TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON ALFONSO DE CASTELLVI, CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ADMINISTRATRIX, NATIVIDAD CASTELLVI DE RAQUIZA, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. JOSE CASTELLVI AND CON…

Appeal from the order dated January 8, 1965 of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, Special Proceeding No. 6824,
Testate Estate of the Late Don Alfonso de Castellvi,
denying the petition for “señalamiento de vista”
filed by appellants Jose Castellvi and Consuelo Castellvi, which in effect was a motion to reopen for a
“vista de novo” of the proceedings for the probate of will of
the decedent Don Alfonso de Castellvi which had
already been terminated by an order of December 11, 1940, to enable appellants
to continue with their opposition to said probate on the ground that the
testator “did not have a sound dispositive mind
when his last will and testament was executed” and to prove that they are
duly acknowledged natural children of said decedent.

It appears that in the above-mentioned probate proceedings,
appellants filed an opposition to the admission of the will of the deceased Don
Alfonso.  The will named as heirs only Natividad Castellvi de Raquiza, his judicially adopted daughter to the extent of
2/3 of his estate and his collateral relatives for the balance of 1/3, omitting
any mention of appellants.  Mrs. Raquiza who was then a minor had Emilia
A. Trono as her guardian ad-litem.

The other material facts are stated in the decision of this Court
in Testate Estate of the late Don Alfonso Castellvi
etc. vs. Jose Castellvi et al., 9 SCRA 395, and are
not disputed by the parties in this case. 
To quote from that decision:

“Alleging that they are the acknowledged natural children of
the decedent and that the latter ‘did not have a sound dispositive
mind when his last will and testament was executed’, appellants opposed its
probate on December 11, 1940.  On the same date, Trono
was appointed guardian-ad-litem of the present
Mrs. Raquiza and, purporting to act on behalf of the
latter, as party of the first part, she (Trono)
entered into an agreement with the herein appellants, as party of the second
part, stipulating, inter alia:

‘1.   That the Party of the First Part recognizes
and acknowledges that the Party of the Second Part are the duly acknowledged
natural children of the deceased D. Alfonso de Castellvi
during his lifetime, as his own
children;

x          x          x          x          x          x          x

‘4.   That the deceased had inadvertently omitted
the Party of the Second Part from his last will and testament, unduly depriving
them of their legitime as forced heirs;

‘5.   That in the said last will and testament, the
probate of which is now pending in the Hon. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, the deceased had left two-thirds (2/3) of his
entire estate to the Party of the First Part, and the remaining one-third (1/3)
to his brother D. Juan de Castellvi;

‘6.   That in consideration of the premises, to do
justice and to show fairness to the Party of the Second Part, the herein
parties, assisted as above stated, do hereby covenant and agree on the
following:

x             x          x          x          x          x          x

‘(b)  That should the provisions of the will and
testament be enforced by the Court,
i.e., two-thirds (2/3) to the Party of the First Part and the remaining
one-third (1/3) to Dn. Juan de Castellvi, then to
carry out the just and spirit of this agreement the Party of the First Part
shall grant unto the Party of the Second Part one-half (1/2) of that which
shall be allotted to her out of the estate;

‘(c)  And lastly that this agreement shall be
submitted to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
to form part of the records of the case therein pending.’ (Italics
supplied.)

“After taking the testimony of one of the attesting witnesses
to the will of the decedent, the Court, by an order dated December 11, 1940,
admitted said will to probate, directed the ‘petitioner’ to propose the name of
a person for appointment as judicial administrator of the estate of the
decedent and approved the agreement above referred to.

“Ten (10) months later, or on September 18, 1941, Trono sought a reconsideration of said order, insofar as it
approved the agreement, upon the ground that the same is null and void for the
reason that she had allegedly signed it without knowing its contents, that it
was devoid of consideration, and that, as Mrs. Raquiza’s
guardian-ad-litem, she (Trono) had no
authority to enter into said agreement. 
The motion for reconsideration was denied, although the order to this
effect and the date on which it was issued do not appear in the records,
because so much thereof as existed at the time had been destroyed during the
liberation of the Philippines
in 1945.  Appellee
maintains, however, that, pursuant to said order, Trono
was estopped from assailing the agreement in
question, she having signed the same, and its annulment could be secured at the
instance only of Mrs. Raquiza, through another
guardian, and that, accordingly, the order contained a proviso ‘reserving’ to
Mrs. Raquiza ‘the right x x
x to annul the agreement x x
x upon reaching’ the age of majority ‘or upon having
another legal guardian’.

“On July 14, 1946,
Mrs. Raquiza, represented by her husband, Atty.
Antonio V. Raquiza, filed a motion praying that said
order of December 11, 1940,
be set aside and that the agreement adverted to above
be declared null and void.  This motion
was denied on August 8, 1946,
upon the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered had ‘already acquired
finality’.

“Thereupon, or on October 18, 1946, Mrs. Raquiza,
assisted by her aforementioned husband and
then guardian-ad-litem, filed
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 47 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, against the appellants herein, for the purpose, inter
alia, of securing a declaration of nullity of the
agreement of December 11, 1940 and of the order of the same date approving
it.  After the filing of appellants of
answer to said complaint, the case was set for hearing on August 6, 1947. 
Two days prior thereto, the Court received a telegram of counsel for
Mrs. Raquiza, praying for postponement of the hearing
and stating that the corresponding motion was ‘coming’.  No such motion, however, had been filed when
the case was called for hearing on August
6, 1947, and neither Mrs. Raquiza nor her
counsel appeared before the court on that date. 
Besides, counsel for appellants ‘explained to the Court that the parties
have practically come into a tentative amicable agreement of the case x x x’ and that the non-appearance of Mrs. Raquiza ‘and her attorney may possibly be due to this
circumstance’.  Accordingly, by an order
dated August 6, 1947, said
case was dismissed ‘without prejudice and without pronouncement as to costs.’ (Exhibit N, Stipulation.)

“In the meantime, the proceedings in the present case continued.  Decedent’s brother, Juan, had been appointed
administrator of the estate, which, upon the death of Juan, was placed under
the administration of his widow, Carmen de Castellvi.  After the performance by the latter of the
usual acts of administration, and feeling, evidently, that the time had come
for the distribution of the net assets of the estate among the heirs of the
decedent, Mrs. Raquiza filed, on March 11, 1958, a
motion praying that appellants be excluded from any share in said estate and
from further participating in the proceedings. 
Subsequently, or on August 5,
1959, said Administratrix filed a motion
praying that the following be declared heirs of the decedent, in the proportion
stated after their respective names, to wit: 
Mrs. Raquiza, one-third of the estate;
appellants, one-third of the estate; and the collateral heirs, one-third of the
estate.  Passing upon these two (2)
motions, the lower court issued, on November 11, 1959, the order mentioned at the
beginning of this decision, holding that the records do not show that
appellants are the acknowledged natural children of the decedent; that
appellants have not introduced any evidence on their alleged relationship with
the deceased; and that appellants merely rely upon the agreement of December
11, 1940 — signed by Trono as guardian-ad-litem of Mrs. Raquiza —
which is null and void ab initio.  A
reconsideration of this order having been denied, appellants interposed the
present appeal.” (at pp. 398-401.)

Upon the foregoing facts, this Court stated the issue in that
case to be “whether lower court has authority to pass, in the order
appealed from, upon the question of whether or not appellants (in that case and
here) are related to the decedent and entitled to share in his estate, as well
as to intervene in this case, considering that the agreement entered into on
December 11, 1940, had been approved by an order of the Court of the same date,
which had allegedly become final and executory, no
appeal having been taken therefrom.” (at p. 401.)

The Court then proceeded to examine the circumstances leading to
the compromise agreement referred to and arrived at the conclusion that said
agreement was null and void for being “within the purview of Article 1814
of the Civil Code of Spain (Art. 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines)
reading:  “No compromise can be made
with respect to the civil status of persons, or with regard to matrimonial
matters, or future support.”

After the finality of the aforesaid decision, the “Peticion de Señalamiento de Vista”
here in issue was filed by appellants. 
Said motion reads thus:

“COMPARECEN los opositores
Jose Castellvi y Consuelo Castellvi
en estas actuaciones de testamentaria del
finado Don Alfonso de Castellvi,
por medio de sus infrascritos abogados, y a este Honorable Juzgado respetuosamente exponen;

“1.  Que en la decision dectada por al Honorable Corte Suprema en la causa G.R. No. L-17630, dicho Honorable
Tribunal ha declarado que
el ‘COMPROMISE AGREEMENT’ otorgado por las partes
en 11 de Diciembre de 1940, y aprobado
por reste Hon. Juzgado por virtud
de su orden dictada en la misma fecha, nulo y de ningun efecto legal, por ser contrario al Art. 1814 del Codigo
Civil Español (Art. 2035 del
Codigo Civil de Filipinas);

“2.  Que en vista de la referida decision de la Honorable Corte Suprema,
la presente testamentaria debe ser tramitada de novo, con el objeto de dar a las partes
oportunidad de presentar sus pruebas en apoyo de sus respectivas
contenciones.

“POR TANTO, dichos opositores Jose Castellvi y
Consuelo Castellvi, a este
Honorable Juzgado respetuosamente
suplican se sirva señalar dia para
la vista de novo de esta Testamentaria,
de ser posible dentro de la
primera quincena del proximo mes de Mayo, 1964.

“Manila, Filipinas
(para San Fernando,
Pampanga).

“Abril 22, 1964.  (Pp. 22-23, Rec. on
Appeal.)

This motion was opposed by the heirs of
Juan Castellvi, the collateral relatives referred to
in the will.  And as already stated,
after due hearing, the court a quo denied appellants’ motion, hence,
this appeal.

The main burden of appellants’ theory in this appeal is that
inasmuch as the above-mentioned and partly quoted decision declared the
compromise agreement of December 11, 1940 void, and considering that their
opposition to the probate of the will of the deceased was withdrawn by them in
consideration of the acknowledgment made in said agreement by Mrs. Raquiza of their status as “duly acknowledged natural
children of the deceased Don Alfonso de Castellvi
during his lifetime, as his own children”, and that they desisted from
presenting proof as to their status as such acknowledged natural children
because of Mrs. Raquiza’s admission, which she in
turn made to make them refrain from questioning the legality of her adoption,
which according to them was legally defective, it should follow, upon the
nullification of that agreement, that the admission of Don Alfonso’s will made
on the basis agreement should also be set aside.  Appellants contend that were it not for the
withdrawal of their opposition, which they did because of the considerations
stated in the agreement, that will could not have been probated on the basis of
the testimony of only one attesting witness, it being the law that all the
three attesting witnesses must indispensably be presented and must testify,
when there is an opposition to the admission thereof, citing Section 11 of Rule
77 (Rules of 1940) and cases applying
the same, Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380, Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil. 742 and Unson vs. Abella, 43 Phil.
496).  In other words, appellants
maintain that because of the annulment of the compromise agreement, “it
becomes ineluctable that the oppositors‘ opposition
to the probate of the will be deemed reinstated.  If this were not the effect, the rights of
your appellants would surely be prejudiced, not to mention the fact that the
opposing parties would benefit from an act which this Honorable Court declared
to be illegal from its inception. 
Therefore, it behooves upon this Honorable Court, as a Court of last
resort, to remedy the situation by allowing your oppositors
to prove the allegations of their opposition to the probate of the subject last
will and testament.” (at p. 13, Brief of
Appellants.)

At first blush, appellants’ contention would appear cogent and
persuasive.  Upon further reflection,
however, a fundamental flaw therein readily becomes apparent.  As We see the situation of appellants, the
decisive question as far as they are concerned is, since they have voluntarily
entered into a compromise agreement “expressly prohibited or declared void
by law” (Article 1409, Civil Code), may they recall, withdraw or otherwise
render ineffective what they have already done in performance of their part in
the illegal bargain?  We believe that
they cannot.  In other words, having withdrawn
their opposition to the will in question by virtue of that agreement,
subsequently voided by this Court for being contrary to law, can they now ask
that the approval of said will be set aside in order that on account of their
contemplated revival of their opposition, the proponents may be compelled to
comply with the requirements of the aforementioned provision of the Rules
making the presentation of all of the three attesting witnesses to the will
indispensable for its probate?  We do not
think they can.  True it is that a
compromise agreement on the civil status of persons is not a criminal offense
in which the parties to the
contract, being in pari delicto,
are left where they are found, but there is Article 1412 of the Civil Code
(formerly Article 1306 of the Civil Code of Spain in force in 1940) which
provides similarly as follows:

“ART. 1412.  If the act
in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a
criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:

(1)  When the fault is on the part of both
contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the
contract, or demand the performance of the other’s undertaking;

(2)  When only one of the contracting parties is at
fault, he cannot recover what he has given by reason of the contract, or ask
for the fulfillment of what has been promised him.  The other, who is not at fault, may demand
the return of what he has given without any obligation to comply with his promise.  (1306)”

In effect, in compliance with the compromise agreement,
appellants agreed that the probate of the will be made on the basis of the
testimony of only one of the attesting witnesses thereto, and because there was
no other opposition, the court proceeded to act pursuant to Sec. 5 of Rule 77
allowing probate upon the testimony of only one attesting witness.  Now, since the agreement has been declared
contrary to law and void, under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, they
may no longer continue with their opposition.

This is not to mention anymore the point stressed by appellees that in the decision of this Court referred to
earlier, appellants have been declared as having “no right to take
part” in the subject probate proceedings. 
As stated in the said decision, the appeal of appellants in that case
was “from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
declaring that Jose Castellvi y Bundalian
and his sister Consuelo Castellvi y Bundalian — hereafter referred to as the appellants —
have no right either to share in the estate of the deceased Alfonso de Castellvi y Hortega — hereafter
referred to as the decedent — or to take part in the present case, and that Natividad Castellvi de Raquiza — hereafter referred to as Mrs. Raquiza — and the Heirs of Juan de Castellvi
y Hortega — hereafter referred to as the collateral
heirs — are the heirs of said decedent and, as such, entitled to divide his
estate as follows:  two-thirds (2/3) for
Mrs. Raquiza and one-third (1/3) for the collateral
heirs.” (at p. 397) And in the dispositive portion, it is adjudged, “Wherefore, the
order appealed from is hereby affirmed.” Clearly, there was indeed a
ruling in that decision against allowing appellants to take part in the
proceedings below and to assert and prove their alleged relationship to the
deceased.  With this consideration in
mind, We cannot see our way clear to practically
reversing that decision and holding now that appellants may still intervene in
the proceedings below.

Furthermore, in the same decision, the Court already indicated
more or less how the quest of appellants for recognition their supposed right
as acknowledged natural children of the deceased will more or less be
frustrated because of inherent weakness of evidentiary support.  The pertinent portion of the decision states:

“Again, the records indicate that appellants had very slim
chances, if any, of establishing their aforementioned allegation.  To begin with, the will of the decedent
explicitly states that he had neither surviving ascendants nor descendants,
except herein appellee as his judicially adopted
daughter.  Secondly, the statement in the
agreement in question to the effect ‘that the deceased had inadvertently
omitted’ appellants herein, cannot be true, for the decedent declared in said
instrument:

‘x x x Que en
la actualidad tengo otra niña tan solamente
protegida por mi, y desde su niñez
la he permitido aun sin autorizacion formal o judicial, usar mi apellido en tal forma que se le conoce ahora por
AMPARO DE CASTELLVI y HORTEGA.  Es mi deseo que
mi hija adoptiva NATIVIDAD
DE CASTELLVI y HORTEGA la ampare y la cuide hasta donde
le permitan sus medios mientras pueda y la extienda la manutencion que se posible.  Yy mientras esta protegida
mia es menor
de edad, es mi voluntad que su
tutoria sea igual que la de mi hija, segun como se expresa en los parrafos anteriores.’

“Having been careful enough to specifically mention his protegee, Amparo de Castelivi y Hortega, and to explicitly convey to Mrs. Raquiza his wish that she protect and support Amparo to the extent that her (Mrs. Raquiza’s)
resources may permit it, the decedent could not have possibly forgotten or
‘inadvertently omitted’ appellants herein, were they, his own flesh and blood,
as appellants would have us believe.

“Lastly, Art. 131 of the Civil Code
of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines
at the time of decedent’s demise, provided that:

‘x x x The
acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a
will, or in some other public document.’

“In the case at bar, the will of the decedent does not merely
fail to support the appellants’ pretense. 
It, also, refutes the same. 
Furthermore, appellants do not even intimate that their pretense is
borne out by their record of birth, or by a statement before a court of record,
or by any authentic instrument.  Neither
do they claim that they were minors at the time of the death of their alleged
father, or that, subsequently thereto, a document, unknown before, has been
found in which he expressly recognized them as his natural children, which are
the only cases in which an action for recognition may be brought after the
death of the alleged natural father or mother (Art. 137, Civil Code of Spain).
(at p. 402.)

And so, even if in strict sense, the most that We can decide here
is that appellants are already precluded from taking part or intervening in the
proceedings below in so far as the probate of the will is concerned, which
naturally does not comprehend any ruling as to whether or not said appellants
may still be entitled to attack the substantive validity of the provisions and
dispositions of that will, the appellants would be well advised to reasses their chances more carefully, if only to avoid
further useless judicial litigation that would occupy the time and effort of
the courts which can be better utilized for the adjudication of more
meritorious cases.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING and the considerations
informing the order appealed from, as indicated therein, the said order is
affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Fernando, Antonio, Aquino, and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.