G.R. No. L-26416. April 25, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF JULIO CHUA LIAN YAN ALIAS JULIO FRANCES TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. JULIO CHUA LIAN YAN ALIAS JULIO FRANCES, PETITIONER-APPELL…
SANCHEZ, J.:
Upon a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal dated January
30, 1961[1] petitioner was declared with right to
be admitted as citizen of the Philippines. No appeal therefrom
was taken. It was on July 21, 1965 when the Solicitor General entered of record the State’s objection to petitioner’s taking
his oath of allegiance, and also
moved to set aside the lower court’s decision.[2] Petitioner’s counsel opposed. The trial court, in its order of November 26, 1965 dismissed the naturalization petition, and
on December 23, 1965 overturned petitioner’s motion to reconsider. Hence, this appeal.
Reasons there are why the
dismissal order should be affirmed.
1. Petitioner failed to
enroll his only minor child Chua Bun Huy alias Choy
Man Fai in a public or private school in the
Philippines “during the entire period of the residence in the
Philippines required of him [petitioner] prior to the
hearing of his petition for naturalization as a Philippine citizen” – a qualification exacted by paragraph Sixth,
Section 2, Revised Naturalization Law.
Indeed, at the time of the filing of the petition herein, his said child
Chua Bun Huy alias Choy Man Fai,
born on August 26, 1947 at Chuan
Chow City, China,
who was already beyond 12 years of age, was still residing in Hongkong, with his mother (petitioner’s wife), Lam Fan La
alias Juana Lim or Juana Ngo.
2. Incidentally, petitioner
is not exempt from filing a declaration of intention. By Section 6, Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended by Commonwealth Act 535, he may only forego the filing of a declaration
of intention if he has also “given
primary and secondary education to all his children in the public
schools or in private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or
nationality.”[3]
He has not filed a declaration of intention.
Therefore, he is not entitled to receive citizenship papers.
Petitioner’s excuse that
his failure to enroll his son in
the Philippines was because he encountered difficulties in
bringing him here from abroad, is unavailing.
The reason for the requirement just mentioned is that upon naturalization
of the father, his children ipso facto become Philippine citizens and “[i]t is
the policy of the Philippine Government
to have prospective citizens, children of applicants for naturalization, learn
and imbibe the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos as well as their democratic form of government.”[4] And the learning process should start “as early as possible, and the first
formative years are the most important for the purpose.”[5]
Petitioner’s position
became aggravated by the fact that when his son who was in China and later in Hongkong
stepped into Philippine territory in October, 1960, petitioner enrolled him at
the Philippine Sun Yat Sen
High School, a Chinese school. It was only after the school years 1960-1961
and 1961-1962 that he took away his child from that school and placed him at
the Paco Catholic School. This
conduct of petitioner makes him far from acceptable as a Philippine
citizen. Because, even long after he has
filed his petition for naturalization, still, he failed to evince a “sincere desire to embrace our customs,
traditions and ideals.”[6] On the contrary, he demonstrated his
“lack of earnest intention to identify” himself and his children
“with the Filipino community.”[7]
Petitioner
may not make a point by saying that after the Philippine Sun Yat Sen
schooling, the child was transferred, as aforesaid, to the Paco
Catholic School, and then to the Far Eastern University. This change of attitude came too late. It was subsequent to the filing of the
petition for naturalization. He is still
short of the requirement in Section 2, paragraph Sixth of the Revised
Naturalization Law. For, that
schooling was not “during the entire period”
of petitioner’s residence in the Philippines
“required of him prior to
the hearing of his petition for naturalization as
Philippine citizen.”
Jurisprudence
has it that the requirement in
paragraph Sixth, Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law is mandatory,[8] and an absolute pre-requisite to naturalization;[9] and that non-compliance with this statutory
requirement is fatal to the application for naturalization.[10] We do not propose to break away from the views just expressed.
3. Petitioner does not have a lucrative income. His application says that his income was P6,000
per annum.[11] His
gross income, according to his Income Tax Return for 1959 is P6,000.00. With a wife
and child to support, this income
does not rise to the level of lucrative.
Some six years back, we held that an applicant with an annual income of P6,300.00 but married with one child would
not qualify as having lucrative income within the meaning of
Fourth paragraph, Section 2, Commonwealth Act 473.[12]
4. Petitioner did not
disclose in his petition all of
his former places of residence. He stated therein that he was born in Nato,
Sagnay, Camarines Sur and at the time of the filing of the petition, a
resident of 224 Quirino
Avenue, Parañaque, Rizal. But his character witnesses, Fructuoso Nepomuceno
and Henry E. Dy Liaco,
testified that he was once a resident
of Tondo, Manila.[13] He himself told the court that he studied
in Goa, Camarines
Sur, where his parents transferred their place of
business in 1927.[14] He also resided at 2727 T. Earnshaw, Manila.[15]
This non-disclosure is
fatal. Section 7 of the Revised
Naturalization Law requires that a petition for naturalization should state
petitioner’s “present and former places of residence”. We have said that “residence”
encompasses all places where petitioner “actually and physically
resided.”[16] Tondo, and T. Earnshaw Street, Manila, where he resided, and Goa, where he studied, certainly come within the term “residence”. The legal requirement of recital in the
petition of present and former places of residence is not without
reason: First, “information
regarding petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be provided by
people in his actual, physical surrounding;”[17] and second, failure
to allege the former places of residence “deprives both public and
government of a fair opportunity to check up petitioner’s activities material
to the proceeding and of registering their objection to his application.”[18]
Upon the view we take
of this case, the orders
under review are affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
Castro, Capistrano, and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
Teehankee, J., in the result.
[1]
Naturalization Case No. 93.
[2]
“A decision or order granting citizenship to the applicant does not really
become executory, and a naturalization proceeding not
being a judicial adversary proceeding, the decision rendered therein is not res judicata as to any of the reasons or matters
which would support a judgment cancelling the
certificate of naturalization for illegal or fraudulent procurement.”
Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, 1 SCRA 1166, 1170. See also: Republic vs. Reyes, L-20602, December
24, 1965; Cheng vs. Republic, L-20013, March 30, 1965; Republic vs.
Reyes, 17 SCRA 170, 172; Bun Tho Khu
vs. Republic, 16 SCRA 29, 31.
[3]
Sy See vs. Republic, 5 SCRA 189, 191-192.
[4]
Ang Yee Koe Sengkee vs. Republic,
90 Phil. 594, 596-597; Ong So vs. Republic,
L-20145, June 30, 1965.
[5]
Ong So vs.
Republic, supra.
[6]
Ng vs. Republic, 25 SCRA, 574, 576, citing cases; Yap Puey Eng vs. Republic, 23 SCRA 681, 684; Hui Eng vs. Republic, 18 SCRA 791, 792; Chan Kiat Huat vs. Republic, 16
SCRA 243, 246.
[7]
Dy vs. Republic, 18 SCRA 858, 860.
[8]
Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, 1 SCRA 1166, 1169 citing Tan vs.
Republic, 49 O.G. p. 1409; Chan Lai vs. Republic, 106 Phil. 210, 215.
[9]
Yap vs. Republic, 2 SCRA 856, 860.
[10]
Yap Chun vs. Republic, L-18516, January 30, 1964.
[11]
“The financial capability of an applicant for Philippine citizenship must
be determined as of the time when he files
his petition.” Cu King Nan vs. Republic, 23 SCRA 1313, 1318;
Sia Faw vs.
Republic, 21 SCRA 893, 894; Teh San vs.
Republic, 23 SCRA 733, 734; Choa Ek
Yong vs. Republic, 22 SCRA 915, 916.
[12]
Tan vs. Republic, 7 SCRA 526, 528.
[13]
Tr., November 12, 1960, pp. 43-44
(Testimony of Fructuoso Nepomuceno);
Tr., December
17, 1960, pp. 16-17 (Testimony of Henry E.
Dy Liaco).
[14]
Tr., January
7, 1961, p. 25.
[15]
Exhibits D and J.
[16]
Tan vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 339, 340; Li Siu Liat vs. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039,
1050; Yap Puey Eng vs. Republic, supra, at p. 682.
[17]
Tan vs. Republic, supra; Chua Chi vs. Republic, 24 SCRA
83, 85-86; Li Siu Liat vs.
Republic, supra; Chua Bok vs.
Republic, 23 SCRA 209, 210; Ong Chian
Suy vs. Republic, 20 SCRA 302, 303.
[18]
Yap Puey Eng vs. Republic, supra, at pp. 682-683 citing cases. See: Chan Kiat Huat vs. Republic, supra, at pp.
246-247.