G.R. No. L-27585. May 29, 1970
PROGRESSIVE LABOR ASSOCIATION (PLA) ASSISTED BY ITS MOTHER FEDERATION PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNION (PAFLU), PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING A…
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing Civil Case No. 9550 for the reason that
the case, as made out by the allegations of the complaint, falls within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations.
The records show that on 4 October 1966 the Progressive Labor
Association (PLA), claiming to be the duly certified exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees and workers in the employ of the Atlas
Consolidated and Mining Development Corporation, filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 9550)
against: said corporation and four of its employees, the Associated Labor Union
(ALU) and the President and Executive Vice-President-thereof, the Department of
Labor and the Bureau of Labor Relations.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that in the election held on
25 January 1966, pursuant to its constitution and by-laws, the general
membership of plaintiff Union chose their officers who were to hold office for
a term of two years;[1]
that said officers, together with the appointed Secretary and Treasurer,
assumed their respective positions on 6 February 1966; that on 31 March 1966
the plaintiff Union presented to the defendant Corporation a set of demands;
that thereafter, representatives of the Union and the Company met to negotiate
on said demands, and when the conferences did not result in any agreement the
Union called a strike (with previous notice) on 11 July 1966, at the corporation’s
place of business in Toledo City; that white the strike was going on defendants
employees, Alexander P. Villas, Manuel Enriquez, Alberto Trocio
and lluminado G. Tantoy, in
conspiracy and connivance with Democrito T. Mendoza
and Cecilio Seno, the president and executive
vice-president, respectively, of the defendant Associated Labor Union (ALU),
assumed and declared themselves to be the president, first vice-president,
secretary and treasurer of plaintiff labor Union; that defendants Seno and
Mendoza, misrepresenting themselves to be clothed with authority to act for
the plaintiff, entered into a Return-to-Work Agreement with the Company on 27
August 1966, which agreement was attested to by the representatives of the
Department of Labor and Bureau of Labor Relations; that defendants Nillas, Enriquez, Trocio and Tantoy were mere usurpers inasmuch as they have not been
elected and/or appointed to the positions they claim to occupy, and that the
duly elected and appointed officers of the ‘plaintiff Union have not abandoned
their offices. The complaint further averred:
“18. That defendant Corporation’s act in entering
into the above mentioned Return to Work Agreement’ is not only in total
disregard of the provisions of law but is, likewise, in violation of the terms
of the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement it entered into with plaintiff
Labor Association[2]
in the sense that the ‘return to work agreement, having been manifestly
executed for the benefit of plaintiff Association and its members, the only
party which defendant Corporation could legally contract with in relation thereto
is the plaintiff Labor Association, not only because it is the exclusive
collective bargaining agency stipulated in the Collective Bargaining Agreement
but because plaintiff Labor Association is the only party with which defendant
Corporation is in dispute in the present labor controversy; and that the so
-called Progressive Labor Association – ALU’, assuming identity as the Union
and represented by the individually – named defendants herein, not being the
exclusive bargaining agent described in the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
nor is it a disputant in the present labor controversy, the ‘Return to Work
Agreement’ was knowingly entered into by defendant Corporation with a party
with whom there was no legal cause and is, therefore, null and void;” (Record
on Appeal, page 9)
x x
x x x
x x x
x x x x x
x x x
x x x
x
“20. That the defendants have tried to enforce, and
still continue to enforce, the ‘Return to Work Agreement’ against plaintiff,
causing demoralization among plaintiff’s members which is damaging and
detrimental to plaintiff’s cause in the labor controversy, and unless restrained
by the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the enforcement, or
further enforcement of said ‘Return to Work Agreement’ will cause, as it has
already caused, irreparable injury to plaintiff Labor Association and its
members, the said enforcement being an unwarranted encroachment on the
guaranteed rights of plaintiff and its members to self-organization and their
right to engage in concerted acts for their mutual protection and
benefit.” (Record on Appeal, page 10)
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x
x x x
x.”
Plaintiff, consequently, prayed for judgment declaring the
Return-to Work Agreement as null and void; the alliance between defendants
Mendoza, Seno and the Associated Labor Union and the defendants employees, as
well as their acts with respect to the said Return-to-Work Agreement, as
illegal; and directing them, jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiff damages
in an amount that the court may assess.
It also asked the court to issue in the meantime a restraining order
against the enforcement by the defendants of the above -mentioned agreement.
Defendants moved to dismiss the case on jurisdictional ground:
that by the averments of the complaint, it is evident that the issue of who are
the rightful officers of the Union was being raised; that the employer was
being charged of committing unfair labor practice, and that the same allegedly
unlawful acts of defendants Seno, Mendoza and the four employees of the Company,
connected with the execution of the disputed Return-to-Work-Agreement, was
already the subject of an unfair labor practice charge levelled
by the plaintiffs against the same defendants in the Court of Industrial
Relations, Cebu Branch (Case No. 56-ULP, Cebu),[3]
— allegations that remove the case within the competence of the Court of First
Instance and place it within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations.
On 11 February 1967,
the court granted defendants’ motions and declared itself devoid of
jurisdiction to entertain the case. Hence, this appeal by the plaintiffs.
The rule is well established that the question of court jurisdiction
over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint.[4]
In this case, appellants claim that the action is for the annulment of contract
– the return-to-work agreement, which matter falls within the jurisdiction of
the court of first instance. We rule
otherwise.
A reading of the complaint herein would show that the acts
complained of by the plaintiffs and from which they were seeking relief, were
the alleged unauthorized assumption by defendants Nillas,
Enriquez, Trocio and Tantoy
of the powers and functions of the president, vice-president, secretary and
treasurer of plaintiff Union; the alleged unauthorized representation of said
plaintiff by defendants Mendoza and Seno in the Return-to-Work Agreement
entered into with the defendant Company; and the supposed illegal participation
by the Company in the execution of such agreement with the other defendants, knowing
them to be without authority to do so.
In short, the case would call not only for a determination of which set
of officers has authority to represent the employees in the negotiations with
the employer — a matter involving labor organization procedure which is
cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations,[5]
but also of the good faith and bad faith of the company in entering into that
agreement. In fact, plaintiff’s
accusation of unfair labor practice was made clear when it alleged in
paragraphs 18 and 20 of the complaint that the Company’s act of knowingly
(Record on Appeal, page 9) entering into the “Return-to-Work
Agreement” constituted a violation of law and of the existing collective
bargaining contract, and that the enforcement thereof was causing
demoralization among the Union members, it “being an unwarranted
encroachment on the guaranteed rights of plaintiff and its members to
self-organization and their right to engage in concerted acts for their mutual
protection and benefit”.
As thus made out in the complaint, there is no denying that
plaintiff’s cause of action arose out of, or is necessarily intertwined with
the alleged unfair labor practice committed by the defendants; jurisdiction
properly lies in the Court of Industrial Relations.[6]
Indeed, considering that the same plaintiff Union even
filed a case for unfair labor practice in the Industrial
Court, which included the acts complained of in
the court below, the dismissal of the civil case by the latter tribunal is in
order.[7]
In its effort to sustain the jurisdiction of the lower court over
the present case, appellants also advance the argument that their demand for
damages anyway cannot be entertained by the Industrial
Court. This
does not improve the situation at all.
As already held by this Court, mere allegation that the plaintiff
suffered damages because of the complained acts does not work to divest the
Court of Industrial Relations of jurisdiction to hear the unfair labor practice
charge. For it must be realized that the
right to damages would still have to depend on the evidence to be presented in
the unfair labor case.[8]
To hold that the demand for damages is to be passed upon by the regular courts
independently or separately from the unfair labor practice accusation would be
to sanction split jurisdiction, which is prejudicial to the orderly
administration of justice.[9]
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appealed from,
the same is hereby affirmed, with posts against the appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., on leave.
[1]
Elected were Bernardo O. Calang, President, Dominador Ruiz, as First Vice-President, Teodulo Esquilona, as Second
Vice-President, and 16 members of the Board of Directors.
[2]
The Progressive Labor Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
the Company on 31 October 1965,
said agreement to be effective until 15
December 1968.
[3] Filed on 20 October 1966.
[4] Security Bank Employees Union vs. Security Bank & Trust Co., G.R. No. L-28536, 30 April 1968, 23 SCRA 503;
Bay View Hotel, Inc. vs. Manila Hotel Workers Union, G.R. No. L-21803, 17 December 1966, 18 SCRA 946;
Tuvera vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-20547, 30 April 1965, 13 SCRA 729
Edward J. Nell Co. vs. Cubacub, G.R. No. L-20843,
23 June 1965, 14 SCRA 419;
Associated Labor Union vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-23537,
31 March 1965, 13 SCRA 582;
Abo vs. Philame(KG) Employees & Workers Union, G.R.
No. L-19912, 30 January 1965, 13 SCRA 120;
Paflu vs. Padilla, 106 Phil. 591.
[5] National Brewery & Allied Industries Labor Union (Paflu) vs. Cloribel, G.R.
No. L-25171, 17 August 1967,
20 SCRA 1083, citing Paflu vs. Padilla, 106
Phil. 591.
[6] Philippine Communications, Electronics & Electricity Workers
Federation vs. Nolasco, G.R. No. L-24984, 29 July 1968, 24 SCRA 321;
Regal Manufacturing Employees Association vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-24388,-29
July 1968, 24 SCRA 352; Erlanger & Galinger, Inc.
vs. Erlanger & Galinger Employees
Association, 104 Phil, 17; Lakas ng
Pagkakaisa sa Peter Paul vs.
Victorino, 102 Phil. 1181; SMB Box Factory Workers
Union vs. Victorino, 102. Phil.
646; National Garments & Textile Workers Union – Paflu
vs. Caluag, 99 Phil. 1067; Elizalde
Paint & Oil Factory, Inc. vs. Bautista, G.R. No. L-5904, 23 November 1960.
[7]
Citizens League of Free Workers vs. Abbas, G.R.
No. L-21212, 23 September 1966, 18 SCRA 71.
[8] Associated labor Union vs. Gomez, G.R. No. L-25999, 9 February 1967, 19 SCRA 304;
also Philippine, Communications, Electronics & Electricity Workers
Federation vs. Nolasco, supra.
[9] Associated Labor Union vs, Gomez, supra.