NARCISO PABLO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. EMILIO PABLO, RESPONDENT.

Narciso Pablo, Junior versus Emilio Pablo

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by Narciso Pablo, Junior against his uncle, Emilio Pablo. The petitioner sued for ownership and partition of a parcel of land in Bangui, Ilocos Norte, claiming that he and the respondent are co-owners by inheritance from their common ancestors, the late spouses Faustino Pablo and Andrea Lauricio. The respondent resisted, asserting that the petitioner is not a child of the late Narciso Pablo at all and therefore has no successional right in the estate. The case matters because it draws the line between an action impugning legitimacy, which is governed by the Family Code and its prescriptive periods, and a case where a party simply asserts that a claimant is not the child of the alleged parent, a question that may be raised as a defense in an ordinary action for ownership and partition.

Procedural History

On 20 June 2006, Narciso Pablo, Junior filed a complaint for ownership and partition before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bangui, Pagudpod, Adams and Dumalneg, in Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated 23 June 2011, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court declared the petitioner and the respondent as co-owners of the subject property as heirs of the late spouses Faustino Pablo and Andrea Lauricio, and ordered the partition of the lot between them in equal shares in accordance with the proposal in paragraph 9 of the complaint, taking into consideration the portions where their respective houses are built.

Aggrieved, the respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated 15 December 2011, the Regional Trial Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Applying Article 448 of the New Civil Code, it directed the parties, the respondent being in good faith, to comply with the objective of that law, giving the owner of the land the right to appropriate the works after payment of indemnity, or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land, with the builder not obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building, in which case he shall pay reasonable rent if the owner does not choose to appropriate the building after proper indemnity. The petitioner then filed this petition for review before the Supreme Court.

Facts

The late spouses Faustino Pablo and Andrea Lauricio acquired the subject lot and were survived by their children, the respondent Emilio Pablo and Narciso Pablo. After the deaths of the spouses and of Narciso Pablo, the shares of the parties in the lot remained undivided, although they had constructed their respective houses thereon. The petitioner, claiming to be the son of the late Narciso Pablo and thus entitled to an undivided half share together with Rogelio Pablo, proposed that the lot be divided into two equal shares taking into consideration the sites of the respective houses. The respondent refused the proposal despite repeated demands, and earnest efforts at an amicable settlement among close relatives failed.

For his part, the respondent denied that the petitioner has any rightful claim on the property, asserting that the petitioner is misrepresenting himself as the lawful heir of his brother Narciso Pablo. He maintained that his brother's union with Gloria Favilla produced no offspring, and that the petitioner was a child of the spouses Mauro Francisco and Fidela Francisco, whom he took in and supported. He added that in 1988 he allowed the petitioner to build his house on a small portion of the property on the condition that the petitioner would voluntarily leave if the property were needed, and that he later learned the petitioner was in the process of selling the property.

The respondent further asserted that the petitioner had assumed the name Narciso Pablo, Junior through self-serving entries he himself supplied to the Local Civil Registrar of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, when he applied for late registration of his birth at the age of twenty three to twenty four. The petitioner's claimed parents, Gloria Favilla and Narciso Pablo, died in 1964 and 1970, respectively.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent could still impugn the filiation of the petitioner as the son of the late Narciso Pablo, or whether an independent action for that purpose was required.
• Whether or not the petitioner adduced preponderant evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Narciso Pablo, making him a co-owner of the subject property.

Applicable Provisions

Article 170 of the Family Code provides:

Article 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded. If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.

This provision fixes the prescriptive period for impugning legitimacy, and the Court held that it does not govern a case where the claimant is said not to be the child of the alleged parent at all.

Article 171 of the Family Code provides:

Article 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases: (1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action; (2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

This provision limits the heirs who may impugn filiation and the period within which they may do so, and the Court read it, together with Article 170, as speaking only of a husband denying as his own a child of his wife.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioner's reliance on Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code was misplaced. A careful reading of those articles shows that they do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the biological child of a certain couple; rather, they govern a situation where a husband, or his heirs, denies as his own a child of his wife. Under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of the child by proving that it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first one hundred twenty days of the three hundred days which immediately preceded the birth of the child, that for biological or other scientific reasons the child could not have been his, or that in case of children conceived by insemination the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading, as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning legitimacy.

The Court found the ruling in Labagala versus Santiago instructive, quoting it:

Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods.

The Court explained that in this case the respondent is not assailing the petitioner's legitimate status but is instead asserting that he is not a child of Narciso Pablo at all, and that the present action is one of ownership and partition, to which the prescriptive rule does not apply.

On the second issue, the Court was not persuaded. It agreed with the Regional Trial Court that there is no competent evidence to support the claim that the petitioner is the legitimate son of the late Narciso Pablo. The Court noted the circumstances that made the claim doubtful: the petitioner was allegedly born in 1963, yet his claimed parents died in 1964 and 1970; his claimed brother's birth certificate was duly registered while his was not, although his parents were still alive at the time; and he carried the surname Francisco while his parents were still living. The petitioner himself supplied all the information entered in his birth record at the age of twenty three to twenty four, and his parents did not participate in it because they were already dead. The Court held that a birth certificate must be signed by the parents to be adequate proof of paternity, and that unsigned birth certificates are not evidence of recognized filiation. The birth certificate, being the end product of self-serving maneuvering, had no leg to stand on in law for purposes of filiation or in proving successional rights, and the birth certificate and high school records could not constitute an open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child where the alleged parents had long been dead.

Doctrine

First, the action to impugn legitimacy under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, with its one year, two year, and three year periods counted from knowledge of the birth or its recording, belongs to the husband or, in a proper case, his heirs, and lies where a husband denies as his own a child of his wife. It does not apply where a party asserts, not merely that the claimant is not the legitimate child of the alleged parent, but that the claimant is not a child of that parent at all. Such an assertion may be raised as a defense in an ordinary action for ownership and partition, and the prescriptive periods do not bar it.

Second, filiation must be proved by competent evidence. A birth certificate must be signed by the parents to be adequate proof of paternity; unsigned birth certificates are not evidence of recognized filiation. A birth record whose entries were supplied solely by the claimant himself, after the death of the alleged parents, is self-serving and cannot establish filiation or successional rights, and neither a birth certificate nor school records can amount to open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child where the alleged parents have long been dead.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 15 December 2011 was affirmed, so the respondent prevailed.

Remember This

Memorize this line: Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code govern a husband denying as his own a child of his wife, not a claim that a person is not a child of the alleged parent at all, so that question may be raised as a defense in an action for ownership and partition. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between impugning legitimacy and denying paternity altogether, and to test the evidentiary weight of a self-serving, unsigned birth certificate in proving filiation.