ALLAN RIÑOS, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES ANICETO URGEL AND REMEDIOS URGEL, RESPONDENTS.

Riños versus Urgel

The Case

This is the case of Riños versus Urgel, a petition brought by Allan Riños against the spouses Aniceto and Remedios Urgel. The Urgel spouses had sued Riños before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of MacArthur and Mayorga in Leyte for recovery of ownership and possession of a fishpen, with damages and a prayer for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. The trial court ruled for the spouses, Riños appealed, and the Regional Trial Court of Abuyog, Leyte dismissed his appeal because his counsel never filed the required appeal memorandum. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's clean statement that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege, not part of due process, and that the appellant's failure to file a memorandum is a ground for dismissal that the client must bear.

Procedural History

The Urgel spouses filed their complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a fishpen, with damages, before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of MacArthur and Mayorga, Leyte. After due proceedings, that court rendered a decision in favor of the spouses. Riños filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court gave the appeal due course and transmitted the records to the Regional Trial Court of Abuyog, Leyte. The clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court issued a notice of appealed case requiring Riños to submit his appeal memorandum within fifteen days from receipt, and copies were sent to both counsels. No memorandum was ever filed.

The Regional Trial Court then issued an order dismissing the appeal for failure to file the required memorandum under Section 7, paragraph b, of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. Riños moved for reconsideration, blaming his counsel's receiving clerk, who had logged the notice but apparently misplaced it and never forwarded it to the lawyer. The Regional Trial Court denied the motion for lack of merit, holding that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence, and omissions of their counsel. Riños then filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court, assigning grave abuse of discretion and error in dismissing his appeal on a technicality.

Facts

The Urgel spouses owned and claimed possession of a fishpen, and they sued Allan Riños before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of MacArthur and Mayorga, Leyte to recover ownership and possession, with damages and a prayer for injunctive relief. After proceedings, the trial court decided in favor of the spouses.

Riños appealed. The records were transmitted to the Regional Trial Court of Abuyog, Leyte, and the clerk of court issued a notice of appealed case dated September 30, 2011, requiring Riños to file his appeal memorandum within fifteen days from receipt. Copies of that notice were sent to both counsels on October 17, 2011, as shown by registry receipts. Despite due notice, Riños's counsel never filed the memorandum.

On January 10, 2012, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the appeal under Section 7, paragraph b, of Rule 40. Riños moved for reconsideration, explaining that his counsel's receiving clerk, Leo Gil, had recorded the notice in his logbook but had probably misplaced it without forwarding it to the lawyer, so counsel never knew of its existence. The Regional Trial Court denied the motion on July 16, 2012, invoking the rule that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence, and omissions of their counsel. Riños elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the Regional Trial Court committed a reversible error of law in dismissing the appeal for failure to file an appeal memorandum under Section 7, paragraph b, of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.
• Whether or not the negligence of the petitioner's counsel and of the petitioner himself may excuse the failure to file the memorandum and justify a relaxation of the procedural rules.
• Whether or not the dismissal of the appeal on a technicality deprived the petitioner of due process of law and of his right to appeal.

Applicable Provisions

Section 7 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, on procedure in the Regional Trial Court, provides:

Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. (a) Upon receipt of the complete records or the record on appeal, the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact. (b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellant's memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. (c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of the period to do so, the case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed.

This is the very rule the Regional Trial Court applied in dismissing the appeal, and its use of the word shall makes the filing of the memorandum a mandatory duty whose breach is a ground for dismissal.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Regional Trial Court committed no reversible error. The filing of a memorandum is a mandatory obligation on the part of the appellant, and failure to do so warrants the dismissal of the appeal. The Court stressed the mandatory language of the rule:

Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.

The Court explained that the word shall expresses what is mandatory and compulsory, and that the rule imposes upon the appellant a duty, not a matter of discretion. Riños not only failed to file the memorandum within the period; he also failed to seek an extension of time on any cogent ground before the period expired.

On the second issue, the Court found no cogent reason to exempt the petitioner. The records showed that the notice was in fact sent to his counsel by registered mail, and the excuse that the receiving clerk misplaced it was flimsy and discreditable. It is the duty of counsel to maintain a system ensuring that pleadings are filed and served on time, and his negligence is imputable to him. The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The exceptions are when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process, or when the general rule results in the outright deprivation of property through a technicality. Here, the Court found no gross negligence, only simple negligence that ordinary diligence could have prevented, so the exception did not apply. The Court also noted that the petitioner did not even attach the records of the trial court, so there was no way to weigh the substantial merits of his appeal.

On the third issue, the Court held that there was no denial of due process. The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in accordance with the law, and failing to comply, the right to appeal is lost. The Court added that the bare invocation of the interest of substantial justice is not a magic wand that will automatically compel the suspension of procedural rules.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process; it is a mere statutory privilege that must be exercised in accordance with the Rules of Court, and failure to comply means the right is lost. Second, under Section 7, paragraph b, of Rule 40, the filing of an appeal memorandum is a mandatory duty, and the appellant's failure to file it is a ground for dismissal of the appeal. Third, a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in procedural technique; the exceptions are reckless or gross negligence of counsel depriving the client of due process, or the outright deprivation of property through a technicality. Fourth, procedural rules may be relaxed only for the most persuasive of reasons and to benefit the deserving, and the bare plea of substantial justice does not compel the Court to suspend the rules.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit and affirmed in full the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Abuyog, Leyte dated January 10, 2012 and July 16, 2012. The Urgel spouses prevailed.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not part of due process, and the failure of the appellant to file a memorandum under Section 7, paragraph b, of Rule 40 is a ground for dismissal that binds the client. Examiners use this case on the mandatory nature of the appeal memorandum, on the binding effect of counsel's negligence, and on the limits of relaxing procedural rules in the name of substantial justice.