MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND LILIA VDA. DE SALAMEDA, IN HER BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN GILDA AND JOSEPHINE BOTH…

This petition for review of the decision of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission dated November 18, 1969 in RO4-WC Case No. 5651, and
its resolution en banc dated April 6, 1970, raises three
issues:  (a) whether the brain tumor
which caused the death of the employee had been aggravated by the nature of his
work; (b) whether death foreclosed the right to disability benefits during
illness; and (c) whether the Commission can award attorney’s fees to claimants’
counsel motu proprio.

Upon appeal by the heirs of the deceased employee of respondent
Manila Electric Company from the decision of the Commission’s Acting Referee, Claro Q. Riego de Dios, dismissing their claim for benefits under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Commission reversed on the basis of the facts
narrated as follows:

“Deceased Fortunato Salameda was first employed by respondent [Manila Electric
Company] in 1959 as a laborer whose job consisted, among others, of digging
holes along the streets.  Later, he was
promoted to steelman. 
As such steelman, he used to lift steel and
connect iron pipes.  A little later, he
was again promoted to assistant boiler maker and one year thereafter, to
full-pledged boiler maker.  As boiler
maker, his duties included connecting pipes and steels, operating the tugger, and assisting in welding jobs.

In 1964, when he was already a boiler-maker, he would at times
arrive home with his eyes reddish and blood flowing from his nose.  Worried about his health, his sister, Mrs. Cirila Tubiera, brought him to
the St. Joseph Hospital in San Miguel, Manila, where the deceased was confined
and treated for 10 days.  The attending
physician allegedly advised the deceased to stop working in the meantime as the
reddening of his eyes was caused by the heat produced by his welding job.

Soon after he was discharged from the hospital, deceased returned
to his work with the respondent.  It was
during this time that he suffered again from headache, which became worse,
acute and chronic.  He lost his appetite
and whatever food he was able to eat, he vomited.  On May
14, 1966, deceased, while working, felt that he could no longer
bear the severe attacks of pain in his head, and so he decided to apply for
sick leave on the spot.  In view of the
seriousness of his ailment, deceased’s sister went to the office of respondent
and pleaded for help so that his brother would be hospitalized.  The plea was denied, but deceased was
nevertheless given some medicine.  After
three days, deceased again pleaded to be hospitalized as by that time he was
complaining of abdominal pains, vomiting, severe headache and blurring of
vision.  His eyes had become not only
reddish; they were already cross. 
Respondent finally agreed to hospitalize the deceased at its own John
F. Cotton Hospital
where deceased’s ailment was diagnosed as “cerebral brain tumor.” A
date was set so that deceased might be operated upon, but before this could be
performed, he died on June 30, 1966.  At the time of his death, deceased was
receiving P1.20 per hour, working 8 hours a day, 6 days a week.

On July 25, 1966,
claimant Lilia Vda. de Salameda,
in her own behalf and that of her two minor children, filed the death claim
with Regional Office No. IV, claiming not only death compensation and burial
expenses, but also reimbursement of medical expenses in the amount of
P1,454.00, allegedly spent for the deceased. 
However, it appears that as early as May 20, 1966, respondent filed with the same Regional
Office an employer’s report of accident or sickness controverting
any claim for com­pensation of Fortunato Salameda.”

Upon a finding that substantial evidence existed to support the
compensability of the claim, the Commis­sion awarded the following
amounts:  P236.98 as disability
compensation corresponding to the period of the illness of the deceased from
May 14 to June 30, 1966, payable to his estate; P5,028.57 as death compensation
and P200.00 for reimbursement of burial expenses, both payable to the
heirs-claimants; and P526.55 for attorney’s fees payable to claimants’ counsel.

1.  Petitioner first
questions, as erroneous and contrary to the evidence, the findings of the Commission
as to the nature of the work of the deceased – that as laborer it involved
making excavations along the streets; that as steelman
it involved lifting heavy steel and iron pipes; and as boiler-maker it involved
connecting pipes, operating the tugger and assisting
in welding jobs.  Petitioner denies all
these and maintains that the work of the deceased as laborer, steelman and boiler-maker was of a light nature.

We see no reason to reverse the facts as found by the Commission,
supported as they are by substantial evidence. 
Petitioner denies that the deceased was ever made to dig holes along the
streets, but failed to specify exactly the work he did as laborer.  As steelman the
deceased was required, among other things, to cut rein­forcing steel; and as
boiler-maker, he assisted in the rigging of boiler materials and in fitting and
connecting pipes and tubes.  Petitioner
admits this, but points out that the work was performed with the aid of tools
and lifting devices.  Be that as it may,
physical exertion was still employed. 
Thus, to cut reinforcing steel it must be lifted to the cutting machine;
tackle and gear must be handled to rig boiler materials; and fitting pipes and
tubes involved operating the tugger and welding the
materials together.  The Commission did
not err in not considering such work as of a light nature.

The more important issue is the compensability of the illness.  Brain tumor was correctly ruled out as an
occupational disease in this case.  But
in awarding compensation the Commission said: 
“the origin of cancer is still undetermined (despite tremendous
scientific discoveries), but note that even respondent’s witness, Dr. Mario Oca, has testified that fatigue, to which deceased was
daily exposed, or physical or spontaneous development, could be the influencing
factors to produce the consequence of cancer.” At the very least his work
must have aggravated the illness.  It may
be noted that the first symptoms manifested themselves in 1964.  The employee continued working thereafter
except when he was confined for a few days in a hospital.  At that time his illness was not yet
correctly diagnosed.  He had his initial
serious attack on May 14, 1966,
when he was incapacitated for work.  The
company had him confined in its own hospital and it was then that he was
pronounced to be suffering from “cerebral brain tumor,” which caused
his death on June 30, 1966.  In other words the progressive course of the
disease was apparent from 1964 to 1966, during which he kept at his various
jobs involving physical labor.  The
aggravation of the illness as a consequence of the work cannot but be presumed
under the circumstances.

The foregoing conclusion is not without precedent.  Thus, where the deceased died of hemorrhagic
gastric ulcer, this Court affirmed the Commission’s finding that his work as
beam carrier involving “the continuous exertion of carrying beams during
his employment gradually, if imperceptively, resulted
to his illness causing paralyzation of half of his
body and ultimately his death.”^[1]
In another case, although ulcer was not considered an occupational disease as
it was not inherent in the nature of the work of the deceased as stockman, the
irregular hours in which he had to perform his work was regarded as a factor
aggra­vating his illness.^[2]
In the case of a sailor who was disabled by paralysis due to hypertension, this
Court affirmed the award of death benefits upon a showing that the illness
super­vened during the period of employment even if there was no positive
evidence that the work of the deceased ag­gravated his illness.^[3]

2.  Petitioner next
questions the award of P236.98 by way of disability benefits to the estate of
the deceased, on the theory that the right thereto is personal to the employee
and is therefore extinguished upon his death. 
The theory is neither logical nor just. 
Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act the dependents, in filing a claim
for compensation, act on their own behalf only with respect to the death
benefits due them for the loss of support by the employee.  But there is no reason why disability
benefits which had accrued to and otherwise would have been recovered by the
employee himself cannot be claimed by his dependents upon his death.^[4]  Although the employer-employee relationship
has ceased to exist, the rights which have already arisen are not thereby necessarily
extinguished.  Uncollected salaries of
the employee, for instance, form part of his estate and the right to collect
them is transmitted to the heirs. 
Disability benefits represent lost or impaired earnings of the employee
which the employer is required to reimburse, and there is nothing in the
statute which exempts the employer from such liability if the employee dies.

In any event the question is of no more than academic importance
in this case.  It is to be noted that the
temporary total disability compensation of P236.98 was awarded by the
Commission under Section 14, in conjunction with Section 12, of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act.  The specific
provision of Section 12 referred to provides that “in the event of death
occurring after a period of total or partial disability, the period of disability
shall be deducted from the respective total periods established in Section ten
of this Act,” which section ten fixes the maximum period of 208 weeks
during which death compensation shall be paid. 
Thus the Commission awarded to the claimants “50% of the average
weekly wages of the deceased for 208 minus 6 1/7 or 201 6/7 weeks,”
thereby deducting the disability compensation granted for the period of the
illness of the deceased immediately prior to his death, that is, from May 14 to
June 30, 1966, equivalent to 6 1/7 weeks.

3.  Finally, the
Commission’s award of attorney’s fees to claimants’ counsel is in accordance
with law.  The case of Central Azucarera Don Pedro vs. Agno
(L-20424, October 22, 1964) cited by petitioner is no longer applicable.  The Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended by
Republic Act 4119 (approved June 30,
1964), provides in its Section 31:

“SEC. 31.  Intervention
of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. 
– In case a laborer who suffers an accident or contracts an illness
comprised within the provisions of Section two of this Act, or his dependents,
contracts the services of a lawyer or other persons to help him or direct him
in his claim for compensation against his employer, the fees of said lawyer or
person which shall be chargeable against said employer shall not be more
than five per cent of the total sum which said injured or sick laborer or his
dependent in case of his death shall receive by way of compensation; but if his
services shall take place in an appealed case, his fees shall not be in excess
of ten per centum, of said sum, x x x“

The insertion of the phrase “which shall be chargeable
against said employer” clearly indicates the intention of the law to make
attorney’s fees an integral part of the compensation or benefits due the
employee or his dependents under the Act. 
Section 31 fixes the amount of attorney’s fees that may be recovered or
charged against the employer, such that a prayer for this specific relief and
proof thereof is no longer necessary. 
The pronouncement of this Court in the Central Azucarera case that Section 31 contemplates
only a situation where the question of fees arises between claimant himself and
his counsel is no longer applicable under the amendment.^[5]

The decision appealed from is correct.  Wherefore the same is hereby affirmed, with
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Ruiz Castro, J., on official leave.

^[1]
Industrial Textile Manufacturing Company vs. Florzo
L-21969, August 31, 1966.

^[2]
National Power Corporation vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission
L-19843, January 30, 1965,
13 SCRA 116, 118.

^[3] Justiniano vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
G.R. No. L-22774, Nov. 21, 1966,
18 SCRA 677, 680.

^[4] The
benefits accrue to the employee during the period of disability.  Section 14, Workmen’s Compensation Act.

^[5] See
also:  National Development Co. vs.
WCC L-21796, August 29, 1966;
Manila Railroad Company vs. Manalang, L-20845,
November 29, 1965.