LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR BETTER PHIL., AND/OR OLIVER O. LOZANO, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL PRICE CONTROL COUNCIL AND/OR SHELL PHILIPPINES, INC., CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., FILOIL REFINE…

Lawyers League for a Better Philippines versus National Price Control Council

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction, brought by the Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and its officer Oliver Lozano against the National Price Control Council and the major oil companies operating in the country. The petitioners sought to nullify the order of the Price Control Council dated January 28, 1971, which fixed the prices of regular grade gasoline, premium grade gasoline, automotive diesel fuel, industrial diesel oil, industrial fuel oil, liquified petroleum gas and asphalt. The case matters because it teaches the doctrine of mootness: when a supervening law freezes the very prices under attack and the question is already embraced in another pending proceeding, the Court will not render an advisory opinion.

Procedural History

The petitioners filed an original action for certiorari in the Supreme Court, praying for an injunction against the oil companies to restrain them from raising petroleum prices beyond the levels fixed by the Price Control Council. On July 6, 1971, the Court issued a resolution commanding the respondent oil companies, effective immediately and until further orders, to desist from enforcing the price increases announced at midnight of June 30, 1971, and to maintain prices at the levels set in the Council's order of January 28, 1971. That restraining order continued until the Oil Industry Commission began hearings to determine whether price increases were justified. The oil companies then filed motions to dismiss on the ground that the case had become moot and academic. The Solicitor General, appearing for the Price Control Council, opposed the motions, and the case was submitted for decision.

Facts

The Price Control Council, acting under the old Price Control Law, issued an order on January 28, 1971 fixing the prices of various petroleum products. The oil companies thereafter announced price increases effective at midnight of June 30, 1971. The petitioners came to the Supreme Court to nullify the Council's order and to stop the increases.

On July 27, 1971, while the case was pending, a New Price Control Law was approved. It expressly covered, among the essential commodities in its Section 1, fuels, lubricants, crude oil and petroleum products, without prejudice to any action the Oil Industry Commission may thereafter take. The maximum prices established by the Price Control Council under the old law and enforced as of June 30, 1971 were made effective by the new law.

On the strength of this development, the oil companies moved to dismiss, arguing that the new law had frozen the prices at the June 30, 1971 levels and that the relief prayed for had thus been overtaken. The petitioners offered no satisfactory rebuttal. The Solicitor General opposed dismissal, warning that lifting the restraining order at that stage, before the Oil Industry Commission had fixed new ceilings, could be misread as license for unilateral increases contrary to the rollback provision of the new law, and noting that the issues had been joined and the case submitted for decision.

Issues

• Whether or not the petition for certiorari to nullify the Price Control Council's order of January 28, 1971 has become moot and academic by reason of the approval of the New Price Control Law.
• Whether or not the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent oil companies should be granted.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of the New Price Control Law, Republic Act Number 6361, provides:

Fuels, lubricants, crude oil and petroleum products, without prejudice to any action which the Oil Industry Commission may hereafter take under the provisions of Republic Act No. 6173.

This provision is decisive because it places petroleum products within the coverage of the new law and preserves the June 30, 1971 price levels, thereby removing the object of the petition.

Section 3 of the same law, invoked by the Solicitor General, provides:

The maximum prices of the articles or commodities mentioned in Section 1 established by the Price Control Council under the old Price Control Law (R.A. No. 6124) and enforced as of June 30, 1971, are made effective by the new law without prejudice to any action which the new Price Control Council or the Oil Industry Commission may take after hearing.

This rollback provision confirms that the prices the petitioners sought to protect were already fixed by statute, so no injunctive relief from this Court was needed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the question sought to be litigated had indeed become moot and academic. The new law had reenacted the price control regime and frozen petroleum prices at the levels established by the Council and enforced on June 30, 1971. Whatever legal issues of consequence the petitioners wished to ventilate were now within the ken of judicial cognizance in the proceedings for review appropriately before the Court, arising from the Oil Industry Commission's hearings, in which a restraining order had again been issued. The Court noted that the petitioners offered no satisfactory rebuttal, and that even the Solicitor General's opposition rested only on the practical concern of misinterpretation, not on any live controversy.

On the second issue, the Court granted the motions to dismiss, there being no remaining live controversy for it to resolve.

Doctrine

A case is moot and academic when a supervening event, such as the enactment of a new statute that grants by law the very relief prayed for, removes the live controversy between the parties. Courts do not sit to render advisory opinions; where the issues have been overtaken and the same questions are already cognizable in another pending proceeding, the petition must be dismissed. The reenactment of the price control law, covering fuels, lubricants, crude oil and petroleum products and freezing prices at the June 30, 1971 levels, supplied by statute what the petitioners asked the Court to decree by injunction.

Disposition

The motions to dismiss of the respondent oil companies were granted, and the petition was declared moot and academic.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a supervening statute granting the relief prayed for renders the petition moot and academic, for courts do not render advisory opinions. Examiners use this case to test mootness and the political question of price control, and to remind you that a restraining order lapses once the controversy it protected is overtaken by law.