IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO AND WRIT OF HABEAS DATA FOR ATTY. MARIA CATHERINE DANNUG SALUCON.
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Salucon versus Executive Secretary
The Case
This is the case of Salucon versus the Executive Secretary, although the decision speaks of it simply as the petition for the writs of amparo and habeas data filed by Attorney Maria Catherine Dannug-Salucon. A human rights lawyer from Isabela, she asked the Supreme Court to shield her and her family from what she described as surveillance and harassment by military and police operatives, and to compel the government to disclose and destroy whatever records it held about her. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's own statement of what the writ of amparo can and cannot do: it is a remedy for a threatened violation of the right to life, liberty and security, but it is not a tool for compelling the production of documents, and it does not make every official in the chain of command a respondent.
Procedural History
The petition was filed directly with the Supreme Court on April 11, 2014, invoking the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data. On April 22, 2014, the Special Sixth Division of the Supreme Court gave due course to the petition and issued both writs, requiring the respondents to make a verified return and to comment within five days. The respondents filed their return and comment on May 5, 2014. A preliminary hearing followed on May 23, 2014, where the parties stipulated on the identity and ranks of the respondents, on the fact that they were impleaded in their official capacities, and on the fact that they knew the petitioner was a member of the Philippine bar even before the petition was filed. Trial on the merits then ensued, after which the Supreme Court rendered its decision.
Facts
Attorney Salucon had been a human rights lawyer since her admission to the bar in 2005. She was a founding member and the national auditor of the National Union of People's Lawyers, and after leaving the Public Attorney's Office she put up her own firm and took on the defense of political detainees, many of them peasants, sectoral leaders and human rights defenders whom the government had labeled or suspected to be members of the Communist Party of the Philippines or the New People's Army.
On March 24, 2014, while she was at a lunch meeting with the relatives of a detained client, her paralegal William Bugatti told her he had personally observed that they were being watched, and he suggested security measures. Bugatti was fatally gunned down that same evening. That night, a confidential informant told her that the regional intelligence of the Philippine National Police had directed the police station in her hometown of Burgos, Isabela, to conduct a background investigation on her and to confirm whether she was a red lawyer, that she was being followed by agents of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and that her name appeared on a military watch list of alleged communist terrorist supporters rendering legal services.
She then gathered a series of incidents: strangers on motorcycles questioning a vendor in front of her office about her movements; a Criminal Investigation and Detection Group member twice looking for her at her office; a text message from the group's chief investigator asking for records of a human rights case; a motorcycle rider with a covered plate staring at her driver outside her home; soldiers posing as clients asking where she was; and a military intelligence civilian asset urging her to meet the head of the intelligence group. She reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation, but no positive report identifying the individuals was ever made. The respondents denied any surveillance of the petitioner, and each described the inquiries and directives he issued upon receiving the writs.
Issues
- Whether or not the petition for the writ of amparo should be granted in favor of the petitioner.
- Whether or not the writ of habeas data may be issued to compel the respondents to disclose and destroy information pertaining to the petitioner.
- Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility may be invoked in an amparo proceeding to hold the respondents liable in their official capacities.
- Whether or not the President of the Philippines may be impleaded as a respondent in the petition.
Applicable Provisions
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, found in Administrative Matter Number 07-9-12-SC, provides:
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
This is the provision the Court construes, because it fixes both the remedy's purpose and its limits, and the petitioner's prayer must be measured against it.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the writ of amparo is a remedy of last resort, available only where the right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission. The petitioner's evidence consisted largely of unverified accounts from an informant whose identity she withheld, and of descriptions of men who merely looked like soldiers or policemen. She could not identify the persons involved or link them to any of the respondents. The Court therefore found no sufficient showing of an actual or threatened violation attributable to the respondents.
On the second issue, the Court held that the writ of habeas data is a separate and distinct remedy, granted to protect the right to privacy in information, and it cannot be used as a means of compelling the production or destruction of documents in an amparo proceeding. The prayer for disclosure and destruction of records was not the proper subject of the writ as invoked.
On the third issue, the Court rejected the invocation of the doctrine of command responsibility. That doctrine is a substantive rule establishing criminal or administrative liability, and it cannot be used in a summary amparo proceeding to make superiors answerable for the acts of unidentified subordinates.
On the fourth issue, the Court held that the President, as Commander in Chief, cannot be impleaded in the absence of any specific unlawful act or omission on his part, and the petition alleged none.
Doctrine
A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the writ of amparo is a remedy of last resort for a violation or threatened violation of the right to life, liberty and security by an unlawful act or omission, and the petitioner must show that violation and attribute it to the respondent. Second, the writ of habeas data is a distinct remedy for the protection of the right to privacy in information, and it is not a device for compelling the production or destruction of documents within an amparo case. Third, the doctrine of command responsibility is a substantive rule of criminal or administrative liability and has no place in a summary amparo proceeding. Fourth, the President may not be impleaded as a respondent absent a specific unlawful act or omission alleged against him.
Disposition
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and the writs of amparo and habeas data were not granted in favor of the petitioner.
Remember This
Memorize the line that the writ of amparo is a remedy of last resort for a violation or threatened violation of the right to life, liberty and security, and that habeas data is a separate remedy for the right to privacy. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between the two writs and the rule that command responsibility cannot be invoked in a summary amparo proceeding.