LAO OH KIM, PETITIONER, VS. HON. PASTOR P. REYES, JUDGE, CAR, 3RD REGIONAL DISTRICT, DOMINGO GARCELIAN AND JOSE BUTARDO, RESPONDENTS.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal by certiorari taken by petitioner Lao Oh Kim
to review the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Third
Regional District, in its Case No. 785-T.

Respondents Domingo Garcelian and Jose Butardo are
tenants in the landholding of petitioner Lao Oh Kim in Anao, Tarlac. On
July 11, 1955, respondent Garcelian was convicted by the Justice of the
Peace Court of Anao of the crime of light threat for having threatened
to harm or kill with a bolo Galanico Oasin, petitioner’s farm manager,
and sentenced to pay a fine and costs; while on August 8, 1955,
respondent Jose Butardo was convicted, also by the same court, of the
crime of malicious mischief for having caused damage to petitioner’s
estate by deliberately opening the earthen dike of its water deposit
without any need for it, being sentenced to a fine and three days’
imprisonment.

On the basis of the above convictions, petitioner
Lao Oh Kim, through his farm manager Galanico Oasin, filed Case No.
765-T in the Court of Agrarian Relations for the ejectment of
respondents Garcelian and Butardo. The Agrarian Court, however,
dismissed the petition on the ground that with respect to respondent
Garcelian, his conviction for the crime of light threat against
petitioner’s farm manager is not within the purview of par. (g), sec.
50, Rep. Act 1199, specifying as a ground for ejectment the tenant’s
conviction of a crime “against the landholder or a member of his
immediate family”; while with respect to respondent Butardo, his
conviction for malicious mischief does not come under sec. 50, par.
(f), of the same Act, making the tenant liable to ejectment when he
“through negligence permits serious injury to the I land which will
impair its productive capacity”, there being no showing of the nature
and extent of the damage caused and considering that the penalty
imposed was only three days of imprisonment. Unable to obtain
reconsideration of the order of dismissal of his petition for
ejectment, petitioner Lao Oh Kim appealed to this Court.

We find no error in the lower court’s holding that
no sufficient ground exists for the ejectment of respondent Domingo
Garcelian.

Sec. 50, par. (g), of Rep. Act 1199 provides:

“Any of the following shall be a sufficient cause for the dispossession of a tenant from his holdings:

* * *

(g) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his immediate family or farm household of a crime against the landholder or a member of his immediate family.” (Emphasis supplied)

As correctly held by the Court a quo,
respondent Garcelian’s conviction of the crime of light threat against
petitioner’s farm manager does not fall within the purview of the above
provision, it not appearing that his farm manager is a member of
petitioner’s “immediate family”.

Petitioner insists that the term “immediate family”
of the landlord should be interpreted to mean his “farm family”, which
includes his farm manager and other persons “who usually help his
operate the farm enterprise”, in the same way that under the same par.
(g) of sec. 50, supra, the crime constituting a ground for
the tenant’s ejectment may not only be committed by him or any member
of his immediate family, but by any member of his “farm household” as
well. The argument is without merit, for if the law had intended that
crimes committed against members of the landlord’s farm household are
justifiable grounds for ejectment , it would have so provided, in the
same way that it provided that a crime committed by a member of the
tenant’s farm household is a ground for the tenant’s ejectment. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
In fact, the intention to exclude crimes committed against the
landlord’s representative, such as his farm manager, as grounds for the
tenant’s ejectment, appears even more clear if we refer to sec. 19 of
the old Tenancy Act (Act 4054) which includes as cause for dismissing
the tenant “commission of a crime against the person of the landlord or his representative.”
The elimination of crimes against the landlord’s representative from
the enumeration of the grounds for the ejectment of the tenant under
the new Tenancy Act, Rep. Act 1199, is clear proof that such crimes,
while sufficient ground for ejectment under the old law, are no longer
available for the dismissal of the tenant under the new law.

Petitioner also argues that the grounds specified
under sec. 50 of Rep. Act 1199 are not exclusive of other valid causes
for the tenant’s ejectment, and that the crime committed by respondent
Garcelian against petitioner’s farm manager is “gross misconduct” that,
under sec. 19, par. 2, subsec. (1) of Act 4054, is reasonable cause for
his dismissal. As already stated, however, Act 4054 has been totally
repealed by Rep. Act 1199; and what is more, sec;. 49 of the latter law
provides that “the tenant shall not be dispossessed of his
holdings except for any of the causes” enumerated in the following
section 50, hence the causes enumerated therein are exclusive of all
other grounds. Indeed, the purpose of the new law in limiting the
grounds for the tenant’s dispossession is to give a tenant security of
tenure and pi: event abuse on the part of the landlord in the dismissal
of his tenants; and to read into the provisions of the new law grounds
for ejectment not specified therein would defeat this purpose.
Furthermore, it would violate the legislative policy, declared in sec.
56 of the Act, that in the interpretation of its provisions, the courts
“shall solve all grave doubts in favor of the tenant”.

Petitioner would have us apply certain cases wherein
we allegedly held that the statutory causes for dispossession of a
tenant are not exclusive of other valid grounds for ejectment. Suffice
it to say that said cases were decided before the passage of Republic
Act 1199 and consequently can not be applied in the instant case.

Coming now to the case for ejectment against
respondent Jose Butardo, we believe that the respondent Court should
have sustained petitioner’s petition to eject this respondent.

In holding that Butardo’s conviction for malicious
mischief for having deliberately opened the earthen dikes of
petitioner’s land without any need thereof does not justify his
ejectment, the lower court applied sec. 50 (f) of Rep. Act 1199
providing the tenant liable for ejectment when he “thru negligence
permits serious injury to the land which will impair its productive
capacity”, aid held that as there was no showing that Butardo’s
mischief caused serious injury to petitioner’s land that impaired its
productive capacity, his conviction could not be invoked for his
ejectment.

We agree with petitioner that the provision applied
by the court below refers only to acts of negligence of the tenant, and
has no application to malicious, willful acts of mischief. As negligent
acts are not deliberate or intentional, they constitute no ground for
ejectment unless they appear to be gross, that is, unless serious
injury is caused to the landholding that impairs its productive
capacity. Where, however, the tenant is guilty of deliberate, malicious
acts of mischief against the land under his cultivation and possession,
the extent of the damage caused by his acts is immaterial, he becomes
unfit to continue in his landholding, and he may be dispossessed under
another paragraph of sec. 50 of Rep. Act 1199, namely, par. (b) thereof
providing as sufficient cause for ejectment “when the tenant violates
or fails to comply with * * * any of the provisions of this Act”. Sec.
23, par. (1) of the Act enjoins the tenant “to cultivate and take care
of the farm, the growing crops and other improvements entrusted to him
as a good father of a family, by doing all the work necessary in
accordance with proven farming practices”; while under sec. 33, par. 3
thereof, the tenant’s duties include “the maintenance, repair and
weeding of dikes, paddies, and irrigation canals in hi3 holdings”. As
the dikes of the land entrusted to him are among the improvements
therein that he must care for with the diligence of a good father of a
family, and which he is bound to maintain and repair at all times,
respondent Butardo’s acts of maliciously destroying the earthen dilx of
petitioner’s land, however small the damage caused, unquestionably
constitute vali d and sufficient ground for his ejectment.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed in
so far as it dismissed the petition for ejectment against respondent
Domingo Garcelian; but reversed in so far as it dismissed the petition
against respondent Jose Butardo, who is hereby ordered ejected from
petitioner’s estate in Anao, Tarlac. Costs against petitioner Lao Oh
Kim and respondent Jose Butardo. So Ordered.

Paras, C.J. Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur