NENA CARBONEL, PETITIONER, VS. FELIX PADILLA ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Carbonel versus Padilla

The Case

This is Carbonel versus Padilla, a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus decided by the Supreme Court in September 1945. Nena Carbonel, the tenant of a house on Rizal Avenue in Manila, asked the Court to stop the execution of a judgment of the Municipal Court of Manila in an unlawful detainer case and to compel the Court of First Instance of Manila to hear and decide her appeal on the merits. The case matters because it fixes a rule every reviewee must know: the fifteen-day period to appeal runs from notice of the denial of a motion for new trial, not from the date of the denial itself, and a party cannot be bound by an order taken without notice to her.

Procedural History

Felix Padilla filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and recovery of unpaid rentals in the Municipal Court of Manila. Judge Mariano Nable rendered judgment for Padilla, ordering Carbonel to vacate the premises and to pay rents from March 10, 1945 at thirty pesos a month, plus costs. Carbonel moved for reconsideration and new trial; the motion was denied without notice to her. A writ of execution followed. Carbonel then perfected her appeal, and Judge Nable recalled the writ and elevated the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila.

In the Court of First Instance, Padilla moved to dismiss the appeal as filed out of time. The motion was set for hearing, but the copy meant for Carbonel's attorney was mailed to the wrong address, so she received it six days after the hearing. Judge Pompeyo Diaz granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, and declared the municipal court decision final and executory. Carbonel's motion to set aside that order was denied, the case was remanded, and a new writ of execution issued. Carbonel then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and mandamus, and a preliminary injunction was granted upon the filing of a bond.

Facts

On April 18, 1945, Felix Padilla sued Nena Carbonel in the Municipal Court of Manila for unlawful detainer and unpaid rentals on the premises at 1706 Rizal Avenue. The case was heard on April 26, 1945, and on the same day Judge Nable ordered Carbonel to vacate the premises and to pay rents from March 10, 1945 at thirty pesos per month until she vacated, plus costs.

Carbonel received a copy of the decision on May 10, 1945, and on May 17 filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial, set for hearing on May 22. On that date Judge Nable denied the motion without giving her any notice of the denial. On June 5, upon an ex parte motion by Padilla, Judge Nable issued a writ of execution directing the Sheriff of Manila to oust Carbonel and collect the rents due.

On June 9, 1945, learning of the writ of execution but still not notified of the denial of her motion, Carbonel perfected her appeal by filing a notice, paying sixteen pesos in docket fees and an appeal bond, and depositing one hundred twenty pesos to cover rents from March to June. Judge Nable recalled the writ and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance. There, Padilla moved to dismiss the appeal as out of time; the notice of hearing was mailed to the wrong address, and Carbonel's attorney received it only on July 13, six days after the hearing. On July 9, Judge Diaz dismissed the appeal and declared the municipal court decision final and executory. His denial of Carbonel's motion to set aside that order led to this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not Judge Diaz erred in dismissing Carbonel's appeal as filed out of time and in declaring the municipal court decision final and executory.
• Whether or not the motion for reconsideration and new trial filed by Carbonel was a mere pro forma motion that did not interrupt the period to appeal.
• Whether or not Carbonel was denied her day in court when the Court of First Instance acted on the motion to dismiss the appeal without notice to her.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides:

An appeal shall be perfected within fifteen days after notification to the party of the judgment complained of.

This fixes the fifteen-day period and, more importantly, makes notification to the party the starting point from which that period is counted.

Section 4 of the same rule provides:

The time during which a motion for new trial has been pending shall be deducted from the period for perfecting an appeal.

This is the provision that interrupts the period to appeal while a motion for new trial is pending, and the Court had to determine when that interruption ends.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the order of July 9 dismissing the appeal cannot be sustained, for it finds no support in law and in the facts and subjected the petitioner to an irreparable injustice through premature execution. Neither Carbonel nor her attorney of record was notified of the denial of her motion until June 9, 1945, when she learned of the writ of execution and presumed her motion had been denied. She perfected her appeal on that same date, within the reglementary period. The Court stressed that notice of the denial of a motion for new trial is the starting point from which the interrupted time for appeal begins to run again, and that such notice may be made in writing or verbally in open court, but in both instances service should be made of record by the judge or his clerk.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the claim that the motion was pro forma. The motion did not merely say that the decision was contrary to law and the evidence; it explained in detail the relevant facts, including the agreed monthly rental of fifteen pesos, the fifty-peso deposit, and the moratorium order. It therefore interrupted the period to appeal.

On the third issue, the Court held that the right to be notified of orders of the municipal court, including the denial of a motion for reconsideration and new trial, is an elemental right of a party. Where an order requires notice before specified action is taken, the parties have a right to rely on that notice and are not bound by action taken without notice and without their actual knowledge. The Court also noted that the Court of First Instance erred in acting on the motion to dismiss without notice to Carbonel, depriving her of the opportunity to be heard.

Doctrine

First, under Section 2 of Rule 40, the fifteen-day period to appeal is counted from notification to the party of the judgment, and by parallel reasoning from notification of the denial of a motion for new trial, which is the point at which the interrupted period resumes. Second, under Section 4 of Rule 40, a motion for new trial that states facts and arguments in support, and is not merely pro forma, interrupts the period to appeal. Third, notice of the denial of a motion for new trial is an elemental right; a party is not bound by an order taken without notice and without actual knowledge, and the denial must be served of record by the judge or his clerk.

Disposition

The Court granted the writ of mandamus: it ordered the municipal court to remand the case to the Court of First Instance, ordered Judge Diaz to reinstate the case and try it de novo on the merits, made the preliminary injunction permanent, and ordered Felix Padilla to pay the costs.

Remember This

The line to memorize: the time to appeal runs from notice of the denial of the motion for new trial, not from the denial itself. Examiners use this case on the computation of the appeal period after a motion for new trial and on the elemental right to notice of court orders.