ECONOMIC INSURANCE CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. UY REALTY COMPANY, HONORABLE GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VI, AND …

In this special proceeding
for prohibition, petitioner Economic Insurance Co., Inc. would impute a grave
jurisdictional defect to an order of the then respondent Judge Gaudencio Cloribel granting a
motion of the other respondent Uy Realty Company for
a writ of execution against petitioner for the amount represented by its supersedeas bond “covering rentals rightfully
due” the other respondent as plaintiff in an ejectment
case.  By its stress on the claim that
the above order of August 26, 1967 was issued notwithstanding the finality of a
previous order of dismissal of the case by respondent Judge, it was enabled not
only to have this Court give due course to such petition, but also to obtain a
writ of preliminary injunction upon posting a bond of P1,000.00.  The answer filed by respondents, however,
altered the picture thus sedulously sought to be created by petitioner.  It was apparent therein that previous to such
order of dismissal, there was a
motion by respondent Uy Realty Company for the
dismissal of the case and for the payment of the back rentals secured by the supersedeas bond filed by petitioner.  Respondent Judge, however, limited his first
order to ordering the dismissal, apparently overlooking the prayer for the payment
of the back rentals guaranteed by the supersedeas
bond.  Thereafter, within the thirty-day
period, respondent sought for an amendment of the above order to include
execution on the bond filed to cover the past rentals due.  The order now challenged was the result
thereof.  It was issued at a time when
the matter was still subject to cognizance by respondent Judge.  It would thus appear that this petition lacks
merit.  We find for respondents.  The order granting the writ of execution by
respondent Judge is sustained.

As shown by the petition itself, there was a complaint for ejectment dated August
12, 1966 filed by now respondent Uy
Realty Company against a certain Co Hing.^[1] There was an answer by defendant on August 27, 1966, seeking dismissal of
such a suit as well as a counterclaim for reimbursement in the amount of P15,000.00 for alleged improvements made on the leased premises
and for damages in the amount of P5, 000.00 for alleged bad faith on the part
of the lessor.^[2]
The decision of the City Court of Manila of October 20, 1966 ordered the defendant and those claiming
under him to vacate the premises as well as to pay the sum of P4,100.00 representing rents in arrears plus the sum of P1,500.00
a month beginning September, 1966 for the use and occupation of such premises.^[3]
Upon an appeal being taken, which fell to the sala of
respondent Judge, a supersedeas bond was executed by
such defendant as well as by the petitioner, the Economic Insurance Co., Inc.^[4]

During the pendency of such appeal,
under date of July 31, 1967,
a motion for dismissal of the case and for payment of the supersedeas
bond was filed by the plaintiff, respondent Uy Realty
Co. It was alleged therein:   “1. That on June 23, 1967, upon failure
of the defendant to make the required rental deposits to comply with the
provisions of Sec. 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, this Honorable Court, upon
motion of undersigned counsel, issued a Writ of Ejectment
Execution against the defendant; 2. That counsel for the defendant did not
raise any objection to the enforcement of said writ of execution by the Sheriff
of Manila whereupon said Officer placed the plaintiff in possession of the
leased premises subject of this appeal; 3. That defendant having vacated the
leased premises and possession thereof having been surrendered to the
plaintiff, the legal issues subject of this appeal have therefore become moot
and the continuation of the trial set for August 2, 1967 will not serve any
purpose; 4. That defendant, upon surrender of the premises to the plaintiff,
manifested that he has no longer any interest in the further prosecution of
this case and would have no objection to the dismissal thereof; 5. That on
November 23, 1966, defendant filed Supersedeas Bond
No. 567 for P8,800.00 thru the Economic Insurance Company, Inc. to enter the
action into this Honorable Court, said bond having for its purpose to guarantee
the payment to the plaintiff of the accrued rentals up to the time of judgment
in the City Court of Manila, including damages, attorney’s fees and costs; 6.
That plaintiff is, as of right, entitled to the withdrawal of the amount
covered by the aforementioned supersedeas bond in
view of the dismissal of this appealed case.”^[5]  It sought in the prayer that “(a) this
appealed case be dismissed; and (b) that the Economic Insurance Co., Inc. be
ordered to pay to herein plaintiff the amount of P8, 800.00 guaranteed by the Supersedeas Bond No. 567 filed in this case representing
rentals, damages and costs as adjudged by the City Court of Manila in Civil
Case No. 151874 in favor of plaintiff.”^[6]

Then came this order of respondent Judge
of August 2, 1967:   “Upon motion of the plaintiff in view
of the fact that the possession of the property, subject matter of this
litigation, has been restored to the plaintiff, the defendants having vacated
the same, this case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs.”^[7]  It was noted in the answer that on August 22,
1967, the aforesaid order of dismissal of respondent Judge being received by
respondent Uy Realty Company only on August 15, 1967,
there was a manifestation and motion to execute bond to this effect:  “1. That on August 1, 1967, the undersigned
counsel filed with this Honorable Court their ‘Motion for Dismissal and For
Payment of Supersedeas
Bond‘; 2. That on August 2,
1967, this Honorable Court issued an Order dismissing the instant case as
prayed for by undersigned counsel but did not resolve the prayer for the
payment of the amount represented by the Supersede as Bond in this case; 3.
That the records of this case will show that on November 23, 1966, defendant
filed with this Honorable Court through the Economic Insurance Company, Inc. Supersedeas Bond No. 567 for the amount of P8,800.00 which
represents accrued rentals due the herein plaintiff up to the time of judgment
in the ejectment case rendered by the City Court of
Manila; 4. That considering the dismissal of this case, plaintiff is entitled
as right to the payment of the amount represented by the aforementioned Supersedeas Bond as rentals due and owing to the plaintiff
before this case was elevated to this Honorable Court on appeal; 5. That the
Economic Insurance Co., Inc. has teen duly notified of plaintiff’s Motion for
the payment of the Supersedeas Bond as of August 1,
1967 and the undersigned counsel has not been served with any opposition
thereto.”^[8]
The prayer was for a writ of execution to be issued against now petitioner for
the amount represented by its supersedeas bond
covering rentals rightfully due respondent Uy Realty
Company.  That was the basis.  The result thereof was the challenged order
of August 26, 1967,
granting the prayer for a writ of execution against petitioner “for the
amount represented by its Supersedeas Bond covering
rentals rightfully due to the plaintiff.”^[9]

Petitioner does not deny,
possibly because it could not deny, its liability on the supersedeas
bond.  It did not even oppose the motion
for its execution.  Its objection is
that the order of August
26, 1967 was issued
at a time when the matter was outside the jurisdiction of respondent
Judge, the case having been dismissed. 
It is on that legal proposition, and that
proposition alone, that it seeks to make out a case for prohibition.  If the motion of respondent Uy Realty Co. sought merely the dismissal of the case, the
premises having been vacated, then perhaps the case
for petitioner, such as it is, would have been bolstered.  As clearly pointed out, however, the motion
precisely sought that petitioner be ordered to pay the amount of P8,800.00 guaranteed by the supersedeas
bond.  Unfortunately, through haste or
inadvertence, respondent Judge ignored that portion and merely ordered that the
appealed case be dismissed.  Within the
period, however, before such order attained the stage of finality, a
modification thereof was secured as a result of a manifestation and a motion of
respondent Uy Realty Co. to execute on the bond filed
by petitioner.  Under the circumstances,
what respondent Judge did was clearly within his authority, and the challenged
order can stand the test of the most exacting scrutiny.  Hence, this petition should fail.

One last observation.  It is understandable for a party in the
situation of petitioner to make full use of every conceivable legal defense the
law allows it.  In the appraisal, however,
of such attempts to evade liability to which a party like petitioner should
respond, it must ever be kept in mind that procedural rules are intended as an
aid to justice, not as a means for its frustration.  Even if the petition were impressed with a
greater degree of plausibility, it would be, considering all the circumstances,
to crown with success an unworthy scheme to evade a just obligation by
perverting the ends procedural requisites are intended to accomplish.  Not once but several times, from Alonso v. Villamor,^[10]
we have stressed that we are not to lend the imprimatur of our approval to any
such effort, the result of which would be to render illusory substantive
rights.  We do so again.  Technicalities, in the appropriate language
of Justice Makalintal, “should give way to the
realities of the situation.”^[11]

WHEREFORE, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by us
by virtue of our resolution of September
25, 1967 is set aside, and this petition for prohibition is
denied.  With costs against petitioner
Economic Insurance Co., Inc.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Castro, J., concurs in the
separate opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee.

Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

^[1]
Petition, Annex A.

^[2]
Ibid., Annex
B.

^[3]
Ibid., Annex C.

^[4]
Ibid., Annex D.

^[5]
Ibid., Annex E.

^[6]
Ibid.

^[7]
Ibid., Annex F.

^[8]
Answer, Annex 2.

^[9]
Petition, par. 9.

^[10]
16 Phil. 315 (1910). Cf. Blanco v.
Bernabe, 63 Phil. 124 (1936); Potenciano
v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 (1958); Marcelo v. Mencias, 107 Phil. 1071 (1960).

^[11]
Urbayan v. Caltex
(Phil.) Inc., L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962,
5 SCRA 1016.

Clean
Clean

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