GVM, INC., AS SEC-APPOINTED RECEIVER FOR FUIFC AND FNCC CAPITAL CORPORATION, COMPLAINANT, VS. ARMANDO DE GUZMAN, DEPUTY SHERIFF OF RIZAL DETAILED AT MAKATI, METRO MANILA, RESPON…

The issue posed in this administrative complaint is whether the
respondent sheriff, Armando M. de Guzman, is liable administratively for
enforcing, in a very harsh and oppressive manner, a writ of possession two (2)
days before the authorized date set for its implementation.

In support of its complaint, the complainant, GVM, Inc., points
to the fact that the respondent was not the regular sheriff attached to the
court which issued the writ of possession but a special sheriff. Not only was he appointed rather hastily,
but he also destroyed valuable pieces of evidence which complainant had been
assiduously gathering, compiling, classifying, analyzing and keeping for use
against the owners and managers of the financially distressed corporations
wherein complainant was ordered to act as receiver by the Securities &
Exchange Commission^[1]
and against the AEA Development Corporation which had bought the distressed
corporations’ building allegedly in fraud of creditors.

Going over the records with the eye of a Sherlock Holmes, this
Court finds for complainant.

According to complainant, the antecedent facts of this case are
the following:

“1. On June 27, 1984, AEA Development Corp.
filed a case against complainant, docketed as Civil Case No. 7701, entitled
Petition To quiet Title, involving the land and building denominated as FNCC
Bldg., located at Legaspi St., Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro Manila.

“2. On June 28, 1984,
just a day after said case was filed, Judge Aguinaldo of Branch 143 (RTC,
Makati), to whom the case was speedily raffled on that same day, issued,
without benefit of a hearing, an ex-­parte order granting AEA’s prayer for an
immediate Writ of Possession, which in effect disposed of the merits of the
case which is to quiet title, and AEA was not in possession of the building
then. Judge Aguinaldo went on leave
immediately after issuing aforementioned order.

“3. On September 6, 1984, the regular Deputy Sheriff of
Branch 143, Jose A. Ascano, served for the first time, the summons (with
complaint attached) in AEA’s case upon complainant, said Deputy Sheriff served
as well upon the complainant a Notice to Vacate the building, giving
complainant fifteen (15) days (or up to September 21, 1984) to voluntarily do
so.

“4. On September 20,
1984, one day (1) before the deadline mentioned, respondent Deputy Sheriff
de Guzman (who somehow replaced the regular sheriff and got himself an
appointment as special sheriff on September 20, 1984) suddenly
implemented the writ of possession when his demands were refused by one of the officers of GVM, Inc. in
the most abusive, reckless, oppressive and barbaric manner. The order was served at 6:00 p.m. of
September 20, 1984, although respondent claimed it was done at 3:30 p.m. Either way, it was simply impossible for the
complainant to go to court to apply for any judicial remedy because of time
constraint. The ejectment was carried
out up to the following day, September 21, 1984, a public holiday. Obviously, the ejectment was so timed as to
prevent complainant from seeking judicial remedies.

“5. On August 30, 1984, complainant
herein filed a case against AEA Dev. Corp. involving the same property, for
annulment of Contract with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 8331, which
surprisingly, was also raffled in the sala of Judge Aguinaldo.

“6. That because of the barbaric and oppressive manner respondent
implemented the Writ of Possession (see pictures attached to complaint), very
important and very valuable documents were lost and/or damaged consisting of promissory notes of debtors of the
corporations, certificate of stocks, loan documents detailing
transactions worth millions of pesos, payroll sheets, other accounting records
and statements, etc., including vital documents to support and prove
complainant’s case (CC No. 8331) against AEA DEV. Corp.

“7. That because of the
loss of important, valuable and vital documents, the Securities and Exchange
Commission had no recourse but to order the liquidation of FNCC Capital
Corp. Also because of this incident,
the Receiver-Liquidator, with the approval of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, was compelled to compromise Civil Case No. 8331 as it lost the
documents to prove its case against AEA DEV. Corp., thanks to respondent.”^[2]
(Underscoring in the original)

Respondent vehemently denied complainant’s allegations and
claimed that what transpired is as follows:

“Civil Case No. 7701, was filed by AEA Development Corp., with
Branch 143, of the Makati, RTC, asking that it be placed in possession the AEA
building located on a parcel of land situated in Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro
Manila, because it owned the land and building which was covered by a title in
its name.

“The Writ of Possession was issued and a corresponding copy thereof
together with the Notice to Vacate was served upon the officers or agents of
GVM, Inc., on September 6, 1984, which was then acting as SEC RECEIVER for two
field financing companies holding office on 3 floors of the AEA building.

“To forestall their ejectment from the building, GVM, Inc., filed
in the court which issued the Writ of Possession, a motion to dismiss the
petition, and later a motion to quash the Writ of Possession. Both motions were resolved against the
movant on September 20, 1984. On the
same date, respondent upon motion of AEA, was designated to enforce the Writ of
Possession issued by the court earlier.

“Respondent proceeded to the AEA Building and found one of GVM’s
lawyers, Atty. Marcelino Villanueva and served him with a copy of the Writ of
Possession, the Order Denying their Motion to Dismiss and their Motion to Quash
Writ of Possession.

“The counsel of AEA Development Corp., Atty. Alfredo Estrella who
was then with respondent Deputy Sheriff, refused to grant the request of
complainant’s lawyers and officers for a second 7-day extension. After negotiation between the lawyers of
both parties, a compromise was forged, and it was agreed that the third and
ground floors will be vacated on that day by GVM, Inc., and that the second
floor occupied by them for audit, examination and investigation purposes will
be vacated the following day.

“Removal of the furnitures and fixtures of complainant was done by
the movers brought along by AEA,
who were assisted by men of GVM, INC.”^[3]

On January 21, 1986, the Court Administrator ordered the
Executive Judge of the Makati Regional Trial Court to investigate the complaint
and submit a report. The ratio
and recommendatory portions of the report are as follows:

“The administrative complaint is impressed with merit.

“Paragraph 3 of Administrative Circular No. 12 of the Supreme Court
dated 1 October 1985 reads:

‘The judge of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
and the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, in the absence of the deputy sheriff
appointed and assigned in his sala, may at any time designate any of the deputy
sheriffs in the office of the Clerk of Court. However, the said judge shall not be allowed to designate the deputy
sheriff of another Branch without first securing the consent of the Presiding
Judge thereof;

This aforequoted provision thus gives the
Judge the right to designate a special sheriff in lieu of the regular
sheriff. But whether or not this rule
had been strictly followed by the Judge, the latter’s act in appointing
respondent as Special Sheriff cannot be taken against herein respondent. Notwithstanding this however, the court
cannot simply ignore the act of respondent in implementing the writ of
possession even before the lapse of the expiration period. While it is true that the regular sheriff originally
gave herein complainants a 7-day period within which to vacate the premises in
question, the same was extended to 15 days. This, respondent did not refute. Hence, the respondent’s act in implementing the said writ a day before
the expiration of the period given to complainants to vacate the premises in
question was irregular.

“Premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that
respondent be held liable for conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest
of the service and correspondingly meted with the penalty of suspension from
office for six (6) months and one (1) day.^[4]

SC Administrative Circular No. 12 dated October 1, 1985 is not
applicable to the case at bar for the simple reason that said circular was not
yet existing when respondent was appointed Special Sheriff on September 20,
1984. But the writ of possession was
prematurely implemented. The
recommended penalty, however, of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day
is too light a penalty to be meted out to respondent.

In the past, the Court has already stated that:

“[W]hen a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty,
in the absence of instructions, to proceed with reasonable celerity and
promptness to execute it according to its mandate x x x he has no discretion
whether to execute it or not. x x
x”^[5]
(Italics in the original)

and, in another case where a deputy
sheriff delayed to serve a warrant of arrest,^[6] the
Court stated that:

“There is no question that it was one of his duties to effect the
prompt and effective service of the orders and warrants issued by the
court. When he failed to act, it was
certainly the business of the complainant to bring such official inaction to
the attention of the appropriate governmental authority. x x x”^[7]

The case before us is unique
in that the special sheriff was EXTRA prompt in implementing the writ of
possession. The complainant had already
been served a Notice to Vacate by the regular deputy sheriff, Jose A. Ascaño,
in the following tenor:

“NOTICE TO VACATE

“TO: FNCC CAPITAL CORPORATION and

GVM INCORPORATED

FNCC Building, 151
Legaspi Street

Legaspi Village,
Makati

Metro Manila

G R E E T I N G S :

For your information and guidance, I am enclosing herewith copy of
the Writ of Possession issued by the Court in the above-entitled case for
compliance.

This office is giving you a period of fifteen (15)^[8]
days upon receipt hereof to voluntarily vacate the premises in question and
failure on your part to do so, much to our regret we will be constrained to
force into effect the said Order to the limit provided by law.

Trusting your early compliance on the above matter, we are.

Makati, Metro Manila, September 6, 1984.”^[9]

Complainant had, therefore, until the close of office hours on
September 21, 1984 to vacate the premises. Deputy Sheriff Ascaño could only start to implement the writ, at 8:00
A.M. of September 22, 1984 or immediately thereafter. In theory, he could have padlocked the premises at 5:01 P.M. of
September 21, 1984 but, as is the usual practice of giving the ejectment defendant
more time in removing its properties from the premises to be padlocked, and,
more importantly, because regular office hours are only from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00
P.M., Deputy Sheriff Ascaño opted not to implement the writ on that day. Under either situation, as of September 20,
1984, the complainant had until 5:00 P.M. of September 21, 1984 – a full two
(2) days before the deadline indicated in the Notice to Vacate would expire.

The writ of possession was implemented, not by regular deputy
sheriff Ascaño, but by special
sheriff Armando M. de Guzman in the afternoon of September 20, 1984. The latter claims that the complainant was
only given seven (7) days from September 6, 1984 to vacate the building, or
until September 13. He refused to note
that the regular deputy sheriff had given the complainant an additional eight
(8) days because it was clear from the Notice to Vacate that the word “seven”
and number “7” had been crossed out and replaced with the word “fifteen” and
number “15” and THEN initialled by deputy sheriff Ascaño.

In any event, it stands to reason, that if only seven (7) days
had originally been granted the complainant without any extension, then
AEA Development Corporation would have moved for the implementation of the writ
by the 14th of September, which the latter did not. As the records show, respondent was designated to enforce the
writ ONLY on September 20, 1984, as can be seen from the order of the trial
court:

“Acting on the motion dated September 20, 1984, and finding the
same to be reasonable, the motion is granted. Deputy Sheriff Armando M. de Guzman is hereby designated to enforce the writ of possession which was
issued by this Court.

“SO ORDERED.

“Makati, Metro Manila, September 20, 1984.”^[10]

While SC Administrative Circular No. 12 was not yet in existence
when the respondent was appointed special sheriff, and, therefore, the consent
of respondent’s presiding judge for respondent’s appointment as special sheriff
in another sala was not necessary, still the trilogy of (1) respondent’s
“midnight appointment,”^[11] (2)
the dismissal of complainant’s motions to dismiss and quash writ of possession
issued in said civil case No. 7701,^[12] and
(3) the ejectment of complainant from the building ALL effected on September
20, 1984 lend credence to complainant’s
plaint:

1. On why respondent
sheriff implemented the writ of possession on September 20, 1984 instead of on
September 21, 1984, or one (1) day earlier, in the late afternoon at that and
making sure that the following day was a public holiday, where complainant
would have no recourse for a judicial remedy;

2. That respondent
implemented the Writ of Possession in a very oppressive, reckless and barbaric
manner resulting in the loss of vital documents, knowing that FNCC Capital
Corp. is a financing company, and consequently its loan documents and papers
are its assets. Respondent’s conduct is
highly deplorable.

3. That among the documents
lost as a result of respondent’s reckless implementation of the Writ of
Possession are the documents needed for complainant to prove its case against
AEA Dev. Corp., the party which paid respondent for his services in
implementing said writ. Was this
reckless implementation of the Writ by respondent done on purpose precisely to
make sure that said documents would get lost and pilfered as claimed by
respondent?^[13]

This illegal implementation of the writ by the respondent, was
confirmed by an independent party, the “Benjamin L. Sim & Co.,” certified
public accountants,^[14] in
its Notes to Financial Statements.^[15]

The very description of respondent’s actuation in the
implementation of the writ as one characterized by “harshness” indicates the
nature, character and manner with which respondent effected the transfer of
possession. Exhibits “H”, “H-1” and
“H-2,” which are pictures of the topsy-turvy condition of the tables, chairs
and equipment thrown out of the building and the scattered documents and
papers, attest to the mute and eloquent evidence of the carnage that resulted
as a result of respondent’s reckless and oppressive manner in implementing the
writ of possession.^[16]

The Court can only ask itself just how many good reasons impelled
respondent to OVERZEALOUSLY and PREMATURELY implement the writ of possession.

The premature implementation of the writ is in itself a badge of
bad faith and evident intent to deny the complainant his right to procedural
due process.

The service of the writ at the start of office hours on September
22, 1984, would not have prejudiced AEA Development Corporation.

The Court holds, therefore, that respondent’s actuations in
harshly implementing the writ of possession in said civil case No. 7701 a full
two (2) days before its scheduled implementation constitutes oppression, gross
misconduct and discourtesy and the Court holds that the penalty is dismissal
from the service.

WHEREFORE, respondent deputy sheriff Armando M. de Guzman
is found guilty of oppression, gross misconduct and discourtesy in the
unauthorized and premature implementation of the writ of possession issued by the
Makati Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 7701 and is hereby DISMISSED from
the service with forfeiture of all benefits he may be entitled thereto, and
with prejudice to future reinstatement in the government service and employment
in government owned and/or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J.,
Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quaison, Puno, and
Vitug, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Order, “In the Matter of FIRST UNITED INVESTMENT & FINANCE CORPORATION,”
issued March 31, 1984 by Manuel G. Abello, Chairman, and concurred in by Julio
A. Sulit, Jr., Gonzalo T. Santos, Jr., Jesus Valdes and Rasario N. Lopez,
Associate Commissioners.

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 101-103.

^[3]
Ibid., pp. 93-94.

^[4]
Ibid., p. 188.

^[5]
Young v. Momblan, A.M. No. P-89-367, 205 SCRA 33, 36, 37 (1992) citing
“The Manual for Clerks of Court,” p. 178, in turn citing 47 Am. Jur. 855.

^[6]
Peñalosa v. Viscaya, Jr., A.M. No. P-1391, 84 SCRA 298 (1978).

^[7]
At p. 301.

^[8]
Originally, seven (7) days were given to the complainant by deputy
sheriff Ascaño. He, however, granted
then fifteen (15) days and initialled the corrected date on the Notice to
Vacate itself.

^[9]
Exhibit “D” of the complaint; Rollo, p. 19.

^[10]
Order dated September 20, 1984 and penned by the Hon. Zoilo Aguinaldo,
presiding judge, Branch 143, Makati RTC, in “AEA Development Corporation vs.
FNCC Capital Corporation and GVM, Inc.” Civil Case No. 7701.

^[11]
Exhibit “2” of the Answer; Rollo, p. 48.

^[12]
Exhibit “3” of the Answer; Rollo, pp.
49-54.

^[13]
Rollo, p. 103.

^[14]
Hired to audit the distress corporations’ book of accounts; Rollo, p.
69.

^[15]
17. POST FINANCIAL STATEMENT EVENTS

x x x     x x x     x
x x

17.3 Ejectment of the Receiver
from the FNCC Building by AEA Development Corporation – On the late
afternoon of September 20, 1984, AEA Development Corporation, after a series of
hearings before the SEC, in court, and off-court with GVM, Inc. on the
controversy over the building, served a court order on the Receiver,
dispossessing the latter of possession and occupancy of the building.

The turn of events not
anticipated. ADDED TO THE
HARSHNESS WITH WHICH THE EJECTMENT WAS SERVED and the resistance
offered by the Receiver, a good deal of records and equipment of all the
companies housed in the building were either lost, damaged, or were totally
destroyed in the process. (Emphasis and
italics supplied)

^[16]
Rollo, pp. 31-33.