G.R. No. L-15414. June 30, 1960
JUAN C. PAJO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE & NATURAL RESOURCES, FELIPE R. AMOS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, VICENTE MARABABOL, AND GABRIEL DAZA,…
BARRERA, J.:
covering 3000 hectares and 1000 hectares of forest area in Gibong and
Jabonga, respectively, in the province of Agusan. Said licenses have
been renewed from year to year, the last renewal being O.T. License No.
760-’56 and O.T. License No. 759-’56, both expiring on June 30, 1956.
The record, which we have examined, does not disclose any
application for renewal of those licenses for 1956-57, nor is there any
allegation with respect thereto in the petition filed by respondent Ago
in the lower court. However, in a letter dated September 6, 1956 (Annex
“9” of petitioners’ answer in the lower court), reference is made to an
application for renewal of O.T. License No. 760-’56 only in which
letter respondent Ago was advised to submit a certification of the
Municipal Treasurer concerned showing the amount of forest products cut
under his license and his pending forestry accounts, if any, with a
warning that if nothing was heard from him regarding the matter on or
before October 6, 1956, his case would be considered closed.
Upon respondent Ago’s failure to answer said letter and inability to
submit the required certification within the period stated, petitioner
Director of Forestry wrote to him another letter on December 29, 1956,
informing him that according to their records, he (Ago) had pending
accounts for forestry and reforestration charges, itemized in a list
attached, and advising him that action on the renewal of his license
was being withheld until receipt of a statement from the municipal or
city treasurer showing payment of said pending accounts.
Respondent Ago having ignored even this second letter, the Director
of Forestry, on April 11, 1957, ordered the suspension of Ago’s logging
operations until his licenses shall have been renewed for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1957.
Notwithstanding his failure to comply with the requirements of the
Director of Forestry and, consequently, to obtain the renewal of his
licenses which had expired on June 30, 1956, respondent Ago instead
filed, on June 26, 1957, another application for renewal for the
ensuing fiscal year 1957-1958.
On July 16, 1957, petitioner Director of Forestry sent still another
letter to respondent Ago calling his attention that inspite of the
lapse of more than 6 months from the second letter of December 29,
1956, nothing had been heard from him regarding the payment of his
(Ago’s) pending forestry accounts, totalling to P12,211.40, and
requesting that the matter be looked into without delay, hut not later
than August 15, 1957, otherwise, his application for renewal would be
rejected and the area embraced therein declared vacant and reverted to
the mass of public forest, subject to disposition in accordance with
law. and regulations on the matter.
Notwithstanding Ago’s continued failure to comply with the repeated
requests contained in said 3 letters of petitioner Director of
Forestry, the latter still wrote him another letter on November 22,
1957, advising him again that no action could be taken on his (Ago’s)
application for renewal unless he settle his forestry accounts.
In view of respondent’s failure to heed all the letters of the
Director of Forestry and satisfy the requirements prerequisite to the
renewal of his timber licenses, said official, on March 3, 1958, issued
an order rejecting his (Ago’s) application for renewal.
Thereafter, on March 19, 1958, petitioner Gabriel Daza, Jr. filed
with petitioner Director of Forestry, an application for timber license
for the area covered by the expired license of respondent Ago.
On April 2, 1958, respondent Ago filed with petitioner Director of
Forestry, a petition for reconsideration of the latter’s order of
rejection of March 3, 1958. However, before petitioner Director of
Forestry could act on said petition, respondent Ago, on April 23, 1958,
filed with the former, an urgent motion in which he stated that on
April 21, 1958, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a
certification in his (Ago’s) favor that he had no more pending forest
liability.
On April 8, 1958, the officer-in-charge of the Agusan Forest
Station, submitted to petitioner Director of Forestry (thru the
District Forester of Agusan), a memorandum advising him of the illegal
operations of respondent Ago in the area covered by his expired timber
license, as well as his refusal to pay forest charges and defiance of
forestry rules and regulations. On April 17, 1958, said memorandum was
indorsed by the District Forester of Agusan to petitioner Director of
Forestry, with the information that in spite of previous instructions
to respondent Ago to stop operating inside the area covered by his
expired timber licenses, he (Ago) persisted in his illegal operation,
and recommended that appropriate steps be taken on the matter.
On April 28, 1958, petitioner Director of Forestry wrote to
respondent’ Ago, advising him that he (Ago) had already lost his right
to the timber area in question, and that he was no longer entitled to a
renewal of his timber license.
On May 8, 1958, petitioners Director of Forestry and Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, finding that petitioner Daza’s
application for a timber license and his offer to assume the unpaid
forest obligation of respondent Ago was in order, approved the same and
issued to him a license, allowing him to deposit in the Forestry office
the amount of P10,000.00 to answer for said obligations of respondent
Ago.
On May 14, 1958, respondent Ago filed with petitioner Director of
Forestry a notice of appeal from the latter’s rejection of his
application for renewal, and with petitioner Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, an urgent motion, praying for the approval of
his application of renewal, and that if the area in question had
already been applied for by any person, to stop the issuance or
withhold the release of any license, if one had already been approved.
On May 19, 1958, respondent Ago filed with petitioner Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, an appeal memorandum and a
supplement to the urgent motion, praying that the approved timber
license in favor of petitioner Daza be cancelled.
In view of respondent Ago’s representations in his urgent motion of
May 19, 1958, that he had fully paid all his pending forestry
liabilities, petitioner Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
verified from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue whether the
certificate of clearance of forest liabilities issued by the latter on
April 21, 1958 was up to date, and whether the records of the City
Treasurer of Butuan City (Agusan) were consulted when said certificate
was issued. In reply, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue stated that
said certification was confined to respondent Ago’s obligations only
insofar as the records of the central office were concerned. Further
verification from the Office of the District Forester of Agusan and the
Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City disclosed that respondent
Ago had unpaid forest charges totalling P27,002.25 as of April 11, 1958
which was reduced to P18,152.83 after crediting his payment of
P8,849.42 to the City Treasurer of Manila on April 18, 1958. This
balance was still outstanding as of June 10, 1958.
On June 16, 1958, petitioner Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources rendered a decision dismissing respondent Ago’s appeal, and
affirming the order of March 3, 1958 rejecting his (Ago’s) application
for renewal.
On July 7, 1958, Ago filed a motion for reconsideration of said
decision, which was denied by petitioner Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources on July 25, 1958. On August 12, 1958, respondent Ago
filed an appeal with the Office of the President.
On March 5, 1959, petitioner Executive Secretary, acting for the
President, affirmed the orders of petitioners Director of Forestry and
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources rejecting Ago’s
application for renewal. In view thereof, petitioner Director of
Forestry released the approved timber license (No. 1714-58) to
petitioner Daza, on March 25, 1959.
On March 30, 1959, respondent Ago filed with the Court of First
Instance of Agusan, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
damages, with preliminary injunction, against petitioners herein
(Special Civil Case No. 75) alleging, inter alia, that the
rejection of his application for renewal by petitioners Director of
Forestry and Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and its
affirmation by petitioner Executive Secretary, as well as the granting
of the timber license in favor of Gabriel Daza, Jr. constituted an
abuse of discretion on the part of said officials, and therefore
illegal. To this petition, petitioner Daza filed his answer with
counterclaim on April 13, 1959. On April 23, 1959, petitioners Director
of Forestry, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and
Executive Secretary, jointly filed their answer.[1]
Thereafter, a preliminary hearing was had on the petition for a writ
of preliminary injunction, and after hearing, the court[2] issued an order on April 30, 1959 the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the respondents,
their subordinates, agents, representatives, attorneys, servants,
employees, guards, or any person acting in their behalf, are hereby
restrained and prohibited from enforcing or giving effect to ordinary
Timber License No. 1714-58 of Gabriel Daza, Jr.; that respondent
Gabriel Daza, Jr., his agents, representatives, servants, attorneys,
guards, laborers, or any person acting in his behalf are hereby
restrained and prohibited from entering any portion of the forest area
described in .paragraph 2 of the petition covered by Ordinary Timber
License No. 1450-51 or O.T.L. No. 1714-58 and from cutting, removing or
hauling any timber or forest product therein; that the respondents
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of
Forestry’, their agents, servants, representatives, attorneys,
subordinates, and any person acting in their behalf are hereby
restrained and prohibited from enforcing the order of the respondent
Director suspending petitioner’s logging operations in the areas
covered by O.T.L. No. 760-’56 and O.T.L. No. 769-’56; that the
respondents Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director
of Forestry, their agents, subordinates, assistants, employees,
inspectors, guards, or any person acting in their behalf are hereby
commanded to release the logs and other forest products cut, removed or
collected by petitioner from the areas covered by O.T.L. No. 760-’56
and O.T.L. No. 759-’56 without requiring petitioner to pay any
surcharges for cutting without license. For the issuance of this writ
of preliminary injunction, petitioner is required to put up a bond in
the sum of P10,000.00 with sufficient sureties to be approved by the
Court.”
From this order, present petitioners, on May 7, 1959, filed with
this Court, a petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying that
pending the determination of the petition on the merits, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued by this Court, restraining respondent
Judge from enforcing said order, and enjoining respondent Ago, and his
agents, representatives, workers, etc., from entering the forested area
in question, and from disturbing the operation of petitioner Daza
therein. In due time, we issued the writ prayed for.
The issues to be resolved in this case are
(1) whether petitioners Director of Forestry, Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, and Executive Secretary acted
without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to renew the timber licenses of respondent Ago,
as to entitle the latter to the remedy prayed for in the lower court,
and, consequently, whether the lower court acted also in excess of
power or with grave abuse of discretion in restraining the enforcement
of said petitioners’ orders rejecting the renewal of respondent Ago’s
timber licenses and suspending the latter’s logging operations; and
(2) whether the same administrative officials likewise acted without
authority and/or with abuse of discretion in granting petitioner
Gabriel Daza, Jr. a timber license over the same forest area, without
public bidding, thereby justifying the issuance by the lower court of
the writ of injunction restraining petitioner Daza from entering the
forest area covered by the timber license awarded to him.
Anent the first issue, there can be no question that petitioner
Director of Forestry has jurisdiction over the grant or renewal of
respondent Ago’s timber license (Sec. 1816, Rev. Adm. Code); that
petitioner Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as department
head, is empowered by law to affirm, modify, or reject said grant or
renewal of respondent Ago’s timber license by petitioner Director of
Forestry Sec. 79 [C], Rev. Adm. Code); and that petitioner Executive
Secretary, acting for and in behalf and by authority of the President
has, likewise, jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or reverse the orders
regarding the grant or renewal of said timber license by the two
aforementioned officials (Art. VII [11] [1], Const.; Sec. 75, Rev. Adm.
Code).
Did said petitioners act with grave abuse of discretion in rejecting
respondent Ago’s application for the renewal of his timber licenses?
Under the facts presently before us, we do not think so. In rejecting
said application for renewal and dismissing Ago’s appeal, the following
facts, as succinctly stated by petitioner Executive Secretary, stand
out in justification:
“In a letter dated September 6, 1956, the Bureau of
Forestry required appellant (herein respondent Ago) to submit a
certificate of the municipal treasurer concerned, showing the amount of
forest products cut under his licenses and his pending forestry
accounts, if any, with the warning that if nothing was heard or
received from him on or before October 6, 1956, his applications would
be considered closed. Appellant did not submit the required
certificate. On December 29, 1956, the Bureau wrote him that, because
he had pending unsettled accounts for forest and reforestation fund
charges, action on his renewal applications would be withheld pending
submission of a statement of the municipal or city treasurer concerned
informing the Bureau that his accounts had been paid. Again, appellant
failed to submit the required statement.“On June 28, 1957,
appellant filed another set of renewal applications and on July 16,
1957, the Bureau wrote him the following letter:‘With reference to our letter to you, dated December 29, 1956:
‘I
beg to inform you that in spite of the lapse of more than. 6 months
nothing has been heard or received from you regarding the payment of
your pending accounts of P11,243.69 representing forest charges and
P967.71 as reforestation fund charges or a total of P12,211.40. It is
therefore to your advantage that you look into this matter as early as
possible but not later than August 15, 1957, otherwise your application
for renewal will be rejected and the area embraced thereby will be
declared vacant and reverted to the mass of public forest subject for
disposition in accordance with the forest laws and regulations.’“Notwithstanding
the foregoing letter, appellant did not settle his forestry accounts.
On November 22, 1957, the Bureau wrote him again, urging the payment of
his accounts. Appellant having failed to comply with the several
demands for payment of his accounts, the Bureau in an order dated March
3, 1958, rejected his renewal applications.“The records show
that your contention that appellant has fully paid all his forestry
accounts has no leg to stand on. Of the amount of P12,211.40 demanded
of him as early as December 29, 1956, only the sum of P8,849.42 was
paid by him on April 18, 1958, or after the Bureau’s order rejecting
the renewal applications had been issued and while his appeal therefrom
with the Department was pending resolution. As a matter of fact the
records in the Office of the District Forester of Agusan tend to show
that appellant has other forestry accounts in a telegram to the
Department dated May 19, 1958, the District Forester disclosed that
appellant has a pending account of P47,746.59 representing forest and
reforestation charges. And in a certification of the same official
dated June 10, 1958, it was stated that appellant was indebted in the
sum of P27,002.23 as of April 11, 1958.“Neither are your
three other contentions in support of the appeal worthy of
consideration. The fact should not be lost sight of that the Bureau
demanded the payment of appellant’s forestry accounts in the sum of
P12,211.40, representing forest and reforestation fund charges, as
early as December 29, 1956. Appellant’s failure to comply with this
demand, let alone his seemingly wanton disregard, of subsequent
demands, was more than enough basis for the Bureau’s refusal to give
due course to his renewal applications. The law is quite explicit in
that the failure to pay reforestation fees including surcharges within
60 days after the same has become due and payable is a sufficient cause
for the cancellation of a timber license and the forfeiture of the
corresponding bond deposit of the licensee. (Sec. 4, R. A. No. 115, as
amended.) Such failure being a sufficient cause for the cancellation of
a subsisting license, with more force evidently will it be a ground for
refusal to grant a renewal of an expired license.”
In the case of Espinoza et al. vs. Makalintal et al.
(79 Phil., 134; 45 Off. Gaz. 712), we held that the powers granted to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (Natural Resources) by law
regarding the disposition of public lands such as granting of licenses,
permits, leases, and contracts or approving, rejecting, reinstating, or
cancelling applications, or deciding conflicting applications, are all
executive and administrative in nature. It is a well-recognized
principle that purely administrative and discretionary functions may
not be interferred with by the courts.[3]
In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and
actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is
generally true with respect to acts involving the Exercise of judgment
or discretion, and fiindings of fact.[4]
Findings of fact by an administrative board or officials, following a
hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except
where the board or official has gone beyond his statutory authority,
exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and
without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion. And we
have repeatedly held that there is grave abuse of discretion justifying
the issuance of the writ of certiorari only when there is capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction (Abad Santos vs. Province of Tarlac, 67 Phil., 480; Tan vs.
People, 88 Phil., 609), as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation
of law (Tavera-Luna, Inc. vs. Nable, 67 Phil., 340; Alafriz vs. Nable, 72 Phil., 278; Liwanag vs.
Castillo, 106 Phil., 375; 57 Off. Gaz. [11] 1962). We have, likewise,
repeatedly held that the lack of jurisdiction which entitles one to the
remedy of certiorari, is that which is from the beginning, or having
jurisdiction, the court, board, or officer oversteps it while acting
thereon (Leung Ben vs. O’Brien, 39 Phil., 182; Silvestre vs. Torres, 57 Phil., 885; Hamoy vs.
Secretary, 106 Phil., 1046). As we see the facts so far adduced, these
circumstances do not in the least appear in the instant case, insofar
as the rejection of respondent Ago’s petition for renewal of his timber
licenses is concerned. Consequently, the lower court erred and abused
its discretion in restraining even preliminarily, under the
circumstances of the case, the enforcement of said petitioners’ orders
rejecting the renewal of respondent Ago’s timber licenses and
suspending the latter logging operations which preliminary injunction,
in effect, would permit respondent Ago, during the pendency of this
case, to operate without a license and without paying the fees required
by law.
In respect of the second issue, it may be stated that respondent
Ago’s contention that petitioner Director of Forestry abused his
discretion in awarding the timber license to petitioner Baza in spite
of the absence of a public bidding as required by Forestry
Administrative Order No. 11-12, of August 1, 1957, is controverted by
the petitioners who claim that there are circumstances that justified
the dispensing with the public bidding. The matter, therefore, will
have to be determined when the case is heard on the merits. On this
score, we are not prepared to say that the lower court committed so
grave an abuse of discretion, as to warrant in this certiorari
proceeding the setting aside of the preliminary injunction issued by
the lower court restraining petitioner Daza from entering the forest
area in question.
Respondent contends that petitioners should have filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order in question, or asked for the dissolution
of the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, before coming
to us.
This is not always so. It is only when the questions are raised for
the first time before this Court in a certiorari proceeding that the
writ shall not issue unless the lower court had first been given the
opportunity to pass upon the same. In fine, when the questions raised
before this Court are the same as those which have been squarely raised
in and passed upon by, the court below, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in
this Court, is no longer prerequisite. It is to be noted that in the
instant proceedings, as in the proceedings before the court below, the
question is whether respondent Judge had authority to review the
decisions of the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, and on appeal, that of the President, denying, under
the circumstances stated in said decisions, respondent Ago’s petition
to renew his timber licenses. The facts and the law of the case that
are the subject of discussion in this certiorari proceedings were all
before respondent Judge, and the only thing this Court is being asked
to do is to declare that the order issued by said respondent Judge in
passing upon those very facts and that very law is null and void. The
doctrine was restated by this Court in the case of Chavez vs. Ocampo (66 Phil., 78), as follows:
“* * * Respondent maintains that reconsideration of
the order of dismissal not having been sought in the lower court, the
petition for mandamus should be dismissed without further proceedings
in accordance with the ruling in this jurisdiction to the effect that
this court cannot consider any petition for any of the special remedies
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure without a showing that
petitioner had filed a motion for reconsideration in the lower court of
the order whose legality is assailed. The ruling invoked by respondent
rests upon the principle that issues which Courts of First Instance are
bound to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted
to this court without first giving them opportunity to dispose of the
same with due deliberation. ‘Herrera vs. Barretto and Joaquin, 25 Phil. 245.) For this reason, when
a definite question has been properly raised, argued, and submitted to
the lower court and has been wholly decided by the latter, a motion for
reconsideration of the same question is no longer necessary as a
condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari in this
court. (Municipal Council of Masantol vs. Guevara, 44 Phil.; 580.)” (Italics supplied.)
In the present proceedings, the issues were not taken summarily from
respondent Judge, who held a hearing before issuing his order, and who
had before him all the same official documents that are now before this
Court. Stated differently, a definite question, that of the authority
of respondent Judge to review and to repeal decisions of administrative
officials (as petitioners herein), including the President, in the
implementation of the forestry law, has been properly raised, argued,
and submitted to, and passed upon by, the respondent Judge and,
therefore, a motion for reconsideration was not necessary as a
condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari in this
Court.
As to the failure of petitioners to move for the dissolusion of the
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, we agree with
petitioners that such a procedure is predicated on the assumption that
ttfe plaintiff is entitled to an injunction, which does not apply in
the instant case, because, as already stated, there is absolutely no
showing either in the complaint, or in the facts proven in the
preliminary hearing that petitioners have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in the discharge of
the functions conferred upon them by law in the matter, in denying the
renewal of respondent Ago’s timber licenses.
For all the foregoing, the questioned order of the lower court is
reversed in so far as it restrains the enforcement of the orders of
petitioners Director of Forestry, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, and Executive Secretary rejecting the renewal applications
for timber licenses of respondent Ago, but affirmed in so far as it
restrains petitioner Daza from entering the forest area covered by the
expired timber licenses of respondent Ago, pending the determination of
the case on the merits by the lower court. Modified in consonance with
the foregoing, the injunction heretofore issued by us is made
permanent. No costs. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
[1] Represented by the Solicitor General.
[2] Hon. Judge Montano Ortiz, presiding.
[3] Coloso vs. Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil., 938, and cases therein cited.
[4] 54 Am. Jur. 558-559.