PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ENRIQUE DUNGAO Y ARCA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
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People versus Dungao
The Case
This is People versus Dungao, a criminal appeal from a conviction for killing a police officer during a buy-bust operation. The People of the Philippines prosecuted Enrique Dungao for Murder, alleging that he shot and killed SPO2 Alberto Lizarondo at about 12:45 in the morning of November 26, 2000, along E. Jacinto Street, Sangandaan, Kalookan City, with treachery and evident premeditation attending the killing. The case matters for two reasons a reviewee must hold onto: first, it teaches how the Supreme Court treats a prosecution witness who retracts, and second, it teaches that a killing is not automatically murder — treachery and evident premeditation must each be proven with the same certainty as the crime itself, and any doubt is resolved in favor of the accused.
Procedural History
Dungao was charged with Murder before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. After trial, that court rendered judgment finding him guilty of Murder, qualified by treachery, beyond reasonable doubt. It sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim 50,000 pesos as indemnity ex delicto, 25,000 pesos as temperate damages, and 50,000 pesos as exemplary damages. Dungao appealed to the Supreme Court, assigning two errors: that the trial court gravely erred in not giving full weight and credence to the retraction made by prosecution witness Gladys Jurado, and that it gravely erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The appeal reached the Supreme Court as an ordinary appeal from the trial court's decision.
Facts
SPO2 Lizarondo and SPO2 Filemon Arenas were members of the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Kalookan City police. Their asset was Gladys Jurado, a drug user who, incidentally, is a man. Jurado reported that he had just bought shabu along Jacinto Street in Sangandaan, where drug trafficking was rampant, from a pusher nicknamed Ricky Tuloy, who turned out to be Dungao. The two officers decided to operate against Dungao, and in the early hours of November 26, 2000 they went to the place using Jurado. They found Dungao sitting in front of his house. Jurado approached him and said his companions wanted to buy 100 pesos worth of shabu. They struck a deal, and money and drugs were exchanged.
Jurado then gave the pre-arranged signal of scratching his head, but this tipped off the wary Dungao, who ran inside his house. Jurado and SPO2 Lizarondo chased him while SPO2 Arenas trailed them. Dungao was not on the ground floor nor on the second floor. With Jurado leading, they were on the way to the third floor when Jurado stopped upon seeing Dungao on the roof holding a gun. He warned his companions, but SPO2 Lizarondo disregarded the warning, blurting, Anong baril baril, and continued the pursuit. Three gunshots rang out and SPO2 Lizarondo slumped, moaning. Jurado saw Dungao fire the shots, but SPO2 Arenas, because of his position, did not see who did it. SPO2 Arenas nonetheless fired in the direction from where the shots came, to dissuade the gunman from further shooting. SPO2 Lizarondo was brought to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival, hit once on the trunk.
Jurado testified on April 19, 2002 and identified Dungao as the gunman. But on March 25, 2004, after the prosecutor announced he had received vital information and recalled him, Jurado said he was not too sure it was Dungao who shot SPO2 Lizarondo, explaining that he had been confused and that they had a prior misunderstanding. The widow, Jeanette Lizarondo, testified for Dungao and submitted an Affidavit of Desistance. Dungao himself did not testify. A separate case for violation of the dangerous drugs law was also filed against him.
Issues
- Whether or not the trial court erred in not giving full weight and credence to the retraction made by prosecution witness Gladys Jurado.
- Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
- Whether or not the killing was attended by treachery and evident premeditation, qualifying it as Murder.
Applicable Provisions
The decision applies the definition of homicide and murder under the Revised Penal Code. Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
This is the felony to which the Court reduced the conviction, since the qualifying circumstances of Murder were not proven.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and be punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
Treachery is the qualifying circumstance the trial court wrongly appreciated, and which the Court here rejects.
On the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
This is the rule the Court uses to sustain the conviction even without Jurado's testimony.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that a mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate his original testimony. A retraction is generally unreliable and is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts, and is subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances. Jurado's recantation appeared to be a mere afterthought and was suspect, given his inadequate explanation for his change of mind and heart. The Court explained the rationale: affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration, and recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable.
On the second issue, the Court held that even without Jurado, the testimony of SPO2 Arenas standing alone already proved that Dungao was the assailant, even though Arenas candidly admitted that from where he was he did not see who was shooting. Conviction need not come from direct testimony alone; circumstantial evidence can suffice when the requisites concur. SPO2 Arenas was in the chase and close at the heels of Dungao and SPO2 Lizarondo. Except for him and Jurado, no one else was on the third floor with SPO2 Lizarondo, and the shot came from the roof where no one else was except Dungao. The totality of the circumstances excluded the possibility that someone else shot the victim.
On the third issue, the Court held that the trial court correctly disregarded evident premeditation but erred in appreciating treachery. For evident premeditation, the prosecution must prove the time the accused decided to commit the crime, an overt act showing he clung to that determination, and a lapse of sufficient time between the decision and the execution to allow reflection. Nothing in the records showed that Dungao planned the killing in advance. As for treachery, its elements are the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and the deliberate or conscious adoption of that means. There was no showing of a plan to kill, let alone the mode of execution. The essence of treachery is the swiftness and unexpectedness of the attack on the unarmed victim, and that was not present, because SPO2 Lizarondo was forewarned that Dungao was lurking with a gun but dismissed it with Anong baril baril. Qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be proven with equal certainty as the commission of the crime charged; they cannot be presumed or based on surmises, and in case of doubt the same should be resolved in favor of the accused. Hence the conviction was affirmed, but only for Homicide, not Murder.
Doctrine
- A mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate his original testimony; retractions are generally unreliable, viewed with considerable disfavor, and tested for credibility like any other testimony.
- Conviction need not rest on direct testimony alone; circumstantial evidence suffices when there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and the combination produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
- Qualifying and aggravating circumstances, such as treachery and evident premeditation, must be proven with equal certainty as the crime charged; they cannot be presumed or based on surmises, and any doubt is resolved in favor of the accused.
- Treachery requires that the means of execution give the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and that the means be deliberately or consciously adopted; its essence is the swiftness and unexpectedness of the attack on an unarmed victim.
Disposition
The appealed decision finding Dungao guilty was affirmed, but modified to convict him only of the felony of Homicide, meting on him an indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Remember This
Memorize this line: a retraction does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony, and qualifying circumstances must be proven as certainly as the crime itself, with doubt resolved for the accused. Examiners use this case to test the treatment of recanting witnesses and the distinction between Homicide and Murder when treachery is not established.