LUZ HERMOSA, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF FERNANDO HERMOSA, SR., AND FERNANDO HERMOSA, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. EPIFANIO M. LONGARA, RESPONDENT.

Hermosa versus Longara

The Case

This is a petition for review by way of certiorari brought by Luz Hermosa, as administratrix of the intestate estate of Fernando Hermosa, Senior, and by Fernando Hermosa, Junior, against Epifanio M. Longara. The estate challenges the approval by the Court of Appeals of money claims that Longara filed against the estate for credit advances he had extended to the deceased and to members of the deceased's family. The case matters because it draws the classic dividing line between a purely potestative condition, which is void, and a mixed condition, which is valid — a distinction that turns on whether payment depends on the debtor's will alone or also on circumstances beyond his control. It also teaches the retroactive effect of a suspensive condition and the effect of death on support and on an agent's authority.

Procedural History

Longara presented his claims against the intestate estate in the probate proceedings. The probate court approved them, and the estate appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the approval of the claims. The estate then came to the Supreme Court by way of certiorari, asking that the appellate decision be set aside. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Facts

Epifanio M. Longara made credit advances to Fernando Hermosa, Senior, from 1932 to 1944, in the total amount of 2,341 pesos and 41 centavos. He also advanced 12,924 pesos and 12 centavos to the deceased's son, Francisco Hermosa. The deceased asked for these advances for himself and for the members of his family, on the understanding that payment would be made by him as soon as he received funds derived from the sale of his property in Spain. Longara testified, without opposition, that the advances were payable as soon as the property in Spain was sold and the deceased received the money from the sale.

Fernando Hermosa, Senior, died in December 1944. After his death, from 1945 to 1947, Longara furnished further credit to the deceased's grandson, Fernando Hermosa, Junior, in the amount of 3,772 pesos. In October 1947, upon authorization of the probate court, the administratrix sold the property in Spain. The sale was consummated in November 1947 and the buyer paid for it subsequently, with the administratrix receiving 20,000 pesos. Longara filed his claim on October 2, 1948.

The Court of Appeals found no evidence that the claim was the product of collusion or connivance between the administratrix, who was the claimant's wife, and the claimant. It found that a real promise to pay had been made, inferring this from the preservation of the receipts, the regularity of the advances, and the close relationship between the deceased and the claimant.

Issues

• Whether or not the obligation to pay the advances was subject to a condition exclusively dependent upon the will of the debtor, and therefore null and void under the old Civil Code.
• Whether or not the action to recover the advances had already prescribed.
• Whether or not the claims for credits furnished to the grandson after the death of the deceased should have been allowed.
• Whether or not the claims were barred by the statute of non-claims.

Applicable Provisions

Article 1115 of the old Civil Code provides:

La obligacion contractual afectada por condicion suspensiva, no es exigible hasta que se cumpla la condicion.

This is the rule on suspensive conditions: the obligation is not demandable until the condition is fulfilled, which bears directly on when the claim became due and when prescription began to run.

Article 1119 of the old Civil Code, as discussed by the Court, provides that if the debtor prevents the fulfillment of the condition, the condition is deemed complied with. The Court used this to show that the debtor's will to sell was presumed to exist.

Article 1114 of the old Civil Code, as cited by the Court, provides that upon the happening of the suspensive condition, the obligation becomes immediately due and demandable.

Article 150 of the old Civil Code provides:

La obligacion de dar alimentos es personal y se extingue con la muerte del obligado.

This is the ground for disallowing the advances made to the grandson after the deceased's death, because the duty of support is personal and ends with the obligor's death.

Article 1732 of the old Civil Code provides that the agency is extinguished by the death of the principal. This is the second ground for disallowing those same advances, because any authorization to furnish support ended upon the principal's death.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the condition was not purely potestative. The condition was that payment be made as soon as the deceased received funds from the sale of his property in Spain. That condition did not depend exclusively on the debtor's will, but also on circumstances beyond his power or control. The Court explained that if the condition had been "if he decides to sell his house," or "if he likes to pay the sums advanced," it would be potestative and void. But here the condition implied that the deceased had already decided to sell, and all that remained was the consummation of the sale and the remittance of the price. Even so, there still had to be a buyer ready, able, and willing to purchase on the terms the deceased demanded. The condition was therefore a mixed one, depending partly on the debtor's will and partly on chance, and the obligation was governed by the second sentence of Article 1115 of the old Civil Code. It was a suspensive condition, and upon its happening the debt became immediately due and demandable.

On the second issue, the Court held that the action had not prescribed. Because the obligation retroacts to the date the contract was entered into, all amounts advanced from the time of the agreement became due upon the happening of the suspensive condition. The action to recover accrued only when the money became available in the islands, so it had not yet prescribed.

On the third issue, the Court held that the claims for credits furnished to the grandson after the deceased's death should not have been allowed. Even if authorization to furnish necessaries had been given, it could not extend beyond death, for two reasons: the obligation to furnish support is personal and is extinguished upon the death of the person obliged to give support, and upon the death of a principal, the agent's authority is deemed terminated.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that it could not consider the statute of non-claims, because that question was never raised in any of the courts below, and the rules did not authorize the Court to consider it at that stage.

Doctrine

A condition that depends exclusively on the will of the debtor is potestative and voids the obligation. But a condition that depends partly on the debtor's will and partly on chance or on circumstances beyond his control is a mixed condition, and the obligation is valid. Where the debtor has already willed the act and only external events remain, the condition is mixed, not purely potestative. A suspensive condition, once fulfilled, retroacts to the date the obligation was constituted, so the debt becomes due and prescription runs only from the fulfillment of the condition. The obligation to give support is personal and is extinguished by the death of the obligor, and the death of the principal terminates the agent's authority.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the judgment insofar as it approved the claims of 2,341 pesos and 12,924 pesos and 12 centavos, reversed it as to the claim of 3,772 pesos, and ordered no costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line: a condition is potestative and void only when it depends exclusively on the debtor's will; if it also depends on chance or on a third circumstance such as the presence of a buyer, it is a valid mixed condition. Examiners use this case to test the potestative versus mixed condition distinction, the retroactive effect of suspensive conditions on prescription, and the extinguishment of support and agency upon death.