ROSALINA SANTOS, ETC., ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal taken directly to Us by the Solicitor General
in behalf of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications from the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, setting aside the
defendant-appellant’s order in Administrative Cases Nos. RA 2056-90-91 as null
and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction theretofore
issued.

On September 19, 1958, the then Senator Rogelio de la Rosa wrote
a letter to the defendant Secretary of Public Works and Communications requesting
action by the latter on the
petition of some residents of Sexmoan, Pampanga, that certain creeks, rivers
and/or streams
which were allegedly converted into fishponds by certain parties, among them
the plaintiffs-appellees, be reopened pursuant to Republic Act No. 2056.

Acting on the said communication, Undersecretary of Public Works
and Communications Marciano Bautista designated Atty. Jesus Lazaro to
investigate the alleged encroachment of public navigable rivers, streams and
waterways in Sexmoan, Pampanga.  The
cases, docketed as “Cases Nos. RA-2056-90-91,” concerned two (2) fish­ponds,
one called “Mandayag,” registered in the name of the late Maxima
Santos Vda. de Blas, whose estate is now under administration of the
plaintiff-appellee Rosa­lina Santos, a niece of the said decedent, and the
other called “Paculayo,” registered in the name of the spouses Jose
S. Chivi, Jr. and Lydia R. Chivi, the other plain­tiffs-appellees in this case.

The investigator conducted several hearings and thereafter
submitted a report to the defendant-appellant on January 29, 1959.  On the basis of this report, the
defendant-appellant rendered a decision dated February 3, 1959, the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:

“Premises considered it is hereby ordered:

(1) That respondent Rosalina Santos de la Paz remove whatever
fishpond constructions and/ or works illegally placed on the bed of Sapang
Mandayag and restore the channel of said stream to its original condition;

(2) That respondents Jose Chivi, Jr. and Lydia R. Chivi remove all
fishpond constructions and/or works placed across the Paculayo River and
Paculayo Creek and restore the channels and/ or beds of said streams to their
original con­dition; and

(3) That the above fishpond constructions and/or works be removed
within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the decision by the
respondents; otherwise, this Office or
its duly authorized representative shall remove the same at the expense of said
respondents within ten (10) days after the expiration of the thirty-day period
given them, without prejudice to institut­ing judicial proceedings against them
under the provisions of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2056.”

Not satisfied with the decision of the defendant-appellant,
plaintiffs-appellees filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint
with preliminary injunction “to declare null and void and without legal
effect the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and/or to
declare Republic Act No. 2056 unconstitutional.”  They alleged, among other things, that the
fishponds which were the subject mat­ter of the administrative investigation were
their private properties registered under the Land Registra­tion Act; that
Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional, being ex post facto and having delegated a purely judi­cial function
to administrative officials; that the com­plainants in the administrative case
were not real par­ties in interest and that the defendant-appellant had no
authority whatsoever to inquire into the titles of plaintiffs-appellees or
otherwise conduct the investiga­tion in question.

In
his answer, defendant-appellant Secretary of Public Works and Communications claimed
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter be­cause
plaintiffs-appellees did not exhaust all adminis­trative remedies; that
Republic Act No. 2056 was valid and constitutional; that under the principle of separation
of powers, the judiciary is not authorized to in­quire into, or interfere with, the
exercise of execut­ive functions and defendant-appellant’s duties and authority under
Republic Act No. 2056; that factual findings in administrative investigations
are con­clusive upon courts; that the construction and encroach­ments
ordered demolished in defendant-appellant’s decision in question were made by plaintiffs
on public, navigable rivers, streams and creeks without proper authority and to
the detriment of public interest; and that the Torrens titles of
plaintiffs-appellees to the fishponds in ques­tion do not include public streams,
rivers, creeks and waterways found therein and, that even supposing that their
titles purport to cover such rivers, streams, creeks and waterways, the
registration and adjudication thereof in plaintiffs’ name are illegal and null and
void insofar as they include the said rivers, streams, creeks and waterways.

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment de­claring the
decision of defendant-appellant null and void and making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction theretofore issued. 
It, however,
disallowed plaintiffs?appellees’
claim for damages on the ground that defend­ant-appellant
had acted in his official capacity.

Defendant-appellant brought
this appeal on the following assignment of errors:

1. The lower court erred in holding that although plaintiffs have
not appealed the de­fendant-appellants
decision to the President of the Philippines they are not precluded from
bringing the action to the court under the theory “that the Secretary of a Department
is an alter ego of
the President,” and that “the action of the defendant bears the
implied sanction of the President unless the same is disapproved by the
latter.”

2. The lower court erred in holding that defendant-appellant
committed “gross abuse of discretion” in investigating and rendering
the decision in the administrative case on the ground that he cannot review and
reverse the lawful actuations and final decisions of a court of justice which
granted the registration of the properties in question to plaintiffs.

3. The lower court
erred in holding that Republic Act No. 2056 which became effective on June 18, 1958 could not affect the
plaintiffs’ fishponds constructed about a century ago; and that the prosecution
of plaintiffs-appellees renders it ex post facto.

The first assignment of error is without merit.  It is now settled that Department Secretaries
are the alter ego of the President so that the decision of Secretary of Public
Works and Communications is presumed to be that of the President, unless disapproved
(See, e.g., Villena v. Sec. of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451; Lovina
v. Moreno, G. R. No. L-17821, November 29, 1963).

But the second assignment is well taken.  The trial court held that there was “gross abuse of
discretion” on the part of the defendant-appellant when he ordered the
removal of fishpond constructions on the beds of Sapang Mandayag, Paculayo
River and Paculayo Creek because in so doing defendant-appellant reviewed and reversed the decision of a court
of justice which ordered the registration of the
properties under the Torrens system.  In
the case of Lovina v. Moreno, supra, this Court has held already that
Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial
power to the Secretary of Public Works and that the silence
of the Torrens title with regard to the existence of a navigable stream with­in
a property does not preclude a subsequent investigation and determination of
its existence.

Indeed, the investigator found evidence of the ex­istence of a
Paculayo River and Sapang Paculayo.  His
report states:

PACULAYO

“The documentary evidence gathered prove to the existence not
only of the Paculayu Creeks but also of a certain Paculayung Maragul or
River.  The Blueprint Plan of a private
land as surveyed for Lydia R. Chivi on July 18, 1956 and February 13, 1957 by
Quintin A. Paredes which was approved by the Director of Lands on April 29,
1957, marked as Psu 158623 (See Annex
S) and Blueprint Plan of private
land as surveyed for Simeon
Blas on Decem­ber 9, 1928, by M.G. Espinosa and approved on August 20, 1930 by
the Director of Lands for Psu 71475 (See Annex S-1), conclusively proved that
Paculayu River was 100 meters
wide and Sapang Paculayung Maragul was 30 meters wide and now enclosed in the
fishpond now owned by the respondent Lydia R. Chivi.

“As to the navigability of the said Paculayu River and Sapang
Paculayu, the same has been proven by the testimonies of Mr. Pedro Bengco and
Pablo Lucas.  x x x

“xxx   xxx       xxx       xxx

“However, at the Sexmoan Cadastre CM 14521N-120°37’E, (hereto
attached as Annex T) made by the Bureau of Lands as a result of a survey
conducted sometime in 1956, the Paculayu River and the Paculayung Malati does
not exist anymore for it is enclosed in the fishponds of respondent Lydia R.
Chivi and Rosalina Santos.  In Annex S-1,
it also clearly appears that a portion of the Paculayu River and Sapang
Paculayu, formerly exist and is navigable at the time it was illegally
appropriated by the respondent.”

These findings are supported by evidence in the record and, in
the absence of any illegality, error of law, fraud, or imposition, which have
not been shown in this case, should be respected.  (Lovina v. Moreno, supra)  Consequently, the court below erred in
declaring null and void the entire decision of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications.

With respect to Sapang Mandayag, however, the in­vestigator
failed to determine its exact location, width and length.  Thus, in his report, he states:

MANDAYAG

“In the ocular inspection ……. it was found out by the Investigators
that the alleged Sapang Mandayag is between the fishponds of Gregorio
Mangalindan and the fishpond of res­pondent Maxima Vda. de Blas, where Rosalina
San­tos is now
the respondent being the executrix of the testate estate. 
The source of the water of the Sapang Mandayag is the Pampanga
River, the direction is leading to Don Tomas Creek. 
The Sapang Mandayag has
a width from bank to bank of about 10 to 20 meters; and the water flows without obstruction and is passable by
banca.  From the mouth of the Sapang
Mandayag up to a length of at least a
kilometer, another dike of the respondent is constructed directly across the
Sapang Mandayag.

“Even the evidence submitted by the respond­ent which is a copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 432, it
appears that Lot No. 2 is bounded on the north by
Sapang Maliit which is 6 meters wide; on the northeast, by Sapang Don Tomas,
which is 25-30
meters wide;
on the south­east, by Sapang Don
Tomas and property of Simeon Carlos, now owned by Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas,
the Sapang Batasan, 10 meters wide and the Sapang Maliit, 6 meters wide.

“In the trace copy of a plan of private land as surveyed for Maxima Santos Vda.
de Blas, as surveyed on April 5, 6, and 7, 1950 by Timoteo Certeza for
Psu 126222, which is sheet No. 2 (see Annex R, roughly traced by the
undersigned) of the 7 sheets now on file on the Record Section of the Bureau of
Lands, the Sapang Batasan, and and
Sapang Maliit clearly appears.  However,
in the attached Sexmoan Cadastre Map CM 14° 54’N-120° 36’E, CM 14°54 N-120
37’E, CM 14°55’N-120° 36’E and CM 14°55’N-120°37’E, which was made as a result of a survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands sometime in 1956, the
Sapang Batasan which is 10 meters wide and the Sapang Maliit, 6 meters wide, does not
exist anymore.  However, the complaint is
about the enclosure and/or encroachment of a certain Sapang Mandayag, the
portion of which is still existing as appearing in the attached Sexmoan Cadastre and there is no
evidence gathered or presented to prove the exact location of the missing
channel or bed of the Sapang Mandayag. 
As to the navigability of the Sapang Mandayag, in the ocular inspection
conducted by the investigators, it was found out that the Mandayag River is
still navigable.

“As a conclusion, therefore, based on the evidence gathered or
presented, the undersigned believe that there was once a Sapang Mandayag which
is navigable, only the exact location, width and length of the said Sapang
Mandayag cannot at present, be determined for lack of evidence.”

Investigator’s recommendation:

“As no conclusive evidence has been gathered or presented to
prove the exact location, width and length of the channel of the Sapang Matua
and Sapang Mandayag, and that the Ilog
Calise is still existing without any encroachment and/ or closure, it
hereby recommended that a de­cision be rendered dismissing the complaint ag­ainst
the respondent Rosalina Santos, as ex­ecutrix of the Testate Estate of the late
Maxima Vda. de Blas without prejudice.”

We, therefore, agree that the complaint against Rosalina Santos,
as executrix of the Testate Estate of the late Maxima Vda. de Blas, with regard
to fishpond “Mandayag,” be dismissed without prejudice to a further
reinvestigation.  In doing so, We merely accord to plain­tiff-appellee
what in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, was
described is her “cardinal primary right” in an administrative
proceeding to have a decision rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the record and dis­closed to the parties affected.

We also find merit in the third assignment of error.  The trial court held that the prosecution of
the plaintiffs-appellees under section 3 of Republic Act No. 2056 which took
effect on June 13, 1958, for acts done half a century earlier, makes the Act ex
post facto.  We do not
agree with the trial court on this point. 
A constitutional
provision that no ex post facto law shall be enacted is
applicable only to criminal cases.  (Roman
Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Taal, 38 Phil. 367; Prov. of
Camarines Sur v. Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 600; Philippine National Bank v.
Ruperto, G. R. No. L-13777, June 30, 1960) Plaintiffs-appellees are not being
criminally prosecuted for constructing dikes; they are merely being ordered by
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to demolish the illegal con­structions
on the channels of public navigable rivers and/or streams.  As to the constructions in the past, Republic
Act No. 2056 merely authorizes their summary demolition as public nuisances by
orders of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications after complying with due process.  Here is no exercise by the State of the
coercive power of its criminal law.  Here
is merely the invocation of an authority which, as noted in Lovina, was
already granted the public works official as early as Act No. 3208 of the
Philippine Legislature.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed as far as
fishpond “Paculayo” is concerned and the writ of injunction issued
therein is annulled
and set aside, but it is affirmed with respect to fishpond “Mandayag”
as to the location, length and width of which no substantial evidence has been
found by the Department of Public Works and Communications.  Costs against the appellees, Jose S. Chivi,
Jr. and Lydia R. Chivi.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, and Castro, JJ., concur.