CONRADO PAEZ, PETITIONER, VS. THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND ISABELA JAPONES, IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN RODOLFO, BOLANDO AND JAIME, ALL SURNAMED BARAWID, RESPON…

On October 30, 1957, the heirs of Marciano Barawid, presented with
the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 3, a complaint for
compensation. A Motion to Dismiss the complaint was presented on
January 28, 1958, on three grounds to wit—

1. The allegations do not constitute a cause of action;
2. Lack
   of jurisdiction; it appearing that the capital,of Paez is very much
   less than P10,000.00 and that his business of buying and selling palay
   is not hazardous nor deleterious to employees; and

3. The claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

On March 10, 1958, Hearing Officer Juan M. Gerardo, issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which states—

“Without prejudice to the right of the claimant to
file suit against the lespondent under Employer’s liability Act (Act
No. 1874) before the Courts as directed by Sec. 4Z, of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, the instant claim is hereby declared DISMISSED for
want of jurisdiction of the Regional Office to take cognizance of the
same.”

Complainant Isabela Japones, presented a Petition for Review of the
above Order. Associate Commissioner Jose Sanchez, on January 9, 1959,
remanded the case for such action as is consistent with the Order,
making the following observations—

“* * * The Hearing Officer is correct in Ma finding
that the respondent regularly used a truck owned by him in his business
of buying palay. But this is precisely the reason for the logical
conclusion that, although the business of buying palay is not in the
enumeration contained in Section 42 of the Act, which is not exclusive,
said business should nevertheless be considered ‘hazardous or
deleterious’ as this phrase is meant to be understood in the Act.

Moreover,
the Hearing Officer’found that the respondent used his truck for
transporting not only the palay he purchased but also that of the other
persons engaged in the same or similar business as his; and that in all
these’ instances he charged freight for such transportation. Respondent
must, therefore, be deemed engaged in the business of transporting
goods which causes liim to fall under sub-paragraph 1, of Section 42 of
the Act.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the
respondent comes within the coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
as amended, either in his business in buying palay, or in his
enterprise of transporting goods; hence, the Regional Office No, 3
Manila, has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim for
compensation. filed against him . by the claimant.”

and remanding the case for further investigation and/or hearing on
the merits. The Hearing Officer, received evidence, and rendered the
same decision, dismissing the case, which was again reversed by the
same Associate Commissioner who ordered Paez—

1. To pay the claimants, thru this Commission, the.
   sum of THKBE THOUSAND FOUit HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE and 71/100 (r3,4bo.71j
   PESOS as Death benefits;

2.  To reimburse the claimant, thru this Commission, the sum of P150.00 for burial expenses;

3.  To pay the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-NINE and 18/100 (F259.18) PESOS
   as attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 8, Rule 26, of the Rules of the
   Workmen’s Compensation Commission and Article 2208 (8) of the new Civil
   Code; and

4. To pay the Commission the sum of P35.00 as fees pursuant to Section 35 of the Act.”

After the denial of a motion for reconsideration, the case was brought to this Court, for review.

Paez and his wife were on and sometime before 1953, engaged in the
business of buying palay for the King Tohg Seng Ricemill of Victoria,
Tarlac, with the latter supplying the capital of P1,00,0.00 to
P2,000.00. In August, 1953, Paez had been buying palay in Isabela. jor
such purpose, he employed agents, two truck drivers and two truck
helpers, all of whom were paid on commission basis. In bringing the
palay purchased by his agents to Nueva Beija or Tarlac, the same had to
be ferried in bancas across the Magat River in Aurora, Isabela, towards
the other bank, which is Cabatuan; from Cabatuan side to Guimba, the
palay were hauled by truck which was regularly driven by Valentin
Lagman. Respondent’s truck driver on. the Aurora.side was.Primitivo
Apolonio, who also collected all the palay on said side—hauled them .to
the. river bank (Aurora side); where he engaged boatmen to ferry the
palay to the Cabatuan side and where Lagman would take them and.bring
them to Guimba or Victoria, as the case may be. On August 1, i953,
.because his child became seriously ill, Lagman engaged the services,
of Marciano Barawid to substitute him . in undertaking the trip to
Isabela, with the understanding that he (Barawid), was to receive his
(Lagman’s) pay during the laser’s absence. On August 2, 1953, Barawid
drove respondent’s truck, up to the Cabatuan side of the Magat River to
await for the palay that were to be ferried from the Aurora side. On
the same date, instead of awaiting the palay on the Cabatuan side,.
Barawid grossed the Magat River and joined Apolonio on the Aurora side
in hauling the palay. After having, collected all the palay on the
Aurora side, Apolonio and Barawid reached the river’s bank at about
,S.:00 o’clock in the evening, and both helped in loading three (3)
bancas. Apolonio advised Barawid not to ride the third banca because
same was already fully loaded, but to take another the next morning.
Barawid told him he was in a hurry to return to Guimba, as he had to
drive a new truck of his brother-in-law. While in the midst of the
Magat River, the banca capsized and sunk, and Barawid was drowned.

The petitioner submits the following issues for determination, to wit-—

	a)	the jurisdiction of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission over the case;
	b)	whether the death arose out of and in the course of employment;
	c)	prescription of action; and
	d)	whether the deceased was guilty of notorious negligence.

The Workmen’s Compensation Act No. 3428, as amended, pfovides—

“Sec. 42. Law applicable to swwll industries.—All
claims for compensation by reason of an accident in an enterprise,
industry, yr business carried on or in a trade, occupation or
profession exercised by an employer for the purpose of gain, whose
capital amounts to less than ten thousand pesos and is not hazardous or
deleterious to employee^, shall be governed by the provisions1 of Act
Numbered Eighteen hundred and seventy-four and its amendments:
Provrided, however, That the following enterprises or establishments
shall be (Mtiong those considered liazardowi or deleterious to
employees:

(1) Any business for the transportation of persons or goods, or both;***.

The regular use of motor vehicles, was indispensable and essential
in carrying on petitioner’s business, and necessarily placed his
business under the category of hazardous enterprises. Without the use
of motor vehicles, it would be extremely difficult for petitioner to
conduct such business. The provision of law above cited is not
exclusive, for it clearly provides that the enterprises or
establishments enumerated therein are among those that are considered
hazardous or deleterious to the employees. True it is, that the mere
act of buying and selling palay is in itself not hazardous, but when
the one engaged in the business used motor vehicles to transport the
goods, especially when, as in the instalit case, the place of purchase
was very far from the place of sale (Isabela to Tarlac), that business
became inherently hazardous and dangerous. Tp a, driver, like the
deceased Barawid, risk on the road was great, resulting from hold-ups
and outlaws, falling into ravines, vehicular accidents of all sorts,
collisions, tire blowouts, etc. There seem to be no serious discussion
that the regular use. of motor vehicles by the claimant’s own employees
makes the business hazardous (Haddad vs. Commercial Motor Truck Co.,
146 La, 897, 84 So. 197, [1920]).

The respondent Court found that petitioner was in a sense engaged in
the transportation of goods, (palay), by charging, freight from other
persons who loaded their palay in his trucks, thereby definitely
classifying the business of the petitioner as hazardous. It was shown
that/for buying palay for the ricemill, the .petitioner was paid a
commission of P.20 for every cavan of palay; purchased, aside from the
freight he charged for transporting palay from Isabela to rjueva Ecija
or Tarlac at P1.50 per cavan. This being the case, We need not stretch
our imagination far, to visualize that petitioner was engaged more in
the transportation’ of palay than in the buy-and-sell thereof. The
trial court was, therefore, correct in assuming jurisdiction of the
case.

Petitioner contends that the respondent WCC erred in finding that
the death of Barawid arose out of and in the course of employment. In
justifying its findings in this respect, respondent court said—

“* * And so, eaeh case must be analyzed and :
decided according to its, own peculiar facts and careful consideration
given to the nature and incidents entailed by the employment.

Here,
as elsewhere stated, the deceased Marciano Barawid left tfte
International truck assigned to him and went to the other sidf- &i
the Magat River (Aurora side) for the purpose of advising the other
truck driver, Primitivo Apolonio, to have all the palay bought buy
the respondent’s agent loaded early because he was in a hurry to go
back to Guimba, In fact, Barawid joined Apolonio in the worfi of
loading and unloading the palay at the bank of the river itt hb ferried
towards the Cabatuan side where the International truck was parked. The
activities performed by Barawid, we believe, were incideTitnl to his
duties not only as driver but as purchaser uf ihe respondent who was
engaged in the business of buying and selling palay. It is reasonable
to expect an employee, as in the case of Barawid, to help a co-employee
in the performance of his duties. And even granting, only for the sake
of argument, that the acta performed by the deceased were not strictly
within the bounds of Jus, duties still he was, in the fullest sense of
the term, in the course of the employment. For the performance of those
acts helping the other employee of the respondent load and unload
palay—would inure to the benefit of the respondent in the pursuit of
his business. As Arthur Larsen, an eminent authority on the subject of
Workmen’s Compensation Laws, has put it: ,

‘An act outside an
employee’s regular duties which is undertaken in good faith to advance
the employer’s interests, whether or not the employee’s own assigned
work is hereby furthered, is within the course of employment.’
(Larsen’s Workmen’s Compensation Text, Vol. 7, p. 338).”

“Simply
stated, ‘if the act is one for the benefit of the employer or for the
mutual benefit of both, an injury arising out of it will usually be
compensable.” (Schneider’s Workmen’s Compensation Text, Vol. 7, p. 338).

There is little to be added to. the above observations, except to
state that they are based upon the evidence and law on the subject,

The third proposition dwells on the non-dismissal of the claim for
having been filed out of time. The record shows that the petitioner had
knowledge of the death of Barawid, and he himself made immediate
arrangements for the removal of his body from the place of the
accident, (Caha-tuan) to his home town, Guimba; and’that the petitioner
also gave respondent Isabels Japohes, the amount of f 3 50.00 for
burial and other expenses and another P150.00 for family subsistence.
Knowledge of the accident by the employer,1 his agent or
representative, is sufficient notice of section 27, of Act No. 3428, as
amended); so that, even if the notice of injury was filed beyond the 3
months period fixed, by law, the proceeding is still valid. The fact
that the petitioner also made voluntary compensation payments Us the
widow, rendered it no longer necessary to file the claim for
compensation within the time prescribed. by law, as provided for in
section 24 of the same Act. The present action is not, therefore,
barred by the statute of limitations.

It is finally contended that the respondent WCC erred in not finding
that the accident was caused through the notorious negligence of the
deceased (Sec. 4, of Act No. 3428). Petitioner’s answer to the
complaint for compensation, does not allege notorious negligence in his
defense. That defense should.be proven by the party invoking it.
Notorious negligence is something more than mere or simple negligence;
or contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the
employee to disregard his own personal fsafety. In the case at bar,
there is no showing at ail that’ ¦deceased Barawid had deliberately
disregarded his safety; no’intention was attributed to him to end his
life or that he wantonly courted death.. The deceased wanted to return
home as it was getting late, and even helped in the loading’ and
unloading of the palay to the banca and truck, to finish the work that
day. It is claimed that the deceased yiantetf to return home, because
he was to drive the new track of his brother-in-law, and he was in
sueha hurry that he unheeded the suggestion of his companion not to
embark any more, as: it was dark and the bahca was fully loaded.
Conceding this, to be true, for the piurpose of argument, dBarawid can
no longer contradict it, his lips having been sealed by death), still
the disregard of the warning, can not.be considered as a notorious
negligence. Disobedience to rules, orders, and/or prohibition, does not
in itself constitute notorious negligence, if no intention can be
attributed to the injured to end his life. Arid if in the case at bar,
there was any negligence at all, the same can not be considered
notorious or evident. The deceased did not act with the full knowlege
of the existence of a danger that ordinary prudence would counsel him
to avoid such a case. That a banca loaded with palay and 3 persons, at
night time, would sink if one person more was added to its weight,
constituted merely a miscalculation on the part of such person, if he
thought it would be safe for him to embark, the. alleged overloading
notwithstanding Barawid’s promptness in accomplishing his duties, to
enable him to attend his personal interest thereafter, cannot be a
valid reason to deny Mm the right to be compensated. In view hereof,
the petition is dismissed’, and the decision appealed from is affirmed,
with costs against the petitioner.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angela, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.