GREGORIO SOLIS, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP­PINES, RESPONDENTS.

Solis versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Gregorio Solis against the Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines. Solis had been convicted of malversation of public funds by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in part. He asks the Supreme Court to set aside the appellate decision on the ground that the judgment of conviction was never validly promulgated, because the judge who penned it had already ceased to hold office when another judge read it out in court. The case matters because it fixes a hard rule on when a judgment is a nullity: a decision promulgated after the judge who rendered it has permanently left the bench is void, and no appeal can be taken from a void judgment.

Procedural History

Solis and several co-accused were indicted, tried, and found guilty of malversation of public funds in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. The judgment was penned and signed by Judge Jose N. Leuterio, then a Judge-at-Large assigned to Camarines Sur. The accused were summoned for promulgation, but no proceeding was held on the scheduled day because it had been declared a special public holiday. The judgment was eventually read out by another judge, Perfecto R. Palacio, over Solis's objection.

Solis appealed to the Court of Appeals, where he attacked the validity of the promulgation. The Solicitor General agreed that the promulgation was illegal and void. The Court of Appeals nonetheless upheld the conviction in part, modifying the sentence in one case, acquitting him in two, and affirming in the others. Solis's new counsel were never served a copy of that decision; they learned of it nearly three years later through the bondsman. After the appellate court denied his motion for reconsideration, Solis filed the present petition for review with the Supreme Court. The case was submitted for decision without a brief from the respondents, since the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that the only consistent stand the People could adopt was to agree with the petitioner.

Facts

Judge Leuterio penned and signed the judgment of conviction on 19 June 1954. All the accused were summoned to appear for promulgation on that same day, but no court proceeding took place, because the President of the Philippines had declared it a special public holiday.

On 20 June 1954, Republic Act Number 1186, which abolished all existing positions of Judges-at-Large, took effect without executive approval. One day later, on 21 June 1954, the defendants appeared before the court, this time presided over by Judge Perfecto R. Palacio of another sala. Over Solis's objection, Judge Palacio promulgated the judgment that Judge Leuterio had written.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that because the abolition of the position was not yet publicly or generally known on 21 June 1954, Judge Leuterio should be considered a judge de facto, and the promulgation of his decision should be treated as valid. Solis brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the judgment of conviction was validly promulgated, considering that it was read out one day after the position of the judge who rendered it had been abolished by law.
• Whether or not Judge Leuterio may be regarded as a judge de facto whose acts are valid, on the theory that the abolition of his position was not yet publicly known when the judgment was promulgated.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in prematurely remanding the records to the court of origin and in refusing to recall them while the case was still pending before it.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6 of Rule 116 of the old Rules of Court, on the reading of a sentence, provides:

The presence of the judge is not necessary for the reading of a sentence.

The Court construes this provision narrowly: it dispenses only with the physical presence of the judge, and it presupposes that the judge who rendered the decision is still a judge of that court.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the judgment was void. Judge Leuterio's position as Judge-at-Large was abolished on 20 June 1954, and his judgment was promulgated on 21 June 1954, one day after he had permanently ceased to be a judge of the court where he sat in judgment. The Court declared that it is firmly established in our jurisprudence that a decision is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it had permanently ceased to be a judge of the court where he sat in judgment. It cited a line of cases: a judgment is a nullity if promulgated after the judge had actually vacated the office and accepted another office, when his term of office had ended, when he had left the bench, when his post was abolished under Republic Act Number 1186, or after the cessation or termination of his incumbency. Section 6 of Rule 116, allowing the reading of a sentence without the judge's presence, applies only to his physical absence, so long as he is still a judge of that court.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the de facto judge theory. A judge de facto is one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be and yet is not a good officer in point of law, because of some defect in his appointment or in his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time. But it is essential to the validity of the acts of a de facto judge that he is actually acting under some color of right. Here, Judge Leuterio did not actually act or perform or exercise the duties of judge when his decision was promulgated, because he had ceased to be one, and the decision was promulgated under another presiding judge. The cases cited by the Court of Appeals were therefore misapplied, since they referred to the acts of a de facto judge, not to a case where he did not act at all.

On the third issue, the Court found it unnecessary to pass upon the alleged error of the Court of Appeals in prematurely remanding the records and later refusing to recall them, because the conclusion that there was no validly promulgated judgment of the trial court from which an appeal could be taken already disposed of the case.

Doctrine

A decision is void if it is promulgated after the judge who rendered it has permanently ceased to be a judge of the court where he sat in judgment, whether because he vacated the office, his term ended, he left the bench, or his position was abolished by law. The rule in Section 6 of Rule 116, dispensing with the judge's presence at the reading of a sentence, applies only to his physical absence; it does not authorize promulgation by another judge after the rendering judge's incumbency has ceased. The doctrine of the de facto judge validates only his actual acts done under color of right; it cannot cure a judgment that he never promulgated and that was instead read out by another judge after he had ceased to hold office. Where there is no validly promulgated judgment, there is nothing from which an appeal can be taken, and the appellate decision affirming it cannot stand.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition, voided and set aside both the decision of the Court of Appeals and the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, and ordered the records returned to the trial court for new adjudication by the judge then presiding, in accordance with the evidence already introduced, without costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line: a decision promulgated after the judge who rendered it has permanently ceased to be a judge of that court is void, and a de facto judge theory cannot save a judgment he never actually promulgated. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of a valid promulgation, the limits of Section 6 of Rule 116, and the distinction between the acts of a de facto judge and a judgment read out by another after the rendering judge's incumbency has ended.