G.R. No. L-27072. January 09, 1970
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
SANCHEZ, J.:
After the July 31, 1968
decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur
International Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to our attention
statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano
Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar,
with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. On November
21, 1968, this Court issued a show-cause order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set
forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:
“a. ‘They
(petitioners, including the ExecuÂtive Secretary) have mace these false,
ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts
against MacArthur International. Such efforts could be accurately called
“scattershot desperation” (Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27,
1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page
14).
b. ‘Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays
bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners.’ (Respondents’
Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner’s Memorandum Brief, dated April
13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of the page).
c. ‘The herein
petitioners x x x opportunistically
change their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to
pleading in the same case.’ (Respondents’ Supplemental Memorandum, Ibid, p. 17,
sixth, seventh and eighth lines from bottom of the page).”
MacArthur’s third motion for
reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente
L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito
R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor
General points out, contain the following statements:
“d. ‘x x x; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable
law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners’ counsel.’
(Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ‘x x x Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that
such a gimmick (referring to the “right to reject any and all bids”)
can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and
excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud * * and it
is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under
many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to
create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute
manner.’ (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept.
10, 1968).”
The motion to inhibit
filed on September 21, 1968 – after judgment herein was rendered – and signed
by Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano, Regala and
Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering,
judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to
January 11, 1967. The motion charges
“[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a
vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false,
erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968” and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled
case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before
the joining of an issue. As to the Chief
Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion was given a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before
the decision of July 31, 1968
was rendered in this
case.” The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created
Board of Investments. The motion
presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side
comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates “incidents” which,
according to the motion, brought about respondent Mac-Arthur’s belief that
“unjudicial prejudice” had been caused it
and that there was “unjudicial favoritism”
in favor of “petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party
directly benefited by the said decision.” The “incidents” cited
are as follows:
“(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law
has not been declared unconstitutional.
(b)
said decision ignores totally the
applicable law in the above-entitled case.
(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right
to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of this nature.
(d)
due course was given to the
unfounded certiorari in the first place when the appeal from a denial of
a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to
a wholesome development of the law – but only served to delay respondent for
the benefit of the favored party.
(e)
the preliminary injunction issued
herein did not maintain the status quo but destroyed it, and the conclusion
cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at all.
(f)
there are misstatements and misrepresentations
in the said decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct.
(g)
the two main issues in the said
decision were decided otherwise in previous decisions, and the main issue ‘right to reject any or all
bids’ is being treated on a double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme
Court.
(h)
the fact that respondent believes
that the Honorable Supreme Court knows better and has greater understanding
than the said decision manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million
dollars by said decision – without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to
learn all the facts through preÂsentation through the trial court, which is
elementary.”
On November 21, 1968,
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for
himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy
and Graciano Regala and
Associates, in writing pointed out to this Court that the statements specified
by the Solicitor General were either quoted out of context, could be defended,
or were comments legitimate and justifiable.
Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his
clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur’s attorney could not plead such thoughts, his
client would be deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to
change the words “Chief Justice” to “Supreme Court”
appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily deleted
paragraph 6 of the said motion, which in full reads:
“6. Unfortunately for
our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they
are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that
no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the
Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be
constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or
pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an
issue. Witness the recent absurdity of
Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to
hold himself in contempt of court – seemingly totally oblivious or
uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved – and also of judge Geraldez
who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused
who is also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for such
mentality? Is it outright
dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our governÂment
officials are just amoral?”
And,
in addition, he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and (h) of
paragraph 7 thereof.
It was on December 2,
1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his compliance with this
Court’s resolution of November 21,
1968. He there stated that
the motion to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of his
exclusive making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor. He further
elaborated on his explanations made on November
21, 1968.
On December 5, 1968,
he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted paragraph 6
of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was
still included through inadvertence.
On March 1,
1969, Atty. Vicente
L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur, registered an
amended motion to inhibit. While it
repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion
and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it left but three paragraphs of the
original motion to inhibit, taking out the dissertation on judicial ethics and
most of the comments attacking the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968.
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that
as early as October 7, 1968,
he insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of
MacArthur. His
ground was that he did not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the
two justices. According to him,
“[t]he present steps (sic) now being taken is against counsel’s upbringing
and judicial consÂcience.”
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto’s return of
November 29, 1968, he took
pains to say that the questioned statements he made were also taken out of context
and were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that those
statements lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient basis for a finding
that Section 20(f), Rule 138, had been violated.
On January 8, 1969,
additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the charge
against him because it is one of civil contempt against a party and the charge
is oriÂginally cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court. He also stressed
that said charge was not signed by an “offended party or witness”, as required by law;
and that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the stead
of an “offended party or witness.”
We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation
of December 2, 1968, as further clarified by a supplemental motion of December
27, 1968, he manifested that the use of
or reference to his law firm in this
case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates; that
on July 14, 1967, one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur’s
behalf, offered to retain his services, which was accepted; that Meads inquired
from him whether he could appear in this case; that he advised Meads that this
case was outside his professional competence and referred Meads to another
lawyer who later on likewise turned down the offer; that in view of the
rejection, Meads and he agreed to terminate their previous retainer agreement;
that he had not participated in any manner in the preparation or authorship of
any pleading or any other document in connection with this case.
On February 4, 1969,
Atty. Erlito R. Uy
explained his side of the case. In
brief, he denied participation in any of the court papers subject of our
November 21, 1968 order; claimed that he was on six months’ leave of absence
from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his name
included as counsel in all of MacArthur’s pleadings
in this case (L-27072), even while he was on leave of absence.
Hearing on this contempt
incident was had on March 3,
1969.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1960,
respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a
special appearance for the purpose, lodged
a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said motion
reiterated previous grounds raised, and contained the following paragraphs:
“4. The said decision
is illegal because it was
penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above
entitled case — which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court —
Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: ‘Justices; who may take part. — X X X X.
only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will
take part in its consideration and adjudication X X’. This requirement is
especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned
the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four months
or more. This proÂvision also applies to
the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
x x x
6. That if the
respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company
abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government,
it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government
officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to
determine the operator of the surigao nickel
deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation
of property and/or to the United States Government, either its executive or
judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent’s
proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either
compensation or due process of law — and invoking the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty
million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made.”
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling “to show
cause within five (5) days from
receipt of notice hereof why he should
not be dealt with for contempt of court.”
On July 30, 1969,
Atty. Juanito M. Caling
filed his return. He there alleged that
the said fourth motion for reconsideration was already finalized when Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that he turned down said
request twice on the ground that he did not know anything about the case, much
less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion; that “the
allegations in said motion were
subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the
background of the case involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton
F. Meads”; that upon assurance that there was nothing wrong with the
motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same; that he was misled in
so signing and the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially
the oral argument allegedly made in the case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling,
this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved “to require Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return
[of Atty. Caling] and at the same time to show cause
why they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be dealt with
for contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and x x
x to direct that the three, Atty. Juanito
M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton
Meads, personally appear before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at
9:30 a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings against all of them will be
heard by this Court.”
On August 13, 1969,
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation.
He disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling’s
statement that he (Santiago)
convinced Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to Santiago,
is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of a
lawyer nearby who could help him file another motion for reconsideration, and
he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling; he thereupon accompanied Meads to Caling, told Caling of Meads’
desire and left Meads with Caling. Santiago
insists that he never prepared the motion and that he never even read it.
On August
15, 1969, Morton
Meads answered. Meads’ version is as follows:
On July 14, 1969, he went to Atty. Santiago’s office with the
fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began
to make some changes in pencil in the first or second paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur
wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked Santiago if he could
recommend one. They then went to Caling whose office
was on the same floor. Santiago
introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing
the fourth motion to Caling. While Caling was reading the document, Santiago
left. After reading the motion, Caling gave his
go-signal. He signed the same after his
name was typed therein. The motion was then filed. According to Meads, from the time he entered
the office of Santiago to the time
the motion was filed, the period that elapsed was approximately one hour and a
half. Santiago
was with Caling for about three minutes and Meads was
with Caling for about fifteen minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that
the quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of context
because said quotation is precisely accurate; that the “xs” indicate that it is not a complete
quotation and that it is a common practice in court pleadings to submit partial
quotations. Meads further contends that
the announced plan to bring the case to the World Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also included a notice of
appeal to the World Court.
On August
27, 1969, this Court
heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to
the second contempt incident.
We shall now discuss the first and second contempt incidents seriatim.
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we,
indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the
courts. He pictures petitioners as
“vulturous executives”. Be speaks of this Court as a
“civilized, democratic tribunal”, but by innuendo would suggest that
it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our
decision of July 31, 1968
as “false, erroneous and illegal” in a presumptuous manner. He there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case
prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner
two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case:
Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president
of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the
newly-created Board of Investments, “a significant appointment in the
Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the decision of
July 31, 1968 was rendered.” In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that
“it would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical
guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority] by the Honorable Supreme
Court should first apply to itself.” He puts forth the claim that lesser
and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to
conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions
obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro “would be
less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular
cause or party.” Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza,
which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that
the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance
of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect
their judgment. He points out that
courts) must be above suspicion at all
times like Caesar’s wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a
member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country, “although the process has already begun.
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which
contained language that is as disrespectful.
But we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. He explained that he deleted this paragraph
in his rough draft, which paragraph was included in the motion filed in this
Court only because of mere inadvertence.
This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing difference; it
erects no shield. Not only because it
was belatedly made but also because his signature appeared on the motion to
inhibit which included paragraph 6. And
this paragraph 6 describes with derision “many of our judicial
authorities” who “believe that they are the chosen messengers of God
in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances
are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity.” It
depicts them as seemingly “incapable of considering that any emanation
from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial
prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a
party or an issue.” After citing acts of two judges of first instance, he
paused to ask: “What is the
explanation for such mentality? Is it
outright dishonesty? Lack of
intelligence? Serious deficiency in
moral comprehension? Or is it that many
of our government officials are just amoral?”
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of
“unjudicial prejudice” against respondent MacArthur and spoke of “unjudicial
favoritism” for petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored
party directly benefited by the decision.
Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court about
loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that “any
other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from
any of the petitioners or members of any board-petitioner, or their agents or
principals, including the President”, should also inhibit themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago’s accusations have
no basis in fact and in law. The slur
made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole
court. For, inhibition is also asked of,
we repeat, “any other justices who have received favors or benefits
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any memÂbers of any
board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including the President.”
The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are
appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each
received a favor from the President.
Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up?
Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to
paralyze the machinery of this Court. We
would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating
in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well
concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant’s attorney
to downgrade this Court,
The mischief that stems
from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the
dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel’s
words are intended to create an
atmosphere of distrust, of
disbelief. We are thus called upon to
repeat what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows:
“By now, a lawyer’s duties to
the Court have become
commonplace. Really, there could hardly
be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: ‘To observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.’ As explicit is
the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that ‘[i]t
is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the
Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of
the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.’ That
same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support
the courts against ‘unjust criticism and clamor.’ And more. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a
conduct that should be ‘with all good fidelity x x x to the courts.’ Worth remembering is that the duty of an
attorney to the courts ‘can only be maintained by rendering no service
involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to
uphold.'”
A lawyer is an officer of
the courts; he is, “like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice.”[1] His duty is to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, “not to promote
distrust in the administration
of justice.”[2] Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to
preserve. For, to undermine the judicial
edifice “is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainÂment
of the liberties of the people.”[3] Thus has it been said of a lawyer that
“[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help
build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.”[4]
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement
that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A client’s cause does not permit an attorney
to cross the line between
liberty and license. Lawyers must always
keep in perspective the thought that “‘[s]ince
lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their
first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration
of justice; to this, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate; and their
conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.”[5] As rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm
in his well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position, lacks
the power to defend himself and it is the attorney, and no other, who can
better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent of the
judicial position.[6] From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to
say: “It will of course be a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain
conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may happen that counsel possesses greater
knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over
the court. It may also happen that since
no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint
on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the
orderly administration of justice.”[7]
The precepts, the
teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of
Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of
justice. The stricture in Section 3(d)
of Rule 71 of the Rules – against improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice –[8] is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is
guilty of contempt of court.
1. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements pointed out to us
by the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted.
Sotto accuses petitioners of having made “false, ridiculous and
wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur.” He brands such efforts as
“scattershot desperation”. He describes a proposition of petitioners
as “corrupt on its face”, laying bare “the immoral and arrogant
attitude of the petitioners.” He charges petitioners with
opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case
but from pleading to pleading in the same case.
Such language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling
of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is
made. It is no excuse to say that these
statements were taken out of context. We
have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. They do not in any manner justify the
inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings, It has been said that
“[a] lawyer’s language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of
the legal profession.”[9]
It is Sotto’s duty as a member of the Bar “[t]o
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice
of the cause with which he is charged.”[10]
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young,
83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use
of the following raw language in his brief: “The accused since birth was a
poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never owned
a thousand pesos in his own name. Now,
here comes a chance for him. A cold
fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man’s life. A simple job.
Perhaps a question of seconds’ work and that would transform him into a
new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This poor ignorant
man blinded by the promise of wealth, protection and stability was given to do
the forbidden deed.” We there held that “[s]uch
a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court.”
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or
his assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case. This Court may motu
propio start proceedings of this nature. There should be no doubt about the power of
this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the power
“[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial
officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before
it, in every manner appertaining thereto.”[11]
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has
misbehaved, under Section 3(a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as an officer of
the court in the performance of his official duties; and that he too has committed,
under Section 3(d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice. He is,
therefore, guilty of contempt.
1. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano
C. Regala. It
was improper for Atty. Santiago to have included the name of the firm of Atty. Regala without the latter’s knowledge and consent. Correctly did Regala
insist – and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents – that he
had not participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled
case. Regala
did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. He is exonerated.
2. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty.
Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the record is the fact that
Atty. Uy was not also involved, in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of
the contempt citation. He should be held
exempt from contempt.
3. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth motion for reconsideration is,
indeed, an act of contumacy.
First. It was filed
without express leave of court. No explanation has been made why this has been
done.
Second. It lifted
Section 1, Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows:
“Justices; who may take part. — X X X X. only those members present
when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its
consideration and adjudication X X.” However,
the provision in its entire thought should be read thus –
“SECTION 1. Justices;
who may take part.
– All matters submitted to the court for its consideraÂtion and
adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication
by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the court at
the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication,
whether such Justices were or were not present at the date of submission;
however, only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral
argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication, if the
parties or either of them, express a desire
to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the date of submission.”[12]
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the
Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain this point.
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a
distorted quotation came about – the portion left out was anyway marked by “Xs”, which is a common
practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with
candor and fairness, and specificÂally states that “it is not candid nor
fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote.” While Morton Meads is
admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate
deception that is being foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to the rule quoted
and that qualification was intentionally omitted.
Third. The
motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World
Court and/or the United
States government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the
decision of this Court of July 31, 1968.
In doing so, unnecessary statements were injected. More specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur “will inevitably x x
x raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine
Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 x x
x to the World Court” and would invoke “the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of
all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price
premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually x x x.“
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this
Court to decide the case in its favor. A
notice of appeal to the World Court
has even been embodied in Meads’ return.
There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to
reconsider the decision. An appeal from
a decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to
reconsider that decision. And yet, it
would appear that the appeal to the World Court
is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this
Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
1. Atty. Caling has not shown to the
satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge against
him. He knows that he is an officer of
this Court. He admits that he has read
the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at the last
minute, still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should
not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.
2. As for Morton F. Meads,
he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. He cannot beg off from the contempt charge
against him even though he is not a lawyer.
He is guilty of contempt.
3. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he had nothing to do with
the fourth motion for reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is
too transparent to survive fair appraisal.
It goes against the grain of circumstances. Caling represents
before us that it was Santiago who
convinced him to sign the motion, who with Meads explained to him the
allegations thereof and the background of the case. Caling
says that if not for his friendship with Santiago,
he would not have signed the motion. On
the other hand, Meads states that Santiago
began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even started to make
changes thereon in pencil. We must not
forget, too, that according to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with Santiago
before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable that Santiago
did not read the fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time.
Furthermore, Santiago
is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in
this case. He has not resigned from his
posiÂtion as such lawyer. He has control
of the proceedings. Whatever steps his
client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal
Ethics should have reminded him that “[a] lawyer should use his best
efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which
the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their
conduct towards Courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the
lawyer should terminate their relation.”
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be
protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than
punishment. The people should not be
given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor
amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a
court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a
standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court
of justice.
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only
for one reason, this Court had really no alternative but to decide the main
case against respondent MacArthur. As we held in our decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur
did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this invitation to bid explicitly warned
that “bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected.” And, we
repeat, “[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company [MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite
bond.”[13]
It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid
unaccompanied by a bond, contrary to
the instrucÂtions to bidders, is not entitled to any consideration.
It should be emphasized,
too, that because the decision herein
was by a unanimous Court, even if the Chief
Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of this
case, the result would have been the
same: MacArthur’s
cause would just the same have failed.
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, this Court hereby finds:
1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and
Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago
in the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates
and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not
guilty of contempt of court; and
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton
F. Meads and Atty. Juanito M. Caling
guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an addiÂtional
P1,000, Morton F. Meads, P1,000,
and Atty. Juanito M. Caling,
P200.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the
Secretary of Justice, for whatever action he may deem proper to take in the
premises against Morton F. Meads who is an alien.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the
Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action as he may deem proper in
relation to the disbarment or suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose
Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of
this decision to the personal records of Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose
Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., did not take
part.
[1]
People ex rel. Karlin vs.
Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855.
[2]
In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602.
[3]
Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160.
[4]
People vs. Carillo 77 Phil, 572, 580.
[5]
5 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1966 ed., p. 69, citing In
re Kelly, 243 F. 696, 706.
[6]
Malcolm, op. cit., p. 161.
[7]
Ibid., pp. 161-162; emphasis supplied.
[8]
Section 3(d), Rule 71, provides:
“SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after
charge and hearing.- After charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt:
x x x
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
x x x
[9]
5 Martin, op. cit., p. 97.
[10]
Section 20(f), Rule 138, Rules of Court.
[11]
Section 5(d), Rule 135, Rules of Court.
[12]
Emphasis supplied.
[13]
Decision of July 31, 1968,
p. 3; Rollo, p. 387.