TAN TUAN ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. LUCENA FOOD CONTROL BOARD, FEDERICO V. MARQUEZ, GODOFREDO REYES, ALFREDO BONUS, TEOTIMO ATIENZA AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed a decision of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas,
now Quezon, ordering the Clerk of Court to deliver to the plaintiffs the sum of
P398.70, deposited with the court as the legal price of certain merchandize
which had been seized and sold by the Lucena Food Control Board. Except to this
extent, the complaint, which sought the recovery of P3,000 as the value of said
goods and P1,000 for damages, was dismissed without special findings as to
costs. The appellants in the Court of Appeals and petitioners for certiorari in
this Court are the plaintiffs.

It appears that on June 14, 1945, the plaintiffs, Tan Tuan and
Uy Sinte Te Pecuy, attempted to bring to Manila from the municipality of
Pagbilao, province of Tayabas, three barrels of coconut oil and sixteen sacks of
cassava flour. The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals found that
those articles were intended not for the personal use of the exporters or their
families but for sale in the black market. They found from the evidence that the
plaintiffs hid the merchandize in the truck under “one enormous pile of
firewood” which concealed it from view.

Upon reaching Lucena, the oil and flour were discovered, seized
and sold by the Lucena Food Control Board, as above stated. The Board provided
for compensation to the owners, at the control price, for the flour but not for
the oil, although, later, compensation was extended to the oil by direction of
the Military authorities. The articles were forthwith rationed to the public at
the official price and the proceeds were offered to the owners, but the latter
turned them down demanding the return of the merchandize or its market value in
cash.

It is contended that the Court of Appeals erred—

“1. In recognizing the Lucena Food Control Board as a legal
entity.

“2. In disregarding the Exhibits I, M, C and E (Appellants’
Brief pp. 6-10).

“3. In affirming the decision and admitting the judicial
deposit made by the defendants-respondents over and above the opposition of the
petitioners.

“4. In ordering the proceedings on deportation in conformity
with section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.

“5. In not adjudging the return of the goods illegally
confiscated by the Lucena Food Control Board the reasonable and actual value of
the same.”

The fourth assignment of error is not subject to review. A mere
recommendation to the executive branch of the government concerning an
administrative matter, it is not an adjudication of any rights enforceable by
the court.

The first three assignments of error have to do with the
legality of the seizure and sale of plaintiffs’ goods by order of the Lucena
Food Control Board. They will be taken up and discussed jointly.

The Province of Tayabas had been declared liberated before the
confiscation on June 14, 1945. So far as we can gather from the plaintiffs’
allegations and argument, it is their contention that upon the announcement of
the province’s liberation the ordinary constitutional processes of government
were automatically reestablished, stripping the defendants of their powers. We
cannot agree with this view.

The liberation of the province without more did not terminate
military control. Notwithstanding such liberation, and although as early as
February 27, 1945, General MacArthur had declared “the full powers and
responsibilities under the Constitution restored to the Commonwealth,” it is a
fact that actually the province was still in a state of war on June 14, 1945.
According to the findings of the Court of First Instance and the Court of
Appeals, military operations in Tayabas on and after that date continued, except
in Lucena and a few other municipalities. The civil authorities of the
Commonwealth had not taken charge of the government in the province; the
provincial governor and the mayors there, were military appointees, and were
acting in pursuance of military law and military directives.

This phase of the case is controlled by the laws of war. The
Rules of Land Warfare, published by order of the Secretary of War on October 1,
1940, and based on treaties and on practices of civilized nations, determined
the time when military occupation might be considered at an end. Entitled
“Cessation of Occupation,” Section 280 of those Rules provides that the
occupation ceases when “the occupant evacuates the district or is driven out by
the enemy, or by levee en masse, and the legitimate government actually
resumes its functions.”

The fact that this was not foreign territory did not deprive
the United States Army of the status of belligerent occupant. Military
government may be established not only in foreign territory occupied or invaded
in time of war, but also domestic territory in a state of rebellion or civil
war. (Chase, C. J., in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall 2, 141, 18 Law ed.,
281.) This right to establish government is not at all dependent upon the right
of conquest, but is treated as an incident to the mere right of belligerent
occupation. A nation can not conquer its own territory, but it may subdue and
occupy such portions of it as are made the theater of an insurrection against
its authority (Hefferman vs. Porter, 96 Am. Dec., 459), or, for that matter, of
foreign invasion. Also, the occupied territory may belong to a state allied to
the occupant, and which willingly confides its domain to the protection of it.
(3 Hyde International Law [1945] 1876, 1877.)

The Lucena Food Control Board, though composed of civilians,
was an instrumentality of the Army and acted within the scope of the powers
conferred upon it. What is more, the acts that are the subject of complaint were
confirmed and ratified by the proper military authorities afterward.

The Philippine Civil Affairs Unit known for short as PCAU was
created in pursuance of the Field Manual issued by the United States War
Department on December 22, 1942, and subsequently amended on December 22, 1943.
It was entitled “Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs.” It provided
for civil affairs control and supervision of the activities of civilians by an
armed force, by military government or otherwise. In occupied territory “the
commander by virtue of his position” was given “supreme legislative, executive
and judicial authority limited only by the laws and customs of war and by
directives from higher authority.” Among other things, it provided for
“supervision of the distribution of food and other supplies; control of prices;
rationing; prevention of hoarding and black markets; regulation of exports and
imports; allocation of imports for local distribution; regulation of military
requisitions and purchases; establishment of policies to be followed in
stimulating local production.”

The Military government in Tayabas pertaining to civil affairs
was organized in accordance with the rules prescribed in that Field Manual. The
Army officer in charge of PCAU in the province appointed the provincial governor
and municipal mayors. And in order the better to carry out the provisions of
Executive Order No. 1 of the provincial governor, issued at the instance of the
military authorities, the municipal mayor of Lucena created the defendant Lucena
Food Control Board and appointed its members with the approval of Captain Leon
Schneider of the United States Army in charge of PCAU. The governor’s executive
order just referred to made it unlawful for any person to carry or export any
prime commodity from Tayabas to any place outside its territorial jurisdiction.
It allowed the removal out of the province only of commodities or livestock
intended for personal use and on permit secured from the provincial governor or
the municipal mayor concerned.

The municipal mayor of Pagbilao had issued a permit to the
plaintiffs to export the oil and flour that were confiscated, but that permit
did not afford the permitees protection, being in violation of the provincial
governor’s executive order and military directives which forbade the exportation
of such goods for commercial purposes. It might be argued that the Lucena Food
Control Board’s authority did not embrace good exported from another
municipality. However that may be, the question is inconsequential; the
defendants’ action, as has been seen, was confirmed, ratified and sanctioned by
the Philippine Civil Affairs Unit who had Jurisdiction throughout the entire
province.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla,
Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.