GUILLERMO AUSTRIA, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION), PACIFICO ABAD AND MARIA G. ABAD, RESPONDENTS.

Guillermo Austria petitions for the review of the decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals (in CA G. R. No. 33572 -R), on the sole issue
of whether in a contract of agency (consignment of goods for sale) it is
necessary that there be prior conviction for robbery before the loss of the
article shall exempt the consignee from liability for such loss.

In a receipt dated 30
January 1961, Maria G. Abad acknowledged
having received from Guillermo Austria
one (1) pendant with diamonds valued at P4,500.00, to
be sold on commission basis or to be returned on demand.  On 1
February 1961, however, while walking home to her residence in Mandaluyong, Rizal, Abad was said to have been accosted by two men, one of whom
hit her on the face, while the other snatched her purse containing jewelry and
cash, and ran away.  Among the pieces of
jewelry allegedly taken by the robbers was the consigned pendant.  The incident became the subject of a criminal
case filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against
certain persons (Criminal Case No. 10649, People vs. Rene Garcia, et al.).

As Abad failed to return the jewelry or
pay for its value notwithstanding demands, Austria
brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action against her and her
husband for recovery of the pendant or of its value, and damages.  Answering the allegations of the complaint, defendants spouses set up the defense that the alleged
robbery had extinguished their obligation.

After due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment for the
plaintiff, and ordered defendants spouses, jointly and severally, to pay to the
former the sum of P4,500.00, with legal interest thereon, plus the amount of
P450.00 as reasonable attorneys’ fees, and the costs.  It was held that defendants failed to prove
the fact of robbery, or, if indeed it was committed, that defendant Maria Abad was guilty
of negligence when she went home without any companion, although it was already
getting dark and she was carrying a large amount of cash and valuables on the
day in question, and such negligence did not free her from liability for
damages for the loss of the jewelry.

Not satisfied with this decision, the defendants went to the
Court of Appeals, and there secured a reversal of the judgment.  The appellate court, overruling the finding
of the trial court on the lack of credibility of the two defense witnesses who
testified on the occurrence of the robbery, and holding that the facts of
robbery and defendant Maria Abad’s possession of the
pendant on that unfortunate day have been duly established, declared
respondents not responsible for the loss of the jewelry on account of a
fortuitous event, and relieved them from liabi­lity for damages to the
owner.  Plaintiff thereupon instituted
the present proceeding.

It is now contended by herein petitioner that the Court of
Appeals erred in finding that there was robbery in the case, although nobody has been found guilty of the supposed
crime.  It is petitioner’s theory that
for robbery to fall under the category of a fortuitous event and relieve the obligor
from his obligation under a contract, pursuant to Article 1174 of the new Civil Code, there ought to be
prior finding on the guilt of the persons responsible therefor.  In short, that the occurrence of the robbery
should be proved by a final judgment of
conviction in the criminal case. 
To adopt a different view, petitioner argues, would be to encourage persons accountable for goods or
properties received in trust or consignment to connive with others, who would be willing to be accused in court for
the robbery, in order to be absolved from civil liability for the loss or
disappearance of the entrusted articles.

We find no merit in the contention of petitioner.

It is recognized in this jurisdiction that to constitute a caso fortuito that
would exempt a person from responsibility, it is necessary that (1) the event
must be independent of the human will (or rather, of the debtor’s or
obligor’s); (2) the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill the obligation in a normal manner, and that (3) the obligor must be
free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.^[1]
A fortuitous event, therefore, can be produced by nature, e.g., earthquakes,
storms, floods, etc., or by the act of man, such as war, attack by bandits,
robbery,^[2]
etc., provided that the event has all the characteristics enumerated above.

It is not here disputed
that if respondent Maria Abad were indeed the victim
of robbery, and if it were really true that the pendant, which she was obliged
either to sell on commission or to return to petitioner, were taken during the
robbery, then the occurrence of that fortuitous event would have extinguished
her liability.  The point at issue in
this pro­ceeding is how the fact of robbery is to be established in order that
a person may avail of the exempting provision of Article 1174 of the new Civil
Code, which reads as follows:

“ART. 1174. 
Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable.”

It may be noted therefrom that the
emphasis of the provision is on the events, not on the agents or factors
responsible for them.  To avail of the
exemption granted in the law, it is not necessary that the persons responsible
for the occurrence should be found or punished; it would only be sufficient to
establish that the unforeseeable event, the robbery in this case, did take
place without any concurrent fault on the debtor’s part, and this can be done
by preponderant evidence.  To require in
the present action for recovery the prior conviction of the culprits in the
criminal case, in order to establish the robbery as a fact, would be to demand
proof beyond reasonable doubt to prove a fact in a civil case.

It is undeniable that in order to completely exonerate the debtor
for reason of a fortuitous event, such debtor must, in addition to the casus itself, be free of any concurrent or
contributory fault or negligence.^[3]
This is apparent from Article 1170 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
providing that:

“ART. 1170. 
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages.”

It is clear that under the circumstances prevailing at present in
the City of Manila and its suburbs, with their high incidence of crimes against
persons and property, that renders travel after nightfall a matter to be
sedulously avoided without suitable precaution and protection, the conduct of
respondent Maria G. Abad, in returning alone to her
house in the evening, carrying jewelry of considerable value, would be negligent
per se, and would not exempt her from responsibility in the case
of a robbery.  We are not persuaded,
however, that the same rule should obtain ten years previously, in 1961, when
the robbery in question did take place, for at that time criminality had not by
far reached the levels attained in the present day.

There is likewise no merit in petitioner’s argument that to allow
the fact of robbery to be recognized in the civil case before conviction is
secured in the criminal action, would prejudice the latter case, or would
result in inconsistency should the accused obtain an acquittal or should the
criminal case be dismissed.  It must be
realized that a court finding that a robbery has happened would not necessarily
mean that those accused in the criminal action should be found guilty of the
crime; nor would a ruling that those actually accused did not commit the
robbery be inconsistent with a finding that a robbery did take place.  The evidence to establish these facts would
not necessarily be the same.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the Court
of Appeals under review, the petition in this case is hereby dismissed, with
costs against the petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Ruiz Castro, J., did not take
part.

^[1]
Reyes & Puno,
Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Vol. IV, pages 25-26, citing Lasam vs. Smith, 45
Phil. 657, 661.

^[2]
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1962 ed., page
117, citing 3 Salvat 83-84.

^[3]
V. Lachica vs.
Gayoso, 48 Off. Gaz. (No.
1) 205, and cases cited; Lanaso Fruit SS Co. vs.
Univ. Ins. Co., 82 L. Ed. 422.