G.R. No. L-3352. June 12, 1950
ILEANA A. CELIS ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLEES, VS. SOLEDAD CAFUIR ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Simeon, supposedly her husband, from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in a habeas corpus case granting the petition for a
writ of Habeas Corpus and ordering the Sheriff of Manila who then had
custody of the boy Joel Cafuir (John Cafuir) to deliver said child to
its mother, petitioner Ileana A. Celis. The appeal involving as it does
only questions of law, we accept the findings of fact made by the trial
court. The facts are few and quite simple and may be stated briefly as
follows.
On July 10, 1946, petitioner, Ileana A, Celis, single, gave birth
at the North General Hospital to a boy subsequently named Joel (John)
Cafuir. The father seems to be unknown, although from what may be
gathered from the decision appealed from, he was an American soldier
who formed part of the American Liberation Forces. Due to the anger and
extreme displeasure of the father of Ileana because of the alleged
disgrace that she brought on herself and the family for having
maintained illicit relations with a man to whom she had not been
married and because of her father’s objection to having her soft in the
paternal home where Ileana was then living, nine days after delivery,
Joel was given to the custody of the respondent Soledad Cafuir, who
thereafter took him direct from the hospital to her house, ministered
to his needs and comfort, and even employed a nurse to take care of
him, Ileana herself spent several days in Soledad’s house while
recuperating; later, she returned to her own home leaving her child to
the care of respondent Soledad. Thereafter, Ileana visited her child
every Saturday, taking to him condensed milk, food, and a little money.
On September 17, 1948, Ileana married her co-petitioner Agustin C.
Rivera. The couple thereafter decided to get back Joel Cafuir. Because
of the refusal of respondent Soledad to give him up, petitioners sued
out the corresponding writ of habeas corpus.
The theory of the respondents-appellants is that Ileana had definitely renounced her custody of and patria potestas
over her child and that now she may not get him back. In support of
this claim, Exhibits 4 and 1 were presented in evidence. The first
exhibit is dated July 10, 194 6, the same day that John Cafuir was born
at the hospital, and reads as follows:
“July 10, 1946 “To whom it may concern: “I
hereby entrusted to Mrs. Soledad Cafuir of 131 Limasana, Quiapo,
Manila, my son name John Cafuir, for the reason that I don’t have the
means to bring the child up.“Anybody who may claim my son for adoption in the future without the consent of the under-signed is hereby ignored. “(Sgd.) “Nenita Celis “Mother”
The second, Exhibit 1, is dated November 2, 1946, and reads as follows:
“November 2, 1946 “To whom it may concern: “I,
Nenita Cells, of 1196 Singalong, Malate, Manila, hereby designate Mrs.
Soledad Cafuir, residing at 131 Limasana, R. Hidalgo, Quiapo, Manila to
be the real guardian of my son, name Johnny Cafuir.“No one has the right to claim for adoption except Mrs. Soledad Cafuir. (Sgd.) “Nenita Celis “Mother”
The trial court found and rule)/that under these two exhibits signed
by petitioner Ileana Cells, there is no basis for finding that she had
renounced the custody of her child in favor of respondent Soledad. We
agree with the said finding and ruling of the trial court.
In the case of Soria Diaz vs. Servando Estrera, (G.R, No. L-1155, June 30, 1947; 44 Off.Gaz., 4354), [1] this court in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus involving the custody of a child held that paternal authority or patria potestas
may be waived, and it denied the petition of the mother to recover the
custody of her child from the respondent Estrera. The facts in that
case are, however, a little different from the those in the present
case. There, the mother in giving up the custody of her child signed a
document reading as follows:
“A quien concierna:
“Hago constar que yo,
Soria Bernardo Diaz, filipina, mayor de edad y vecina del pueblo de
Badian, Cebu, doy a mi hija Dulcisima que nacio en la propia casa de
los esposos Senor y Señora, de Servando Estrera, del pueblo de Mandaue,
Cebu, debido a su amor grande a mi hija y como correspondencia a sus
preocupaciones y gastos con motivo de mi parto he ofrecido a ellos sin
ninguna vacilacion o deseo de tener la referida niña,“Hago
entender que cuando firme este documento ha cesado mi autoridad sobre
mi hija y si en los dias futuros intentare intervenir, reclamando dicha
niña y sacandola, yo podria ser acusada ante los tribunales del pueblo
para que me castiguen por la infraccion, que yo cometiere de este
contrato que he firmado.“He firmado esto en este dia 20 de Febrero del año 1944 en preseneia de los testigos que firman abajo.
(Fda.) “Soria Bernardo Diaz “Madre de la niña”
From a reading of the above-quoted document it is not hard to see
that the mother definitely gave up and renounced all right and claim to
the custody of her child. She even imposed against herself a penal
sanction should she in the future try to claim her child. Moreover, in
that case, the man to whom the mother gave the custody of her child was
the latter’s adulterine father and that circumstance seems to be one of
the considerations which impelled this court to overrule the mother’s
claim and leave the custody of the child in status quo, for the reason
that the respondent being the father, tho illegitimate, of the child,
he had obligations and duties towards said child such as support, care,
and education, and that said duties and obligations could best be
complied with by keeping the child in his own home.
The facts in the present case, however, are quite different. The
respondents, particularly Soledad, are strangers to the child. She is
not related to him in any degree by consanguinity or affinity.
Furthermore, the document wherein the boy’s mother is supposed to have
definitely renounced custody over the child cannot be reasonably
interpreted as having contemplated such renunciation. In the first
document she merely entrusted her son to Soledad because she did not
have the means to bring him up. The word “entrusted” cannot convey the
idea of definite and permanent renunciation of the mother’s custody of
her child.
The second document, Exhibit 1, merely designated respondent
Soledad as the “real guardian” of the child. The designation of one as
the guardian of another cannot and does not mean that said guardian
will always assume and discharge the duties of the office or position.
Guardianship is always or almost invariably understood to be temporary.
While one is a minor or is incompetent, a guardian is appointed; but
when minority has passed or incapacity has ceased, guardianship also
terminates. The same reasoning may be applied in the present case.
While petitioner Ileana was still unable to care for and support her
child and because she could not bring said child to live with her in
the home of her father, she entrusted its custody and care to
respondent. Now that she has been emancipated from the parental
authority of her father and now that she has already been married and
is now in a position to care for and support her own child, this with
the consent and desire of her husband, who joins her in the petition,
there can no longer be any reason for depriving her of the custody of
her boy. In her legitimate efforts, and to have her realize her natural
desire in this respect, the law and this Court should give her every
help.
Furthermore, the very last paragraph of Exhibit 1 to the effect
that “no one has the right to claim for adoption except Mrs. Soledad
Cafuir”, envisages a future act; it means that no one else may adopt
the boy except respondent Soledad. It does not mean, however, that she
has already adopted him. She may or may not adopt him. It is something
yet to be done in the future. This the respondent has not done.
Of course, we realize and understand the position and attitude of
respondent Soledad. She must have come to love the boy whom she raised
from baby-hood and on whom she may have lavished her affections and
spent money for rearing him up» To separate the boy from her now will
mean a loss and mental suffering. But to assuage such suffering she has
her own children, four of them,
Now, let us look at the other side of the picture. It shows to us
the case of the real and natural mother legitimately, anxiously, and
desperately trying to get back her child in order to fill the void in
her heart and existence. She wants to make up for what she has failed
to do for her boy during the period when she was financially unable to
help him and when she could not have him in her house because of the
objection of her father. Now that she has her own home and is in a
better financial condition, she wants her child back, and we repeat
that she has not and has never given him up definitely or with any idea
of permanence.
This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having
deprived other and son of the beautiful associations and tender,
imperishable memories engendered by the relationship of parent and
child. We should not take away from a mother the opportunity of
bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to
poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look
back with pride and a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and her
efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come
true. We should not forget that the relationship between a foster
mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child turns
out to be a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done
for him, said parents might yet count and appraise all that they have
done and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a dead
loss, and even rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the
child into their hearts and their home. Not so with a real natural
mother who never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring
memories of her associations with her child, however unpleasant and
disappointing. Flesh and blood count. On this point we quote with
approval a paragraph in the decision of the trial court presided over
by Judge Tiburcio Tancinco:
“El Juzgado mira con simpatia los esfuerzos hechos
por la recurrida Soledad Cafuir y su familia por el cuidado del niño
Joel, a quien se le ha rodeado de todas las comodidades y cuyos menores
caprichos han sido satisfechos, y preve el dolor que causaria a ella y
a los demas miembros de su familla la separacion del nino Joel, en
quien se han acostumbrado a ver a un verdadero hijo. Pero si este
carino es digno de adrairacion y de fsspeto, existe otro amor mas
grande y mas digno de respeto, que es el amor de madre, no solo porque
esta recoaocido y amparado por las leyes y constltuye un derecho mejor,
sino porque tiene su origen en la misma sangre.”
The decision of the trial court does not assess the financial means
of the mother to support and educate the boy. But bearing in mind the
fact that she is now married to a man who with her is ready and willing
to assume the responsibility of support and education, we may presume
that the couple is able to discharge and cope with said responsibility.
It is possible that the means of the respondent in this respect are
more adequate, and that Joel would be better off staying and remaining
with her. But financial means is not everything. Whether a child should
stay permanently with a kindly stranger or with his own mother, is not
to be determined alone by considerations of affluence or poverty. Poor
youths who had to work their way thru school and college, have, not
infrequently, scaled the heights of success, as easily and swiftly as
their more favored companions, and done so with more, inner
satisfaction, and credit to themselves and their humble parents.
As to the petition of respondents that they be indemnified in the
sum of P5,531.15, the amount spent for the care and support of the
child, we agree with the trial court that said claim should be made and
established in a separate suit.
Pending the present appeal, upon motion of respondent Soledad, she
was, by resolution of this Court dated October 14, 1949, given
temporary custody of the boy Joel Cafuir, and pursuant thereto, the
Sheriff had been directed to deliver said boy to Soledad, The
dispositive part of the decision appealed from should therefore direct
not the Sheriff but respondent Soledad to deliver the boy to
petitioners. With this modification, the decision appealed from is
affirmed, with costs.
Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] 78 Phil., 637.
OZAETA, J.:
I hereby certify that Mr. Chief Justice Moran and Mr. Justice Padilla voted for the affirmance of the decision.
TUASON, J., dissenting:
I keenly regret that I am unable to agree with the views of the majority and compelled to write this dissent.
The things that instantly meet the eye upon reading the record, the
briefs, and the decisions themselves, both of the lower court and of
this Court, are issues of fact. The single question of law presented is
itself directly dependent on matters of fact.
The main issue relates to whether plaintiff Ileana Solis executed
Exhibits 1 and 4, which she disowns. This denial necessitated the
introduction of a handwriting expert, who was subjected to prolonged
examination and cross-examination. And even after this Court and the
court below have found that Exhibits 1 and 4 are authentic, controversy
as to facts is not eleminated; there still remains the question as to
what the parties contemplated in those papers. As the language of
Exhibits 1 and 4 is said to be ambiguous, the parties and the courts
have resorted to the evidence, specially the parties’ conduct, to
discover the meaning and intent of the agreements.
That fundamental questions of fact, then, are involved is to me so
manifest as to be beyond dispute. For this reason, I am of the opinion
that this appeal has been erroneously brought to this Court and should
be certified to the Court of Appeals.
But if this Court must decide the appeal on the merits, regarding
jurisdiction as a simple matter of discretion, which of course is
wrong, it is submitted that the judgment below is against the facts,
the law and the equity of the case.
It is settled by various pronouncements of this Court that patria potestas may be renounced. In Strong vs. Boishir, (53 Phil. 331), the Court laid down this doctrine:
“In accordance with the facts stated, and with Act
No. 3094, the Jtaerican Guardian Association legally assumed the care
and custody of these minors, who are at present under the legal care
and custody of the respondents, having been provisionally placed in his
power for their adoption.“By virtue of the instrument
Exhibit 1, the applicant’s right as natural mother of the minors ceased
and passed to the American Guardian Association. The reason alleged by
the court below in its judgment for holding that the rights and duties
of the patria potestas cannot be renounced, is incorrect.
Both the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure in dealing with
cases of adoption, and said Act 3094, itself, authorizes the
renunciation of the patria potestas and the rights to the care and custody of infants, such renunciation being the basis for the purposes of said laws.”
And in Diaz vs. Estrera, (44 Off. Gaz., 4354) [1],
the Court expressed the same idea. In that case the petitioner was the
natural mother of a child whose father was respondent Servando Estrera.
On February 20, 1944 petitioner executed a document granting the
custody and possession of her child to Servando Estrera and wife and
renouncing her authority over said child. A petition for habeas corpus
was subsequently brought by petitioner in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu to recover from the respondents Servando Estrera and his wife
the custody of the child. Upon these facts, the Court held.
“La patria potestad es renunciable. No solo no hay
nada en nuestras leyes y en nuestra jurisprudencia que prohiba esa
renuncia, sino que una ley de la Legislatura Filipina, la Ley No. 3094,
promulgada el 16 de Marzo, 1923, la permite y autoriza expresamente.”
The distinctions which the majority cake between the case at hand and Diaz vs. Estrera, supra,
relate to collateral, nonvital aspects which do not alter the
underlying principle of the latter decision. In any case, if the
present action could be differentiated from Diaz vs. Estrera, no reason is given why the ruling in Strong vs. Boishir, supra, should not control the case at bar.
It is plain beyond doubt, in my opinion, that it was the intention
of the parties that defendant Soledad Cafuir should have permanent
possession and custody of the child. The very fact that the parties
deemed it necessary to put the agreements in writing is the best
evidence of such intention. For, what co uld have been the purpose of
going into that formality if the understanding were that the mother
could get her child any time she wanted? And would the defendant, who
is not in any way related by blood to the child, have gone into the
trouble and expense of hiring a nurse and rearing the child in her home
if she had not felt secure in the belief that the child was to be hers
for keep? Would she have gone to such trouble and expense if, as Ileana’s mother would have the court believe, Soledad Cafuir promised
that “at the end of two or three years she would return the child to
the mother specially if and when the latter should get married?” And
finally, why should plaintiff deny the authenticity of Exhibit 1 if it
meant nothing more than what she says and this Court finds—that the
defendant could keep the child only as long as the plaintiff would
allow?
Further support of the contention that the renunciation by the
mother of her right over the child was intended to be permanent, is the
fact that the child was baptized in the Quiapo church on August 8,
1946, as John Cafuir, and Soledad Cafuir was registered in the parish
record as the mother, and Bibiano and Emilia Ramirez, defendant
Soledad’s parents, as the maternal grandparents.
The plaintiff denies that she was aware of these entries. But the
date of the child’s baptism fell within the period, following
plaintiff’s discharge from the hospital, during which she lived with
the defendants in their home. It is utterly inconceivable that Soledad
Cafuir should have made herself appear in the parish record as the
mother of a child of an unknown father without the plaintiff’s
knowledge or consent, let alone suggestion. The assumed maternity of
the child by Soledad Cafuir did not offer her any material or spiritual
benefit. It was not anything on which she could cash in or which she
could have the avidity and’ covetiousness to appropriate steathily. If
we are to believe that the plaintiff did not know the name given her
child at baptism, her ignorance would only confirm her lack of interest
in it and her relinquishment of her right over its custody. However,
Ileana did know that John Cafuir was her child’s baptismal name, for in
Exhibit 4, which is totally in her handwriting, that is the name she
wrote.
At this point, it is significant to notice that the defendants
attended to every detail of the baptism and defrayed all expenses
incident thereto. The plaintiff and her mother who, unlike her father,
remained friendly and helpful to her daughter, appear to have kept
aloof from the ceremony so momentous to a Filipino family.
The plaintiff’s mother testified that in June 1948, she or her
daughter did not recover the child from the defendant “because I also
wanted her (defendant) to have the child, because somehow I owe her
gratitude.” It is difficult to perceive how, by allowing the defendant
to keep the child a little longer and make further sacrifices, the
plaintiff was repaying gratitude. It seems more sensible to suppose
that realization of an injustice, or shame and embarrassment at having
to break a formal commitment, deterred the plaintiff or her parents.
No one would begrudge sympathy from a mother who gave up the
custody of her child by force of Inexorable necessity or circumstances
beyond her control. This was far from being the case here. The sole
reason the plaintiff has given for not having her baby with her was
that her father was furious over the disgrace she had brought upon the
family and that she alone would be unable to support her child outside
her parents’ dwelling. But her parents’ home was not the only place
where she could live and give her son the care that she owed him before
God and before the law, and she had the wherewithal to perform that
duty. She could live in a separate house with her child as she has been
doing with her husband. She lived with the defendants for more than one
month after she left the hospital, and when she moved from Soledad’s
house after that period, “she had landed a job.” That was as early as
September 1946, more than one month before she signed Exhibit 1, which
is dated November 2, 1946. However, plaintiff’s mother gave a different
reason for her daughter’s reluctance to take her child along with her.
Plaintiff’s mother says the reason was that Soledad “began to act
differently; she did not want to leave the child with the mother.” If
we are to give credence to this testimony, such attitude on the part of
the defendant should go far to refute this witness’ other testimony,
namely: that, according to the agreements, Soledad was to have the
child tinder her care during the plaintiff’s pleasure.
It is said that “This Court should avert the tragedy in the years
to come of having deprived mother and son of the beautiful associations
and tender, imperishable memories engendered by the relationship of
parent and child. We should not take away from a mother the opportunity
of bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due
to poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to
look back with pride and a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and
her efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come
true. We should not forget that the relationship between a foster
mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the ch ild turns
out to be a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done
for him, said parents might yet count and appraise all that they have
done and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a dead
loss, and even rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the
child into their hearts and their home. Not so with a real natural
mother who never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring
memories of her associations with her child, however unpleasant and
disappointing. Flesh and blood count.”
These are beautiful sentiments, but with all due respect, they are
a generalization hardly justified by the facts obtaining in this case.
The plaintiff has proved to be bereft of those tender affections which
draw a mother to her child or a child to its parents. To say the least,
substantial evidence is against the belief that flesh and blood mean
much to the plaintiff or that she truly has”beautiful dreams about her
little boy.” Strange as it may seem, the evidence abundantly shows that
it is the defendant who has real, genuine affections for the child and
who is ever willing and ready to make sacrifices for him.
By their acts ye shall know them. As a Spanish saying goes, “El
amor y la fe, en las obras se ve.” What are the facts as revealed by
the parties1 conduct?
By the plaintiff’s testimony, (for which liberal allowance should
be made for exaggeration, bearing in mind her proven unreliability for
truth), she visited her child in defendant’s home only once a week, and
gave the defendant P5 and two cans of condensed milk for the baby. And
during the time the boy was in the sheriff’s possession by order of the
court below, an order which was revoked by this Court on certiorari,
the mother, according to the sheriff, came to see her son every other
day, spending with him a few hours each time and “bringing only fried
potatoes once in a while.”
Not so with Soledad Cafuir. According to the same sheriff, Soledad
visited the boy every afternoon and slept with him at night. The boy,
the sheriff said, played with his mother sometimes, but with the
defendant, much. The sheriff declared that the defendant supplied the
child’s food daily, and to attend him she sent a nurse who stayed with
the child all the time, day and night. He further stated that Soledad
brought the child “many things, there were biscuits, milk and other
things more.” Jtad it was not Soledad alone who showed love and
solicitude for the child; all the other members of her family came
every day to visit him.
It was only the sheriff’s fee for the custody of the child that the
plaintiff equally shared with Soledad; and this was so because, it is
reasonable to presume, the plaintiff had been required to do so in the
court’s order which, it is also to be assumed, she herself suggested
but which Soledad fought with tenacity, going to the extent of bringing
the case to this Court.
The placing of the child in the hands of the sheriff, which this
Court regarded as unnecessary and cruel, speaks louder than any
profession on the mother’s part of love and concern for the child’s
aomfort and welfare. This move, as above stated, was vigorously
resisted by the defendants and was as vigorously defended by the
so-called mother. Innocent and not intended as a bait, this incident
nevertheless parallels Solomon’s legendary method of determining the
true mother of a disputed child. This incident unmasks who’s who more
eloquently than anything that co uld be devised and affords a good test
of the comparative regard and affections which the parties have for the
child.
With this background, the real tragedy, in my opinion, lies in
taking the child away from the defendants. The Court admits that “She
(Soledad) must have come to love the boy whom she raised from babyhood
and on whom she may have lavished her affections and spent money for
rearing him up. To separate the boy from her now would mean a loss and
mental suffering.”
For contrast, what suffering would the mother have to endure if she
were denied the possession of her son? Does she love him now more than
she did when she voluntarily parted with his custody? Does affection
grow or does it wane as separation lengthens, specially when there was
never an association to remember? Is it not rather continued and
endearing companionship that blossoms into fondness and personal
attachment?
The plaintiff’s cause deserves contempt rather than sympathy. She
has shown herself denuded of the tender devotion of a mother when she
turned her back on her child at a time it needed most a mother’s care
and attention. By casting behind her back her legal and moral
obligation towards her child, she forfeited all claims to his custody.
In this, precedent is not lacking. .
From the decision in Castillo vs. Castillo, (39 Off. Gaz., No. 37 p. 968), we quote the following syllabus:
“When the defendant was scarcely two years old, the
plaintiff (her mother) delivered her to the possession and custody of
R. H. and his wife, and since then never took care of her. Held:
‘Having abandoned the defendant, the plaintiff is not entitled to be
supported by her. Abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the
natural and legal obligation of care and support. If a parent withholds
his presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to display filial
affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, such parent
relinquishes all parental claim and abandons the child.”
I believe the present case is stronger, in that in the case just
cited the child was abandoned when it was already two years old. Here,
the abandonment took place when the child was at the most delicate
stage of a normal life and needed the utmost care and attention of its
mother.
The marriage of the plaintiff is offerred as Justification for her
plea Jibst she should be given her son now. But her marriage should be
a hindrance instead of a help to her union with her child. Children by
previous marriage are a frequent source of dissension and quarrel in
the family. Such children are often a widowed deterrent to a widowed
mother or father from marrying, human nature being as it is. How much
more should It be so if the child is the product of an illicit
intercourse?
With this idea in mind, I can not resist the suspicion that selfish
motives not conducive to the child’s wellbeing are behind this action.
The boy will soon be big enough, if he is not already, to help in the
chores about the house. Plaintiff’s husband who is earning a meager
salary is not in a financial condition to hire help. These are
conjectures but when the welfare of a helpless child is at stake, it is
well to weigh possibilities and not leave things to chance. The best
policy under the present circumstances would be to leave well enough
alone; to be satisfied with one bird in hand.
That, as the Court fears, the boy might in the future turn
different from what the defendants expected of him, and the defendants
might regret the sacrifices they had made and the hardship they had
gone through to bring him up, has nothing to do with the case
whatsoever. Besides, that is the defendants1 own lookout. They ought to
know the risk, assuming the remote possibility that what they have been
doing for the boy was prompted by mercenary considerations. But again,
who would guaranty that the plaintiffs, specially the stepfather, would
not curse the days when they brought up and reared the child If later
in life the latter should fail to measure up to their expectations?
I am afraid we presume too much in favor of parents, assuming that
parental love is universal and immutable like a phenomenon of physical
science. We also err in assuming that only mothers cotld be capable of
disinterested love and affections. Common observations give truth to
the other Spanish adage, “El amor no mira linaje, ni fe ni pleito
homenaje.” Specific example of this truth is the tragedy that is
exhibited before us; yes, the defendants’ and the child’s tragedy, with
the court’s blessing.
Insinuation is made that the defendants could begin a new getion
for reimbursement of their expenses. This is not even a palliative to a
wounded heart and outraged feelings. It is encouraging the defendants
to court new trouble and expense for nothing. Granting that they could
feet something from the mother and/or step-father of the child, that
would not assuage the defendants’ disappointment, sorrow and anguish,
which can not be appraised in terms of peso and centavos.
[1] 78 Phil., p. 637.