MAYO LOPEZ CARILLO, HONEY LOPEZ PANGANIBAN, BENITA LOPEZ, ALBINA H. LOPEZ, AND BALBINO BIADO, PETITIONERS, VS. ALLIED WORKERS’ ASSOCI­ATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (AWA), RAFAEL DIDA…

On September 22, 1964, respondent Judge, the Hon. Artemio C. Macalino, of the Court
of Agrarian Relations, rendered a decision wherein petitioners Mayo Lopez Carillo, Honey Lopez Panganiban,
Benita Lopez, Albina H. Lopez and Balbino
Biado, as defendants, were ordered to reinstate now
respondents Rafael Didal, Baltazar
de Asis, Diego Caballes and
Crispin Buenafe, all affiliated with the Allied Workers’
Association, also a respondent, to their positions as security guards of
Hda. Fara-on, located in Cadiz,
Occidental Negros, with back wages computed on weekly basis at the
daily rate of Two Pesos and Seventy-five Centavos (P2.75), commencing from May 22, 1963 up to the time of their
reinstatement as security guards and to pay the costs.  Hence this petition for review.

The facts as found in the decision of respondent Judge follow:
“Plaintiffs Rafael Didal., Baltazar
de Asis, Diego Caballes and
Crispin Buenafe [now respondents] were originally
employed at Hacienda Fara-on, Cadiz, Occidental Negros, as farm workers and laborers performing with the
other farm workers and laborers thereat varied, work as cutting cane points,
weeding and clearing the field, hosing the same, and brushing of boundaries of
the field, Sometime later and at different times, these plaintiffs, together
with one Sebastian Rizalino, were appointed as
security guards in the Hacienda. * * *.”^[1]

The recital of facts from the decision under review continue:
“Sometime in April, 1963, these plaintiffs and Sebastian Rizalino affiliated with plaintiff Union
[now respondent Allied Workers’  Association]. 
Later, on May 21, 1963,
they were summoned by defendant Mayo Lopez Carillo, a
co-owner and the administrator of Hacienda Fara-on,
to his office.  Thereat, they were told
by him that he was aware of their membership in plaintiff Union, but it was
necessary that as security guards, they should not be affiliated with it, or,
if they desire to continue with their member­ship and union activities, they
would have to be transferred to another department in the Hacienda and perform
other kinds of farm work, except that of security guards and other skilled work
to which they are not fit.  Defendant Carillo then instructed the assistant administrator of the
Hacienda, one Ismael Gulmatico,
to accommodate them in the field and assign to them any available farm work
thereat.  This presumably irked herein
four plaintiffs and they at once reported the matter to plaintiff Union.  And not being agreeable to the condition
imposed by the Hacienda, they did not report for work anymore. * * *.”^[2]

According to respondent Judge, the principal Issue “is
whether or not the Hacienda committed an act of unfair labor practice when the
security guards were required to relinquish their membership with plaintiff
Union or be transferred to another department in the Hacienda should they
desire to maintain their union membership and activities.”^[3]
Such an issue was resolved thus: “Plaintiffs proposed transfer to some
other phases of farm work with a wage scale lower than their actual wages as
security guards tended to dis­courage
membership with the union of their warn choosing, hence, may be considered an
act of unfair labor practice.  More so is
the requirement imposed by the Hacienda that they relinquish their union
membership in order that they may not be divested of their position of security
guards.”^[4] Respondent Judge then decided the
case as above set forth.

In the brief for petitioners, three errors were assigned, but the
third error, which complained against the reinstatement of respondent security
guards to their positions being entitled at the same time to back wages, is the
consequence of the other two assigned errors, the first of which is factual in
character, namely, that their proposed transfer, to some other phases of farm
work amounted to constructive discharge and hence an unfair labor practice, and
the second, legal in connotation, the contention being that the provisions of
the Industrial Peace Act^[5]
as well as the Land Reform Code^[6]
could not be applied to the present case as the acts which gave rise to the
same took place before the passage of the latter legislation.  Neither the factual nor the legal alleged
error committed is meritorious. 
Consequently, it could not be said that the reinstatement of respondent
security guards with back wages was contrary to law.

No further inquiry is called for concerning the alleged grievance
that respondent Judge should not have considered as unfair labor practice the
proposed transfer of respondent security guards from their positions to some
other phases a farm work.  This is a find­ing of fact resting on
evidence substantial in character.  We are not at liberty to disturb it on
appeal.  That is a principle that has
been affirmed time and time again.  One
of its latest formulations is
that set forth in Lapina v. Court of Agrarian
Relations,^[7]
in an Opinion by Justice Dizon, to the effect that its finding of fact must be accepted “unless it is shown that
they are unfounded or were
arbitrarily arrived at, or that said court had failed to consider
important evi­dence to the contrary.”

Neither is the second alleged error that respondent Judge should
not have passed on the alleged unfair labor practice of petitioners considering
that such provision insofar as tenancy relations are concerned was provided for
only in Agricultural Land Reform Code, which took effect on August 8, 1963,
seventy nine days after the alleged unfair labor practice committed on May 29,
1963 persuasive.  It is to be noted that
as far back as 1961, in Santos v.
Court of Industrial Relations,^[8]   more than two years before the Agricultural
Land Reform Code became a law, the provision of the Industrial Peace Act
insofar as unfair labor practice is concerned was held applicable to agricultural
laborers.  In the language of this Court:
“With regard to our conclusion that the present controversy comes under
the exclusive jurisdic­tion of the Court of Agrarian Relations, suffice it to
state that the latter court was created for “the enforcement of all, laws
and regulations governing the relation of capital and labor on all agricultural
lands under any system of cultivation (Section 1, Republic Act 1267, as amended
by Republic Act 1409), and was given exclusive jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines ‘to con­sider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions,
matters, controversies, or disputes involving all those relationships
established by law which determine the varying rights of person in the
cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the
land’ (Section 7, mid.).  Complainants,
therefore, should have lodged their complaint with the agrarian court for the
redress of their grievance considering this broad power given to it by law even
if nothing is said therein relative to unfair labor practice.”

A complication is introduced by our holding in Dequito v. Lopez^[9]
that the work performed by a security guard is not em­braced in the term
“agrarian relations” and that a matter of this character should be
litigated either in an ordinary judicial tribunal or where a reinstatement is
sought in the Court of Indus­trial Relations.^[10]
Fortunately, such a complication is not necessarily fatal.  Petitioners are not now in a position to
raise such a question, and if they could do so, the decision under review could
still be allowed to stand.

For as was made clear in the aforesaid.  Dequito decision a
motion to dismiss an appeal on the ground that the record On appeal would not
disclose on its face that it was timely perfected, a motion, which otherwise is
entitled to serious consideration, would be futile and unavailing if, as was
disclosed by the facts therein, while the record on appeal was received by this
Court as far back as August 16, 1967 and the brief for defendants appellees was dated January 6, 1968, it was not until the 24th of such month
that such a motion to dismiss appeal on that ground was filed.  It was considered then as being much too
late, defendants appellees having lost their right in
view of their tardiness to question the alleged timely perfection of the
appeal.  So in this case, with the
decision under review being rendered on September 12, 1964, the petition for
certiorari being dated October 29, 1964 and the brief of petitioners submitted
on May 20, 1965, during all, of Which time as a matter of fact, up to now a
question of that character was not raised, it would seem that Whatever right to
contest the jurisdiction could have been availed of is by now no longer in
existence.

It is much too late.  A
similar implication arises from the ruling in Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy,^[11]
where this Court, through justice Dizon, stated:
“The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a
quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved
which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts.  It
failed to do so.  Instead, at several
stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of
Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative
relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits.  It was only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question
of jurisdiction.  Were We to sanction
such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case, since it was commenced on July 19, 1948
and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more.  The inequity and un­fairness of this is not
only patent but revolting.”

Even if, however, petitioners could challenge the jurisdiction of
respondent Judge still under the doctrine announced
in Francisco v. City of Davao,^[12]
the need for litigating the matter anew is not unavoidable.  In the language of the present Chief Justice:
“The ends of justice would not he served, If we now dismiss the case –
over nine (9) years after it had been Initiated – and bade the plain­tiffs to
start all over again, following the procedure that the defendants had asked the
lower court, but which the latter refused, to require.  At any rate, since the legal question raised
in the pleadings has reached this Court, and the assessment complained of is
manifestly violative of the clear and express
provision of the law, it is best that we decide said question, instead of further
defer­ring its resolution.”

Social justice would be a meaningless term if in a situation like
the present, an element of rigidity would be affixed to procedural: precepts
and made to cover the matter. 
Flexibility should not be ruled out. 
Precisely, what is sought to be accomplished by such a fundamental
principle expressly so declared by the Constitution^[13]
is the effectiveness of the community’s effort to assist the economically
underprivileged.  For under existing
conditions, without .such succor and Support, they might not, unaided, be able
to secure justice for themselves.  To
make them suffer, even inadvertently, from the effects of a judicial ruling,
which perhaps they could not have anticipated, the Dequito
decision having been promulgated only last March 28th, when such a deplorable
result could be avoided, would be to disregard what the social justice concept
stands for.

Moreover, there is equally the obligation on the part of the
State to afford protection to labor.^[14]
The responsibility is in­cumbent then, not only on the legislative and
executive branches but also on the judiciary, to translate this pledge into a
living reality.  The present case is an
appropriate occasion for the dis­charge of such a trust.  To preclude-relief under the circumstances
herein disclosed would be to fail to submit to the dictates of a plain
constitutional command.  That we should
not allow to happen.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Judge ordering
petitioners to reinstate respondents Rafael Didal, Baltazar de Asis, Diego Caballes and Crispin Buenafe to
their positions of security guards at Hacienda Fara-on,
located at Cadiz, Occi­dental, Negros and ordering
petitioner Mayo Lopez Carillo to cause the payment by
the management of Hacienda Fara-on to herein individual
respondents their back wages they should have realized had they not been
constructively discharged, computed on the weekly basis at the daily rate of
Two Pesos and Seventy-five Centavos (P2.75), commencing from May 22, 1963 tip
to the time they are actually reinstated to their positions of security guards
is affirmed.  With costs against
petitioners.

Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Reyes, JBL, J., in the result.

^[1]
Petition, Annex. C, p. 4.

^[2]
Ibid, pp. 4-5.

^[3]
Ibid, p. 5-6.

^[4]
Ibid, p. 9.

^[5]
Republic Act No. 875.

^[6]
Republic Act No. 3844.

^[7]
L-20706, September 25, 1967.

^[8]
L-17196, December 28, 1961.

^[9]
L-27757, March 28, 1968.

^[10]
Centro Escolar University
v. Wandaga, L-25826, April 3, 1968 and cases cited therein. See also
Price Stabilization Corp. v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-13806, May 23, 1960; Phil. Wood Products v.
Court of Industrial Relations, L-15279, June
30, 1961; Tamayo v. San Miguel
Brewery, Inc., L47749, January 31,
1964 and Mercado v. Elizalde  & Co., L-18962, December 23, 1964,

^[11]
 L-21450,
April 15, 1968.

^[12]
L-20654, December 24, 1964.

^[13]
Article II, Section 5, Constitution
of the Philippines.

^[14]
 Article
XIV, Section 5, Constitution of the Philippines.