MARIANO GARCHITORENA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. TOMAS P. PANGANIBAN, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations denying
the request of petitioner Mariano Garchitorena for authority to
transfer the thirty-four (34) respondents herein excluding Hon. Tomas
P. Panganiban. Judge of said Court—to other lots suitable for
agriculture, or, in the alternative, to order the ejectment of said
respondents, and directing said petitioner to maintain them in the
peaceful possession and cultivation of the lands involved in this case.

Petitioner is the owner and landholder of a farm land of about 138
hectares located in the barrio of Habago, Municipality of Ocampo,
Province of Camarines Sur. Different portions of this land, with an
aggregate area of over 77 hectares, are held by said thirty-four (34)
respondents, as tenants or lessees of the petitioner. On May 9, 1956,
the latter commenced this proceedings in the Court of Agrarian
Relations, Sixth Regional District, Naga, with a petition for
permission to effect the transfer aforementioned, or, else, to eject
the aforementioned respondents, because petitioner wishes to convert
said portion of about 77 hectares from palay land to pasture land, and
because said respondents had not paid the rentals respectively due from
them, aside from having failed to follow proven farm practices.

Upon being summoned, said respondents filed a motion to dismiss,
which was denied on September 22, 1956. Despite notice of the order to
this effect, they did not answer the petition. Hence, on November 20,
1956, said respondents were declared in default. Over seven months
later, or on June 27, 1957, two (2) of said respondents moved for the
lifting of the order of default. Subsequently, eleven (11) other
respondents filed a similar motion, which, like the first, was granted.
After the submission of respondents’ answer and subsequent appropriate
proceedings, the court rendered a decision annulling the orders lifting
the declaration of default, finding that the tracts of land involved in
this case had not been proven to be within the perimeter recommended by
the Bureau of Soil Conservation for conversion into grazing land, that
non-payment of the rentals due to petitioner was not deliberate on the
part of said respondents, apart from the circumstance that the amount
of rental charged by petitioner might be excessive, and, hence,
illegal, and that the alleged failure of respondents to observe proven
farm practices had not been established. Consequently, judgment was
rendered against the petitioner, who now seeks its review by certiorari.

The first question for determination in this appeal is whether the
land occupied by said respondents forms part of the area found by the
Bureau of Soil Conservation to be suitable for pasture. His Honor, the
trial Judge, resolved this question in the negative, but the records
show otherwise.

The land in dispute is described in paragraph II of the petition as follows:

Referring thereto, Atty. C. Fabricante testified:

“Atty. Contreras:

Do you know this plan. Please see this plan which we request to be marked as Exh. A.

Court:

Mark it.

Atty. Contreras:

Whose property is this?

Court:

What is the superficial area of this whole tract of land?

This testimony is corroborated by the plan Exhibit A. It appears,
moreover, from the soil conservation report, Exhibit C, when considered
in relation to said plan (Exhibit A) and the aforementioned testimony
of Atty. Fabricante, that the land involved in this case is
“characterized by the presence of stony sections * * * and rock
outcrops or boulders and gully formations” and that its “soil fertility
has become actually low * * * because of the loss of the topsoil due to
soil erosion”. Indeed, the lower court took on its face value the
testimony of Atty. Fabricante to the effect that said land can hardly
yield three (3) to five (5) cavanes of palay per hectare, thus
corroborating the conclusion, reached in the aforementioned soil
conservation report, to the effect that the land should be “utilized
for pasture and not for crops”.

We are satisfied, therefore, that the land in question is appropriate for grazing purposes, not for agriculture.

In support of its finding that the failure of respondents to pay the
stipulated rentals for many years was not deliberate, the lower court
cited the aforementioned low fertility of said property. It even
intimated that the rentals charged by petitioner may, as a consequence,
be considered excessive, and, therefore, illegal. We do not believe
that these premises warrant the conclusion drawn therefrom by the lower
court.

If the non-payment of rentals were due to a poor harvest owing to an extraordinary
event or an unusual act of God, the refusal of His Honor, respondent
Judge, to order the ejectment of the other respondents upon the ground
that their omission was not deliberate would be justified. However,
when said omission takes place for several years and the land normally
has a poor yield, by reason of the condition of its soil, as it is in
the case at bar, said refusal has the effect of authorizing the
respondents to hold the land for life, or, at least, indefinitely,
without giving the owner or landowner any share in its produce, thus
virtually depriving him of one of the main attributes of ownership,
which is the enjoyment of the possession and use of the thing owned, as
well as of the products thereof.

Our Constitution and tenancy laws do not countenance such result. To
begin with, the same amounts to a taking of private property for
private use and without compensation. Secondly, the principle of social
justice cannot and should not be so construed as to violate the
elementary principles of justice and bring about a patent in justice.
Thirdly, if the land in dispute is as poor for agricultural purposes as
it is, the continuance thereon of respondents herein would tend to
perpetuate their precarious condition, instead of promoting their well
being and economic security, which is the immediate objective of social
justice. It is to the best interest, therefore, of said respondents
that they be transferred to lands that may offer them and their
families a better future.

As regards the statement in the decision appealed from to the effect
that, if the productivity of the property in dispute is as poor as
above pointed out, then the rental charged by petitioner may even be
considered as excessive and hence, illegal, suffice it to say that
these premises do not justify non-payment of any rental whatsoever, not even of the amount that is reasonable and legal.

In view of the foregoing, it is not necessary to consider the
question whether or not respondents herein had adhered to proven farm
practices. The judgment appealed is reversed and another shall be
entered, authorizing petitioner herein to convert the land in dispute
into a pasture land. Let the record of this case be remanded to the
lower court for determination of the feasibility of transferring
respondents herein to other portion of petitioner’s land which are
suitable for agricultural purposes, and the adoption of such measures
as may be appropriate to carry out the corresponding transfer or
transfers, if and when indicated. No costs. It is so ordered,.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.