G.R. No. L-16991. March 31, 1964
ROBERTO LAPERAL, JR., ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. RAMON L. KATIGBAK, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.
REGALA, J.:
Manila declaring the property covered by TCT No. 57626 in the City of
Manila to be the separate or paraphernal property of the
defendant-appellee Evelina Kalaw. Plaintiffs-appellants, tie spouses
Lapera disagree with the said finding. Hence, they appealed from the
Said decision. They maintain that the realty in question, with its
improvements and income, are conjugal assets of the spouses Evelina
Kalaw and Ramon Katigbak.
This litigation is a sequel to the one instituted by the Laperals
against Katigbak and Kalaw way back in August, 1950. In that case,
Civil Case No. 11767 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the
Laperals sought from the therein defendants “recovery of P14,000
evidenced by various promissory notes executed in favor of the Laperals
by Katigbak, and for the return of jewelry valued if at P97,500.00,
delivered by the Laperals to Katigbak for sale on commission, or a
total of P111,500.00.” On November 1, 1950, upon a confession of
judgment by Katigbak, the trial court rendered judgment against him to
pay the Laperals the sum of P14,000.00, and to return the jewelry
involved, or in lieu thereof, to pay plaintiffs P97,500.00, with
interest from August 8, 1950.
About a month, after this decision was rendered, Kalaw filed a
complaint against her husband Katigbak, for “judicial separation of
property and separate administration,” docketed as Civil Case No.
12860, of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Prior to the trial,
Katigbak and Kalaw submitted an agreement or stipulation of facts, on
the basis of which the court granted the prayer for the “judicial
separation of property and separate administration.”
On February 1, 1955, the Laperals filed another complaint against
Kalaw and Katigbak, Civil Case No. 25235 in the Court of First Instance
of Manila, seeking among other things, annulment of the proceedings had
in Civil Case No. 12860 for “judicial separation of property and
separate administration,” to enforce the judgment secured by the
Laperals in Civil Case No. 11767 on the fruits of Kalaw’s paraphernal
property, and to secure a ruling declaring the real property covered by
TCT No. 57626 as conjugal property of Katigbak and Kalaw. After trial,
the court dismissed the complaint, which dismissal the Laperals
appealed to this Court. Acting on the same, We rendered judgment under
G.R. No. L-11418, promulgated on December 27, 1958, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
“However, our holding does not write a finish to the
case. Because the trial court held that the conjugal partnership was
not liable, it naturally, saw no reason or necessity for ruling upon
the other issues involved, such as the legality of the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 12860 for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
and whether or not the property covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 57626 belongs to the conjugal partnership.“In
conclusion, we hold that while the fruits of the paraphernal property
of Kalaw are not liable for the enforcement of the obligations
contracted by Katigbak, nevertheless, the conjugal properties are.“The
case is hereby ordered remanded for further proceedings to the trial
court, the latter to make the necessary findings indicated and then
render a decision on the basis of said findings in accordance with our
decision. No Costs.”
In compliance with the above endorsement, the trial court, after
submission by the parties of their respective memoranda, there being
already sufficient evidence in the record, rendered judgment declaring
the property covered by TCT No. 57626 as paraphernal. Hence, this
appeal.
The facts upon which the trial court predicated its conclusion that the realty in question is paraphernal are as follows:
“For the reason that it is established without
contradiction in the records that the spouses Ramon Katigbak and
Evelina Kalaw were married in 1938 (tsn, p. 20s hearing of Jan. 31,
1956) and neither of them had brought properties unto the marriage;
that Ramon’s occupation was that of Asst. Atty. of the Bank of the
Phil. Islands wherein his monthly salary was P200.00 (id); that the
property under TCT No. 57626 was registered in the name of Evelina
Kalaw-Katigbak, married to Ramon Katigbak on December 6, 1939, only two
years after marriage and the property was and is in Calle Evangelista,
which was and is a business district; the Court, notwithstanding the
presumption that all properties acquired during the marriage arc
conjugal, is led to believe that, as Evelina declares, her mother Pura
Villanueva was the one that had bought that property for her and had
placed it only in her name as was the practice of her mother; that is,
buying properties and placing them directly in the names of her
children; and this is recognized by Article 1448; and the Court t is
all the more led to the conclusion when it sees that Ramon Katigbak, in
the same year 1939, that is, long before the spouses had come to the
parting of ways, made a manifestation that he had no interest in the
properties —‘Ramon Katigbak, the husband
of the vendor signed this document only for the purpose of assisting
his wife but he has no interest in the property.(Sgd.) Ramon L. Katigbak
(Exh. Ba, p. 189; Record)”
As this case is before us now, therefore, the issue is whether or
not the above findings warrant a rejection of the presumption that the
property disputed, for the reason that it was acquired during the
marriage, is conjugal.
We find for the appellee.
There is no denying that all properties acquired during the marriage
are, by law, presumed conjugal. (Art. 160, Civil Code). The
presumption, however, is not conclusive but merely rebuttable, for the
same law is unequivocal that it exists only “unless it be proved that
it (the property) belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife.”
And, examining the records and evidence in this suit, We hold that this
is a case where the presumption has been sufficiently and convincingly
disproved.
The facts recited by the trial judge in explanation of his view that
the property in dispute is paraphernal despite its having been acquired
during coverture, impress us as adequate and conclusive. As a, matter
of fact, the factors he took into account in rejecting the presumption,
on the whole, tally with Our own views in the cases of Gasiano vs.
Samaniego, 30 Phil. 135 and Coingco vs. Flores, 82 Phil. 284.
In the Casiano case, the deeds to the property in question were in
the name of the defendant who testified that they were “purchased by
her mother for herself and that the purchase price was paid with money
furnished by her mother. On the foregoing, the trial judge rendered
judgment in favor of the defendant, and declared the real properties to
be paraphernal. On appeal to this Court, declaring the ruling as
essentially factual, We said:
“We do not question the correctness of the doctrine
contended for, but we think it is sufficient to say that the legal
presumption established by article 1407 of the Civil Code has been
overcome by the evidence of record. There is nothing in the record
which would justify us in disturbing the findings of the trial judge as
to the credibility of the witnesses called by the defense, and if we
believe the defendant herself there can be no doubt the land in
question was purchased for the wife with her own separate funds.”
It should be further noted that the husband in the aforecited case,
apart from relying on the presumption established by the Civil Code,
sought to show the conjugal nature of the disputed property by
presenting a number of documentary evidence. He exhibited, for
instance, “certified copies of reports on file in the City Assessor’s
Office showing that the ]and was assessed in his name; a certified copy
of an inspector’s report in which the name of the husband appears as
the owner; and, a tax declaration made in November, 1905, relating to
the property in dispute, in the name of the husband.” Yet, even then,
this Court declined to give effect to the presumption as the wife’s
evidence to the contrary were more preponderant. In the present case,
on the other hand, We note that other than invoking the presumption,
the burden of denying the evidence so presented was shifted to the
appellant. In this latter task, the appellant failed completely.
Again, in the Coingco case, We ruled:
“The second question raised in the motion for
reconsideration is, whether the presumption that the properties in
litigation are conjugal properties because they were acquired during
the coverture may be sufficiently rebutted by any one of the following
facts: (1) the titles to them are in the name of the wife alone; (2)
that the husband gave his marital consent to their being mortgaged by
the wife; (3) that the wife was financially able to buy those
properties. While it is true that each one of them, taken separately,
may not be sufficient to overcome the above-quoted presumption
established by Art. 1407 of the Civil Code, it is nonetheless true that
all of them taken together with all the other facts and circumstances
established by the evidence, might be and were considered by the lower
court as sufficient to rebut the same presumption.”
In the case before Us now for review, the deed to the disputed land
is in the name of the wife. At the time of its purchase, the property
was already of such substantial value as admittedly, the husband, by
himself could not have afford to buy, considering that his singular
source of income then was his P200.00 a month salary from a Manila
hank. As in the Casiano case, supra, the defendant herein
testified, and was believed by the trial court, that the purchase price
was furnished by her mother so she could buy the property for herself.
Furthermore, it was established during the trial that it was a practice
of defendant’s parents to so provide their children with money to
purchase realties for themselves.
These facts, quite obviously, more than measure up to the
circumstances obtaining in the two cases previously cited wherein We
held the conjugal presumption to have been rebutted.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the lower Court declaring
the property covered by TCT No. 57626 of the Register of Deeds of
Manila as paraphernal is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellants.
Bengzon, C. J., Concepcion, Reyes J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Bengzon, J.P., Angelo and Dizon, JJ., took no part.