PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. AMRBOSIA VALLE, DEFENDANT, ALTO SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC., BONDSMAN AND APPELLANT.

Appeal by the Alto Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc., from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila directing the confiscation of a bond.

Accused of estafa
in Criminal Case No. D-091007 of the Municipal Court of Manila,
Ambrosia Valle secured her provisional release by filing a bail bond
subscribed by herein appellant, the Alto Surety & Insurance
Company, in the sum of P800.00. Subsequently convicted by said court
and sentenced accordingly, Ambrosia Valle appealed to the Court of
First Instance of Manila and filed an appeal bond in the sum of P500.00
posted by appellant herein. In this bond, appellant undertook that
Ambrosia Valle would “appear and answer the charge above-mentioned in
whatever court it may be tried,” and would “at all times hold herself
amenable to the orders and processes of the court,” as well as “pay
such fine as the appellate court may direct,” or “surrender her in the
execution of such judgment as the appellate court may render,” or “in
case the cause is remanded for a new trial,” she would appear in the
court to which it may be so remanded and submit her to the orders and
processes thereof, or, if she fails to perform any of these conditions,
that appellant “would pay to the Republic of the Philippines the sum of
five hundred pesos (P500.00) Philippine Currency.”

After
due trial, later on, in the Court of First Instance, the same ordered
appellant to produce the person of the accused for the promulgation of
the decision on September 14, 1959. On that date, Ambrosia Valle
appeared before the court, which promulgated its decision, convicting
her as charged and sentencing her to 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor,
to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P180.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay costs. The court,
likewise ordered her to appear on September 29, the last day to appeal
from said decision, in order to perfect her appeal, if she wanted to do
so, and file her appeal bond, and appellant was notified accordingly,
on September 15, 1959. Although somewhat late, the accused appeared
before the court in the morning of September 29 and asked that she be
given up to the afternoon thereof to file her notice of appeal and
appeal bond. The court granted this request and warned her to come back
in the afternoon, but she did not do so. Hence, on October 1, 1959, the
court issued the following order:

“Accused not having filed notice of appeal nor appeal
bond’ and not having surrendered for execution of judgment, bail bond
confiscated; let warrant of arrest issue; execution postponed until she
is arrested.”

On the same date, the court ordered defendant’s arrest, copy of
which was received by appellant on October 3, 1959. On October 14,
appellant surrendered the accused to the trial court, which forthwith
committed her to prison. The next day appellant filed a motion to lift
the order of confiscation of its bond and for the concellation thereof,
but this motion was denied in an order dated October 17, 1959. On
October 22, 1959, appellant filed notice of appeal from said orders
dated October 1 and 17, 1959 to the Court of Appeals. Subsequently, the
latter forwarded the records of the case to the Supreme,Court, upon the
ground that only questions of law are involved in the appeal. Indeed,
appellant maintains that the lower court erred:

1. “*
   * * in postponing of in not immediately executing its judgment of
   conviction after the promulgation or reading thereof on September 14,
   1959.

2. “* * * in releasing the accused
   after the promulgation of its judgment of conviction without the
   appellant’s knowledge or consent.

3. “* *
   * in confiscating the appellant’s bail bond after having produced the
   accused on the date of promulgation and/or execution of its judgment
   (September 14, 1959) and on another subsequent date (September 29,
   1959).

4. “* * * in denying the appellant’s motion to lift the order confiscating its bail, bond and to cancel the same.”

The
first assignment of error has nothing to do with the propriety or
validity of the order of confiscation of the bond. Moreover, since the
defendant was entitled to appeal, the lower court had the discretion to
postpone, until the last day for the perfection of such appeal, the
determination of the question whether it should or should not order
defendant’s detention or the execution of the decision of conviction.

With respect to the other alleged errors assigned by appellant, it
should be noted that its liability, under the bond, continued until
after the accused had been surrendered and the court had ordered the
cancellation of said bond. Thus, in People vs. Lorredo (50 Phil., 218), it was held:

“Moreover,
one of the conditions of the bond subscribed by the appellants is that
if the accused is convicted, he will render himself amenable to the
judgment as well as to the execution thereof. After notification of the
judgment, the accused had fifteen days within which to perfect his
appeal, and it is, only after the expiration of the said fifteen days,
without the accused having made use of his right, that the said
judgment becomes final. (Sec. 47, General Orders No. 58), Neither the
fact, then, that the court granted the accused ten days within which to
comply with the judgment, nor the fact that Ills attorney guaranteed
said compliance, relieves his sureties from their liability in case of
non-compliance with said judgment, because, as we have already seen, in
order to be relieved from the obligation contracted by them by virtue
of their bond, a judicial order relieving them of their liability is
necessary.”

Inasmuch, however, as the person of the accused was surrendered to
the lower court shortly after the appellant’s bond had been ordered
confiscated and the arrest of the accused had been decreed, the
question arises as to whether appellant’s liability under said bond
should be reduced or not. We do not think it should be, for this is a
matter left to the sound discretion of the lower court, and its action
thereon should not be disturbed because appellant had misrepresented
thereto, in its motion to lift the confiscation of the appeal bond,
that the court had, on September 29, 1959, granted the accused two days
within which to file his notice of appeal and appeal bond, which is not
true.

Wherefore, the orders appealed from are hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellant Alto Surety & Insurance Co.,
Inc. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.