G.R. No. L-25354. June 28, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARIANO FONTANILLA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CASTRO, J.:
The appellant Mariano Fontanilla was
prosecuted in the justice of the peace court (now municipal court) of San
Fernando, La Union for qualified seduction. The criminal complaint, signed by the
offended woman Fe Castro and filed on February
28, 1961, charged
“That on or about the month of September, 1960, and for
sometime subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of San Juan, Province of La
Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with grave abuse of confidence and authority, seduce and have sexual
intercourse with the offended party Fe Castro, a domestic in the house of the
said accused, located at Allangigan, San Juan, La
Union, the offended party being then a virgin over 12 years but under 18 years
of age.”
After trial, the court, on November 27, 1962, found that
“the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt,”
and accordingly sentenced him to “an indeterminate prison term from four
(4) months of arresto mayor as maximum to two (2)
years and four (4) months of prision correccional and to pay the costs.” The accused was
further ordered “to pay the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) as moral
damages to the offended party or to her parents.”
Fontanilla forthwith appealed to the
Court of Appeals which subsequently certified the case to us in a resolution
dated September 25, 1965,
on the ground that the jurisdiction of the court a quo, inter
alia, is in issue.
The following, in paraphrase, are the assigned errors:
1. The justice of the peace court of San
Fernando, La Union had no jurisdiction to try and decide this case because the
alleged offense was committed outside its territorial jurisdiction and at the
same time does not fall within the compass of its original jurisdiction;
2. The lower court erred in finding that the
accused had sexual intercourse with Fe Castro repeatedly and that he had told
her a number of times that he will separate from his wife Magdalena Copio and will marry her, which was the reason why Fe
Castro consented to the sexual intercourse;
3. The lower court erred in relying heavily on
the testimony of Fe Castro, considering that her testimony is hazy and
self-contradictory;
4. The lower court erred in totally disregarding
the evidence adduced by the appellant;
5. The lower court erred in failing to consider
in favor of the accused the delay in the filing of the complaint, which delay
is not convincingly explained and which renders the accusation suspicious; and
6. The lower court erred in ordering the
appellant to pay the sum of P500 in moral damages to the offended party or to
her parents.
The evidence for the prosecution discloses that in September,
1960 Fe Castro, a fifteen-year old virgin, was brought by her mother to the
house of the appellant and his second wife, Magdalena Copio,
a sister of the complaining witness’ mother, to serve as a helper. The Fontanilla
spouses had been married for two years but were childless, although the
appellant had grown-up children by his first marriage who
were domiciled elsewhere.
Fe Castro testified that during her stay in the house of Fontanilla for about three months from September to shortly
before Christmas of December, 1960, the accused succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her repeatedly, the total number of times she could not
recall. She was certain, however, that
the accused consummated the first sexual intercourse with her one night in
September, about a week after her arrival, when the accused intruded into her
bedroom, placed himself on top of her and fondled her
nipples. She added that he was able to
gain access to her room because the wooden bar used to lock the door did not
prevent the said door from being opened when pushed from the outside. She also declared that prior to this incident, the accused had made amorous overtures and
advances toward her. Aside from giving
her money, the accused repeatedly promised to abandon his wife to live with
her.
“Q. – You told us that Mariano Fontanilla
had been giving you money. Are there
other circumstances that led you to the sexual intercourse?
“A. – He told me, ‘Come
now let us play. I am going to separate
your aunt because I love you more than my wife.’
“Q. – For how many times had Mariano Fontanilla been promising you this?
“A. -He was telling me
all the time.”
Fe Castro farther testified that she subsequently repeatedly
yielded to the carnal desires of the accused, as she was induced by his
promises of marriage and frightened by his acts of intimidation. The accused made love to her during the day
when his wife was away and at night when the latter was already asleep. Their intimacies lasted for almost three
months until her aunt, the wife of the accused, caught them in flagrante on the kitchen floor. The following day she returned to her
parents, and revealed everything to her mother two days later.
Mariano Fontanilla, testifying in his
defense, admitted that Fe Castro actually lived in his house from September to
December, 1960, not as a helper, however, but in consideration of her being a
niece of his wife, and was treated as their own child. He vehemently denied having had carnal
knowledge of her, as there was never an occasion during which he could have
taken advantage of the chastity of his ward, because at night her room was
locked and during the day he was out in the farm.
“Q. – When the offended party testified before the
Court she stated that the first time you had sexual intercourse with her was a
certain night in September and you said to her, ‘You are very beautiful. Come let us play.’ What do you say to this
allegation?
“A. – I did not do that,
sir.
“Q. – How is it possible
or will circumstances afford you of getting inside her room and take advantage
of her being a woman?
“A. –
No, sir. It cannot be.
“Q. –
Why could it not be that you could enter the room and take advantage of her
womanhood?
“A. –
Because the room is locked.”
x x x x
x
“Q. – The offended party
further testified in Court that you did the sexual intercourse daily, one in
the day time and one in the nighttime.
Will you mention before this Honorable Court if you can commit sexual
intercourse in the day time?
“A. – That cannot be,
sir.
“Q. – Why could you not
possibly do the sexual intercourse in the day time?
“A. –
Because I am in the farm, sir.
“Q. – Sometimes when you are
in the farm, during lunch time Fe Castro would bring your food in the farm?
“A. –
No, sir.
“Q. – And when you go
home to your house in the day time for example you take your lunch. So it is possible for you to have sexual
intercourse with the offended party?
“A. –
No, sir. It is not possible
during day time.
“Q. –
Who are your companions in your house in the day time?
“A. –
My wife and also our neighbor who used to come.”
Fontanilla declared that another reason
why it was not possible for him to seduce Fe Castro was that his sexual
capabilities had waned considerably because of old age, as he was already 52
years old at the time of the supposed commission of the crime charged. He admitted that despite the fact that he had
been married for only two years to his second wife, he made love to her only
once a week. Under these circumstances,
it was impossible for him to have indulged in sexual intercourse with Fe Castro
twice daily.
The accused advances the theory that the instant case was filed
against him upon the malevolent instigation of one Avelino
Gapasin, an uncle of Fe Castro, who wielded strong
influence over her, adding that the complainant herself was envious of his (Fontanilla’s) children of the first marriage who received
some salary from their employment. This
allegation was indirectly corroborated by a witness for the defense, Mayor
Antonio Aquino of San Juan, La Union, who testified
that he endeavored to settle the case by proposing that the accused pay P50
which was due to Fe Castro as her share in the cultivation of tobacco, but the
complaining witness through Avelino Gapasin refused the offer and the latter then insinuated
that the amount of P2,000 should be paid, which sum he believed would be
sufficient reparation for “the honor destroyed.”
Magdalena Copio, 51-year old wife of
the accused, corroborated her husband’s statement that they indulged in sexual
intercourse only once a week. She also
stated that during the three months that Fe Castro stayed with them, there was
no unusual incident or sexual relation between her husband and her niece. She denied having caught the accused in a
compromising situation with the offended party.
She also testified that she slept regularly from 7:00 p.m. to 12:00
midnight, after which she seldom could
go back to sleep, and that she was easily awakened by the slightest noise. She categorically declared that her husband
slept with her in the same bed every night.
For the first time on appeal, Fontanilla
challenges the jurisdiction of the court a quo – the justice of
the peace court of San Fernando, the capital of La Union – alleging that it had
no jurisdiction to try and decide this case, for two reasons: (1) the crime charged according to the
indictment was committed in San Juan, a municipality outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the court a quo; and (2) original jurisdiction
over the crime of qualified seduction belongs exclusively to the court of first
instance, and not to the justice of the peace court of the provincial capital.
The appellant’s theory finds no basis in the then governing
provisions of the Judiciary Act when the instant action was commenced on February 28, 1961. It is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of
a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement
of the action.[1]
The pertinent statutory provision then in force was section 87(c), paragraph 3,
of Republic Act 296, as amended by Republic Act 2613, which unequivocably
provided that “Justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces and
Judges of Municipal Courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First
Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within the
province in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional
or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding three
thousand pesos or both. . .” (underscoring
supplied) It is therefore beyond dispute that under the then existing law all
offenses committed within the province, provided that the penalty
prescribed did not exceed prision correccional or a fine not exceeding P3,000 or both, were triable by the
justice of the peace courts of provincial capitals. Since the penalty prescribed for qualified
seduction under article 337 of the Revised Penal Code is prision
correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, the instant case was clearly within the periphery of the concurrent
jurisdiction of the court a quo.
It was only on June 22,
1963, more than two years after the institution of the case at bar,
that the above-cited provision of the Judiciary Act was amended by Republic Act
3828. The pertinent provision is now
section 87(c), paragraph 4, which, as amended, reads:
“Municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces
and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First
Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within their
respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not
exceed prision correccional
or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six
thousand pesos or both. . .”
Republic Act 3828 introduced two
significant changes: (1) the concurrent
jurisdiction of municipal courts in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces
and of city courts with the courts of first instance has been territorially
localized and limited to the proper offenses committed “within their
respective jurisdiction,” while previously said courts could take cognizance of
the proper offenses committed “within the province;” and (2) the
proper offenses cognizable include those where the pecuniary (fine) does not
exceed P6,000, an increase over the previous P3,000 limit.
The first of the above-mentioned changes unmasks the fallacy of
the appellant’s theory that even under the then existing provision, the
concurrent jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts of provincial
capitals with the courts of first instance was already confined to their
respective territorial limits. If this
were true, then Congress would have had no reason to enact the foregoing
amendment which eliminated the phrase “within the province” and in its
place substituted the delimiting phrase “within their respective
jurisdictions.”
The foregoing notwithstanding, the appellant insists that justice
of the peace courts of provincial capitals, like the court a quo,
have no jurisdiction over the crime of qualified seduction because of the
provisions of article 345 of the Revised Penal Code by virtue of which the
court must, in addition to the imposition of a prison term (prision correctional minimum to medium in
case of qualified seduction) which the accused must suffer, require him to
indemnify the offended woman, to acknowledge the offspring unless the law
should prevent him from so doing, and in every case to support the offspring. The theory of the appellant is that the
imposition of the enumerated civil liabilities increases the punishment,
thereby divesting the justice or the peace courts of the capitals of provinces
of jurisdiction and consequently confining original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the offense to courts of first instance.
This contention is obviously untenable because section 87(c),
paragraph 3 [now sec. 87(c), paragraph 4] of the Judiciary Act grants the
justice of the peace courts (now municipal courts) of provincial capitals
concurrent jurisdiction with courts of first instance over offenses for which
the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision
correctional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding
P3,000 (now P6,000). This concurrence of jurisdiction is based upon
the duration of the imprisonment and/or of the amount of the fine imposable,
irrespective of the civil incidents or obligations which may attach to the
offense charged. So that any civil liability attaching to the
offense concurrently cognizable by the courts of first instance and the justice
of peace courts provincial capitals can also be imposed by the latter because
these have been conferred jurisdictional parity.
The appellant cites as authority for his theory the case of U.S.
vs. Bernardo,[2] a
seduction case in which this Court, with a slim majority of four justices
(three justices dissented), said:
“These obligations imposed upon the culprit ordinarily exceed the
amount of the penalty fixed by the law as being within the jurisdiction of the
justice of the peace court and comprise, moreover, by virtue of the forced
recognition imposed by article 135 of the Civil Code, the special determination
of the civil status of the offspring which resulted from the crime, consequently,
although the said crime of seduction is only punished by the penalty of arresto mayor, a judgment of conviction
cannot be pronounced by a justice of the peace, on account of his lack of
jurisdiction.
“But disregarding the amount of the indemnity, whatever it
be, according to the conditions and circumstances of the offended party and of
the one obliged to furnish the same, which amount might be greater than that
fixed by law as within the jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts, the
acknowledgment of the resulting offspring, one of the findings which the
sentence must contain, establishes by force of law the civil status of the
child whose acknowledgment is necessarily upon the guilty party; so with much
less reason could the crime fall within the jurisdiction of the justice of the
peace court, inasmuch as, in accordance with specific legal provisions, only
the judge of the Court of First Instance can make such pronouncements.”
As correctly contended by the Solicitor General, however, “there
is a big difference between the case of U.S. vs. Bernardo, supra, and
the present case, in that while the Bernardo case involved the original
exclusive jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts, the present case
touches a concurrent jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts in the
capitals of the provinces and Courts of First Instance.” Furthermore, “It would
be going a long way to say that an indemnification or a
restitution or a reparation is a fine or an imprisonment under any
definition found in the criminal law of any country. The jurisdiction of the court is determined
by the amount of the fine and imprisonment.
An indemnification or a reparation or a
restitution is merely an incident of the crime. The jurisdiction of the court is not fixed by
the incident but by the nature of the crime itself. Legally speaking, the nature of the crime is
determined by the punishment imposed. . . . The jurisdiction of courts of
justice of the peace over crimes being determined exclusively by the amount of
the fine and imprisonment imposed by law, that is by the legal nature of the
crime, and in no manner and to no extent whatever by the civil incidents which
accrue to the person injured by the commission of said crime, such courts have
jurisdiction of the crime presented in the case at bar, the punishment
prescribed by law for such crime being (then) simply arresto
mayor.”[3]
We now proceed to the merits of the case.
The atmosphere of secrecy and privacy which pervades the
commission of crimes against chastity, coupled with the consequent dearth or
even absence of witnesses, constrains the courts to rely in no small measure
upon the uncorroborated testimony of the complaining woman whose testimonial
and personal credibility assumes pivotal importance. It is against this situational backdrop that
we proceed to discuss the issues of fact posed by the appellant.
Fontanilla contends, among others, that
the court a quo erred in finding there that there is evidence to
show that he had sexual intercourse many times with the complainant Fe
Castro. We disagree. After a thorough study of the record, we find
that the complainant’s testimony, in direct as well as in cross-examination, is
entitled to essential credence. She
declared that Fontanilla had carnal knowledge of her
one night in September, 1960 in the house of the former where she was staying
as a maid, and that since then up to December of the same year, Fontanilla had sexual intercourse with her repeatedly,
sometimes at night, sometimes in the daytime, but always when his wife was
asleep or away. Significantly,
convincing proof of the first sexual intercourse would suffice to affirm the
conviction of the appellant without necessity of proving the subsequent instances
of carnal liaison. The following frank
and revealing testimony of the offended woman appears on record:
“Q. – When you were with
the Fontanillas, do you know if there was anything
unusual that took place?
“A. – He fooled me.
“Q. –
Who fooled you?
“A. – Mariano Fontanilla.
“Q. – What do you mean
by fooled you?
“A. – He had
sexual intercourse with me.”
x x x x x
“Q. – When did Mariano Fontanilla start having sexual intercourse with you?
“A. –
One week after my arrival in their house.
“Q. – For how many times
did Mariano Fontanilla have sexual intercourse with
you?
“A. –
Very often when I was in their house.”
x x x x x
“Q. –
For how many times after September?
“A. – I could not count
anymore, sir.”
x x x x x
“Q. – Do you mean to
tell us that he had been having sexual intercourse with you during the three
(3) months you stayed with them?
“A. –
Always.
“COURT:
“Q. – Now, usually what
time did you have that sexual intercourse?
“A. –
Day and night.
“Q. – And where did you
do sexual intercourse during the day time?
“A. – When I iron their
clothes in their house.
“Q. – Was there no other
person in that house during the day when you have been ironing clothes?
“A. – The wife is not
there.
“Q. – Do they have any
children?
“A. – They have no
children.”
x x x x x
“Q. – When you left the
house of Mariano Fontanilla and returned to your
house in barrio Allangigan, was it with the consent
of Mr. & Mrs. Mariano Fontanilla?
“A. – They allowed me
to go home.
“Q. – Why did you go
home?
“A. – I left, sir,
because the wife of Mariano Fontanilla discovered
what we have been doing.”
When asked upon cross-examination to narrate the circumstances
surrounding the first intercourse, Fe Castro testified thus:
“Q. – Now, what were you
doing in your room when Mariano Fontanilla first came
in?
“A. – I was already
sleeping.
“Q. – And how were you
awakened from your sleep?
“A. – When I woke up,
he was on top of me holding my nipples.”
x x x x x
“Q. – Can you remember
the date of the week when Mariano Fontanilla
consummated his first sexual intercourse with you?
“A. – I don’t remember
the date.
“Q. – Do you remember
what time? In the
morning or afternoon?
“A. –
Night time.
“Q. – Do you remember
what were the actual words of Mariano Fontanilla when
he consummated his first sexual intercourse with you?
“A. – ‘How beautiful
are you, my daughter! I wish I could marry one as beautiful as you. Come let us play.’
“Q. – After he uttered
those words, what did he do to you?
“A. – He was placing
his private parts in mine.
“Q. – Do you mean to say
he did not remove your panties first?
“A. – He removed it.
“Q. – Did you offer any
objection when he made those acts to you?
“A. – He told me that
‘If you are going to move, I am going to club you.’
“Q. – And you never
uttered a word of what he is doing?
“A. – I did not complain
anymore because I was afraid.”
x x x x x
“Q. – Now, it was in the
evening of that day when he started caressing you in the kitchen when he had that
first sexual intercourse with you, is that right?
“A. – Yes, sir, the
same night he came to the room.”
x x x x x
“Q. – This room where
you had your intercourse with the accused, was there a lock in the door?
“A. – There is a piece
of wood that is used as a bar but if you push it, it will be opened.”
The foregoing testimony of the aggrieved woman belies the
contention of Fontanilla that there is no evidence
showing that he had carnal knowledge of Fe Castro.
Of course no other witness was presented by the prosecution to corroborate the
testimony of the victim with respect to the actual act of seduction, nor to the
amorous overtures of the accused before the first sexual intercourse, nor to
their subsequent carnal acts. But this
is quite understandable because aside from Fontanilla
and Fe Castro, there was only one other person in the house of the accused —
his wife, who was either asleep or away when the two indulged in their illicit
love-making. As previously intimated,
the final verdict would principally hinge on the testimonial and personal
credibility of the complaining witness.
Assailing the credibility of the complainant, Fontanilla
contends that Fe Castro had malevolent and ulterior motives for filing this
case against him. He alleged that Fe
Castro was envious of his children by his first marriage who had some
income. In our view, this is a flimsy
rationalization which the accused, significantly, did not even attempt to
substantiate.
Fontanilla also argues that Fe Castro
was induced and pressured by her uncle Avelino Gapasin to file the criminal complaint. Testifying on this point, Mayor Antonio Aquino of San Juan, La Union, stated that he tried to
settle the case by proposing that the accused pay the complainant P50 as the
latter’s alleged share in the tobacco harvest and that this proposal was refused,
however, by Fe Castro, thru Gapasin, on the ground
that the amount offered would not even be sufficient to defray the expenses
for the delivery of the child which the victim mistakenly thought she was
conceiving as a result of Fontanilla’s carnal knowledge
of her. Aquino
also claimed that Gapasin insinuated that any
compromise amount must be equal to the “honor destroyed” and he, Gapasin, suggested P2,000.
The foregoing testimony was presented by the defense to prove its
allegation that Fe Castro was pressured into filing the case at bar. Standing alone, Gapasin’s
objection to the proposed compromise does not prove that he induced the victim
to denounce Fontanilla in court. On the contrary, from the actuations of Gapasin it can be inferred that he was just trying to
protect the interests of his niece who was offered so meager an amount as
settlement for an offense which caused the latter the irredeemable loss of her
virginity. Furthermore, it is on record
that prior to the overtures at settlement, the complaining witness had already
gone to the office of the provincial fiscal of La Union to file charges against
Fontanilla. Aquino himself admitted upon cross-examination that he had
requested Fiscal Crisogono Bautista to postpone the
filing of the complaint to enable him to settle the case, and that the proposed
compromise was his idea and made upon his own initiative. This admission shows that the filing of the
instant case preceded, and was not due to, the failure
of the alleged proposed compromise.
The appellant further contends that the complainant’s testimony
does not merit credence because it is hazy and self-contradictory. He argues that if it is true that he
repeatedly promised to marry Fe Castro in order to deceive her into submitting
to his carnal designs, why did the latter allegedly consent to the continuance
of their illicit liaison even after it was evident that he would not fulfill
his promise to marry her? A situation
like this, says the appellant, borders on the
incredible and suggests that there was actually no promise of marriage and
consequently there was no resultant carnal relation between him and the complaining
woman.
This “unthinkable” situation pointed out by the
appellant was quite reasonably explained by the complainant in a frank, albeit
embarrassing, reply contained in her sworn statement (exh.
A-1) taken in the office of the provincial fiscal of La Union
on January
31, 1961. Upon interrogation, Fe Castro declared:
“Q. – Despite his many
promises which he never fulfilled, why did you still continue to have
relationship with him?
“A. –
Because I was beginning to like him and enjoy this sexual intercourse.”
Underscoring the above statement of Fe Castro, Fontanilla claims that it exposes in fact the fabricated
nature of the case against him, because for a woman to continue having sexual
relations with a man even after a patent breach of the latter’s promise of
marriage, is unthinkable and alien to human experience. We believe, on the contrary, however, that
the said statement of the aggrieved woman does not make her testimony
incredible for it evinces basic honesty and sincerity on her part, even to the
extent of admitting something which could conceivably put her to shame and
ridicule.
Anent the said marital promise, Fontanilla
also claims that there is no evidence on record supporting its veracity. Granting this to be correct, it is
nevertheless settled that deceit, although an essential element of ordinary or
simple seduction, does not need to be proved or established in a charge of
qualified seduction. It is replaced by
abuse of confidence. When the offender
is a public officer, a priest or minister, a servant, domestic, tutor,
teacher, or under any title is in charge of the education or keeping of the
offended woman, as in the present case, the act is punishable although fraud or
deceit may not have been used or, if employed, has not been proved.[4]
The seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age,
committed by any of the persons enumerated in art. 337 “is constitutive of
the crime of qualified seduction . . . even though no deceit intervenes or even
when such carnal knowledge were voluntary on the part of the virgin, because
in such a case, the law takes for granted the existence of the deceit as an
integral element of the said crime and punishes it with greater severity than
it does the simple seduction . . . taking into account the abuse of confidence
on the part of the agent (culprit), an abuse of confidence which implies deceit
or fraud.”[5]
It is likewise contended for the appellant that the testimony of
the complainant is unbelievable because while she denounced the perverse and
criminal conduct of the accused, in the same breath she described the relation
between the accused and his wife as harmonious and cordial. The alleged inconsistency in this regard is
more apparent than real. A man could
hide his evil motives and immoral conduct behind a deceptive facade. And it stands to reason that a husband who
has illicit relations with a woman who resides in the same house where he
dwells with his wife would even be over-solicitous with the latter to
camouflage his infidelity.
Fontanilla also challenges the
credibility of Fe Castro’s account regarding his having been discovered by his
wife in the act of sexual intercourse with the complainant on the kitchen
floor. He argues that had such a
discovery actually been made, the natural reaction of his wife would have been
to lay hands on both of them (Fe Castro and himself), with the complainant
taking the most punishment since women are inherently possessive and are merciless
upon those who attempt to take away their loved ones. Fe Castro did not testify on such a hostile reaction.
We are inclined to believe, however, that women are bound to
react differently to the same or similar situations. There is no sufficient reason to discredit Fe
Castro’s testimony that when they were discovered in flagrante
by Magdalena Copio, the appellant’s wife and her
aunt, the latter verbally chastised Fontanilla for
having “fool(ed) this little girl.”
The appellant’s wife, then 51 years old and twice married, most
probably knew that it was her 52-year old second husband, the herein appellant,
who was at fault and thus spared her 15-year old niece from any punishment.
It is conceded that the testimony of Fe Castro suffers from some
inconsistencies; these, however, could be attributed to her minority (she was
barely 16 years old at the time of the trial), lack of education (she had
reached only grade III), perceptibly low intelligence, and to the
understandable partiality of a litigant to her cause. On the whole, we find that the complainant’s
testimony is credible and convincing.
Furthermore, we believe that no other reason impelled Fe Castro in
instituting this case against her very kin, and exposing thereby her sordid
experience to public scrutiny and suffering as a consequence the travail of
trial, than to seek justice for herself.
The appellant further claims that the court a quo
erred in failing to consider the unexplained delay in the filing of the complaint,
which delay renders the accusation suspicious.
It is relevant to note that the accused did not raise this issue before
the court a quo. Anent the
alleged delay, the Solicitor General states that it can easily be explained
“by the fact that the complainant was not accusing a person who was a
total stranger to her but the husband of her mother’s sister. The attempt of the older people to thresh out
their differences and to settle the case amicably had brought about the said
delay.” It appears on record that Fe Castro left the house of Fontanilla on December
18, 1960, and two days thereafter she informed her parents of what Fontanilla had done.
Forthwith she and her parents decided to bring the case to court, and on
January 13, 1961 Fe Castro had herself examined in the La Union Provincial
Hospital, with the name of Fiscal Bautista appearing in the medical certificate
as the requesting officer, which means that prior to January 13, 1961 Fe Castro
had already gone to the office of the provincial fiscal presumably to complain
against Fontanilla.
The criminal complaint was filed only on February 23, 1961 because as previously stated,
Mayor Aquino had requested Fiscal Bautista to
postpone the filing of the indictment to give the former sufficient time to
attempt at an amicable settlement of the case.
We now come to the basic defense set up by Fontanilla,
which is a denial of his having had carnal knowledge of Fe Castro whom he
admits was once his ward. His denial is
anchored on two grounds: (1) there was
no occasion during which he could have violated the chastity of the complainant
because during the night the room of the latter was locked and during the day
he was always out in the fields; and (2) at the age of 52, his sexual potency
had considerably waned as proved by the fact that he had sexual intercourse
with his own wife only once a week. The
court a quo did not accord credence to this defense, and we are
of the view that in this regard the court did not err.
The complainant testified that the wooden bar which she used to
lock the door of her room did not prevent the said door from being opened when
pushed from the outside. Thus, Fontanilla had easy access at night to Fe Castro’s sleeping
quarters. Considering the general
make-up of residential houses in the barrios, we believe that the
complainant’s statement is essentially true.
With respect to the appellant’s argument that during the day he
had no opportunity of being alone with the complainant, he himself admitted
upon cross-examination that there were times when he would be home earlier than
his wife and would ask Fe Castro to serve him food. As there was no other person in the house
during such occasions Fe Castro and Fontanilla
naturally would be alone together. The
appellant also admitted that whenever his wife went to market she would be away
for two to three hours. He hastened to
add, however, that each time his wife left for the market she advised Fe Castro
to stay with their neighbor. Granting
that Fe Castro would really go to their neighbor’s place which was only five
meters away from their house, it is not improbable that Fontanilla
would call her back once his wife had left.
Thus, the very record of the case belies the defense of the appellant
that there was no occasion when he could have violated the chastity of his
ward.
The appellant also contends that it was impossible for him to
have indulged in sexual intercourse with the complainant twice a day, because
even with his wife he made love only once a week. Fontanilla
attributed his diminished virility to old age as he was already 52 years old at
the time of the commission of the alleged crime. This declaration was corroborated by his
wife, Magdalena Copio, who went to the extent of
vouching that two years after their marriage they did
not indulge anymore in sexual relations.
We believe, nonetheless, that the appellant’s claim is untenable. In the first place, the complainant did not
say that Fontanilla had her twice a day during the
three months that she stayed with him and his wife. When asked what time they indulged in sexual
intercourse she replied “Day and night.” (t.s.n.,
p.6) This answer of the complainant cannot be interpreted to mean that they had
sexual intercourse twice daily (one in the daytime and another at night), for
said statement was in reply to a question with respect to the time when
they engaged in carnal intercourse and not the frequency of their
illicit love making. In the second
place, there is a presumption that an adult male has normal powers of virility
and the burden of proving the contrary rests on the party asserting it.[6]
We believe that the declarations of Fontanilla and his
wife on the former’s alleged weakening potency are
not sufficient to rebut this presumption.
Alfred W. Herzog has cautioned that “one must be very careful not
to express the opinion that a man on account of his age is either sterile or
impotent.”[7]
Hence, a party who claims loss of virility, or waning potency for that matter,
must bolster his assertion clinically with the aid of a competent and expert
witness.
On the other hand, the prosecution presented Dr. Magno K. Guerrero, the physician at the La Union Provincial
Hospital who examined the victim. Dr.
Guerrero testified that the hymen of Fe Castro showed “incomplete healed
lacerations at 9 & 3 o’clock
positions on the face of a watch, edges of which are sharp and easily coaptable.” He explained that healed
lacerations would suggest that the injury happened six months, more or less,
prior to the date of examination. In the
case at bar, since per medical findings the hymen of the complainant showed “incomplete
healed lacerations,” then this fact would indicate that the injury occurred
less than six months before February 12, 1961, the date of the medical
examination of Fe Castro. Significantly,
said period corresponds to the time when Fe Castro stayed as a helper in the
house of the Fontanilla spouses. Upon cross-examination, Dr. Guerrero
testified:
“Q. – Dr. Guerrero, you
stated that it (the laceration) should last less than six (6) months counting
from?
“A. – From the time I
examined.”
x x x x x
“Q. – Disregarding the history of the patient,
from your observation of the patient, how many sexual intercourse could have
caused the lacerations taking into consideration the condition of the hymen?
“A. – Several
intercourses because of the laxity of the vaginal canal and it admits three (3)
fingers.
“Q. – How many
intercourses could have caused that?
“A. –
Several. More
than ten (10) times.”
x x x x x
“Q. – And those
lacerations could be caused ten (10) times or more?
“A. – Ten
times or more.
Q. – How many more?
“A. –
Another ten (10) times more.”
It is clear from the above testimony that
Fe Castro had experienced numerous distinct acts of sexual intercourse, a fact
which affirms her claim that the appellant had carnal knowledge of her
repeatedly during her three-month stay in his house. There is no evidence on record that Fe
Castro, then a 15-year old single girl was unchaste prior to her living with
the Fontanilla spouses. Such being the case, her virginity before she
was seduced by the appellant must be presumed.
Presumption of a woman’s virginity arises whenever it is shown that she
is single, and continues until overthrown by proof to the contrary.[8]
This is in accord with the presumption of innocence which “includes, also,
that of morality and decency, and, as a consequence, of chastity.”[9]
We are of the considered opinion that the findings of fact
reached by the court a quo are substantially correct. This, apart from the rule that “as far
as credibility and veracity of witnesses are concerned, the conclusions of the
lower court command great weight and respect, on the ground that the
trustworthiness of witnesses and the merit of the defenses by the accused, are
in the peculiar domain of the trial court.”[10]
In the case at bar, we see no reason for departing from this doctrine, there
being no showing that “some fact or circumstance of great importance to
the case has been overlooked in the records or misapplied or its significance
misunderstood by the lower court.”[11]
The appellant finally contends that the lower court erred in
ordering him to pay P500 in moral damages to the offended party or to her
parents. Ironically, this contention is
correct in two respects. The first is
that the award of P500 in moral damages is inadequate. We have heretofore stated that the complainant
was a virgin, there being no proof to the contrary, and that she was deflowered
by the appellant. The loss of her virginity,
at the hands of the appellant, together with the attendant shame and scandal,
entitles her, in the view of this Court, to the sum of P2,500
in moral damages. Her future as a woman
is definitely impaired, and the resultant prejudice against her engendered in
the male population of the barrio where she resides cannot be blinked away. The second error of the lower court is in
making the award payable to the offended party or to her parents; which
award is, by the very wording of the judgment, in the alternative. Article 2219 of the New Civil Code provides
that moral damages are recoverable by the offended party in the cases of “seduction,
abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts” and that the “parents of
the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused . . . may also recover
moral damages.” (underscoring supplied) The
conviction of the accused suffices as a basis to adjudge him, in the same
action, liable for an award of moral damages, without independent proof
thereof, to the victim and her parents, because the law presumes that
not only the woman who was seduced, abducted, raped or abused, but as well her
parents, naturally suffer besmirched reputation, social humiliation, mental
anguish, and wounded feelings. In the
case at bar, moral damages must be awarded to the offended woman and her
parents, not to either of them, as ordered by the court a quo.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with
the modification that the appellant is ordered to pay the sum of P2,500 in moral damages to the offended party and her
parents. Costs against
the appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
[1] People vs. Paderna, L-28518, January 29, 1968; Aquisap vs. Basilio,
L-21293, December
29, 1967, 1967D PHILD 874, 876.
[2] 19 Phil. 265.
[3] Justice Moreland’s dissenting opinion in U.S. vs.
Bernardo, supra.
[4] U.S.
vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595.
[5] U.S.
vs. Santiago, 41 Phil. 787.
[6]
Gardener vs. State, 7 S.E. 144.
[7]
Herzog, Medical Jurisprudence (1931), p. 806-807.
[8] U.S.
vs. Alvarez, 1 Phil. 351.
[9] Valdepeñas vs.
People, L-20687, April 30, 1966 (SCRA, vol. 16,
p. 871), citing 6 Moran, pp. 28-29, 1963 Edition).
[10] People vs. Evaristo, L-14520, February 26, 1965; See also People vs. Lumayag,
L-19142, March
31, 1965; People vs. Jaravata, L-22029, August 15, 1967
(SCRA, vol. 20, p. 1014).
[11] People vs. Castro, L-20555 and L-21449, June 30, 1967 (SCRA, vol. 20, p. 543).