PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MELVIN GIRON Y SANTOS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

On appeal before Us is the
decision*
of the then Court of First instance of Caloocan City, convicting herein
accused-appellant, Melvin Giron y Santos of the crime of Rape as charged in the
information, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

“IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders
judgment, finding and declaring the defendant, Melvin Giron, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as charged in the information, without any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance.  The penalty provided for by law is reclusion perpetua.

“The Court sentences accused Melvin Giron the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with the accessory penalties
provided for by law, to pay the costs, and to indemnify the offended party,
Corazon Gungun, the sum of P6,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

“SO
ORDERED.”

(Rollo, p. 17)

Appellant Melvin Giron was charged with the crime of Forcible
Abduction with Rape in a
complaint filed by Special Counsel Felizardo Y. Viray, at the instance of the
complainant Corazon Gungun, quoted hereunder:

“The undersigned complainant
accuses MELVIN GIRON Y SANTOS of the crime of FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH
RAPE, committed as follows:

“That on or about the
22nd ‘day of October 1971 in Kaloocan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above named accused with lewd designs and by
means of violence and intimidation,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously abduct and carry away in a motor vehicle the
undersigned complainant against her will and without her consent and thereafter, said accused took her to the
Fifth Avenue Hotel, this City, and then and there said accused, by means of
force, violence and intimidation had carnal knowledge of the undersigned
complainant against her will and
without her consent.

“Contrary to law.

“Caloocan
City, September 25, 1972.”

(Rollo, p. 3)

With the assistance of his counsel, appellant Giron entered a
plea of not guilty when arraigned on December
27, 1973.  Thereafter, trial
ensued.

The prosecution
presented the following witnesses:  Dr.
Dario Nalagan, Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, the complainant Corazon Gungun and Sgt. Artemio Manuben, and
the following documentary evidence: 
Exhibit “A”, letter of request for the physical examination of
Corazon Gungun signed by Capt. Benjamin O. Manlapig, Chief, MID-DB, Caloocan
City Police Department; Exhibit “B”, Living Case Report No. 71-644 on
Corazon Gungun signed by Dr. Dario Nalagan; Exhibit “B-1”, No. 2
conclusion in Exhibit “B”; Exhibit “C”, copy of the
complaint and Exhibit “C-1”, signature of Corazon Gungun and rested
its case.

Dr. Dario Nalagan testified that he examined the person of Corazon
Gungun on November 3, 1971, upon a letter of request signed by Capt.
Benjamin Manlapig of the Caloocan City Police Department (Exhibit
“A”) and submitted a Living Case Report No. N-71-644 (Exhibit “B”).  His
report stated that 1) there was no evidence of extra-genital injuries; and 2)
medical evidence compatible with sexual intercourse with a man on or about the
alleged date of commission October 22, 1971 (Exhibit “B-1”) (March 8,
1974, TSN, pp. 23-32).

Sgt. Artemio Manuben, Liason,
LCO, Metrocom, testified that he
arrested appellant Giron in Navotas while driving a PUJ
jeep, after which he turned the latter over to the warrant section of
the Caloocan City Police Department (August 1, 1974, TSN, pp. 2-10).

Corazon Gungun testified that at the time of
the incident she was a pre-med student at the University of the East in Manila (September 13, TSN, 1974, p. 39).  She came to know appellant Giron about a year
prior to the incident since he was then working as a driver of the Lachenal family whose residence was opposite their store.  He was courting her but she did not accept
his love (September 13, 1974, TSN, pp. 46-51). 
On October 22, 1971 on coming out of the San Bartolome Church in Malabon
after hearing mass, she saw appellant Giron who
informed her that it would be the last time that he will approach her since he was going to Bataan.  He forced her to stay and talk to him.  He invited her to eat and so as not to create a scandal, since he was pulling her and people were
staring at them, she went with him to Jack’s Restaurant in Monumento where he
continued professing his love for her (September 13, 1974, TSN, pp. 4-14).

It was getting late and
appellant Giron was preventing her from going home, threatening her that he had
other companions and a vehicle outside and that he would create a scandal.  She, however, forced herself to stand and
proceeded towards the jeepney stop to get a ride home.  She was surprised that he was at her back and pulled her to a waiting taxi.  She pleaded with him to let her go, shouting at the top of her voice but the people around merely stared at them (September 13,
1974, TSN, pp. 16-22).

The taxi driver appeared
hesitant to proceed but moved when appellant Giron told him that she is his
wife.  They proceeded directly to the
Fifth Avenue Hotel.  While
inside the taxi, she shouted, pleaded and even scratched his face (September
13, 1974, TSN, pp. 24-25).

Upon reaching the hotel, appellant Giron pulled her out of the
taxi.  No hotel boy attended to them or
if there were any, she could not remember (January 17, 1975, TSN, p. 33).  She was continuously struggling, kicking him,
pulling his clothes to the point that his pants got torn to prevent him from bringing her
to the room.  Once inside, appellant Giron pushed her towards the bed and
locked the door.  She stood up and tried to open the door but was again pushed by the appellant.  This happened several times, according to the
complainant more than ten times.  In the
process of her struggle, she noticed that her dress, a one piece dress with a
zipper at the back, was open.  She tried
to cover her private part with her two hands (across the chest) and turned her
back against the appellant.  The latter
was able to take off her clothes, including her
underwears, and lay on top of her.  It took appellant sometime to consummate his
act as she was continuously struggling. 
When she eventually lost her strength, she felt a pain that she has
never felt before and it was then that she concluded that the appellant has
succeeded in ravishing her (September 13, 1974, TSN, pp. 26-40).

They left the hotel the
following morning on board a taxi.  She
alighted at the corner of San Ildefonso Church in Navotas and took a jeepney
towards Daanghari to get home (January 17, 1975, TSN, pp. 49-50).

Upon reaching their
house, she informed her mother that she was abducted by appellant
Giron.  It was only on November 3, 1971 that she was examined
by a doctor because she lost
consciousness for more than one
week and could not speak (September 13, 1974, TSN, pp. 41-43).

On cross examination,
when she was confronted with a picture (Exhibit “1”) showing her with
appellant Giron, she claimed that it was a stolen shot taken at the
Chinese Garden in Luneta when the latter went with their family on an outing (September 13, 1974, pp. TSN, 52-58).  When she was shown a letter addressed to
appellant Giron (Exhibit “2”), she identified the body of the letter
to be in her handwriting but denied having written the greetings
“Mahal kong Melvin” (September 13, 1974,
TSN, pp. 50-60).  She likewise denied
being the signatory of the letter but claimed that it was intended for her
boyfriend, a certain Felizardo Alejandrino
(September 13, 1974, TSN, pp. 63-67). 
When confronted with an envelop with the letterhead of the University of
the East (Exhibit “3”) she
admitted that it was in her handwriting but claimed that it contained an
estamfita (Exhibit “6”) which she sent to the appellant for moral support when he entered the cursillo (September 13, 1974, TSN,
pp. 76-78).  A Christmas card was
presented (Exhibit “4”) and admitted by the complainant to be
in her handwriting but denied having
given it to the appellant since it was placed on the Christmas tree in their
store.  She claimed that it was taken by
the appellant from the Christmas tree (September 13, 1974, TSN, pp. 60-70).

The defense presented as
witnesses Venancio Luna and the accused Melvin Giron and Exhibit “1”, a picture of the accused with the complainant
allegedly taken at the Chinese Garden in Luneta on February 15, 1971; Exhibit “2″, a letter in Tagalog addressed to the accused; Exhibit
“3”, an envelop with the name of the accused as addressee;
Exhibit “4”, a Christmas card; Exhibit “5”, residence
certificate of the complainant for the year 1971; Exhibit “6”, a
decolores estamfita addressed to the accused and signed by the complainant;
Exhibit “7”, a prayer book of the complainant; Exhibit
“8”, a signed statement of the complainant taken at the Caloocan
City Police Department on November 2, 1971; Exhibit “9”, a picture
of the accused with the mother of the complainant; and
Exhibit “10”, voter’s I.D. of the complainant and rested its case.

Venancio Luna testified that he came to know
the complainant Corazon Gungun about two months prior to the
incident of October 22, 1971 because he and appellant Giron often went to
their store to drink beer.  In the
morning of October 23, 1971, complainant Gungun together with appellant
Giron came to his house at P. Cadorniga St., Navotas and informed him that they have
eloped.  After sometime, he brought them
to the house of his sister, Feliza Luna, at Pacheco St., Tondo because they were ashamed since the
complainant knew a lot of people in his place.  The following day, appellant Giron and
complainant Gungun came back to his house and asked him to bring them to the house of complainant’s parents, to which he agreed (August 1, 1985,
TSN, pp. 7-17).

It was the mother of the
complainant who led them into the house when they came.  She scolded the complainant and the
appellant, and even slapped the former so he asked permission to leave (August
1, 1975, TSN, pp. 33-36).

Appellant Giron testified
that he started courting the complainant about a year prior to the incident and
that she reciprocated his love sometime in September 1970.  On the day of the incident, at about 3:00 p.m., he informed the complainant that he was
leaving for Bataan.  She
suggested that they hear mass together. 
After hearing mass at the San Bartolome Church, they went to Jack’s
Restaurant for merienda.  After which,
they went to Nayong Pilipino, then to Luneta. 
They were supposed to spend the night at the place of his friend named
Mely but had to proceed to the Fifth Avenue HoteI when they were not
accommodated at the latter’s house (September 26, 1975, TSN, pp. 28-42).

Upon their arrival at the
hotel, he paid for the room accommodation but they were not required to register
(February 13, 1976, TSN, pp. 34-35). 
They spent the night there, upon
mutual agreement.  They made love twice,
the first lasting for one hour and the second for thirty minutes.  All these are with the consent of the complainant
(September 26, 1975, TSN, pp. 47-51).

They left the hotel the
following morning on board a taxi and proceeded to his place in North
Bay Boulevard.  They
were met by his mother who got angry because he is a married man.  They left and proceeded to the house of
Venancio Luna (September 26, 1975, TSN, pp. 52-56).  The latter brought them to the house of his sister, Feliza Luna, in Tondo, where
they spent the rest of the day and the night (September 26, 1975, TSN,
pp. 57-60).

They went back to
Venancio Luna the following day and asked him to accompany them to the house of
complainant Gungun.  Upon their arrival
at the latter’s house, the mother of Corazon scolded them and even boxed
them.  When asked why they eloped, he
informed them that it was Corazon who did not want to go home.  He was then sent home by the latter’s
mother and her sister (September 26, 1975, TSN, pp. 61-66).

As aforestated, a
decision was rendered on August 17, 1976, convicting herein
appellant.  Hence, this
appeal.

On November
19, 1976, this Court
resolved to approve the P30,000.00 bail bond filed by appellant Giron and subscribed by
the Philippine Guaranty, Co., Inc. for his provisional release.  (Rollo, p. 49).

The defense assigned three
(3) errors, namely:

I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE WHICH BRING FORTH GRAVE DOUBTS AS TO THE VERACITY AND
CREDIBILITY OF COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONY.

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION IS UTTERLY
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF
THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE THE FACT
THAT GREAT WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE OR THE SUM TOTAL OF IT SHOWS THAT THE SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND THE COMPLAINANT WAS MUTUAL AND VOLUNTARY.

Reduced to bare essentials, the issue in the case at bar is
whether or not the guilt of the accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

It is well established that the appellate court generally does
not disturb the findings of the lower court considering that the latter is in a
better position to pass upon the matter of credibility having seen and heard
the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the hearing.  However, exception
is taken to this well-settled
rule in order to keep faith with the immutable principle that
every criminal conviction must be
supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt (People v. Mejias, 168 SCRA 33, November 28, 1988).

Among others, the exceptions to the general rule are:  (a) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (b) the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (d) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (e) the court in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and
appellee (People v. Ale, 145 SCRA 58 [1986]).

While rape is truly a detestable
crime, the probability looms large
that it may be resorted to as a contrivance to malign the accused who would be
hard pressed to prove his innocence and would thereby place his life, liberty
or fortune or all of them together, hanging on the balance (People v. Ymana,
171 SCRA 174, March 9, 1989 reiterating the ruling in People v. Barbo, 56 SCRA 459, March 19, 1974 and People v.
Quintal, 125 SCRA 734, November 25, 1983). 
In the case at bar, appellant is a married man, a fact known to the
complainant (September 13, 1974, TSN, p. 10). 
For  the testimony of the offended party to be sufficient to convict for
the crime of rape, it must be clear and
free from any serious contradiction.  Her
story must be impeccable and must ring true throughout or bear the stamp of absolute truth and
candor (People v. Ramos, 167 SCRA 476, November 18, 1988; People v. Ymana, supra;
People v. Lacuna, 87 SCRA 364, 1974).  This the complainant has failed to meet.

Complainant’s testimony
is vitiated with a lot of inconsistencies and improbabilities that do not
inspire belief.

Complainant Gungun
testified that she was shouting on top of her voice when she was being forced inside the taxi and also
when she was being dragged to the room
in the hotel.  Yet no one came to help
her.  Verily it is inconceivable that
with the resulting fiasco, no one noticed or even seemed interested (September
13, 1974, TSN, pp. 20-30).  Notably, the
accused was not even holding a gun or a deadly weapon so that anybody who
wanted to, could have helped without endangering
themselves.

Even more incredible is
the testimony of complainant
that she had been fighting the accused all the
way from the taxi to the hotel room (September 13, 1974, TSN, pp. 20-30) which under normal circumstances could have
knocked off her eyeglasses to the floor of the taxi and yet she
claimed that after the sexual intercourse the accused handed back to her, her
eyeglasses and clothes.  They left the
hotel together, riding a taxi and
then she, who could hardly walk,
upon alighting at the San Ildefonso Church, took a jitney and went home alone
(March 13, 1975, TSN, pp. 18; 20-21).

She narrated that her
dress – a one piece dress with zipper at the back was open.  She said she tried to cover her private parts with her hands and turned her back at
the accused; all the more exposing her body to him and facilitating the removal
of her dress (September 13, 1974, TSN, pp. 26-40).

Also from her testimony,
she would have this Court believe that she only knew the accused
because the latter was courting her, but she did not accept his love.  In fact she was aloof and it was only her
mother who was treating him well (September 13, 1974, TSN, pp. 51-54).  However, her testimony was belied by the
letters, cards, etc., she sent the accused, the most
telling of which was the picture at the Chinese Garden showing her leaning on the accused
(September 13, 1974, TSN, pp. 56-57). 
She claimed that such was a stolen shot which obviously made it
even more convincing (September 13,
1974, TSN, p. 55).

Finally, it is beyond belief that after complainant told her
mother that she was abducted and raped and
thereafter lapsed into unconsciousness for one week, the latter was not even alarmed to seek immediate medical
assistance but waited instead for complainant to regain consciousness before
having her physically examined, in order to file the case (September 13,
1974, TSN, pp. 41-42).

Thus, in view of the
severity of the penalties for the offense of rape, the judiciary is cautioned
by this Court to take extreme care to avoid an injustice to the accused.  If reasonable doubt exists, the verdict must
be one of acquittal.  Rape is an
accusation easy to make, hard to prove but harder to defend by the accused,
though innocent.  The evidence for the
prosecution must be clear and convincing to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence.  Rape is an
offense to which, as is often the case, only two people can
testify, thus requiring the most conscientious effort on the part of the
arbiter to weigh and appraise the conflicting testimonies.  If a reasonable
doubt exists, the verdict must be one of acquittal (People v. Leoparte,
G.R. No 85328, July 4, 1990
reiterating People v. Cabading, G.R. No. 74352, June 6, 1989).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant Giron is hereby
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

*
Rendered by Judge Manuel A. Argel.