ANTONIO MACADANGDANG, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS; HONORABLE ALEJANDRO E. SEBASTIAN, IN HIS CAPA­CITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO, 16TH JUDICIA…

This petition for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining
order presents for review the Court of Appeal’s resolution dated December
21, 1973, which
dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. No. Sp-02656-R, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the said
resolution having been denied on January 29,
1974.

From the records, it
appears that respondent Filomena Gaviana
Macadangdang (hereinafter referred to as private
respondent) and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang contracted marriage in 1946 after having
lived together for two years.  From a
humble buy-and-sell business and sari-sari store operation in Davao City, the spouses moved to Mawab,
Davao del Norte where, through hard work and good
fortune, their small business grew and expanded into merchan­dising, trucking,
transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate and
others.  They were blessed with six
children, three of whom were already of majority age and the other three were
still minors as of the time this case was initiated in the lower court.  With their established businesses and accumulated
wealth, their once simple life became complicated and their relationship
started to suffer setbacks.  While the
economic or material aspect of their marriage was stabilized, the physical and
spirit­ual aspects became shaky.  Both
accused each other of indulging in extramarital relations.  Married life for them became so intolerable
that they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for good. 
When she returned to Davao in 1971, she learned of the illi­cit affairs
of her estranged husband.  Then and
there, she decided to take the initial action.

On April 28, 1971, private respondent (plaintiff therein)
instituted a complaint for legal separation in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VIII at Tagum, Davao, which complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 109
and entitled “Filomena Gaviana
Macadangdang vs. Antonio Macadangdang”
[p. 156, rec.].

Petitioner (then defendant) filed his answer with counterclaim
dated May 31, 1971 [p. 158,
rec.].

On February 9, 1972,
private respondent filed a petition for appointment of administrator, to
administer the estate of the conjugal partnership pending the termination of
the case [p. 100, rec.].

Petitioner opposed the aforesaid petition in a pleading dated February 21, 1972 [p. 102, rec.].

On January 4, 1973,
the petition for appointment of administrator not having been acted upon, the
trial court handed down its decision, the dispositive
portion of which states thus:

“Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the legal
separation of plaintiff and the defendant, or what under the old law was
separation from bed and board — a mensa
et thoro — ­with all the legal effects
attend­ant thereto, particularly the dissolution and liquidation of the
conjugal community of property.  Since
there is no complete list of the community property which has to be divided,
pending the dissolution of the conjugal prop­erty, the defendant is ordered to
pay to plaintiff P10,000.00 for her support, for any way he had been disposing
some of the properties or mortgaging them without sharing the plaintiff any part
of the fruits or proceeds thereof until the court can appoint an administrator,
as prayed for by plaintiff in a separate petition, who will take over the
administration and management of all the con­jugal partnership properties, and
act as guardian of the minor children; to protect said properties from
dissipation, and who will submit a complete inventory of said properties so
that the Court can make a just division, such division to be embodied in a
supplemental decision. xx.x
xx.” [pp. 104?115, rec.].

On August 7,
1973, private
respondent filed a motion praying that she be allowed to withdraw P10,000.00 from the lease rental of a portion of their conjugal
property deposited by Francisco Dizon [p. 116, rec.].

Respondent Judge acted on
the aforesaid motion by issuing the order of August 13, 1973 which directed the
clerk of court “to deliver, under receipt, to plaintiff Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and/or to her counsel, Atty. Marcial Fernandez, the amount of P10,000.00″ [p. 118, rec.].

On August
25, 1973, private
respondent filed another motion for the appointment of an adminis­trator,
reiterating her previous petition and urging favorable action thereon “to
impede unlawful seques­tration of some conjugal assets and clandestine
transfers” by petitioner [p. 120, rec.]. 
Petitioner again filed his opposition dated September 6, 1973 [p. 122, rec.].

On September 20, 1973,
respondent Judge issued an order directing
plaintiff’s counsel “to
submit three (3) names for appointment as administrator,
including in the list, if possible, a banking institution authorized to handle
cases of administration of properties, furnishing a copy of said list to
defendant, who shall be given three (3) days from receipt thereof to present
his observations and objections to said recommended persons or entity, after
which the Court will select the administrator as may seem best suited for the
purpose” [pp. 126-­127, rec.].

Petitioner then filed a
motion for reconsidera­tion dated October 3, 1973 of the order of September 20, 1973 with prayer that he be
allowed to continue adminis­tering the conjugal properties in accordance with
law [p. 128, rec.]. 
This motion for reconsideration was denied in the order of October
13, 1973 [p. 133,
rec.].

On October
13, 1973, herein
private respondent filed a motion for appointment of administrator and
submission of complete list of conjugal assets by defendant, submitting therein
three nominees for administrator [p. 135, rec.].

On October
23, 1973, petitioner
filed his second motion for reconsideration praying therein that the orders of September
20, 1973 and October
13, 1973 be
reconsidered by not proceeding with the appoint­ment of an administrator of the
conjugal properties of the parties [p. 137, rec.].

Respondent Judge denied
the aforesaid second motion for reconsideration in his order of November 19,
1973, reiterating therein his ruling that the decree of legal separation had
become final [p. 141, rec.].

Petitioner brought the
case to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order filed on
December 18, 1973.  Said petition sought to
review, set aside, and declare
null and void the orders of September 20, 1973, October 13, 1973 and November
19, 1973 of respondent Judge; to prohibit respondent Judge from carrying out
and executing the aforecited orders; and to prohibit
him from treating, regarding and construing his decision of January 4, 1973 as
being “final and executory” as well as from
enforcing the same in any manner
whatsoever [pp. 1, 4 & 5, CA rec.].

The Court of Appeals, in
its resolution of December 21, 1973, ruled that the questioned January 4, 1973
decision of the lower court had become final and, consequently, the appointment
of an administrator was valid and that the petition was not sufficient
in substance, since the applicable law and jurisprudence afford the petitioner
no valid cause to impugn the three questioned orders.  The appellate court accordingly dismissed the
petition [pp. 70-80, rec.].

Hence,
this appeal from the resolution of December
21, 1973.

On February 6, 1980,
counsel for petitioner, through a notice of death and motion to dismiss,
informed this Court that petitioner Antonio Macadangdang
died on November 30, 1979 and as a conse­quence thereof, this case and Civil
Case No. 109 of the Court of First Instance of Davao
have become moot and academic [p. 516, rec.].

Private respondent, when
required to comment on the aforesaid motion, moved for a resolution of this
case although she believes that petitioner’s death has posed new intervening
circumstances that would affect the entire purpose in filing the same.  In effect, private respondent agrees
with petitioner’s counsel that her
husband’s death has rendered the instant petition moot and academic [pp.
522, 524, rec.].

Petitioner had averred
that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that respondent Judge’s incomplete decision of January 4, 1973 had become final and executory
and that the same Court committed an error in holding that the appointment of
an administrator in the case below was proper.

Private respondent, upon
the other hand, has always maintained that —

1.    the decision of January 4, 1973 had become
final and executory when the petitioner failed to
appeal therefrom within the regle­mentary
period of 30 days from receipt thereof, despite the non-issuance of a
supplemental decision regarding the division of the con­jugal properties; and

2.    the appointment of
an administrator pending the actual division of said properties is proper being
“a must” and an exercise of the sound discretion of the Honorable
Presiding Judge in the Court of First Instance
of Davao, Branch VIII in Tagum
[pp. 193-194, rec.].

Did petitioner’s death on
November 30, 1979 render the case moot and
academic?  Legal problems do not cease
simply because one of the parties dies; the same problems may come up again in
another case of similar magnitude. 
Considering also the far-reaching significance and implications of a pronounce­ment
on the very important issues involved, this Court feels bound to meet said issues frontally and come out with a decisive
resolution of the same.

Thus, the questions for
resolution have been narrowed down to the following:

1.    Whether the decision of the trial court
dated January 4, 1973 in Civil Case No. 109 finding herein petitioner guilty of
concubinage and decreeing legal separation between
him and his wife Filomena Gaviana
Macadangdang (private respondent herein) had already
become final and executory
long before the herein petition was filed;

2.    Should the children of both spouses
predecease the sur­viving spouse, whether the intestate heirs of the deceased
could inherit from the innocent surviving spouse, particularly where the
latter’s share in the conjugal assets is concerned, in view of Article 106, No.
4 of the New Civil Code; and

3.    The effect of the pen­dency
of Special Proceedings No. 134
in the Court of First Instance of Davao for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased petitioner herein, on the decision in
Civil Case No. 109 as well as on the instant petition.

In support of his
contention that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in holding that
respondent Judge’s incomplete decision of January 4, 1973 had become final and executory,
petitioner had consistently asserted the following reasons:

1.   Private respondent’s complaint for legal
separation and division of properties was a single complaint.  Thus, she explicitly prayed:

xx                    
           xx                                 xx

“3.  That upon trial of this action judgment be
rendered ordering the legal separation of the plaintiff and the de­fendant and
the division of all the assets of the conjugal partnership, xx x” [p. 157,
rec.].

In
this single action, private respondent asked the trial court to decide if petitioner
and she should be legally separated, and if they should, what properties would
form part of the conjugal regime and which properties would be assigned to each
spouse.

2.   Of the aforesaid issues, the lower court
resolved only the issue of legal separation and reserved for supplemental
decision the division of the conjugal properties.  Petitioner had further argued that —

“Inasmuch as the Decision failed to dispose of all the
issues before the Court, which necessitated the announcement of a forthcoming supplemental
decision, petitioner respect­fully submits that the Decision was an
incomplete judgment.  In Santos
v. de Guzman, 1 SCRA 1048,
is found this very succinct ex­planation of what an incomplete judgment is:

‘x x x There was but one case before the
lower court.  Its first decision (of June 12, 1956) was, as already
stated, incomplete the same not having resolved the issues involved in the
litigation.  For this reason the
trial had to be reopened and a supplemental decision had to be rendered x x’
(at p. 1053; emphasis supplied).”

WE do not find merit in
petitioner’s submission that the questioned decision had not become final and executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides for
the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal part­nership of gains of the
absolute community of property as among the effects of the final decree of
legal separation.  Article 106 of the
Civil Code thus reads:

“Art. 106.  The decree
of legal separation shall have the following effects:

“1)    The spouses shall
be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall
not be severed;

“2)    The conjugal partnership of gains or the
absolute conjugal community of property shall be dissolved and liquidated, but
the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits earned by
the partnership or community, without prejudice to the provisions of Article
176;

xx                                 xx                                 xx                                 x”

[underscoring
supplied].

The aforequoted provision mandates the
disso­lution and liquidation of the property regime of the spouses upon
finality of the decree of legal separation. 
Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary conse­quences of the
final decree.  This legal effect of the
decree of legal separation ipso facto or automatically follows,
as an inevitable incident of, the judgment decreeing legal separation — for
the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.

Even American courts have made definite pronounce­ments on the aforestated legal effect of a divorce (legal separation)
decree.

Generally speaking, the
purpose of a decree in divorce insofar as the disposition of property is
con­cerned is to fix and make certain the property rights and interests of the
parties (Mich-Westgate vs. West­gate, 288 N.W. 860,
291 Mich. 18, 300 [1] p. 354, C.J.S. Vol. 27B); and
it has been held that the provisions of the decree should definitely and
finally determine the property rights and interests of the parties (Wash.-Shaffer
vs. Shaffer, 262 P. 2d. 763, 43 Wash. 2d 629; 300 [1] p. 354 C.J.S. Vol. 27B); and that any attempted reservation of such questions for future
determination is improper and error (Mich.-Karwowski
vs. Karwowski, 20 N.W. 2d 851, 313 Mich. 167, 300 [1]
p. 354, C.J.S., Vol. 27B; underscoring supplied).

Some statutes
providing for the division or disposition of the property of the parties to a
divorce have been held mandatory and hence to require the court to decree some
division of their property rights (U.S. – Pearce vs. CIR, 62 S. Ct. 754, 315
U.S. 543, 86 L. ed. 1016, construing Texas statute; 291 [1] p. 263 C.J.S. Vol.
27B).

Likewise, it has been held that the settle­ment of some property
rights between the parties is an incident
of every decree of
divorce where there is any
property involved (Utah – Smith vs. Smith, 291 P. 298, 77 Utah 60, 291 [1] p. 264, C.J.S., Vol. 27B).

It has been held that notwithstanding the division of property
between the parties, the subject matter
of a divorce action remains the marital
status of the parties, the
settlement of the property rights being merely incidental (Wash.
State ex rel. Atkins vs. Superior Court of King County, 97 P. 2d. 139, 1 Wash. 2d 677;
291 [1] p. 264 C.J.S., Vol. 27B; underlining
supplied).

Under other authorities, by the very nature of the litigation, all property rights
growing out of marital relations are settled and included in
divorce proceedings (Ind. – Novak vs. Novak, 133 N.E. 2d 578, 126 Ind.
App. 428) and a decree of divorce is an
adjudication of all property
rights connected with the marriage and
precludes the parties as to all matters which might have been legitimately proved in support of charges or defenses in
the action (U.S. – Spreckles vs. Wakefield, C.C.A., 286 F. 465) and
bars any action thereafter brought by either party to determine the question of property rights (Fla. –
Cooper vs. Cooper, 69 So. 2d
881; Finston vs. Finston,
37 So. 2d 423, 160 Fla. 935; p. 751, C.J.S. Vol.
27A).

An absolute divorce
ordinarily terminates all property rights and interests, not actually vested, of
divorced persons in property of
each other, which are dependent on the marriage (U.S. – Cockrill
vs. Woodson, D.C. Mo., 70 F. 752), at least where no proceedings have been taken to vacate or modify the decree by appeal until the statutory time therefor
has expired (Kan. – Roberts vs. Fagan, 92 P. 559,
76 Kan. 536).  Accordingly, unless
the court granting the decree is without jurisdiction, inchoate rights of the
wife in the husband’s property are usually cut off (Ky. – Bowling vs. Little,
206 S.W. 1, 182 Ky. 86)
especially where by the terms of the decree all property obtained by either spouse from or through the other
during the marriage is restored to such spouse (Tex. – Houston, etc., R. Co.
vs. Helm, Civ. App. 93 S.W. 697; pp. 752-753, C.J.S.
Vol. 27A).

Enunciating with
directness and finality, one U.S. court held: 
“The part of a divorce suit regarding property is a part of the
very divorce action itself” (Tex. – Ex parte
Scott, 123 S.W. 2d. 306, 313, 133 Tex. 1, answers to certified questions
conformed to, Civ. App. 126, S.W. 2d 525; 291 [1] p.
264, C.J.S. Vol. 27B).

Petitioner erred in
invoking the case of Vda. de Zaldarriaga
vs. Zaldarriaga which in turn cited the doctrine of Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso, which
We have already declared abrogated in the case of Miranda vs. Court of Appeals (L-33007, 71 SCRA 295, [June
18, 1976]).  In this case, this Court
expli­citly stated:

“For the guidance of
the bench and bar, the court declares as abandoned the doctrine of Fuentebella
vs. Carrascoso and adopts the opposite rule
that judgments for recovery with accounting are final and appealable
(without need of awaiting the accounting) and would become final and executory if
not appealed within the reglementary period.”

In resolving the question of whether or not the judgment directing an accounting in an action for recovery of properties is
final and appealable, this Court further explained:

“The
judgment ‘directing an accounting’ is appealable,
regardless of whether the accounting is
the principal relief sought or a mere incident or consequence of the judgment
which grants recovery and delivery of absconded prop­erties as the
principal relief and expressly
provides that ‘a judgment or
order directing an accounting in an action, shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal
is taken or during the penden­cy of an appeal.’

xx                                 xx                                 xx                     x

“If a judgment which
directs solely an accounting is appeal­able notwithstanding that it ‘does not finally dispose of the action and the accounting has yet
to be rendered to com­plete the relief sought,
‘much more so is a judgment
which orders accounting as a mere incident appealable,
because the judgment which orders the delivery of properties does finally
dispose of the action on its
merits.

”xx                               xx                                 xx                     x

Imperative and controlling con­siderations of public policy and of sound practice in the courts to achieve the desideratum of just, speedy and inex­pensive determination of every action militate against such a novel
and unprecedented situa­tion where a judgment on the merits for recovery of
properties would be left dangling and would be considered as ‘interlocutory’ and subject to revision and alteration
at will for as long as the account­ing ordered
as a mere incident and
logical consequence has not been rendered and acted upon by the trial
court.

“xx                               xx                                 xx

The Court, however, deems it proper for the guidance of the bench
and bar to now declare as is clearly indicated from the compelling reasons and con­siderations herein-above
stated:  –that the court considers the
better rule to be that stated in H.E. Heacock Co. vs. American Trading Co. (53 Phil. 481 [1929]),
to wit, that where the primary purpose of a case is to ascer­tain and determine
who between plaintiff and defendant is the true owner and
entitled to the exclusive use of the disputed property, ‘the judgment . . .
rendered by the lower court [is] a
judgment on the merits as to those questions, and (that) the order of
the court for an accounting was based upon and is incidental to
the judgment on the merits.  That is to
say, that the judgment . . . (is) a final judgment .
. ; that in this kind of a case an accounting
is a mere incident to the judgment; that an appeal lies from the
rendition of the judgment as rendered. .’

xx                                 xx                                 xx                                 x.

— that accordingly,
the contrary ruling in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso which
expressly reversed the Heacock case and a line of
similar decisions (Africa vs. Africa, 42 Phil. 934; Villanueva vs. Capistrano;
Prophylactic Brush Co., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 46254, Nov. 23, 1938
[Unpublished]) and ruled that such a decision for recovery of property with accounting ‘is not final but merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable‘
and subsequent cases adhering to the
same (Zaldarriaga vs. Enriquez, 1 SCRA
1188) must be now in turn abandoned and set aside.

xx                                 xx                                 xx                                 xx

“The Court’s considered opinion is that imperative con­siderations
of public policy and of sound practice in the courts and
adherence to the constitutional mandate of simplified, just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action call for consid­ering such judgments
for recovery of property with accounting as final
judgments which are duly appealable (and would
therefore become final and executory if not
appealed within the reglementary period) with the
accounting as a mere incident of the judgment to be rendered
during the course of the appeal as provided in Rule 39, section 4 or to be
implemented at the execution stage upon final affirmance
on appeal of the judgment (as in Court of Indus­trial Relations unfair labor
practice cases ordering rein­statement of the worker with accounting,
computation and payment of his backwages less
earnings elsewhere during his layoff) and that the only reason given in Fuentebella for the contrary ruling, viz,
‘the gen­eral harm that would follow from throwing the door open to multi­plicity
of appeals in a single case’ is of lesser import and consequence.”

Considering the aforestated well-established jurisprudence on the matter,
the clear mandate of Article 106 of the Civil Code and the aforequoted
ruling in the Miranda case, the decision of the trial court dated
January 4, 1973 decreeing the legal
separation between then spouses Antonio Macadangdang
and Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang had long become final and executory
and the division of the conjugal property in a “supplemental
decision” is a mere incident of the decree of legal separation.

Since We
have ruled on the finality of the
judgment decreeing the spouses’
legal separation as of January 4, 1973, the remaining issue for Our resolution is
the final disposition of their conjugal partnership of gains which partnership,
by reason of the final decree, had been automatically dissolved.  The law (Articles 106, 107 and 176 of the
Civil Code) clearly spells out the effects of a final decree of legal
separation on the conjugal property.

The death on November
30, 1979 of herein
petitioner who was declared the guilty spouse by the trial court, before the liquidation
of the con­jugal property is effected, poses a new problem which can be
resolved simply by the application of the rules on intestate
succession with respect to the properties of the deceased petitioner.

Thus, the rules on dissolution
and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains under the aforecited provisions of the Civil Code would be applied
effective January 4, 1973 when the decree of legal separation became
final.  Upon the liquidation and
distribution conformably with the law governing the effects of the final decree
of legal separation, the law on intestate succession should take over in the
disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to
petitioner.  This procedure in­volves
details which properly pertain to the lower court.

The properties that may be allocated to the deceased
petitioner by virtue of the liquidation of the conjugal assets, shall be distributed in accordance with the laws of intestate succession in Special Proceedings No. 134.

WHEREFORE, THIS PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED, WITH
COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER’S
ESTATE.

SO ORDERED.

Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., (Chairman), concurs in the result in a separate opinion.