EDUARDO VIDAL AND PABLO DE JESUS, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND ROLANDO BELEN, EMILIO BONLFACIO, JUVENAL LEGASPI, TEODORO T. CALALANG, ANTONIO DOLOSON, ARCA…

This is a special civil action for mandamus.

Petitioner Eduardo Vidal was general president of the Kapisanan ng Mga
Manggagawa sa Perokaril, hereafter referred to as Union.  Before the expiration of his term ending on
May 15, 1968, he sought another term at the national election of officers of
the Union scheduled to be held on March 28, 1968.  His co-petitioner Pablo de Jesus, another Union
member, likewise, ran in said election, for the office of general
treasurer.  Their main opponents were
Rolando Belen, for president, and Emilio Bonifacio,
for general treasurer.  Said election was
to be conducted, pursuant to the Election Code of the Union,
under the supervision of an Election Committee – hereinafter referred to as
Committee – composed of private respondents herein, Juvenal Legaspi,
Teodoro T. Calalang,
Antonio R. Dolozon, Arcadio
Alon, Laureano B. Caracta and Buenaventura Mapanao.

After the election returns, ballot boxes and other papers
pertaining to said election had been transmitted to the Committee for
canvassing in Manila, there was an incident which induced Belen to file, on
April 2, 1968, a petition, docketed as Charge No. 2419 of the CIR, against said
respondents, alleging that, when the canvass was about to begin, respondent Dolozon, “with threats of bodily harm tried to get
from him (Belen) the key to the room where the ballot boxes” were kept;
that “on the same occasion there were several persons, not members of the
Union, who were around bearing firearms”; and “that several minutes
before the above incident, x x x
the secretary of the Comelec delivered to the
chairman of the committee (Mr. Juvenal Legaspi)”
the returns for six (6) precincts named in the petition, and praying that said
Mr. Legaspi be ordered to deliver to the Clerk of the
CIR the above-mentioned returns and the members of the Committee directed to
convene in the CIR “and there make the canvass of the election returns x x before a represen­tative” of said Court.  Soon thereafter, or on April 8, 1968, the
parties in said Charge and Eduardo Vidal executed a compromise agreement
stipulating, inter alia:

“That after canvassing the election returns of each box, it is
hereby agreed that the entire ballots be counted under the following
conditions:

“(a)    That the number of
votes in the election returns inside the ballot boxes and the number of bal­lots
corresponding to said election returns will be simultaneously counted;

“(b) That in the counting of ballots, any question as to the
legality will be held in abeyance and the ballots in question will be counted
in favor of the candidate voted upon in the ballot, but the ballot will be
placed under question mark.  If, in the
overall counting, the winning candidate obtains a majority votes which cannot
be overcomed or affected by the questioned ballots,
the legality of the ballots will no longer be put in question, but if the
number of questioned ballots will be the deciding factor as to who will be the
winner for a certain position, the questioned ballots will be acted and decided
by the Election Committee as in a formal protest under the provisions of the
Election Code.”

After canvassing the corresponding election returns, the Committee
certified that Vidal had received 845 votes for president, as against 1,003 of
Belen, who, accordingly, had a plurality of 158 votes, and that De Jesus had
obtained 496 votes for treasurer, as against 527 votes of Bonifacio,
who thus had a plurality of 31 votes. 
Out of the 1,003 votes in favor of Belen, 332 had, however, been
questioned by Vidal, and 114 of the 527 votes cast for Bonifacio
were contested by De Jesus.  This
notwithstanding, the Committee, without passing upon the legality of these two
(2) sets of questioned ballots, issued the corresponding certificate of the
“election results” and “proclamation”, declaring, among
others, that Belen and Bonifacio had been elected
general president and general treasurer, respectively, of the Union.  Accordingly, on April 29, 1968, Vidal and De
Jesus moved, in the proceedings involving Charge No. 2419, that the
aforementioned certification and proclamation of the winning candidates be
nullified and that the Committee be instructed to recanvass
the contested ballots in accordance with the above-quoted provisions of the
compromise agreement, in order to determine the real winning candidates for the
positions already adverted to.  Inasmuch,
however, as the candidates proclaimed elected, including Belen and Bonifacio, took their respective oaths of office on April
30, 1968, Vidal and De Jesus, without waiting for the action of the CIR on
their motion of April 29, 1968, commenced in this Court, on May 9, 1968, the
present special civil action for mandamus against Belen, Bonifacio
and the members of the Committee, praying that this Court:

“1.     Issue a Writ of Mandamus against the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations to act on the Urgent motion of the herein
petitioners which is in fact a motion for a Writ of Execution, to order the
respondent members of the Election Committee to revise the questioned ballots
for validity under the compromise agreement which is in the nature of an order
of said Court, x x x , with
preliminary injunction to enjoin respondents Rolando Belen and Emilio Bonifacio from assuming the positions of General President
and Treasurer, respectively, of said labor union and to allow petitioner
Eduardo Vidal to continue as President of the labor union as ‘hold-over’
president, pending result of the recanvassing;

“2.    To also nullify the
certification of the alleged winning candidates of respondent Election
Committee; and

“3.     Lastly, to nullify the
‘Proclamation’ x x x , by
said members of the Respondent Election Committee, which was with the sanction
of the respondent Court, of the alleged winning candidates as well as their
induction into office, which powers are vested with the present Board of
Directors of the union and that in the meantime, for the present officers of
the labor union to continue in office pending compliance with the legal
Proclamation and induction of the newly elected candidates as per the union’s
Election Code, x x x.”

Meanwhile, or on May 8,
1968, Belen had filed, with the CIR, a motion to dismiss the
aforementioned Charge No. 2419, upon the ground that it had become moot and
academic.  Soon thereafter, an acting
prosecutor of said Court moved to dismiss said charge, alleging that the acts
therein complained of do not constitute an unfair labor practice.  As prayed for in these motions and despite Vidal’s
opposition thereto, Presiding Judge Arsenio I.
Martinez of the CIR issued an order, dated May 24, 1968, dismissing Charge No.
2419, upon the grounds already mentioned.

Herein petitioners maintain that the proclamation of Belen and Bonifacio as candidates-elect for general president and
general treasurer of the Union is null and void, the Committee not having
complied with the provision in the compromise agreement to the effect that,
when the number of questioned ballots in favor of the candidate who obtained
the largest number of votes exceeds that of his plurality over the candidate
who got the second largest number of votes, as in the case at bar, the
Committee shall pass upon the objections to said questioned ballots, so as to
ascertain who has been elected, and that, consequently, the CIR should be
compelled to act on petitioners’ urgent motion of April 29, 1968, and to direct
the Committee to recanvass the questioned ballots for
Belen and Bonifacio, in accordance with the
stipulations of said agreement.

Upon the other hand, it is urged by respondents herein that the
alleged threats to get a given key and the presence of non-members of the Union
provided with firearms, without any averment that these threats were made, or
said armed men were there, on behalf or by order of the Union or the Committee,
and the alleged delivery of some election returns by the secretary of the
Committee to its chairman, before the actual beginning of the canvass, do not
constitute an unfair labor practice; that, for this reason, and be­cause said
acts do not fall under any of the other categories of cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the CIR, the same had no authority to entertain said Charge No.
2419; that, even if said acts amounted to an unfair labor practice, the CIR had
no authority to act upon the charge until its prosecutor shall have filed the
corresponding complaint; that said prosecutor had, not only filed no such
complaint, but even moved for the dismissal of Charge No. 2419; that, since the
CIR had no jurisdiction over the merits thereof, neither did it have authority
to act upon petitioners’ motion of April 29, 1968, the same being a mere
incident of Charge No. 2419; and that, consequently, the CIR should not and
cannot be compelled by mandamus to pass upon the merits of said motion.

Even, however, if the CIR had authority to entertain said motion,
we find that petitioners herein are not entitled to the relief prayed for.  In this connection, it should be noted that
the motion was filed as part of the proceedings in connection with Charge No.
2419; that these proceedings were dismissed by an order of Presiding Judge
Martinez, dated May 24, 1968; that a decision or order of a CIR Judge may not
be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court^[1];
that the party aggrieved by said decision or order must first seek its
reconsideration by the CIR en banc, which petitioners herein
never did; that, even if Presiding Judge Martinez had not acted on the motion
of April 29, 1968, petitioners could have sought the proper relief from the CIR
en banc; that only decisions or orders of the CIR en banc
are reviewable by the Supreme Court; that petitioners
have neither moved for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal of Presiding
Judge Martinez nor asked from the CIR en banc the proper remedy
against his failure to act on said motion; and that, consequently, petitioners
herein are barred from seeking the assistance of this Court.  As stated in Namarco
v. Hon. E. Tabigne:”^[2]

“x x (I)t is well settled that only an award, order or
decision of the CIR in banc, and not that of any of its Judges,
is appealable to this Court x x
x . 
Petitioner, therefore, should have resorted first to the Court of
Industrial Relations in banc before coming to this Court.  While, under its rules, a motion for
reconsideration to the full court requires a period for the opposing party’s
answer before the motion may be acted upon, there is no law prohibiting or
divesting the CIR in banc from exercising in the meantime,
and upon proper application, the power to stay or suspend the
enforcement of any order, ruling or decision of au of its trial judges,
pending resolution of the motion to reconsider, where such stay is
imperative to prevent reconsideration
from becoming nugatory.  This power is implied in the right of
the Industrial Court in banc to affirm, alter, modify or reverse the
orders, rulings or decisions of any of its trial judges x x
x.  On this
score, failure to present a motion to
reconsider before the CIR in banc is fatal to the instant petition.”^[3]

WHEREFORE, the present action for mandamus should be, as
it is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioners herein.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., took no part.

^[1]
NAMARCO Employees v. Hon. Tabigne, L-23294,
April 30, 1966; Broce v. CIR, 106 Phil. 388,
390-391.

^[2]
L- 23294,
April 30, 1966.

^[3]
See, also, Luzon Stevedoring v. Luzon Marine Dept. Union, 101 Phil. 257, 271-272;
Connel Brothers v. NLU, L-3631, June 30, 1956.  Underscoring supplied.