EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR. AND GRETCHEN OPPEN-COJUANGCO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, GEORGE F. SISON AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, RESPONDENTS.

May a criminal case for libel and an independent civil action for
damages arising therefrom, filed pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, be
consolidated for joint trial?

The case which provoked this issue eighteen (18) years ago was
then one of first impression. However,
its early resolution did not seem to merit priority from the parties and so it
became one of the many “move in the premises” cases of this Court.

Subsequent events had significantly dimmed the glow of the
issue’s novelty. In the 1982 case of Caños
vs. Peralta, et al.,^[1]
this Court enunciated a new doctrine which significantly touched upon and
indirectly, albeit partly, resolved this issue. Then followed amendments to the Rules on Criminal Procedure, some
of which allowed, in certain instances, the consolidation of the civil suit
with the criminal action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from
the latter.^[2]
In a later case, Naguiat vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al.,^[3]
decided in 1988, this Court went further by allowing the consolidation with the
criminal action for violation of a special law of a civil case for specific
performance with damages arising from said law. Be that as it may, there is still the need to meet the issue squarely.

The parties do not dispute the following antecedents:

In the 14 June 1972 issue of the GRAPHIC, a weekly magazine of
general circulation in the Philippines, under the column Social Climbing
by one “Conde de Makati,” later identified as George F. Sison, the
following item appeared:

“ONCE UPON A time a beautiful Blue Lady (GOC) used to frequent
the office of the Honorable Sir.

Because of her well-known beauty and charm, the frequency of her
visits did not pass unnoticed by our Lady of the House by the Pasig. An investigation by her battery of personal
‘spies’ revealed that the beautiful Blue Lady was ‘following up’ her
three-million-peso loan from one of our leading government-lending
institutions.

‘Ang mahal naman ng kanyang x x x! exclaimed our Lady of the
House.

Aba, floating rate yata tayo ngayon. Even my friend Marquesa de Culi-Culi has upped her price by 50
percent, ‘kasi ang mahal na ng bilihin ngayon, kahit bulak at alkohol.”

Claiming that the publication alludes to petitioners-spouses, and
that it is false, malicious and constitutes a vicious attack on
petitioner-wife’s virtue, honor and character as it imputes to her not only the
corrupt and immoral act of “following up” an alleged loan, but also
the commission of corrupt and immoral acts of adultery and/or prostitution,
petitioners filed on 11 July 1972 with the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Quezon City a civil action for Damages based on Libel
against the Graphic Publishing Co., Inc., as owner; J. Antonio Araneta, as
publisher; Luis R. Mauricio, as general manager and editor; and Conde de
Makati, as writer, of the GRAPHIC magazine. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-16725, was raffled to Branch XVI
of said court. The complaint was
amended on 20 September 1972^[4]
to specifically identify Conde de Makati, herein private respondent George F.
Sison.

On 29 December 1972, the City Fiscal of Quezon City filed with
the above court a criminal case for libel against defendants Sison, Mauricio
and Araneta.^[5]
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-2713 and was raffled to Branch V
thereof.

On 7 March 1973, after issues in Civil Case No. Q-16725 were
joined and the accused in Criminal Case No. Q-2713 were arraigned, petitioners
filed therein separate motions to consolidate the criminal case with the civil
case in Branch XVI alleging that the evidence to be presented in both would be
the same; much valuable time and effort of the court as well as that of the
parties would be saved by such consolidation; and, moreover, Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides, inter alia, that
in libel the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal
action is filed and vice-versa, provided, however, that the court where the
criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.

Only defendants Mauricio and Araneta, now private respondents,
filed their opposition to the motions. They claim that petitioners, having filed a separate civil action, have
no legal standing to intervene in the criminal case; there is no provision in
the Rules of Court authorizing the consolidation of the criminal case with the
separate civil action; the rule contemplates the consolidation of the hearing
of two (2) or more cases pending before the same judge, and not when the cases
are before different courts or different branches of the same court; different
rules on the competency of witnesses and the weight of evidence necessary to
make proper findings in the two (2) proceedings always exist; and consolidation
would circumvent the rules giving the prosecution in the criminal action, thru
the fiscal, direction and control over the case, and granting the offended
parties the right to intervene in the criminal prosecution once they opt to
pursue a civil action.

On 13 October 1973, then Judge Pacifico de Castro of Branch V of
the above court handed down an Order in Criminal Case No. Q-2713 overruling the
opposition, granting the motion to consolidate, and ordering the transfer of
the records of said case to Branch XVI for consolidation with Civil Case No.
Q-16725.^[6]
In overruling the opposition, the judge held that the Court may, in appropriate
cases, order motu proprio the consolidation of cases as
such power is inherent in the court.^[7]
The mere absence of any specific rule authorizing the consolidation of the
trial of a criminal and civil case does not necessarily deprive the court of
its inherent power to do so as long as it does not prejudice the parties or
place difficulties during trial, thereby defeating the avowed purpose of
consolidation, which is to avoid unnecessary costs, delay and inconvenience to
the parties. The interpretation of the
rule as urged in the opposition was clearly not meant to exclude consolidation
of cases pending in different courts or branches of the same court as long as
such branches or courts agree to the consolidation. Generally, the rules on evidence are the same in all courts and
in all trials and hearings, whether civil or criminal, and the fact that there,
nevertheless, would be different rules governing the competency of witnesses
and weight of evidence necessary to make proper findings in the two (2) cases
could not present special difficulties. Furthermore, it is not clear in what way the fiscal would be divested of
his control and supervision over the criminal prosecution.

Mauricio filed a motion to reconsider the Order, which Sison
adopted.

In the Order of 10 April 1973, the trial court denied the
motion. Mauricio and Sison went to the
Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary injunction to seek annulment of the aforesaid Orders of 13
March and 10 April 1973. The herein
petitioners were among the respondents therein. The petition was docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP-02026-R.

On 25 June 1975, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision^[8]
granting the petition and setting aside the challenged Orders on the basis of
the following grounds:

“1st.
  – There is really no law nor (sic) rule
that expressly permits consolidation even quasi?consolidation of joint
trial, of a criminal and a civil, case; x x x.

2nd. – Not only this, in cases of defamation, fraud or physical injuries,
pursuant to Art. 33 and Rule 111, Sec. 2, the civil can be filed independently
of the criminal which is the case here, but in that situation, the law and the
rules expressly dictate that such civil action,

‘shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.’

going to
show that the apparent intent of the Law and Rule Maker was to command that
where offended party should choose to file an independent civil action, then
said civil action should proceed entirely separate (sic), independent of and
disconnected with, the criminal, and this can well be invoked to show that the
law and the rules would and should be interpreted not to authorize
consolidation;

3rd. – Since Fiscal controls criminal prosecution but complainant plaintiff in
civil controls the civil complaint, it might well happen that Fiscal might
insist on proving for prosecution of criminal, what complainant might refuse to
prove for civil, or vice versa, Fiscal might refuse to present evidence for
criminal what complainant would wish to present for civil; and when it comes to
turn (sic) of petitioners to present their evidence, it might well happen that
Fiscal might object and insist in objecting but complainants as plaintiffs, in
civil might permit, and so on, — this Court can hardly see who should be
obeyed as captain in such emergencies;
Therefore, a joint trial of the two cases where filed independently but tried
consolidatedly would be not (sic) a clear and orderly trial; but a confusing
and chaotic one;

4th. – Still worse, since petitioners as accused are entitled to keep silent,
but as defendants in civil, may be called upon as hostile witnesses, it might
well happen that complainants as plaintiffs may call them in that capacity, and
perhaps petitioners would have no valid ground to refuse to testify, but it
being a joint trial, this Court can hardly see how in such a possibility, even
probability, the Judge can divide his brain, but let it not be forgotten that
the test of sufficiency of proof in both cases unfortunately is different, mere
preponderance in the civil, beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal, and yet,
in the final analysis, the determination must rest in the conscience of trial
Judge as Filangieri has written, XXVI Enciclopedia Juridica Española 399, and conscience
is indivisible;

5th. – There further is the point of elementary fair play; since under law,
Art. 33 and the Rules, Rule 111, complainants were free to vindicate their
rights by either just intervening in the criminal case as offended parties, or
by filing an independent civil action, and since they can not and are not
permitted, to do both, having made their choice, it would not be very fair that
they should be permitted retrace (sic) their steps and reap the benefit of a
joint trial which they had opted to refuse at the beginning by filing an
independent civil action; x x x”^[9]

The motion for reconsideration of the decision by respondent
Judge de Castro having been denied by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners
filed on 15 September 1973 the instant petition for the review of the
decision. In support thereof,
petitioners interposed the following grounds:

“I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ARTICLE 33 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE AND SECTION 2, RULE 111 OF THE NEW RULES OF COURT PROHIBIT THE CONSOLIDATION,
FOR JOINT TRIAL, OR (SIC) THESE CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE (SIC) A JOINT TRIAL OF
TWO CASES WOULD ONLY CAUSE CONFUSION AND CHAOS.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT A JOINT TRIAL OF THESE
TWO CASES WOULD PUT THE TRIAL JUDGE IN A PREDICAMENT TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE
ACCUSED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.”^[10]

In compliance with the Resolution of 20 September 1973,^[11]
private respondents Mauricio and Sison filed their Comment on 4 October 1973.^[12]
However, instead of opposing the petition, they manifested that considering the
important question of law not yet resolved, it would be advisable for this
Court to give due course to the petition to enable it to pass upon such a novel
question and make an authoritative ruling for the guidance of the bench and the
bar.

This Court gave due course to the petition in the Resolution of
10 October 1973.^[13]

On 1 December 1973, petitioners filed their Brief^[14]
reiterating, as assignments of errors, the aforementioned grounds. Private respondents filed their Brief on 29
January 1974.^[15]

As we stated in the opening paragraph, the core issue presented
in this case is whether the criminal case and the separate and independent
civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the former, filed
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, may be consolidated for joint
trial. We also pointed out that the
issue had been partly resolved by the Caños and Naguiat cases and
the subsequent amendments to the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

In Caños, We affirmed the Order of respondent Judge
Peralta of the then Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur ordering the
consolidation of Criminal Case No. 326 and Civil Case No. 558. The former was for violation of Section 3
(a) of R.A. No. 602, as amended, otherwise known as the Minimum Wage Law, for
alleged non-payment by Caños of the minimum wage to her employee, Rolando Apas,
filed by the fiscal against the former on 23 December 1971. The latter was a civil action filed on 4
August 1972 by Apas against Caños for collection of differential, overtime and
termination pay, plus damages. Caños
maintained that after the institution of Criminal Case No. 326, the proceedings
in Civil Case No. 558 should be suspended until final judgment in the criminal
action pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court which read:

“[a] Criminal and
civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but
after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be
instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;

[b] After a criminal action has been commenced,
no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same
shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in
the criminal proceedings has been rendered;”

In affirming the challenged consolidation Order, this Court per
Justice Escolin held:

“The argument fails to consider the provisions of Article 31 of the
Civil Code. Civil Case No. 558 is a
separate and distinct action from Criminal Case No. 326. The former is based upon a contract of
services entered into by the parties, not upon the civil liability arising from
the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 326, i.e., non-payment of the minimum
wage, punishable under Section 3 (a) of Rep. Act 602, as amended, in relation
to Section 15 (a) of the same Act. Being essentially an action for enforcement of an obligation ex-contractu,
the civil case can proceed independently of the latter, in accordance with
Article 31 of the Civil Code:

‘Art. 31. When the civil
action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.’

But did respondent judge abuse his discretion in ordering the
consolidation and joint trial of the criminal and civil cases? A court may order several actions pending
before it to be tried together where they arise from the same act, event or
transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or
substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction
over the case to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party
an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties
(citing 1 CJS, 1347). Consolidation of
actions is expressly authorized under Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court:

‘Section 1. Consolidation.
– When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before
the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid
unnecessary costs or delay.’

The obvious purpose of the above rule is to avoid multiplicity of
suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear
congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short the attainment
of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants (citing
1 CJS 1342-1343).

Consolidation of actions is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court, and its action in consolidating will not be disturbed in the absence
of manifest abuse of discretion. In the
instant case, respondent judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering the
joint trial of the two cases. There is
no showing that such joint trial would prejudice any substantial right of
petitioner. Neither does the latter
question the court’s jurisdiction to try and decide the two cases.”

In Naguiat, We set aside the 20 March 1985 decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court annulling the Order of Branch LX of the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City which decreed the consolidation of Criminal Case
No. 6727 for violation of Section 25, P.D. No. 957^[16]
(on delivery of title of lot or unit upon full payment thereof) which was
filed, at Naguiat’s instance, by the fiscal on 13 September 1984 against Manuel
Lazatin, president of the Timog-Silangan Development Corp. (TSDC), and Civil
Case No. 4224 in the same court, a complaint for specific performance with
damages filed by Naguiat against TSDC and Lazatin; We then reinstated said
Order. In the civil case, Naguiat
prayed for judgment ordering, inter alia, said defendants
to deliver to him the transfer certificates of title to three (3) lots which he
had allegedly paid in full. Both cases
were raffled to Branch LX of the above court. The Intermediate Appellate Court disagreed with the trial court and
ordered instead the suspension of the civil case until final determination of
the criminal case, in line with the spirit of Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court. It further disallowed the
intervention of Naguiat in the criminal case. In overruling the Intermediate Appellate Court, We held:

“In the cases at bar, the nature of the issues involved, at
least, the factual issues in the civil and criminal actions are almost
identical, i.e., whether or not petitioner had fully paid for the lots he
purchased from the private respondents, so as to entitle him to the delivery of
the certificates of title to said lots. The evidence in both cases, likewise, would virtually be the same, which
are, the Contract to Sell, the letter which contains the conditions for the
purchase of the lots and, to which petitioner allegedly affixed his conformity,
the official receipts for the alleged payments made by the petitioner, and
other related documents.

Based on the foregoing, and considering that the criminal action
filed is one for violation of a special law where, irrespective of the motives,
mere commission of the act prohibited by said special law, constitutes the
offense, then the intervention of the petitioner’s counsel, as private
prosecutor in the criminal action, will not prejudice the substantial rights of
the accused.

The consolidation of the two (2) cases in question, where
petitioner’s counsel may act as counsel for the plaintiff in the civil case and
private prosecutor in the criminal case, will instead be conducive to the early
termination of the two (2) cases, and will redound to the benefit and
convenience of the parties; as well as to the speedy administration of
justice.”

The aforesaid Section 3 of Rule 111 was subsequently amended, and
is now Section 2 thereof, and reads in full as follows:

“SECTION 2. Institution
of separate civil action. – Except in the cases
provided for in Section 3 hereof, after the criminal action has been commenced,
the civil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.

(a) Whenever the offended party shall have
instituted the civil action as provided for in the first paragraph of Section 1
hereof before the filing of the criminal action and the criminal action is
subsequently commenced, the pending civil action shall be suspended, in
whatever stage before final judgment it may be found, until final judgment in
the criminal action has been rendered. However, if no final judgment has been rendered by the trial court in
the civil action, the same may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the criminal action. If the application is granted, the evidence
presented and admitted in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action, without prejudice to the admission of
additional evidence that any party may wish to present. In case of consolidation, both the criminal
and the civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise
did not exist. (3a)”

Section 3 of said Rule referred to in the opening paragraph of
Section 2 reads as follows:

“SECTION 3. When
civil action may proceed independently.
– In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may be
brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal
action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (2a)”

while the first paragraph of Section 1,
referred to in subsection (a) of Section 2, reads:

“SECTION 1. Institution
of criminal and civil action. – When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately,
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. x x x”

From the foregoing, it is clear that the civil action for the
recovery of damages arising from a crime, or ex delicto,
may be filed separately from the criminal case either before the institution of
the latter, which may be done without reservation, or after such institution,
provided, however, that a reservation to that effect has been made. If in the meantime the criminal action is
instituted, the civil action which has been reserved cannot be commenced until
final judgment has been rendered in the former. This restriction does not, however, apply to the cases provided
for in the aforecited Section 3. Thus,
in the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33 (as in the instant case), 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code, the civil action may be filed even after the
institution of the criminal case, provided that prior proper reservation had
been made.

Subsection (a) of Section 2 refers to civil cases filed before
the institution of the criminal cases. Since it makes reference to the first paragraph of Section 1, and the
latter necessarily includes the cases under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code as expressly recognized in the second paragraph thereof which reads:

“Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.”

it follows without saying that an
independent civil action for the recovery of civil liability, authorized under
Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code, filed before the institution of
the criminal case, may be consolidated with the latter, subject to the
condition that no final judgment has been rendered in the criminal case. If this is permitted, there is neither rhyme
nor reason why, given the existence of the condition, an independent civil action
under any of the said Articles, but filed after the institution of the criminal
case, may not be consolidated with the latter. This second scenario is equally and logically addressed by the reasoning
behind the provision for the first situation.

That these provisions were incorporated into the Rules after this
petition was filed may not be interposed to deny their retroactive application
since procedural laws may be given retroactive application.^[17]

Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court authorizes
consolidation of actions involving common questions of law or fact pending
before the court. The purpose or object
of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or
abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial
court, and save unnecessary costs or expense; in short, the attainment of
justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants.^[18]
This provision applies to both civil and criminal actions. Caños and Naguiat had removed
any doubt on this point.

It is self-evident that Civil Case No. Q-16725 and Criminal Case
No. Q-2713 involve common or identical questions of fact and law, and that they
would even have the same witnesses. These considerations alone justify the exercise by the court of its
discretion to consolidate the cases for joint hearing to attain the salutary
purpose of consolidation.

There is yet a further consideration why in the instant case
consolidation of Civil Case No. Q-16725 and Criminal Case No. Q-2713 should be
allowed. What is involved is the crime
of libel. As correctly stated by
petitioners, per the third paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, the criminal case for libel and the civil action for damages
arising therefrom must be filed in the same court. The pertinent portion thereof reads as follows:

x x x

“The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense. x x x Provided, further, That the civil
action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed and
vice-versa: Provided, furthermore, That
the court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is first
filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: x x x”

If the court referred to is a multi-sala court, it may happen, as
in this case, that the criminal and civil actions are raffled or assigned to
different salas. In this situation,
consolidation of one with another earlier filed would not only be practical and
economical — it would subserve the very purpose of the law. Consolidation of cases assigned to different
branches of a court had earlier been recognized. In Raymundo, et al. vs. Felipe,
et al.,^[19] We held:

“[A]lthough consolidation of several cases involving the same
parties and subject-matter is a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial
court, joint hearing becomes a matter of duty if two or more cases are tried
before the same judge, or even if filed with the
different branches of the same court of first instance,
provided one of such cases has not
been partially tried.”

This modified what this Court stated in PAL,
et al. vs. Teodoro, et al.,^[20]
that the provision on consolidation^[21]
refers to the consolidation of hearings of two (2) or more cases which are
before the same judge, and not when the cases are pending before different
courts or different branches of the same court.

In view of the foregoing, it would no longer be necessary to
consider the other reasons adduced by respondent Court of Appeals in setting aside
the Orders of the trial court. Suffice
it to say that the feared chaos or confusion in procedure is at best
speculative and the possible difficulty the judge may face in the light of the
different tests of sufficiency of proof in each case is unfounded for it fails
to consider the instances when the civil aspect is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of 25 June 1973 and
Resolution of 7 August 1973 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-02026-R
are hereby SET ASIDE and the Order of the trial court of Quezon City of 13
March 1973 consolidating for joint trial Civil Case No. Q-16725 and Criminal
Case No. Q-2713, and its Order of 10 April 1973 denying the motion to
reconsider the former, are hereby REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
G.R. No. L-38352, August 19, 1982, 115 SCRA, 843.

^[2]
Section 2 (a), Rule 111, Rules of Court.

^[3]
G.R. No. 73836, August 18, 1988, 164 SCRA 505.

^[4]
Rollo, 43-48.

^[5]
Id., 49-51.

^[6]
Rollo, 37-40.

^[7]
Citing 1 C.J. 1122.

^[8]
Per Associate Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan, concurred in by Associate Justices
Cecilia Muñoz Palma and Jose N. Leuterio.

^[9]
Rollo, 30-33.

^[10]
Id., 16.

^[11]
Id., 92.

^[12]
Id., 113.

^[13]
Rollo, 116.

^[14]
Id., 125, et seq.

^[15]
Id., 134, et seq.

^[16]
Regulating the Sale of Subdivision Lots and Condominiums, Providing Penalties
for Violations Thereof.

^[17]
Yakult Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357.

^[18]
1 C.J.S. 1343.

^[19]
42 SCRA 615 (1971).

^[20]
G.R. No. L-6698, August 30, 1955, 97 Phil. 461.

^[21]
Then Section 1, Rule 32, of the Rules of Court.