TONGDONEN GISOBEN, TOMAS FOCASAN, CORNELIO MALINANG, MARCELO GISOBEN, AND THE HEIRS OF THE LATE ANDOY FANIKER, PETITIONERS, VS. SPS. BENJAMIN AND FILIPINAS PIMENTEL, DUCAR GONGC…

Tongdonen Gisoben versus Spouses Pimentel

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by Tongdonen Gisoben, Tomas Focasan, Cornelio Malinang, Marcelo Gisoben, and the heirs of the late Andoy Faniker against spouses Benjamin and Filipinas Pimentel, Ducar Gongcao, Jimmy Gongcao, and Lucia Gongcao. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to set aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga, which denied their motion for reconsideration, ordered the entry of judgment, and issued a writ of execution in a case for declaration of ownership, possession, recovery of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, and damages. The case matters because it is a compact teaching vehicle on three recurring bar topics: the binding effect of counsel's negligence on the client, the reckoning of the period to appeal, and the rule that a final and executory judgment may no longer be disturbed.

Procedural History

The respondents filed their complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga. The trial court initially deferred the proceedings and directed the parties to the Lupon Barangay, and it denied the respondents' motion to declare the petitioners in default. After pre-trial and trial, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the respondents, declaring the Pimentels the lawful and registered owners of the lot covered by the certificate of title, ordering the petitioners to surrender the owner's duplicate copy, declaring the Gongcaos the lawful owners of the respective portions, ordering the petitioners to receive the amount consigned with the court, and awarding attorney's fees, litigation expenses, moral damages, and costs.

The petitioners, without the assistance of a lawyer, filed a motion for reconsideration. The respondents moved for entry of judgment and issuance of a writ of execution, arguing that the petitioners' counsel of record had received the decision and that the period to appeal had lapsed. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and granted the entry of judgment and the writ of execution. An entry of final judgment and a writ of execution followed. A new lawyer then entered his appearance for some of the petitioners and filed a second motion for reconsideration, and the petitioners filed an omnibus motion to set aside the entry of judgment and to quash the writ. The trial court denied these motions. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Facts

The Pimentels were the registered owners of a lot in Maledda, Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga. Through special powers of attorney, Benjamin Pimentel was authorized to sell two adjacent lots belonging to other owners. He then sold the three lots, with a total area of about seven and a half hectares, to Ducar Gongcao for fifty thousand pesos, of which Ducar paid thirty thousand pesos.

The petitioners later offered to buy the same lots, but Benjamin declined because of the sale to Ducar, telling them it would be up to Ducar to share the lots with them. Faniker then showed Benjamin a photocopy of a document purporting to evidence an agreement that the petitioners would share in the purchase. Ducar disowned the agreement, and Benjamin told the petitioners that Ducar would share only one-half of the total area, to which the petitioners agreed. The petitioners paid twenty-five thousand pesos, retaining one thousand pesos for realty taxes in arrears, and Benjamin received twenty-four thousand pesos for the one-half portion and returned five thousand pesos to Ducar.

Subsequently, Faniker and Tongdonen gave twenty-five thousand pesos to Benjamin's father, Severo, and convinced him to turn over the owner's duplicate of one certificate of title. Later, while Benjamin was out of town, Faniker and his companions convinced Filipinas Pimentel to give them the owner's duplicate of the Pimentels' own certificate of title. Benjamin reported the matter to the barangay captain, but the petitioners refused to return the titles or to accept the refund. The petitioners were later able to effect transfers of the lots into their own names, although Benjamin never executed a deed of sale in their favor.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration and in issuing the entry of judgment and the writ of execution.
• Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time, applying the technical rules of procedure.
• Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the decision of February 10, 2012.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

This provision bears on the case because it establishes that execution of a final judgment issues as a matter of right, without need of notice and hearing to the losing party.

Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.

This provision bears on the case because it shows the contrast: discretionary execution pending appeal requires notice and hearing, while execution of a final judgment does not.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari lies only where a court acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the Court found no such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment in the assailed orders.

On the second issue, the Court held that the petitioners' counsel of record was still their lawyer when he received the decision, and the period to appeal was correctly reckoned from that receipt. The motion for reconsideration was therefore filed out of time. The Court stressed that clients are bound by the acts or omissions of their counsel, and that the right to appeal is not a natural right or part of due process but only a statutory privilege. The Court also held that the entry of judgment was valid even without a prior resolution of the second motion for reconsideration, because a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited and does not stop the running of the period of finality. On the respondents' motion for execution, the Court held that it did not need a notice of hearing because the judgment had already become final and executory.

On the third issue, the Court held that the petitioners' contentions on good faith and on the sufficiency of the evidence concern the merits of the case and are beyond the province of a petition for certiorari. The Court closed with the rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, for what remains is the purely ministerial enforcement of the judgment.

Doctrine

A client is bound by the acts and omissions of counsel in the conduct of the case. The exception is when counsel's actuations are gross or palpable and result in serious injustice, but where the client was not deprived of due process, nullification of the decision on grave abuse of discretion is not warranted. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not a natural right or part of due process, and it must be exercised in the manner and within the period fixed by law. The period to appeal is reckoned from receipt of the decision by counsel of record. A second motion for reconsideration is prohibited and does not prevent the decision from attaining finality. Execution of a final and executory judgment issues as a matter of right under Section 1 of Rule 39, without need of notice and hearing to the losing party. Finally, a final and executory judgment is immutable and may no longer be modified in any respect.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the Court upheld the assailed orders of the trial court denying the motion for reconsideration and issuing the entry of judgment and writ of execution.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that clients are bound by the negligence of their counsel, and the right to appeal is a statutory privilege reckoned from counsel's receipt of the decision. Examiners like to use this case on the binding effect of counsel's negligence, the prohibited second motion for reconsideration, and the rule that execution of a final judgment issues as a matter of right without notice and hearing.