VICENTA MALAGGAN, HEIRS OF VENTURA MALAGGAN, REPRESENTED BY BENJAMIN MALAGGAN, PETITIONERS, VS. FRANCISCO C. MABAZZA, DEPUTY SHERIFF IV, JOHN A. DONGUI-IS, JR., OIC, CLERK OF CO…

Malaggan versus Mabazza

The Case

This is an administrative case brought by Vicenta Malaggan and the heirs of Ventura Malaggan against Francisco Mabazza, Deputy Sheriff, and John Dongui-is, Jr., Officer in Charge Clerk of Court, both of the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25. The complainants charged the two respondents with grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, arising from a certification that made it appear the losing defendants in the complainants' civil case had paid their appellate docket fees on time. The case matters because it fixes the standard of competence demanded of every court employee, and because it marks the shift from the old procedure of paying appellate fees to the appellate court to the present rule of payment to the clerk of the trial court within the period to appeal.

Procedural History

The complainants were the plaintiffs in a civil case for recovery of property and nullity of title before the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25. The trial court denied the prayer for nullity of title but ordered the defendants to indemnify the plaintiffs in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos on the principle of unjust enrichment. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal for failure to pay the appellate docket and other lawful fees. The defendants moved for reconsideration, relying on a certification signed by respondent Mabazza, and the Court of Appeals denied the motion, giving credence instead to the certification of respondent Dongui-is that the fees were paid only on August 27, 1998, beyond the reglementary period. The complainants then filed this petition-complaint against the two respondents. The matter was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator, which found administrative lapses but no deliberate misleading of the court, and recommended a fine of Two Thousand Pesos each. The case was then resolved by the Supreme Court in its administrative jurisdiction.

Facts

On June 22, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision in the civil case, ordering the defendants to indemnify the plaintiffs in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 6, 1998, they filed their notice of appeal. Respondent Mabazza later issued a certification dated December 21, 1998, signed in behalf of respondent Dongui-is as Officer in Charge Clerk of Court, attesting that the defendants paid the appellate docket and other lawful fees of Four Hundred Twenty Pesos on August 6, 1998, and that the amount was remitted to the appellate court by postal money order only on August 27, 1998.

In their comment to the defendants' motion for reconsideration, the complainants attached a certification dated February 16, 1999 executed by respondent Dongui-is, stating that the defendants paid their appeal fee on August 27, 1998, and that the amount was transmitted to the Court of Appeals on the same date. On April 16, 1999, respondent Mabazza issued an explanation clarifying that he received the appellate fees on August 7, 1998, not August 6, 1998, and that he converted the amount into a postal money order for transmittal, believing the same was treated as proof of payment. Respondent Dongui-is certified that explanation as true and correct on April 27, 1999.

The Court of Appeals denied the defendants' motion for reconsideration, finding that respondent Mabazza had no authority to issue the certification because he was not the Clerk of Court, and that the certification was not even under oath. The appellate court gave credence to the certification of respondent Dongui-is that the fees were paid only on August 27, 1998, beyond the reglementary period. Respondent Dongui-is explained that he received the postal money order from respondent Mabazza and indicated August 27, 1998 as the date of payment because that was the date appearing on the money order, not knowing the amount had been received in cash earlier. Respondent Mabazza claimed he followed the old procedure of converting the fees into a postal money order for transmission to the appellate court, and that there was no misappropriation.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondents are guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for failing to follow the procedure on the payment of appellate docket and other lawful fees.
• Whether or not the respondents deliberately misled the court or prejudiced the complainants, so as to justify a graver penalty than a fine.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

Section 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within the periods for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal.

This provision governs the case because it is the rule that superseded the old procedure the respondents followed, and it fixes the period and the place of payment that the respondents failed to observe.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found the respondents guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Court explained that under the old rules, only the notice of appeal was filed with the trial court, and the docket fees were later paid to the appellate court after notice that payment was due, or could be paid to the clerk of the lower court at any time before the record on appeal was transmitted. That procedure, however, had already been superseded by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997, more than a year before the complained incident. Respondent Mabazza, who was authorized to collect fees in behalf of the court, should not only have been familiar with the proper procedure but should have kept abreast of circulars and rules vital to his duties as a collecting officer. Respondent Dongui-is, as Officer in Charge Clerk of Court, should not have merely relied on respondent Mabazza's representations, and should have known that the rule on payment of docket and appellate fees had already been amended, which would have forewarned him that the turnover of the postal money order was beyond the reglementary period. Had the circumstances been timely brought to the attention of the appellate court, the dismissal of the defendants' appeal could have been averted.

On the second issue, the Court held that in the absence of evidence that the offenses were committed deliberately to mislead the court or to prejudice the complainants, a fine of Four Thousand Pesos each was just and appropriate, higher than the Two Thousand Pesos recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator. The Court reminded judges and all court employees to maintain at all times the confidence and high respect accorded to those who wield the gavel of justice, and found that the respondents' actions showed a lack of familiarity with the laws, rules, and regulations that undermines public confidence in the integrity of the courts.

Doctrine

A court employee authorized to collect fees must know and follow the governing rules on payment of docket and appellate fees, and ignorance of a superseded procedure is not excused by the employee not being a lawyer. Under Section 4 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the appellant must pay the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment appealed from, within the period for taking an appeal, and proof of payment is transmitted to the appellate court with the record. A clerk of court may not simply rely on the representations of a collecting officer; the clerk must keep abreast of amendments to the rules, and failure to do so constitutes gross ignorance of the law and procedure and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Where there is no evidence that the lapses were deliberate, the penalty is a fine rather than dismissal.

Disposition

The Court found both respondents guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and fined each of them Four Thousand Pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

Remember This

Memorize the rule: within the period to appeal, the appellant pays the appellate docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of the trial court that rendered the judgment, not to the appellate court. Examiners use this case to test the 1997 amendment to Rule 41 and the administrative liability of court personnel who cling to superseded procedures.