LOLITA MARTIN, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. JUDGE PLACIDO B. VALLARTA, RESPONDENT.

For alleged undue delay in resolving a motion for reconsideration
and issuing a restraining order, this administrative complaint was lodged
against respondent Judge Placido B. Vallarta of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Cabiao-San Isidro, Nueva Ecija.

This case traces its origin to the decision rendered by Judge Vallarta
on July 20, 1990 in Civil
Case No. 90-02, an unlawful detainer case filed by
the complainant against her tenants, Armando Camua
and Concepcion Manlutac.  The decision ordered the defendants to vacate
and surrender the possession of Lot
No. 1255 to the plaintiff.  On August 6, 1990, the defendants, Camua and Manlutac, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which the complainant opposed.

On the other hand, a “Motion to Restrain Defendants from Cultivating the Lots in Question” was filed by the
plaintiff on September 18, 1990.  Complainant pointed out that even before the ejectment case was filed, the Court of Appeals had already
ruled in A.C. G.R. No. 04030 entitled, “Diocese of Cabanatuan
vs. Bonifacio Martin” and A.C. G.R. No. 14696
entitled, “Armando Camua and Concepcion
Manlutac vs. Spouses Bonifacio
Martin” that the plaintiffs-spouses are the lawful owners of the
agricultural land in question.  The
complainant herein decries the fact that as of February 6, 1991, or six (6)
months after the defendants filed their “Motion for Reconsideration”
and plaintiffs their “Motion to Restrain Defendants from Cultivating the
Lot in Question,” those motions have not yet been resolved by respondent
Judge Vallarta, thereby unduly depriving the complainant of her possession of
the subject lot despite the decisions rendered by himself and the Court of
Appeals in favor of the complainants-spouses.

In his Comment, respondent Judge alleged that there was no undue
delay in resolving the aforementioned motions which were in fact resolved
within 90 days after submission:

“Per Order dated September 21, 1990, ‘the plaintiff (herein
complainant), thru her lawyer, was given a period of up to October 19, 1990,
within which to file their Rejoinder to
the Reply to the Amended Opposition to be filed by the defendants and
with or without the said Reply
and Rejoinder, the incidents will be deemed submitted for resolution.’ In other words,
it is only on October 19, 1990, where the Motion for Reconsideration
dated August 6, 1990,
and the other pending incidents, including
the Motion to restrain defendants from
cultivating the lot in question can be
resolved.  And if we
have to count the 90-day period within
which motions should be resolved starting
from October 19, 1990, the
90-day period is up to January 16, 1991.

“In the hearing on January
16, 1991, of the Motion to Harvest Re:  Palay under the
supervision of the Court dated December
14, 1990, an Order
dated January 16, 1991, was
issued and the parties, thru their respective counsel were furnished [copies]
thereof.  Briefly, the Order
dated January 16, 1991, wherein the Decision
dated July 20, 1990, was reconsidered
and set aside and the complaint for
(sic) herein complaint was dismissed, in
effect, granting the Motion for Reconsideration
and dismissing and/or denying other pending
incidents including the Motion to restrain
defendants from cultivating the lot in
question, subject of the letter-complaint
dated November 27, 1990 of Ms. Lolita Martin was resolved and issued
within the 90-day period, and, the parties,
thru their respective counsel, were
likewise furnished with the Order
dated January 16, 1991, within the
90-day period.  Such
being the case, the letter-complaint
of herein complainant and made the
basis of the above-entitled administrative case
[i.e., instant case] has no legs to stand on
(sic). 
(pp. 1-2, Comment.)

He pointed out that the complainant has been harassing him for
having granted the defendants’ motion for reconsideration and for denying her (plaintiff’s)
motion to restrain the defendants from cultivating her land.  This letter-complaint dated November 27, 1990, is the sixth
complaint that she has filed against the herein respondent.

After deliberating on the complaint and the respondent’s comment
thereon, we find the complaint to be bereft of merit.

It is the prerogative of a judge to correct his own decision
before it becomes final and executory, so as to make
it conform to the evidence presented and the applicable laws (Baguyo vs. Leviste, 107 SCRA
35).  Respondent Judge Vallarta did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in exercising that prerogative in this
case.

Since respondent’s good faith has not been put in issue, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official
duties must be conceded to him (Baguyo vs. Leviste, supra).

A judge is not administratively accountable for every erroneous
ruling or decision rendered provided he acts in good faith and without malice
(Mendoza vs. Villaluz, 106 SCRA 664).  The proper remedy of the aggrieved party is
not an administrative charge against the judge but an appeal or petition for
review of his decision.

WHEREFORE, as respondent Judge did not act with malice or
bad faith in resolving the incidents in
Civil Case No. 90-02, this instant administrative complaint against him is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.