ANGEL MANALILI, SIXTO MORALES, ORLANDO MONTE­MAYOR, GLORIA SALALILA, MARCELO BAUTISTA, ERNESTO SURLA, PAULA MANALILI, MARIO CALARA AND SERAFIA VDA. DELA CRUZ, COMPLAINANTS, VS. …

This incident arose from an administrative com­plaint filed
against Deputy Sheriffs Danilo M. Viesca and Renato E. Robles of the Province
of Bataan for alleged irregularity committed while executing a demolition order
in Civil Case No. 179 of the Municipal Court of Dinalupi­han, Bataan on July
12, 1977.^[1]

After both Deputy Sheriffs, Renato E. Robles and Danilo M.
Viesca, had filed their respective comments, this Court issued a Resolution
dated October 23, 1978 dismissing the administrative complaint but requiring
Act­ing Municipal Judge Vivencio A. Bantugan of the Municipal Court of
Dinalupihan to explain within ten (10) days “why no administrative action
should be taken against him for issuing an order to execute a judgment
promulgated more than 10 years old on a mere ex–parte motion in
vio­lation of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.”

In his explanation dated November 8, 1978, Acting Judge Vivencio
A. Bantugan avers that the Order of Demo­lition in question was the subject of
a certiorari and prohibition case filed with this Court docketed as G. R. No.
L-46452, entitled “Marcela R. Diwa, et al., vs. Hon. Vivencio Bantugan, et
al.”; that the petition in G. R. No. L-46452 was dismissed by the Second
Division of this Court in a minute resolution dated October 10, 1977 for lack
of merit; that the judgment rendered on October 10, 1966 in Civil Case No. 179
for illegal detainer had already been executed within the five year period from
its entry so that Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court does not
apply; and that the respondent judge issued the questioned Order “not only
in the exercise of jurisdiction, but also in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion”; and that it is his “inescapable and sworn duty to
resolve once and for all the said motion for demolition.”^[2]

It appears from the Order of Demolition that the plaintiff’s
counsel in Civil Case No. 179 filed on January 12, 1977 an “Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion for Immediate Issuance of an Order of Demolition”. However, although the motion was urgent and ex–parte,
the respondent judge took it upon himself to conduct a full hearing upon proper
notice to the parties and their counsel on January 21, 1977. The order mentioned the receipt of a
telegraphic message from the Office of the President signed by Technical
Assistant for Legal Affairs, M. V. Icasiano, requesting deferment of the resolution
on the motion until such time as the protest lodged by defendants in Civil Case
No. 179 against the pre­vailing party-plaintiff over the grant of the land in
question shall have been resolved by said Office.

The protest in question was finally resolved by the dismissal of
the appeal interposed by defendants for lack of merit. The Administrative Order dismissing the
appeal of the defendants was signed by Executive Assistant Ronaldo Zamora and
was filed before the respondent’s court on April 22, 1977. There was also filed on May 6, 1977 with the
municipal court a certification from the Team Leader of the Department of
Agrarian Reform stationed at Dinalupihan, Bataan, confirming said final
adjudication of the protest in favor of the prevailing party-plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 179.

All the foregoing facts were made known to the complainants and
their counsel during the hearing on June 3, 1977.

It is clear from the record that the Order of Demo­lition was not
issued upon a mere ex–parte motion. Said order was issued only after consideration of the facts and
circumstances brought out at the hearing. The judgment rendered in the detainer case was already executed within
the period of five (5) years from the entry of judgment as shown by the
sheriff’s return filed before the Municipal Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan, on
November 7, 1966.

In Albetz Investments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,^[3]
this Court said:

“There is no question that the Municipal Court had full
authority to order the demolition of the Calma’s house by the Sheriff in order
to give effect to its judgment in the unlawful detainer case. It is not enough for the Sheriff, in the
enforce­ment of a judgment for delivery or res­titution of property, to direct
the defeated party to make such delivery or restitution. It is the duty of the Sheriff to oust the
defeated party from the property and make the resti­tution by placing the
winning party in possession of said property. If to accomplish this he has to remove an improvement constructed by the
defeated party, he cannot effect such removal without special order of the
court, which order can only be issued upon motion of the prevailing party with
notice and after hearing, and upon the defeated party’s failure to remove the
improvement within the reasonable time given to him by the court. (Guevara v. Laico, et al., 64 Phil. 144)

Thus, Section 14, Rule 39, of the Revised Rules of Court,
specifically provides:

‘SEC. 14. Removal of im­provements on property sub­ject of
execution. – When the property subject of the exe­cution contains improvements
constructed or planted by the judgment debtor or his agent, the officer shall
not destroy, demolish or remove said im­provements except upon special order of
the court, issued upon petition of the judgment cre­ditor after due hearing and
after the former has failed to remove the same within a reason­able time fixed
by the court.’

This provision has been taken from Sec­tion
1 of Commonwealth Act No. 39, which states that: ‘The Provincial Sheriff, in executing the decision of a competent
court in ejectment cases, shall not des­troy, demolish, or remove the
improvements constructed or planted by the defendant or his agent or servant on
the premises, unless expressly authorized by the Court. The court may authorize the Provincial
Sheriff to do so, upon petition of the plaintiff or his attorney, after due
hear­ing, and upon failure of the defendant to remove the afore­mentioned
improvements within a reasonable time after being so ordered by the
Court.”

Evident from the foregoing is the statutory purpose which is to
grant to the defeated par­ty a reasonable time to remove his improvement from
the pre­mises. Therefore, any delay in
the implementation of the order of demolition accrues to the benefit of the
deforciant. The grant of such a
reasonable pe­riod to remove the improvements is predicated upon reasons of
fairness and justice to enable the defeated party to look for another place
wherein he can transfer his improvements and personal effects. The law does not specify the period
within which the order of demolition should be carried out. The   
reason is obvious. There may be factors
and circumstances which would justify deferment of the implementation of the
order of demolition.” (Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, in the instant case, the order of demo­lition was the
subject in G. R. No. L-46452 for certiorari and prohibition. The petition was dismissed by the Second
Division of this Court for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the explanation of Acting Judge Vivencio A.
Bantugan on why he issued the order of demolition is found satisfactory and no
administrative action lies against him.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-3.

^[2]
Letter of Judge Vivencio A. Bantugan dated November 8, 1978, pp. 1-3.

^[3]
75 SCRA 311, 316-317.