon, the latest tax receipt[10] of which is dated April 17, 2008.[11]
Allegedly, defendants-petitioners have been occupying the subject property since the year 1984 at the tolerance of its previous owners. After plaintiffs-respondents acquired the subject property in 2007, they likewise tolerated defendants-petitioners’ possession of the subject property. The latter did not even pay any rentals at all. Plaintiffs-respondents had seen the need to fully utilize the subject property, thus, they made several oral demands to the defendants-petitioners to return the possession of the same but the latter refused and still refuse to vacate the subject property. Plaintiffs-respondents brought the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Brgy. Puti-an, Cuartero, Capiz for conciliation and mediation but to no avail,thus, prompting the Barangay Lupon to issue a Certificate to File Action.[12] Plaintiffs-respondents then sent a final demand to vacate on March 12, 2008[13] to defendants-petitioners but the same still proved futile. Since demand to vacate was made, defendants-petitioners and all other persons claiming rights under them are unlawfully detaining the subject property and defendants-petitioners had been cutting trees and bamboos therein for commercial purposes without proof of their right to do so. Hence, this complaint and the need for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.[14]
In their Answer,[15] defendants-petitioners vehemently denied the material allegations in the complaint and averred that in 1984, Andres Anuncio, registered owner of the subject property, and his wife Nida Anuncio borrowed money from defendants-petitioners in the amount of six thousand pesos (P6,000.00), with a mutual understanding that defendants-petitioners remain in actual possession over the subject property until Spouses Anuncio completed payment of the loan. Included in their right to possess the subject property is the right to cultivate it and harvest all the fruits and produce that could be derived therefrom. Immediately after the consummation of the loan, defendants-petitioners took actual possession of the subject property and personally cultivated the same peacefully until February 2007 when plaintiffs-respondents claimed they had bought the subject property from Spouses Anuncio.
Defendants-petitioners likewise averred that there exists an agricultural leasehold between them and the Spouses Anuncio, the subject property being an agricultural lot. Defendants-petitioners claimed that as lessees/tenants of the subject property, they are entitled to security of tenure and cannot be ejected therefrom. Defendants-petitioners averred further that plaintiffs-respondents are buyers in bad faith as they allegedly bought the subject property knowing that the former have been cultivating the same as agricultural lessees. As such, plaintiffs-respondents merely stepped into the shoes of Spouses Anuncio with respect to the latter’s legal obligation as landlord to respect their rights as agricultural lessees/tenants. Likewise, their legal right of pre-emption as agricultural lessees/tenants had been grossly violated by the plaintiffs-respondents and Spouses Anuncio. The plaintiffs-respondents did not afford them their preferential right to buy the subject property under R.A. 3844, as amended by R.A. 6389.[16]
Defendants-petitioners prayed that the case be dismissed both for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.[17]
The instant case was referred for mediation proceedings but the same failed and the case was returned to the lower court for further judicial proceedings. Considering that the defense of tenancy was raised in defendants-petitioners’ answer, a preliminary hearing on the matter was conducted by the lower court and it found no prima facie merit on the defendants-petitioners’ defense of tenancy in its Order dated September 18, 2009. Defendants-petitioners moved for a reconsideration but the same was denied by the lower court in another Order dated December 2, 2009. Thereafter, this case was set for preliminary conference but was reset several times upon motions by the parties.[18]
On May 27, 2011, the lower court referred this case to the Department of Agrarian Reform, Provincial Agrarian Reform Office, Roxas City for the determination whether an agrarian dispute exists pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 9700. On June 27, 2011, Regina L. Caspillo, Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer II submitted to the lower court a certification to the effect that this case does not involve an agrarian dispute.[19]
After several postponements, pre-trial conference was held and terminated on December 7, 2012 and the parties were then required to submit their position papers. Plaintiffs-respondents’ position paper was not admitted by the lower court as it was not filed on time. Defendants-petitioners, on the other hand, did not file their position paper at all.[20]
The Decisions of the MCTC and RTC
After due proceedings, the MCTC rendered its Decision[21] on February 28, 2013 ruling in favor of plaintiffs-respondents and ordered defendants-petitioners to vacate the subject properties and to pay reasonable rentals thereof. The dispositive portion[22] of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the plaintiffs as entitled to the possession of Lot No. 5960 situated in Brgy. Putian, Cuartero, Capiz;
2. Ordering the defendants to immediately vacate the above-mentioned parcel of land and to turn over the peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiffs.
3. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs the sum of Php 1,000.00 a month as reasonable rental for the use of the property, from March 27, 2008 and every month thereafter until possession thereof shall have been peacefully surrendered to plaintiffs;
4. Dismissing the counterclaim of the defendants.
The lower court found plaintiffs-respondents to have sufficiently established ownership over the subject property and clearly made out a case for unlawful detainer against defendants-petitioners. The lower court likewise found that defendants-respondents failed to prove their defense of agricultural tenancy as supported by the findings of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Provincial Agrarian Reform Office, Roxas City.
Dissatisfied, defendants-petitioners appealed[23] the said Decision to the RTC, Branch 16, Roxas City. On December 19, 2013, the RTC rendered its assailed Decision[24] affirming the decision of the MCTC and consequently, dismissed the instant appeal for lack of merit. The RTC disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is dismissed for lack of merit. The Decision dated February 28, 2013 is affirmed in toto.[25]
Aggrieved, defendants-petitioners moved for a reconsideration[26] but the same was denied by the RTC in its Order[27] dated February 4, 2014.
Undeterred, defendants-petitioners filed the present petition raising the following assigned errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS CORRECT IN DECLARING/AFFIRMING THAT THE COURT A QUO MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THIS CASE.II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT’S (SIC) ALLEGATIONS OF TOLERANCE HAS BEEN DULY PROVEN FOR FAILURE TO SUBMIT POSITION PAPER.[28]
This Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
At the outset, it should be stressed that We are called to resolve issues which were squarely addressed and extensively threshed out by the court a quo and the MCTC as well.
The arguments advanced by defendants-petitioners in their Petition shows that they involve an inquiry into the factual matters or relate to the trial courts’ appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties.
Time and again, it is a hornbook doctrine that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons,[29] because the trial court is in a better position to examine the real evidence, and observe the demeanor of the witnesses, and can therefore discern if they are telling the truth or not.[30] Stated otherwise, findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the case, those findings should not be ignored.[31]
No Serious Error in the Findings of the Lower Courts
Defendants-petitioners imputes errors in the findings of the court a quo that MCTC has jurisdiction over this case. As repeatedly accentuated by defendants-petitioners, the instant case for unlawful detainer filed by plaintiffs-respondents against defendants-petitioners does not fall within the ambit of the MCTC as this case involves facts and issues which are beyond the sphere of unlawful detainer cases, that is contractual arrangement. The loan agreement allegedly entered into between defendants-petitioners and Spouses Anuncio is a contractual arrangement and is incapable of pecuniary estimation which falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
We do not agree.
The court a quo, in ruling against defendants-petitioners on this matter, expounded in this wise:[32]
“Appellants’ defense of existence of loan agreement between them and spouses Anuncio failed to rebut said allegations. No documentary evidence was presented to prove the existence of said loan agreement. No evidence was presented to prove the non-payment of said loan.
Even assuming that the loan agreement was made orally, title of Lot No. 5960 remains registered with the spouses Anuncio. Ownership of the said lot was passed to appellants as evidenced by the deed of absolute sale.
The sale of Lot No. 5960 by the spouses Anuncio to appellees’ was categorically admitted by appellants during the pre-trial conference. As owners, appellees are entitled to possess said lot since the right of possession is necessary incident of ownership. xxx.
Thus, as between appellants’ unregistered deed of absolute sale and the appellees’ undocumented loan agreement, the former confers better right to possess Lot No. 5960. xxx.” (citations omitted)
We find merit in the court a quo’s reasoning, thus, We adopt the same. Contrary to defendants-petitioners’ claim, there is nothing in the records that would indicate that they had legitimate basis in remaining in possession of the subject property. Otherwise stated, the records is bereft of any evidence that would prove the fact that plaintiffs-respondents are not entitled to possession of the subject property. Defendants-petitioners’ claim of tenancy relationship was struck down by the lower court at first instance when it was raised as an affirmative defense and squarely resolved in the negative by the Department of Agrarian Reform, Provincial Agrarian Reform Office, Province of Capiz. As such, defendants-petitioners can only posit the argument that the alleged existence of a loan agreement between them and Spouses Anuncio, being a contractual arrangement, takes this case beyond the sphere of an unlawful detainer case. But this argument alone, bereft of any sufficient substantiation, failed to save defendants-petitioners. Moreover, the records indubitably shows that plaintiffs-respondents have complied with the requisites for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case.
A careful review of the Complaint readily reveals that the plaintiffs-respondents are the lawful owners of the subject property by way of purchase from the Spouses Anuncio, who are the registered owners of the subject property. That by mere tolerance of Spouses Anuncio and plaintiffs-respondents and without rental, defendants-petitioners occupied the subject property. That oral demands to vacate were made but defendants-petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the subject premises to the plaintiffs-respondents. Hence, the matter was referred by the latter to the Lupon Tagapamayapa for the required barangay conciliation proceedings but no amicable settlement was reached thereat, thus, a certificate to file action was issued. That despite receipt of formal demand to vacate, defendants-petitioners still refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the subject premises to the plaintiffs-respondents. Indeed, plaintiffs-respondents’ allegations in the complaint clearly make a case for unlawful detainer.
Firm is the rule that as long as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action for unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter.[33]
Anent the second issue, defendants-petitioners contend that plaintiffs-respondents have failed to substantiate their allegation of tolerance in the complaint. Capitalizing on plaintiffs-respondents’ failure to submit their position paper and affidavits of witnesses on time, defendants-petitioners posit that plaintiffs-respondents’ allegation of tolerance have no probative value as the same was not duly proven.
We are not convinced.
Before We proceed, it is appropriate to quote hereunder the disquisition of the MCTC on this regard, thus:
“The failure of the plaintiffs to submit their position paper on time and the resulting of the denial of their motion to admit position paper, and also the failure of the defendants to file the said pleadings do not bar this court rendering a judgment on this ejectment case. Section 10 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure provides:
‘Section 10. Rendition of judgment. – Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment. [Underscoring supplied.]
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the rendition of the judgment.’
That a position paper is not indispensable to the court’s authority to render judgment is further evident from what the RSP provides regarding a preliminary conference: ‘on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions made by the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need for further proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be rendered within 30 days from the issuance of the order.’ Thus, the proceedings may stop at that point, without need for the submission of position papers. In such a case, what would be extant in the record and the bases for the judgment would be the complaint, answer, and the record of the preliminary conference. (citation omitted)”[34]
As earlier intimated, defendants-petitioners anchor their possession of the subject property on their alleged loan arrangement with Spouses Anuncio, the subject property’s previous owners. The defendants-petitioners insist on their actual possession of the subject property continues until Spouses Anuncio have completely paid the loan. Thus, the plaintiffs-respondents’ purchase of the subject property would mean merely stepping into the shoes of Spouses Anuncio.
On the other hand, the plaintiffs-respondents’ cause of action is based on their ownership of the subject property, which is evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale, and on their claim that they merely tolerated the defendants-petitioners’ occupation thereof. According to the plaintiffs-respondents, their being owners of the subject property entitles them to the possession thereof.
Between the defendants-petitioners’ unsubstantiated self-serving claim of actual possession of the subject property by reason of an undocumented loan agreement and the plaintiffs-respondents’ ownership of the subject property as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, the latter must prevail. The plaintiffs-respondents’ ownership of the subject property, which was categorically admitted by defendants-appellants during the pre-trial conference, and that of Spouses Anuncio’s title thereto (TCT No. T-18653) give rise to the reasonable presumption that the defendants-petitioners have no right over the subject property and that their stay therein was merely tolerated. The defendants-petitioners failed to overcome this presumption, being inadequately armed by a narration that yearns for proof and corroboration. Defendants-petitioners harped on the existence of a loan agreement between them and Spouses Anuncio but the absence of any evidence to prove the same impresses that their claim is based only on surmises, speculations or conjectures.
Considering all the foregoing disquisition, We have no other recourse but to affirm the RTC’s decision in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision of the RTC, Branch 16, Roxas City, in Civil Case No. V-16-13 dated December 19, 2013 and its Order dated February 4, 2014 are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.
Hernando, J., Chairperson and Azcarraga-Jacob, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pages 2-12.
[2] Penned by Judge Delano F. Villarruz, rollo, pages 67-74.
[3] Penned by Judge Delano F. Villarruz, rollo, page 78.
[4] Penned by Judge Sebastino A. Baguio, rollo, pages 36-47.
[5] Rollo, pages 75-77.
[6] Rollo, pages 13-18.
[7] Rollo, page 19.
[8] Rollo, page 21.
[9] Rollo, pages 23-24.
[10] Rollo, page 25.
[11] See Complaint, supra, at note 6.
[12] Rollo, page 26.
[13] Rollo, pages 27-28.
[14] See Complaint, supra, at note 6.
[15] Rollo, pages 29-34.
[16] See Answer, supra, at note 15.
[17] See Answer, supra, at note 15.
[18] See page 5 of MCTC Decision, rollo, page 40.
[19] See pages 5-6 of MCTC Decision, rollo, pages 40-41.
[20] See pages 6-7 of MCTC Decision, rollo, pages 41-42.
[21] Supra, at note 4.
[22] Rollo, page 47.
[23] See Appeal Memorandum (For Defendants-Appellants), rollo, pages 48-54; Appellees’ Memorandum, rollo, pages 55-65.
[24] Penned by Judge Domingo D. Diamante, rollo, pages 31-34.
[25] Page 4 of RTC Decision, rollo, page 34.
[26] Supra, at note 5.
[27] Supra, at note 3.
[28] Page 4 of the Petition, rollo, page 6.
[29] Tayco v. Tayco-Flores, G.R. No. 168692, December 13, 2010.
[30] People v. Cabalhin, 231 SCRA 486, 496 (March 28, 1994).
[31] Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, 234 SCRA 175, 185-186 (July 18, 1994).
[32] Pages 7-8 of RTC Decision, rollo, pages 73-74.
[33] Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odones, G.R. No. 178096, March 23, 2011.
[34] Page 7 of MCTC Decision, rollo, page 42.