DULCE VDA. DE FLORES, FOR HERSELF AND IN BEHALF OF MINOR CHILDREN NAMELY, SALVADOR, OSCAR, SALVIO, SALLY, SALVE AND SANDY ALL SURNAMED FLORES, PETITIONERS, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENS…

A petition for review^[1]
of the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission in RO6-WCU Case No.
129100 which reversed the award made by the Acting Labor Referee in favor of
the petitioners.

Salvador Flores, the deceased husband of the petitioner Dulce Vda. de Flores, was first
employed by respondent Pantranco South Express, Inc.,
(formerly known as Alatco) way back in 1952.  In the course of his employment, he occupied
different positions, such as driver, driver-conductor, dispatcher, checker and
later on, as line inspector for which he received a monthly salary of
P321.00.  In 1970, Salvador Flores, got
sick of cardio respiratory arrest due to myocardial infarction,
bronchial asthma and acute broncho-pneumonia
for which he was treated and confined at the Briola Hospital
in Daet, Camarines
Norte.  After a few weeks, he was able to
return to his work but on an off and on basis. 
On September 30, 1972
respondent Pantranco terminated Flores’
employment.  On July 7, 1974, Flores’
ailments recurred until he finally died on July 20, 1974.  In
due time his widow, the petitioner herein, filed a claim for death benefits,
for herself and in behalf of her minor children, Salvador, Oscar, Salvio, Sally, Salve and Sandy, all surnamed Flores.  She attached to the said claim the
physician’s report and her affidavit. 
Respondent Pantranco did not controvert the
claim.  But notwithstanding the non-controversion of the claim, the Acting Labor Referee
conducted a hearing of the petition. 
During the hearing, although allowed to cross-examine the witnesses for
the claimants, counsel for respondent Pantranco
waived the presentation of any evidence.

On August 18, 1975,
the Acting Labor Referee rendered an award, the dispositive
portion of which, reads:

“WHEREFORE, AWARD is hereby rendered in favor of the claimants
and the respondent is hereby ordered to pay the following:

1.  To the claimants, thru this Office, the sum
of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS by way of compensation, plus TWO HUNDRED
(P200.00) PESOS as reimbursement for burial expenses;

2.  To the widow, thru this Office, the further
sum of FIFTY THREE & 60/100 (P53.60) PESOS as reimbursement for medical ex­penses;

3.   Atty. Jose B. Corral, Daet,
Camarines Norte, the sum of P300.00 as attorney’s
fee;

4.   To this office, the sum of P61.00 as office
fee, pursuant to Section 55 of the law.”

Respondent Pantranco
moved to reconsider the award made by the Acting Labor Referee but the motion
for reconsideration was denied. 
Accordingly the record of the case was elevated to the respondent
Commission for review.

On January 26, 1976,
the respondent Commission reversed the award made by the Acting Labor Referee
in favor of petitioner on the ground that the petitioner has failed to
establish the causal connection between the deceased’s employment with that of
his alleged ailments and his subsequent death.

We disagree.

Sufficiently established by the evidence is the fact that the
deceased became sick of cardio respiratory arrest due to myocardial
infarction, bronchial asthma and acute bronchopneumonia in 1970
while he was still in the employ of respondent Pantranco.  The same ailments recurred on July 7, 1974 causing his death on July 20, 1974.  It is a well settled rule that once an
ailment has supervened in the course of one’s employment, there exists a rebuttable presumption that the same arose out or was at
least aggravated by such employment and the burden to overthrow such
presumption shifts to the employer.^[2]

The claimant is thus relieved from the burden of showing
causation.^[3]
Under the circumstances, the claimant need not prove his case to the point of
demonstration for it is only sufficient to show that the hypothesis upon which
he bases his claim is probable.^[4]
Moreover, “the precise medical cause of the illness is not legally
significant, as long as the illness supervened in the course of
employment.”^[5]
In the case at bar, the respondent Republic failed to discharge the burden of
overthrowing the said presumption established by law.  It did not even bother to controvert the
claim of the petitioners.  Such absence
of controversion is indeed fatal to any defense that
the employer may interpose^[6]
and the same constitutes a constructive admission of the compensability of the
claim.^[7]

It is claimed by respondent Pantranco
that the claim of petitioner is out of time because under Section 8 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act,^[8]
the death of an employee is compensable if the same occurs within two years from
the date he contracted the sickness or received the injury as provided in
Section 2 thereof^[9]
which caused his death.  In the case at
bar, respondent Pantranco points out Salvador Flores
contracted his ailments in 1970 while his death occured
on July 20, 1974.  Petitioners should have filed their claim
within two (2) years from 1970.  In Central
Azucarera Don Pedro vs. De Leon^[10]
this Court already held that the two-year period should be counted from the
date the disease or illness becomes compensable or from the time the employee’s
sickness renders him physically disabled to do the work, thus rejecting a
literal interpreta­tion of the wording of the law that the two-year period
should be reckoned with from the time the sickness is contracted or the injury is
caused resulting in death.  The same view
was subsequently adopted in International Oil Factory vs. Doria, et al.^[11]
It was shown during the hearing before the Acting Labor Referee that the
deceased had occasionally suffered from his ailment which started in 1970 and
which persisted until the respondent Pantranco
terminated his services on September
30, 1972 due to the condition of his health.  At the hearing respondent Pantranco
did not bother to present any evidence to the contrary.  True, counsel for respondent Pantranco had caused certain exhibits to be marked but he
did not submit the same formally.  It was
only after the Acting Labor Referee had granted the award that respondent Pantranco showed interest in opposing the claim by filing a
motion for reconsideration, appeal and/or review.  Its main thrust in its motion for
reconsideration is that the death of the deceased is not compensable because he
did not become disabled while he was under its employ and that his ailment was
contracted after he was already separated from the service.  True it is that in support of its motion for
reconsideration, respondent Pantranco attached
thereto an alleged deed of quitclaim signed by the deceased, Salvador Flores;
the letter of the President of the respondent Pantranco
dated September 30, 1972 terminating the services of Salvador Flores; the
separation pay voucher; and the letter dated July 7, 1973 of Salvador Flores to
the General Manager of respondent Pantranco seeking
reinstatement to his former position as line inspector.  However, said documents can be of no
evidentiary value as the same were not at all formally presented during the
hearing of the case before the Acting Labor Referee.  It is claimed by respondent Pantranco^[12]
that it has, through counsel filed a motion asking for five days from June 18, 1975, to submit its evidence
by way of written affidavits together with the documents already marked during
the trial of the case.  Said motion was
granted by the Acting Labor Referee in his Order dated June 18, 1975.^[13]
However, counsel for respondent Pantranco failed to
submit the evidence mentioned in said motion within the five-day period granted
him.  Thus, for all legal intents and
purposes, no evidence has been presented by respondent Pantranco
and the documents marked during the hearing and attached to the motion for
reconside­ration, appeal and/or review cannot be considered at all; and, We
have no other alternative but to consider the case strictly in accordance with
the evidence formally submitted and admitted during the hearing.  Since according to the evidence on record the
deceased was separated from the service of the respondent Pantranco
on September 30, 1972 due
to ill-health, said date should be considered as the time the sickness of the
deceased has rendered him physically disabled to work.  When he died therefore on July 20, 1974 from the same ailments,
it is obvious that his death occurred within the two-year period from the time
he became disabled to work.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of
the respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission is hereby reversed and set
aside and the award made by the Acting Labor Referee, Regional Office No. V,
revived and reinstated.  No pronouncement
as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Fernandez,
and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

^[1] Treated as a special civil action per
resolution dated April 4, 1976.

^[2] Talip vs. WCC, L-42575, May 31, 1976; Reynaldo vs.
Republic, L-43108, June 30, 1976; Simon vs. Republic, L-42510, June 30,
1976; Cabinta vs. WCC, L-42639, July 30, 1976;
Maria Cristina Fertilizer vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228; Acosta vs. WCC,
L-19772, October 31, 1964; Galang vs. WCC,
L-41893, July 30, 1976; Pros vs. WCC, L-43348, September 29, 1976; Magalona vs. WCC, 21 SCRA 1199.

^[3] Magalona vs. WCC, supra., citing Justiniano vs. WCC, L-22774, Nov. 21, 1966, citing
Agustin vs. WCC, L-19957, Sept. 29, 1964; Cabinta
vs. WCC, supra.

^[4] Abana vs. Quisumbing,
22 SCRA 1279, citing MRR vs. WCC, L-18773, May 30, 1974; Cabinta vs.
WCC, supra.

^[5] Magalona vs. WCC, supra.; Cabinta vs. WCC, supra.

^[6] Apolega vs. Hizon,
25 SCRA 336; National Mirror Factory vs. Vda.
de Anure, 27 SCRA 719; Victorias
Milling Co. vs. WCC, 28 SCRA 285; Northwest Airlines vs. WCC, 28
SCRA 877; La Mallorca vs. WCC, 30 SCRA 613;
Pros vs. WCC, L-43348, Sept. 29, 1976.

^[7] A.D. Santos vs. Vasquez, 22 SCRA 1156,
citing A.D. Santos vs. Sapon, L-22220,
April 29, 1966; Itemcop
vs. Florzo, L-21969, Aug. 31, 1966; Nadeco vs. Rongavilla,
L-21963; Aug. 30, 1967; Rio y Compañia vs.
WCC, L-21467, Aug. 30, 1967; Pampanga Sugar Mills vs.
Espeleta, L-24973, Jan. 30, 1968; Pros vs.
WCC, supra.

^[8] SEC. 8. 
Death benefit.  – If the
disease contracted or injury received by the employee as provided in Section
two hereof causes his death within two years from the date of such
injury or sickness, the employer shall pay to the persons entitled thereto,
and, in case there shall be none, to the person representing the deceased
employee the burial expenses in the amount of two hundred pesos, and shall also
pay to or for the following persons, in the order of priority and during the
periods hereinafter set forth, compensation equivalent to the following
percentages of the average weekly wages of the employee as determined in
Section nineteen of this Act:

x          x          x          x          x          x

^[9]
SEC. 2.  Grounds for compensation.  – When an employee suffers personal injury
from any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, or
contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such employment, or
either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, his
employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the person hereinafter
specified.  The right to compensation as
provided in this Act shall not be defeated or impaired on the ground that the
death, injury or disease was due to the negligence of a fellow servant or
employee, without prejudice to the right of the employer to proceed against the
negligent party.

^[10] L-9449, July 24, 1969.

^[11] L-13426, September 30, 1960.

^[12] pp. 43-44, Record.

^[13] p.
41, Record.