G.R. No. L-20619. July 29, 1968
REPARATIONS COMMISSION, BENEDICTO PADILLA, JUAN M. ALBERTO, GREGORIO G. ABAD, CALIXTO O. ZALDIVAR AND HERMINIGILDO ATIENZA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JUDGE HIGINIO B. MACADAEG, HON.…
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Original petition for
mandamus, to compel respondent Judges Higinio B. Macadaeg and Jose Moya – who now
presides the Court formerly presided over by Judge Macadaeg
– to give due course to the appeal taken by petitioners herein – the Reparations
Commission and its members[1] – as respondents in Civil Case No. 42668 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, hereinafter referred to as the CFI.
On August
12, 1958, the
Reparations Commission approved a resolution awarding to the Liberation
Steamship Co. – herein? after referred to as Liberation –
“two (2) additional units of cargo vessels of 11, 000 dead weight ton each
at an estimated price of $7,900,000”.
Alleging that the Commission and its members – hereinafter referred to
collectively as petitioners – had neglected their “bounden duty to finally consumate”
the aforementioned resolution, on February 29, 1960, Liberation filed with the
CFI a petition for mandamus – docketed as Civil Case No. 42668 of said court –
to compel herein petitioners “to implement” said resolution by
“allocating in an award properly implemented the two (2) additional cargo
vessels in the third yearly or the next immediately available schedule of
reparations awards, ” as well as to recover damages. Their motion to dismiss said petition having
been denied, petitioners herein filed their answer contesting Liberation’s
alleged right to the relief prayed for. Subsequently,
both parties submitted an agreed statement of facts and compromise agreement,
dated October 13, 1960, reading:
“COME NOW the parties in the above-entitled case, thru their
respective counsel and to this Honorable Court respectfully stipulated and
agree to submit this case for decision upon the following facts agreed upon to be true and correct:
“1. That the petitioner is a corporation duly organized by
native-born Filipino citizens under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines, for the purpose of engaging in shipping business and to help in the promotion of the country’s economic
rehabilitation;
“2. That the
respondent Reparations Commission is a Commission created by law, Republic Act
No. 1789, and the other respondents are the duly appointed, qualified and
incumbent Chairman and Commissioners of the said Commission;
“3. That the exercise
by the respondent Reparations Commission of its powers and prerogatives to
administer the acquisitions utilization and distribution of reparations goods
and/or services is subject to the Reparations Agreement, the Reparations Law,
and the Rules and Regulations promulgated pursuant thereto;
“4. That in the
smatter of the supply of services and products by the Japanese Government by
way of reparations, subject “services and products shall be those
requested by the Republic of the Philippines and agreed upon between the two
governments” pursuant to Article 3 of the Reparations Agreement;
“5. That the
respondent Reparations Commission taking cognizance of representations made by
the petitioner, that the latter
be assured of at least three ocean-going vessels as per its original
application to be constructed within the next coming five years, in order to
permit it to plan for definite financing commitments and to make agency
contracts abroad, awarded two (2) additional units of cargo vessels of 11,000
deadweight ton each at an estimated-price of $7,900,000 by virtue of a
resolution adopted and approved by it on August 12, 1958;
“6. That under the aforesaid resolution, it was also
“RESOLVED, FURTHER, that the Chief, Philippine Reparations Mission be, as
he is hereby requested to transmit to the GAIMUSHO the necessary amendment
covering these additional awards; and he is further authorized to make adjustments
in the 3rd year schedule as per attached amendments”;
“7. That pursuant to said Resolution of August 12, 1958, the
Reparations Mission transmitted to the GAIMUSHO on August 18, 1958, an
amendatory schedule to the 3rd year schedule containing the award of two (2)
additional vessels to the petitioner, but when the 3rd year reparations
schedule was returned to the respondent Reparations Commission by the GAIMUSHO, only one vessel was awarded
to the petitioner, and the two additional units awarded to it were not approved
by the GAIMUSHO;
“8, That thereafter,
the petitioner repeatedly requested the respondent Reparations Commission for
the inclusion of the two additional vessels awarded to it in the subsequent 5th
year reparations schedule, but the respondent could not grant said requests in
view of unavailability of funds for the purpose as well as the limitations
contained in the economic pattern established by the National Economic Council
which did not permit the same;
“9. That any
reparations schedule prepared by the respondent Reparations Commission, in
order to be valid and effective, must be approved by the National Economic
Council, then by the President and finally by the GAIMUSHO, representing the
Japanese Government;
“10. That the matter
of inclusion of a particular award or allocation in any given reparations
schedule is governed by Several factors, among which are, the economic
priorities established by the National Economic Council, the
conditions set forth by the law itself including the availability of funds for
the purpose;
“11. That the herein
petitioner is not the only applicant for overseas vessels; that the approved
allocation for one (1) vessel in favor of the petitioner, as well as those in
favor of other applicants, all come under one schedule, that is, the approved
3rd year schedule which was carried over to the 4th Reparations Year;
“12. That with reference to ocean-going vessels, there was no
new and additional allocation under the 4th Reparations Year for the reason
that the 4th year schedule merely carried over those approved under the 3rd
year schedule;
“13. That petitioner is willing that the two (2) additional
vessels awarded to it by respondent Reparations Commission be included in
whole or in part at the next available yearly schedule and the respondents
agree to consider this willingness of the petitioner in the drafting of the
next available reparations schedule subject to the conditions enumerated in
paragraph 10 hereof.
“WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that a decision be
rendered based on the foregoing agreed statement of facts and approving this
compromise without pronouncement as to costs. “
On November
10, 1960, the CFI
rendered judgment “approving” this agreement and “enjoining the
parties to comply strictly” with “the terms and conditions”
thereof, “without pronouncement as to costs. ” Over a year later, or
on November 21, 1961, the Company filed a motion praying “that an order of execution
of the above judgment be issued awarding” to the movant
“the two (2) vessels” referred to in the agreement. Despite petitioners’ opposition to said
motion, on December 20, 1961, the CFI, then presided over by Honorable Higinio B. Macadaeg, Judge, ordered that “a writ of
execution issue to the x x x Reparations Commission” and the
Reparations “commissioners to include” said Company “as the awardee of the first two (2) ocean-going
vessels in this year’s reparations schedule. “
Accordingly, on December
22, 1961, a writ of execution, commanding the Sheriff of Manila “to cause
the x x
x Reparations
Commission” and the Reparations “Commissioners to comply” with
paragraph 13 of the compromise agreement, “by including the x x x Liberation Steamship Co. as the awardee of the first two (2) ocean-going vessels in this
year’s reparations schedule, within ten (10) days from the date of receipt hereof, ” was issued.
A reconsideration of said order of December 20, 1961, and a
motion to quash said writ of execution having been denied, petitioners herein
perfected their appeal, by seasonably filing their notice of appeal, appeal
bond and record on appeal; but, the appeal was, on motion of Liberation,
dismissed by Judge Macadaeg, on March 30, 1962, upon
the ground that, being based upon a compromise agreement, the judgment rendered
on November 10, 1960, became final and executory upon
its rendition, and that an appeal would violate said agreement, the purpose of
which is to settle the issue between the parties. Notice of the order to this effect was
received by the petitioners on April
10, 1962.
Thereupon, or on April 25, 1962, petitioners herein filed, in the
Court of Appeals, a petition for mandamus, which was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
30796-R, to compel the CFI to give due course to said appeal. In a resolution of the Court of Appeals date October 26, 1962, this petition was,
however, “dismissed without prejudice to filing the same in the
appropriate court, ” upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction, because the
issues involved in the appeal are “all questions of law” and the
value of the controversy exceeds P200,000.
Soon thereafter, petitioners commenced the present action, for the same purpose, in the Supreme Court, which
forthwith issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining and enjoining the
Sheriff of Manila from proceeding with the enforcement of the aforementioned
writ of execution.
Respondents maintain that the “right of petitioners herein
to file the instant petition for mandamus x x x has
already prescribed, inasmuch as this action was begun on December 11, 1962,
whereas the order of the CFI dismissing
petitioners’ appeal was received by them over eight (8) months prior thereto.
Cortes v. Court of First Instance of Capiz[2]
cited by respondents in support of their contention, is not in point. In that case no action was taken by
the petitioners therein until over four (4) months after notice of the last
order denying their appeal. In the
present case, petitioners did act within fifteen (15) days after notice
of said order – by filing the petition
for mandamus in CA-G. R. No. 30796-R
of the Court of Appeals. The delay in
the commencement of the case at bar in the Supreme Court was due to the fact
that the Court of Appeals did not
dismiss the case before it until October 26, 1962, notice of which was received
by the petitioners on October 29, 1962.
Moreover, the Cortes case involved the application of section 499
of Act 190, pursuant to which a petition for mandamus for the approval of a
record on appeal should be filed “at the next term of the Supreme Court.” The pertinent provision is now section
15 of Rule 41 of the Revised
Rules of Court,[3] which fixes no period for the filing
of said petition. Hence, the time therefor must be deemed “variable as the ends of
justice may demand,” in the language of Mr. Justice Reyes (J. B. L.),
speaking for this Court in Centenera v. Yatco.[4] In other words, the petition should be filed
within a reasonable time.
Under the facts of the
present case, we find that the petition therein has been filed within such
time. Indeed, referring to a delay of
four (4) months, in the Centenera case, we held:
x x x the
constant policy of the courts is not to deny the writ if the result would be to
deprive a party of his substantial right and leave him without remedy (14
C.J.S. 190). A delay of four months
in the pursuit of his remedy of mandamus is not so long or unreasonable as to nullify petitioner’s right to appeal and leave him
without any relief against the decision of the trial court which may after all
be erroneous and reversible,
especially as the lower court is already poised to execute said judgment and
compel petitioner to remove his house of strong materials from the premises in
question, which execution could cause petitioner great damage and
prejudice.”[5] (Underscoring supplied)
Incidentally, this view
must be deemed to have superseded that expressed in the Cortes case, insofar as
the latter is inconsistent therewith.
Was the CFI justified in
refusing to give due course to petitioners’ appeal?
The record on appeal
attached to the petition herein shows that on December 27, 1961, petitioners
moved for a reconsideration of the order of December 20, 1961 (granting the
motion for execution filed by the Company) and to quash the writ of execution
issued pursuant thereto; that this motion was denied on January 10, 1962; and
that on January 19, 1962, petitioners filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond
and record on appeal. In other words,
petitioners’ appeal was perfected within the reglementary
period therefor.
This notwithstanding, the
CFI dismissed the appeal upon the ground that, having been rendered upon a
compromise agreement between the parties, its decision dated. November 10, 1960, “had already become final and executory.” Petitioners sought to appeal, however, not
from said decision, but, from the order of December 20, 1961, purporting to execute said decision in a
manner which, petitioners claim, is not in accordance therewith. It is true, Judge Macadaeg
opined otherwise, but, it is no less true
that petitioners are entitled, not only to disagree with his view, but, also,
to bring the issue, on appeal, to a higher court.
The CFI might have had
some semblance of justification in dismissing the appeal if its order of December
20, 1961, and the
writ of execution issued pursuant thereto had, at least, purported to adhere to
the tenor of the decision of November 10, 1960. Said order, however, directs petitioners herein
“to include” the Company “as the awardee
of the first two (2) ocean-going vessels” in the “reparations schedule”
for the year 1961. Similarly, the
writ of execution commands the Sheriff of Manila “to
cause” the petitioners herein to comply with the aforementioned decision
“by including the x x x
Liberation x x
as the awardee of the first two ocean-going vessels”
in the reparations schedule for the year 1961. This writ and said order manifestly depart
from the letter and the spirit of the decision they purport to enforce.
Paragraph 13 of the
compromise agreement, incorporated into said decision, merely states that
Liberation “is willing that the two (2) additional vessels awarded
to it” by petitioners be included, in whole or in part, “in the next available yearly schedule”,
and, that petitioners herein have agreed “to consider this willingness” of Liberation “in
the drafting of the next available reparations schedule.” The obligation
thus assumed by the petitioners is not “to include”
Liberation in the reparations schedule for 1961, but merely “to consider”
its willingness to be included in the “next available yearly
schedule,” in connection with the drafting thereof.
Moreover, the commitment
of petitioners herein “to consider” Liberation’s aforementioned
willingness, was explicitly made subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph 10 the compromise agreement, which provides:
“x x
x that the matter of inclusion of a particular
award or allocation in any given reparations schedule is covered by several
factors, among which are the economic priorities established by the National Economic Council, the
conditions set forth by law itself
including the availability of funds for the purpose.”
This paragraph should, in turn, be correlated with paragraph 9 of
said agreement, stipulating:
” x x x that any reparations schedule prepared by the
Reparations Commission in order to be valid and effective must be
approved by the National Economic Council, then by the President and
finally by the Gaimusho representing the Japanese
Government.”
Neither should we overlook the other provisions of the compromise
agreement, particularly those stipulating that Liberation “is not the
only applicant for overseas vessels;” that “the approved
allocation for one (1) vessel” in
favor of Liberation, “as well as those of other applicants, all
come under one schedule x x the approved 3rd
year schedule which was carried over to the 4th
Reparations Year”[6];
that, “with reference to ocean-going vessels, there was no new and additional allocation under
the 4th Reparations Year, for the reason that the 4th year schedule merely
carried over those approved under the 3rd year schedule x x “[7];
that, despite repeated requests by Liberation “for the inclusion of
the two (2) additional vessels awarded to it in the subsequent 5th year reparation
schedule,” petitioners herein “could not grant requests in
view of unavailability of funds for the purpose as well as the
limitations contained in the economic pattern established by the National
Economic Council which did not permit the same”[8];
and that “the two additional units awarded” to Liberation “were not
approved by GAIMUSHO,”[9]
the representative of the Japanese Government, whose concurrence is essential
to the validity and effectivity of “any
reparations schedule.”
By virtue of these
stipulations, Liberation has, in effect, admitted that the non-inclusion, up to
the 5th year reparations schedule, of the two (2) additional ocean-going
vessels awarded thereto, was due, not to petitioners’ neglect or refusal to
implement the award, but to several factors beyond their control; that,
because of these factors, the
petitioners are neither free to act in the matter of inclusion of awardees in
the reparations schedules, nor in a position to state, in advance, either the
specific circumstances under which the inclusion could be effected, or the
particular time at which or the
schedule in which the inclusion could or would be made; and that, accordingly,
Liberation had agreed to depend upon the sense of duty and justice, as well as
to rely upon the sound judgment and discretion of the petitioners
herein, in the determination of the conditions under which the implementation
of said award would be viable or feasible, taking into account that there were
previous awards still to be met, apart from the “economic priorities,
established by the National Economic Council” and a number of other
“factors” governing “the matter of inclusion of a particular
award or allocation in any given reparations schedule.”
In short, petitioners
herein could not have bound themselves, and Liberation could not have
understood them as assuming the obligation to include said company in the 1961
reparations schedule. Otherwise, both
parties would have explicitly named said year, in their compromise
agreement. Upon the other hand, the
exercise of the aforementioned judgment and discretion by petitioners herein
cannot be controlled by writ of execution.
Hence, the order of December 20, 1961 and the writ of execution issued on December
22, 1961, are not in
accordance with the decision of November 10, 1960.
For this reason, it is
alleged in the petition herein that, in issuing said writ, the CFI had exceeded
its jurisdiction. In view of this, and
of petitioners’ allegations to the effect that said CFI had gravely abuseedits discretion and that they have “no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,” and considering
that, if the CFI were required to give due course to petitioners’
appeal, we would unduly delay the determination of the merits of the issue
between the parties – which, at any rate, has been amply discussed by them in
the CFI, as well as in the Court of Appeals, and in this Court – said petition
may and should be, as it is hereby treated as one for certiorari.[10]
WHEREFORE, said order and writ issued, respectively, on
December 20 and 22, 1961, are declared null and void, ab
initio, and the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by this Court hereby made
permanent, with costs against respondent, Liberation Steamship Company.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
Fernando, J., did not take
part.
[1]
Benedicto Padilla, Juan M. Alberto, Gregorio C. Abad, Calixto O. Zaldivar, and Herminigildo Atienza.
[2]
52 Phil. 214.
[3]
SEC. 15. Mandamus.- When erroneously a motion to dismiss an appeal is
granted or a record on appeal is disallowed by the trial court, a proper
petition for mandamus may be filed in the appellate court.
[4] 57 O.G. 4923, 4925.
[5]
57 O.G. 4923, 4925-4926.
[6]
Paragraph 11, Compromise Agreement.
[7] Paragraph 12, Compromise Agreement.
[8]
Paragraph 8, Compromise Agreement.
[9]
Paragraph 7, Compromise Agreement.
[10]
Candelario v. Cañizares,
L-17688, March 30, 1962;
Gambol v. Barcelona,
L114339, September 30, 1959;
Tarnbunting v. S. Jose, 97 Phil. 491.