THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JESUS L. CRISOSTOMO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

On September 3, 1959, Jesus L. Crisostomo was charged before the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, with the crime of estafa, described and punished
under Articlle 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, in an information worded
as follows—

“That on or about the 16th day of September, 1946, in the municipality of
Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to defraud, did then and their
wilfully and feloniously, sell, transfer and convey, by way of absolute sale
unto the spouse Teodoro Faustino and Regina Pangan for P15,000.00, Philippine
Currency, by executing a public instrument duly recorded with the Register of
Deeds, over a parcel of land containing an area of three (3) hectares, more or
less, situated in Bugyong, Calumpit, Bulacan, stating in the said deed of sale
that the said property was free from all liens and encumbrances of whatever
nature, knowing that said statement was false, as the property was (already)
previously encumbered by way of mortgage, to one Antonio Villarama, said
mortgage still valid and subsisting at the time of the dale aforementioned, and
which fact came to the knowlege of the said spouses only in 1953, thereby
defrauding and damaging said spouses in the sum of P15,000.00 as the property
was later sold at public auction as a consequence of a foreclosure proceedings
against the accused Jesus L. Crisostomo, to the damage and prejudice of the said
spouses in the amount of P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.”

On October 18, 1959, the accused, moved to quash the information, on the
ground that the offense had already prescribed. On November 21, 1959, after an
exchange of pleadings by the prosecution and defense, the trial court issued an
order, the pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereunder—

“* * *. The motion to quash and the opposition thereto in effect raise two
questions, first, the starting point for the computation of the prescriptive
period, and second, the length of such prescriptive period.

* * * * * * *

* * *. The defendant contends that the offense charged prescribe in 5 years,
it being punishable with arresto mayor (Art. 90, paragraph 3, Revised
Penal Code.) On the other hand, the prosecution contends that the offense
charged prescribes in 15 years because aside from the penalty of arresto
mayor, the law also imposes a fine of not less than the value of the damage
caused and not more than three times such value, which in this case would be a
minimum of P15,000.00. The prosecution fortifies its contention with the Supreme
Court’s decision in People vs. Basalo, 101 Phil., 57; 53 Off. Gaz., [15]
4814).

After a review of the motion and the opposition thereto and the memorandum
filed by the parties, the court believes that defendant’s position is the
correct one and that the prosecution’s reliance on People vs. Basalo,
supra, is misplaced. In the Basalo case, the defendant was charged with
violation of the Chattel Mortgage Law, penalized by Article 319, paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor or a fine amounting to twice
the value of the mortgage personal property. In computing the prescriptive
period of the offense, the Supreme Court, sustaining the contention of the
Solicitor General, took as the basis, not the penalty of arresto mayor (a
correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, which
prescribes in 5 years) but the fine of P640.00 representing twice the value of
the mortgaged property, which fine is a correctional penalty under
Article 26 of the same Code. Thus, the Supreme Court said the following:

‘In conclusion, we hold that to determine the prescriptibility of an offense
penalized with a fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty,
such fine should not be reduced or converted into a prison term, but rather it
should be considered as such fine under Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code;
and that for purposes of prescription of the offense defined and penalizd in
Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, the fine imposable therein if
correctional of afflictive under the terms of Article 26, same Code, should be
made the basis rather than that of arresto mayor, also imposable in said
Article 319.’ (People vs. Basalo, 101 Phil., 57; 53 Off. Gaz., [15], 4814,
4818).

It will be noted from the foregoing citation that the Supreme Court took the
fine imposable as the basis for computing the prescriptive period of the offense
for two reasons, firstly, because the fine there imposable was prescribed by law
as an alternative penalty, and secondly, because the said fine was correctional.
In other words, a fine may be taken as the basis for computing the prescriptive
period of an offense when such fine is imposed as a single or as an alternative
penalty and when it is either correctional or afflictive under the provisions of
Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code.

In the instant case the offense charged is also punishable with a fine which
is afflictive in nature (Article 26, Revised Penal Code), but such fine is not
imposed either as a single or as an alternative penalty, but is imposed in
conjunction with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. For
this reason, the court is of the opinion that the afflictive fine imposable
should not be taken as the basis for computing the prescriptive period, but that
such computation can be based only upon the penalty of arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods.

The foregoing conclusion of the court finds support in the very text of
Article 26 of the Code itself. Thus, the Code says, ‘A fine, whether imposed as
a single or as alternative penalty, shall be considered * * *.’ (Article 26). In
other words, the classification of fine into afflictive, correctional or light,
under Article 26, should be made only when a fine is imposed either as a single
or as alternative penalty; and that no such classification should be made where
the fine is imposed in conjunction with, another penalty (See Reyes, the Revised
Penal Code, 1956, Vol. I, p. 293).

* * * * * * *

WHEREFORE, this case is not maintainable because of prescription of the
offense charged, and the same will be, as it is hereby dismissed, with costs
de oficio and the cancellation of the bond filed by defendant for his
provisional release.”

The people appealed from the above order on two counts, both of which pose
the question as to “When does a crime punishable under Article 316, par. 2, of
the Revised Penal Code, prescribe”?

The provisions of the Penal Code which are necessary for the resolution of
the issue at bar, are hereunder reproduced:

“ART. 316. Other forms of swindling.—The penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the
value of the damage caused and not more than three times such value, shall be
imposed upon:

* * * * * * *

2. Any persons who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose
of the same, although such encumbrance be not recorded.”

ART. 26. Fine.—When afflictive, correctional, or light
penalty.—A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty,
shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a
correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200
pesos; and a light penalty, if it be less than 200 pesos.”

ART. 90. Prescription of crimes.—Crimes punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty
years,

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in
fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with
the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe
in five years.

* * * * * * *

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty
shall be made the basis of the application of the roles contained in the first,
second, and third paragraphs of this article.”

Contrary to the conclusions of the learned trial court, We are of the opinion
that the present case conies within the aegis of the Basalo case, (supra), where
this Court declared that there is no legal justification for converting or
reducing the fine into a prison term in case of insolvency “and that for the
purposes of prescription of the offense, define and penalized in Article 319 of
the Revised Penal Code, the fine imposable therein if correctional or
afflictive under the terms of article 26, same code, should be made the basis
rather than that of arresto mayor, also imposable in said article
319″.

But the accused-appellee contends that in the Basalo case, the penalty
provided is “arresto mayor or fine (Art. 319 par. 2, Rev. Penal Code),
while in the case at bar, the penalty imposable is arresto mayor and
fine” (Art. 316, par. 2, same Code), which carry two different juridical
concepts altogether. In other words, the accused-appellee and the trial court
contend that in the computation of the period of prescription, arresto
mayor, the penalty attached to the offense and which prescribe in five (5)
years, shoulid be made the basis, disregarding the fine which ranges from
P15,000.00, at least, to P45,000.00, imposable upon the accused in this
particular case. Upon the other hand, the State maintains that the fine, which
Article 26 classifies as afflictive, since it exceeds P6,000.00, and
which prescribes in fifteen (15) years (article 90), should be made the medium
of the computation.

The interpretation and construction made by the trial judge on the pertinent
provisions of the penal code, as heretofore reproduced, can not but lead to
absurb results. If a fine, standing alone as a principal penalty and for an
amount less than that embezzled by herein appellee (say P640.00 like the Basalo
case, supra), the offense prescribes in 10 years, there is no sense in
holding that in the case of tiie accused-appellee, where the penalty, if found
guilty, is imprisonment (arresto mayor) and fine for P15,000.00 to P45,000.00,
would only prescribe in five (5) years. Apparently, article 26 points out that
it is only when a fine is imposed as a single penalty or as an alternative one,
as provided in article 319, par. 2, Rev. Penal Code (Basalo case), that
classification thereof into afflictive, correctional or light penalties may be
made. However, whatever doubt said article 26 might engender, is cast away by
the last paragraph of Article 90, which provides that, “When the penalty fixed
by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the
application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs
of this article” (See also People vs. Rufo Cruz, 108 Phil., 255; 58 Off. Gaz.
[13] 2679). Under the facts alleged in the present information, the fine is a
higher penalty than arresto mayor, because by virtue of its amount P15,000.00 to
P45,000.00), it is afflictive; while arresto mayor is merely
correctional. Certainly, article 26 provides the classification, while
article 90 indicates when such classification should be applied.

The trial court reasoned out “that when a fine is imposed as an alternative
penalty, the presumptive intention of the legislature is to consider the fine to
be at least of the same gravity as the other penalty and the court has a
choice whether to impose the fine or the penalty, whereas when a fine is
imposed in conjunction with another penalty (like the present), the fine is
considered merely as an additional penalty and is subordinated to the main
penalty, and the court has no choice and must impose the fine in
conjunction with the other penalty”. The position of the trial court is
untenable. The same is not warranted by the language of article 26, which
declares without qualification, that a fine is either afflictive, correctional
or light penalty. The Revised Penal Code contains no provision which states that
a fine when imposed in conjunction with an imprisonment is subordinate to the
main penalty. In conjunction with imprisonment, a fine is as much a principal
penalty as the imprisonment. Neither is subordinate to the other. On the
contrary, in the instant case, the fine is higher than the imprisonment because
it is afflictive in view of the amount involved and as stated heretofore,
it is the basis for computation to determine the prescriptive period. We
conclude, therefore, that where the Revised Penal Code provides a penalty
consisting of imprisonment and fine, whichever penalty is the higher,
should be the basis in computing the period of prescription.

The cases cited by the accused-appellee and the trial court, in support of
the order of dismissal (People vs. Dinsay, 40 Off. Gaz. 12 Supp., 50 People vs.
Maneja, 72 Phil. 256; People vs. Yuhaia Haya, 99 Phil., 725; People vs. Aquino,
et al., G. R. Nos. L-9357-70, Aug. 21, 1956), are not applicable in the case at
bar, for not only are the facts at variance, but the issues therein raised are
also different.

The period of prescription of offense charged in the case at bar, is,
therefore, fifteen (15) years. And from whatever date the computation may start,
whether from September 16, 1945, the date of the fraudulent transaction, or from
1953, the year the offended parties gained actual knowledge of the fraud, the
fifteen years had not prescribed when the information was filed on September 3,
1959.

Conformably with all the foregoing, the Order appealed from should be, as it
is hereby reversed and another entered, remanding the case for appropriate
proceedings. No costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Barrera, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.