GERONIMO DE LOS REYES, PETITIONER, VS. GREGORIO ESPINELI, RUPERTO ALCANTARA, JORGE LOBREN, PEDRO AMANTE, MATEO GUTIERREZ, ISIDRO RAMOS, SANTOS DANGUE, MIGUEL RAMOS, CORNELIO GAR…

Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in
C.A. GR-37689-R and C.A. GR-37690-R, modifying that of the Court of Agrarian
Relations in CAR cases 1185 and 1186.

The petitioner Geronimo de los Reyes is
the owner of a 200-hectare coconut plantation located in Calauan,
Laguna.  In 1958 his overseer (“katiwala“) therein was Gonzalo Belarmino,
who took into the land the 17 respondents under an agreement that the latter
were to receive 1/7 portion of every coconut har­vest.  Sometime in October, 1962, the petitioner
dismissed Be­larmino, upon the suspicion that the
latter had been deceiving him, in connivance with the respondents.

On March 2, 1963 Ruperto A lcantara, et al., and Gre­gorio Espineli
(respondents here) filed separate petitions (sub­sequently amended) against De los Reyes in the Court of Agra­rian Relations, seeking the
delivery to them of the difference between the 1/7 share which the petitioner
had been giving them and the 30%
share to which they, as share tenants, were alleged­ly entitled.  Upon the finding that the respondents were
mere agri­cultural workers of the petitioner, the CAR ordered the latter to
retain them as such and to pay them the sum of P4,559.07 “which is the
total of their unpaid shares of 1/7 of the net coconut har­vests for the period
from September 13 to December 23, 1962 and February 25 to May 28, 1963,”
plus P500 as attorney’s fees.  Upon
respondents’ appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the CAR, by
declaring the respondents tenants of the petitioner and ordering the
latter to pay them “the difference between the one-seventh (1/7) share of
the crops and the thirty (30%) per cent pro­vided for in the Tenancy Law from
the year 1958 up to the filing of the petitions and so on; the resulting amount
for this purpose to be arrived at in a liquidation to be submitted, if and when
this judg­ment shall have become final and the record remanded to the low­er
court.”

Basically, the petitioner contends that (1) there existed no
contractual relationship between him and the respondents; (2) the respondents
were not his tenants; and (3) the decision of the Court of Appeals deprives him
of his property without due process of law.

The respondents attempted to have the present appeal dis­missed
on the ground that it involves questions of fact.  If indeed the issues posed by the petitioner
necessarily invite calibration of the entire evidence,^[1]
then the appeal should be dismissed since issues only of law may be raised in
an appeal from the Court of Appeals to this Court.^[2]
It seems to us clear, however, that the petitioner accepts the findings of fact
made by the appellate court, but takes exception to the conclusions drawn therefrom.  Such be­ing
the case, the questions here tendered for resolution are pure­ly of law.^[3]

At the outset, we must resolve the question of existence of a
contract, the petitioner alleging, as he does, that his consent, express or
implied, had never been given.  His
position, simply stated, is that at the time the respondents were taken into
his land by Belarmino, the latter was a mere laborer
and therefore with­out the requisite authority to contract in his behalf, and
it was on­ly later that he was promoted to the position of overseer.  How­ever, in his “Amended
Complaint” of April 22, 1968,^[4]
the petitio­ner prayed that “judgment be rendered … finding the
defendants guilty of a breach of their contractual obligation with the
plaintiff,” and in the body thereof he incorporated statements from which
it can plainly be seen that a contractual relationship existed between the
parties.

Verily, there was and still is a contractual relationship between
the petitioner and the respondents.  In
our view the pith of the problem is, actually, whether the relationship is that
of agricultural share tenancy (as averred by the respondents) or that of farm
employer and agricultural laborer (as asserted by the pe­titioner).  On a determination of this question depends
the respec­tive rights of the parties, more particularly the proper assess­ment
of the share of the respondents under the law.

Of fundamental relevance in this discussion are definitions of
basic terms.

“Agricuitural tenancy” is the
physical possession by a per­son of land devoted to agriculture belonging to,
or legally pos­sessed by, another for the purpose of production through the la­bor
of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in
consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter,
or to pay a price certain or ascer­tainable, either in produce or in money, or
in both.^[5]
“Share te­nancy” exists whenever two persons agree on a joint
undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land
and the other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of
the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land personally with the
aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the
produce thereof to be di­vided between the landholder and the tenant in
proportion to their respective contributions.^[6]
And a “share tenant” is a person who, himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land
belonging to or possessed by ano­ther, with the latter’s consent for purposes
of production, shar­ing the produce with the landholder.^[7]

It is to be readily deduced from the foregoing definitions that
aside from the usual essential requisites of a contract,^[8]
the characteristics of a share tenancy contract are:    (1) the parties are a landholder, who is a
natural or juridical person and is the owner, lessee, usufructuary
or legal possessor of agricultural land,^[9]
and a tenant who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate
farm household, cultivates the land which is the subject-matter of the tenancy;
(2) the subject-matter is agricultural land; (3) the purpose of the contract is
agricultural pro­duction; and (4) the cause or consideration is that the
landholder and the share tenant would divide the agricultural produce bet­ween
themselves in proportion to their respective contributions.

While the Agricultural Tenancy Act did not define the term
“agricultural laborer” or “agricultural worker,” the
Agricultural Land Reform Code does.  A
“farm worker” is “any agri­cultural wage, salary or piece worker
but is not limited to a farm worker of a particular farm employer unless this
Code ex­plicitly states otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as
a consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an
unfair labor practice and who has not ob­tained a substantially equivalent and
regular employment.” The term includes “farm laborer and/ or farm
employees.^[10]
An “agricultural worker” is not a whit different from a “farm
worker.”

From the definition of a “farm worker” thus fashioned,
it is quite apparent that there should be an employer-employee relationship
between the “farm employer”^[11]
and the farm worker.  In determining the
existence of an employer-employee relation­ship, the elements that are
generally considered are the follow­ing:   
(1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the pay­ment of
wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the employer’s power to control the
employee’s conduct.  It is this last
element that constitutes the most important index of the existence of the
relationship.”^[12]

This is not to say that agricultural workers or farm la­borers
are industrial workers.  Not by any
means, although they may both appear in the same establishment.  The difference lies in the kind of work they
do.  Those whose labor is devoted to
purely agricultural work are agricultural laborers.  All others are industrial workers.^[13]
Nonetheless, they belong to the same class. 
Both are workers.  Both are
employees.

We are here primarily interested in the basic differences between
a farm employer-farm worker relationship and an agri­cultural sharehold tenancy relationship.  Both, of course, are leases, but there the
similarity ends.  In the former, the
lease is one of labor, with the agricultural laborer as the lessor
of his services, and the farm employer as the lesse
thereof.^[14]
In the latter, it is the landowner who is the lessor,
and the sharehold tenant is the lessee of
agricultural land.  As lessee he has
possession of the leased premises.^[15]
But the relationship is more than a mere lease. 
It is a special kind of lease, the law refer­ring to it as a “joint
urdertaking.”^[16]
For this reason, not only the tenancy laws are applicable, but also, in a suppletory way, the law on leases, the customs of the place
and the civil code provisions on partnership.^[17]
The share tenant works for that joint venture. 
The agricultural laborer works for the farm em­ployer, and for his labor
he receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a
profit.^[18]
On the other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural
produce.  His share is necessarily
dependent on the amount of the harvest.

Since the relationship between farm employer and agricul­tural
laborer is that of employer and employee, the decisive fac­tor is the control
exercised by the former over the latter. 
On the other hand, the landholder has the “right to require the
tenant to follow those proven farm practices which have been found to con­tribute
towards increased agricultural production and to use fer­tilizer of the kind or
kinds shown by proven farm practices to be adapted to the requirements of the
land.” This is but the right of a partner to protect his interest, not the
control exercised by an employer.  If
landholder and tenant disagree as to farm practices, the former may not dismiss
the latter.  It is the court that shall
settle the conflict according to the best interests of both parties.^[19]

The record is devoid of evidentiary support for the notion that
the respondents are farm laborers.  They
do not observe set hours of work.  The
petitioner has not laid down regulations under which they are supposed to do
their work.  The argument tendered is
that they are guards.  However, it does
not appear that they are under obligation to report for duty to the petitioner
or his agent.  They do not work in
shifts.  Nor has the petitioner pres­cribed
the manner by which the respondents were and are to per­form their duties as
guards.  We do not find here that degree
of control and supervision evincive of an employer-employee rela­tionship.  Furthermore, if the respondents are guards,
then they are not agricultural laborers, because the duties and functions of a
guard are not agricultural in nature.^[20]
It is the Industrial Court
that has jurisdiction over any dispute that might arise between employer and
employee.  Yet, the petitioner filed his
complaint against the respondents in the Court of Agrarian Relations.

We now proceed to determine if there are present here the salient
characteristics of an agricultural share tenancy con­tract.  The subject-matter is coconut land, which is
considered agricultural land under both the Agricultural Land Tenancy Act^[21]
and the Agricultural Land Reform Code.^[22]
The purpose of the contract is the production of coconuts; the respondents
would receive 1/7 of the harvest.  The
petitioner is the landholder of the coconut plantation.

The crucial factors are that the tenant must have physical
possession of the land for the purpose of production^[23]
and he must personally cultivate the land. 
If the tenant does not cultivate the land personally he cannot be
considered a tenant even if he is so designated in the written agreement of the
parties.^[24]

“Cultivation” is not limited to the plowing and
harrowing of the land.  It includes the
various phases of farm labor described and provided by law, the maintenance,
repair and weeding of dikes, paddies and irrigation canals in the holding
Moreover, it covers attending to the care of the growing plants.^[25]
Where the parties agreed that they would “operate a citrus nursery upon
the condition that they would divide the budded citrus in the propor­tion of
1/3 share of respondents and 2/3 as share of petitioner,” and that the
“petitioner would furnish all the necessary seedlings and seeds, as well
as the technical know-how in the care, cultivation, budding and balling of the
budded citrus, while respon­dents would furnish the land necessary for the
nursery, the farm labor that may be needed to plant and cultivate, and all the
che­micals, fertilizers, and bud tapes that may be necessary for such
cultivation,” then “the tenancy agreement entered into bet­ween the
parties has relation to the possession of agricultural land to be devoted to
the production of agricultural products thru the labor of one of the parties,
and as such comes within the pur­view of the term ‘agricultural tenancy’ as
defined in section 3 of Republic Act No. 1199 as amended.”^[26]

In one instance,^[27]
the landholder claimed that his care­taker was not an agricultural tenant
because he “does not till or cultivate the land in order to grow the fruit
bearing trees because they are already full grown,” and “he does not
even do the actual gathering of the fruits” but “merely supervises
the gathering, and after deducting the expenses, he gives one-half of the
fruits to plaintiff all in consideration of his stay in the land.” This
Court’s answer was to the point:

“Anyone who has had fruit trees in his yard will disagree with
the above description of the rela­tionship. 
He knows the caretaker must water the trees, even fertilize them for
better production, up­root weeds and turn the soil, sometimes fumigate to
eliminate plant pests, etc.  Those chores
obvious­ly mean ‘working or cultivating’ the land.  Besides, it seems that defendant planted
other crops, [i. e. cultivated the lot] giving
the landowner his corres­ponding share.”

The Court of Appeals made some essential findings of fact.  The respondents were called “kasama.” They have plowing im­plements.  The
respondent Pedro Amante even used to have a ca­rabao which he subsequently exchanged for a horse.  Almost all of the respondents have banana
plantations on the land.  They live in the landholding.  They are charged with the obligation to clean
their respective landholdings.  Certain
portions of the land are planted to palay.

These factual findings may not be reviewed by the Supreme Court.^[28]
Furthermore, the said facts are supported by the testimony of the petitioner
himself, who admitted that the respondents are his “kasama,”
although he tried to minimize the effect of this admission by alleging that
although called “kasama,” the respon­dents
“do not perform the work of a ‘kasama‘” and that in Quezon the “kasama”
“plow the land, they plant rice, but here in Laguna, they do not do
anything.” The appellate court was correct in concluding that “kasama” means “tenant,”^[29]
not worker or laborer, which is translated into our national language as “manggagawa.”^[30]
Respecting farm implements, the petitioner admitted that “they have the
implements,” but again he tried to minimize the signifi­cance of his
statement by adding that “they have not used it in the farm.”
However, the report of the CAR clerk of court, based on his ocular inspection,
pertinently states that he found “certain por­tions planted with palay.”

The petitioner cannot deny that the respondents were all living
in the landholding and that “all of them have banana planta­tions, small
or big,” though he averred, “not one single banana was given to me as
my share.”

We now come to the all-important question of whether the
respondents have the duty to cultivate the land in order that the trees would
bear more coconuts.  The petitioner’s
answers on cross-examination are quite revealing.  Thus:

“Q.  Where
these petitioners duty bound to do any cleaning or clearing of the underbrush
with­in the coconut land?

“A.   These
laborers clean the land from where … They are getting their food and
subsistence.

“COURT: The question is that, are they duty bound to
clean the landholding in question?

“A. To make my answer short, I say
that the res­ponsibility is to Gonzalo Berlarmino, to
him, because he is the one who engaged them.”

*                           *                                   *

“A.   One,
to guard the property and use their names as threat to people who might …
have the intention of stealing my coconuts, and two, to assist in the clearing
of the Land because that is the responsibility of Gon­zalo Belarmino.
. .”^[31]

Undeniably, the petitioner considers it
one of the duties of the respondents to clear and clean the land.  Additionally,
in his com­plaint the petitioner claimed that “the defendants have
abandoned their posts at the plaintiff’s plantation and have likewise failed
and refused to comply with their contractual obligation with the
plaintiff to keep the areas respectively assigned to them clean and clear of
undergrowths and cogonal grass at all times, with
the result that it is now impossible for the plaintiff to harvest the mature
coconuts as these would only be lost amid the under­growth and cogonal which have now grown to unreasonable heights,
thereby causing further damage and prejudice to the plaintiff.” (emphasis
supplied)

The petitioner clearly expected the respondents to perform the
duties of a tenant, especially, to maintain the land clean and clear “at
all times,” which not only would facilitate harvesting but, more
importantly, would necessarily result in greater production.  As found by the CAR clerk of court during the
ocular inspection,

“the planting of palay
has a direct effect on the grow­ing of the coconuts because in the places he
found planted with palay, the coconut trees displayed
white leaves gray in color with plenty of nuts or fruits, compared to the
portion in the hacienda where we encountered cogon grasses, underbrushes
and ipil­-ipil trees, there is a need for thorough
cleaning, especially the ipil-ipil trees which are
growing high for years already in-between the rows of coconut trees.”^[32]

Therefore, the parties to the contract understood, in sum and
substance, that the respondents were to “cultivate” the land.  Whether the latter had been remiss in the
performance of their contractual obligations, does not affect the nature of the
contract which the appellate court analyzed and found to be that of share
tenancy.  It is the principal features
and stipulations which deter­mine the true essence of a contract.^[33]
Considering then that the respondents are duty bound to cultivate their
respective holdings (of which they have possession), and that they share in the
har­vest, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion must be upheld.  This, es­pecially in the light of the facts that
the respondents raise secon­dary crops and have their homes in their respective
holdings.

The petitioner having entered into a share tenancy con­tract with
the respondents, it certainly cannot be seriously claim­ed that the
relationship of landlord and tenant is unjustifiably be­ing imposed on him without due process of law.  It was the peti­tioner himself who
voluntarily entered into the relationship, and, therefore, should shoulder the
consequences thereof, one of which is
that the tenants must be given, as they are entitled to, a 30% share in the
produce.^[34]

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at
petitioner’s cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., no part.

^[1]
Fortus vs. Novero,
L-22378, June 29, 1968;
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. Inc. vs. Rich, L-22608, June 30, 1969.

^[2]
Municipality of Legaspi vs. A. L. Ammen Trans. Co. Inc., L?22377, Nov. 29, 1968.

^[3]
Where all the facts are stated in the decision and the issue is the correctness
of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the ques­tion is
one of law. (Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. Inc. vs. Rich, supra)

^[4]
This “Amended Complaint” is annex B of the petitioner’s “Com­ment”
(Re: Respondents’ Constancia dated 2 October, 1968)
filed with this Court on November 5,
1968.

^[5]
Section 3, R.A. 1199. According to section 6 of the same law, tenancy
relationship is a juridical tie which arises bet­ween a landholder and a tenant
once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation
of land belonging to the former, either under the share te­nancy or leasehold
tenancy system, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right
to continue work­ing on and cultivating the land, until and unless he is dis­possessed
of his holdings for any of the just causes enume­rated in section 50 of the law
or the relationship is termi­nated on the authority of section 9 thereof.

^[6]
Sec. 4, RA 1199. Sec. 166(25) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code recites that
“‘Share tenancy’ as used in this Code means the relationship which exists
whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production
wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his la­bor, with either or
both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant
cultivating the land personally with the aid of labor available from members of
his immediate farm household, and the produce there­of to be divided between
the landholder and the tenant.” This provision lacks only the phrase,
“in proportion to their respective contributions,” to amount to an
exact re­production of the definition of share tenancy in sec. 4, RA 1199.

^[7]
Sec. 5(a), RA 1199.

^[8]
There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:  (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2)
object certain which is the subject-matter of the contract; and (3) cause of
the obligation which is established. Art. 1318, Civil Code of the Philippines.

^[9]
Sec. 5(b), RA 1199.

^[10]
Sec. 166(15), Agricultural Land Reform Code.

^[11]
Defined by sec. 166(14), id.

^[12]
LVN Pictures vs. Philippine Musician Guild, L-12582 & L­-12598, Jan.
28, 1961; Sterling Products International vs. Sol, L-19187, Feb. 28,
1963; R. R. Sugay & Co. vs. Re­yes, L-20451, Dec. 28, 1964; Quiño vs.
Muñoz, L-17222, Oct. 29, 1965; Allied Free Workers
Union vs. Compania Maritima,
L-22051, L-22952, L-22971, Jan. 31, 1967; Republic vs. WCC, L-22650,
April 28, 1967; Social Secu­rity System vs. Court of Appeals, L-26146,
Oct. 31, 1969.

“Where the element of control
is absent; where a person who works for another does so more or less at his own pleasure and is not
subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and in turn is compensated
according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof,” the
relationship of employer and employee does not exist. (Investment Planning
Corporation of the Phil. vs. SSS, L-19124, Nov. 18,
1967, 21 SCRA 932)

^[13]
“The only issue We are called upon to determine in the instant proceedings
is ‘whether or not the Industrial Peace Act ap­plies to agricultural workers,’
since there is no dispute that the members of respondent Union are merely
laborers in the different sugarcane plantations of the petitioner.

“In the case of ‘Boy Scouts of
the Philippines
vs. Julian Araos, G.R. No. 10091, Jan. 28, 1958, We stated?

‘x x x For instance, there can be no ques­tion that under our
Industrial Peace Act, the Repu­blic or any political division or subdivision,
like a province or municipality, must and should also be excluded from the
definition of employer. Similar­ly, under the term ’employee’ of our law, agricul­tural laborers or individuals employed in the do­mestic
service, like private or domestic drivers, housemaids, kitchen help, etc., should be exemp­ted.’

It is claimed, however, that the
above is an obiter dictum.

“In a case, involving workers
in a sugar central, We made a distinction between those performing exclusive­ly
agricultural chores from those who are not. Thus, We said –

‘Where petitioner
is a highly mechanized in­dustrial concern
with the work of planting and har­vesting clearly distinguished from that of
transport­ing the cane from
the fields, first to a switch and later to the mill, all its workers are to be
consider­ed industrial workers, except those devoted to pure­ly agricultural work.’ (Pampanga
Sugar Mills vs. Pasumil Workers Union, L-7668,
Feb. 29, 1956.)

It is, therefore, the nature of the
work which classifies a worker as one failing under the exemption as
‘agricultural laborers.’ The members of respondent Union
are merely agricultural laborers in petitioner’s haciendas, the princi­pal work
of which is planting and harvesting sugar canes and other chores incidental to
ordinary farming operations. They are agricultural laborers.” (Victorias
Milling Inc. vs. CIR, L-17281, March 30, 1963, 7 SCRA
544-545).

“The case of Victorias Milling Co. vs. CIR and Free Visayan Workers, G.R. No. 17281, decided on March 30, 1963, is particularly
relevant, being almost on all fours with the present case. There a union of
laborers working in the sugar cane haciendas of the Victorias
Mill­ing Co. had charged the company with unfair labor prac­tice in the Court
of Industrial Relations. The latter’s ju­risdiction was impugned before this
Court, and it was held that:

‘The members of respondent Union
are merely agricultural laborers in petitioner’s ha­ciendas, the principal work
of which is planting and harvesting sugar cane and other chores in­cidental to
ordinary farming operations. They are agricultural workers, and in the
supposition that the milling company had committed unfair labor practice upon
them, the Court of Agra­rian Relations has jurisdiction over the case.’” (Elizalde Co. Inc. vs. Allied Workers’ Ass’n. of the Phil., L-20792, May 31, 1965)

“The first issue leads Us to
consider Our rulings in Pampanga Sugar Mills vs.
Pasumil Workers’ Union and Victorias Milling Co. vs. CIR, supra.

“In the Pasumil
case, we held that where ‘petitio­ner is a highly mechanized industrial concern
with the work of planting and harvesting clearly distinguished from that of
transporting the cane from the fields, first to a switch and later to the mill
… all its workders are to be considered industrial workers, except those devoted to
purely agricultural work.’ (at p. 561) Reiterating this, We said in the Victorias case that it is
‘the nature of the work which classifies a worker as one falling under the
exemption [from the coverage of RA 875] as agricultural laborers.’

“In an hacienda, there may
therefore be both agri­cultural and industrial workers. Regarding the former,
exclusive jurisdiction has been given to the Court of Agra­rian Relations. As
to the latter, exclusive jurisdiction has been placed in the Court of
Industrial Relations.” (Del Rosario vs. CIR, L-23133, July
13, 1967, 20 SCRA 652-653)

^[14]
Arts. 1700-1712, Civil Code of the Philippines.

^[15]
Latag vs. Banog,
L-20093, Jan. 31, 1966.

^[16]
Sec. 4, RA 1199.

^[17]
Art. 1684, Civil Code of the Philippines.

^[18]
Noteworthy is the fact that the respondents in the case at bar receive not
salaries or wages, but a share of the produce.

^[19]
Sec. 25(2), RA 1199.

^[20]
The word “guard” comes from the Anglo-Saxon “weardian,”
to watch, the “gu” being due to French
influence. To guard in its largest sense comprehends both watching and defend­ing,
that is, both preventing the attack and the resisting it when it is made. (18-A
Words and Phrases 697, citing Slyder vs. Board
of Comm’rs of Preble County, 12 NE2d 407, 408, 133 Ohio
St. 146)

Property protection agency’s
employees who were designated by agency as guards and wore uniform and bad­ges
and carried guns, and who were ready to stand guard duty on subscriber’s
premises in the ordinary course of their work when occasion required, even
though they did not do so constantly, were “guards” within the
provision of National Labor Relations Act to the effect that that card shall
not decide that any unit is appropriate for bargaining purposes if it includes
both guards and other employees. (Id. 698, citing NLRB vs. American
Dist. Tel. Co. of PA, CA 3, 205 F2d 86, 90)

“Agrarian relations” does
not include employment of security guards in agricultural enterprise. (De Quito
vs. Lopez, L-27757, March 28, 1968)

^[21]
Sec. 41, RA 1199.

“But since then, and more
specifically on August 30, 1954,
Republic Act 1199 entitled ‘An Act to
Govern the Relations between Landholders and Tenants of Agri­cultural
Lands (Leasehold and Share Tenancy)’ has
been approved. This law governs the relations between land­lord and tenant
in all kinds of agricultural lands. It re­peals C.A. No. 461. The provisions of
the Act are made to apply to all kinds of agricultural lands, whatever may be
their nature or character, whether rice, sugar, corn or coconut, and all
controversies between landlord and tenant are placed within the jurisdiction of
the Court of Industrial Relations [now within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Agrarian Relations since the passage of R.A. 1267 on June 14, 1956] so any
controversies between land­lord and tenant, or owner and leasee
falls under said court’s jurisdiction.” (Mendoza vs. Manguiat, 96 Phil. 310)

^[22]
“Agricultural land” means land devoted to any growth, including but
not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fish ponds, idle land and abandoned land as
defined in paragraphs18 and 19 of this Section, respectively. (Sec. 166[1], RA
3844)

^[23]
Sec. 3, RA 1199.

^[24]
“Si los recurrentes cultivasen personalmente el terreno, ellos serian inquillinos
o aparceros – tenants – de Patalinghug;
pero, segun los hechos admitidos
en los escritos obrantes en autos, los recurrentes no son aparceros, eran antes de la yenta proprietarios
y despues continuaron en la po­sesion del terreno como arrendatarios.
Segun el articulo 3 de la Ley No. 4054, tal como fue enmendada
por la Ley de la Republic
No. 34, aparcero es ‘todo labrador o bra­cero agricola que se compremete a trabajar y cultivar un terreno por otro o la persona que facilita la mano de obra, con el consentimiento del propietario‘
y, en virtud de di­cho trabajo, recibe una participation fijada por la Ley de A parceria. Comos los recurrentes no cultivan personal­mente el terreno en cuestion, no se les puede considerar como aparceros, aunque en la escritura de yenta
con pac­to de retro los vendedores se llamen a si mismo impro­piamente
tenants.” (Omega vs. Solidum, 93
Phil. 460)

^[25]
De Guzman vs. Santos, L-16568, Nov. 30, 1962.

^[26]
Almodiel vs. Blanco, L-17508, July 30, 1962.

^[27]
Marcelo vs. De Leon, 105 Phil. 1175.

^[28]
Marchan vs. Mendoza, L-24471, Aug. 30, 1968; Villarica vs. CA, L-19196, Nov. 29, 1968; Caguiat vs. Torres, L-25481, Oct. 31, 1969.

^[29]
English-Pilipino, Pilipino-English Vocabulary, page 146.

^[30]
Id., page 45.

^[31]
Court of Appeals decision, on pp. XIV-XV, appendix A, brief for the petitioner.

^[32]
CA decision, p. IX, appendix A, brief for the petitioner.

^[33]
Teodoro vs. Macaraeg,
L-20700, Feb. 27, 1969

^[34]
Sec. 41, RA 1199.