LEYTE LAND TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. LEYTE FARMERS’ & LABORERS’ UNION, RESPONDENTS.

This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations in which the Petitioner (appellant), Leyte Land Transportation
Company, Inc., was ordered, — among other directives not here assailed, — (1) to
grant its various employees, drivers, conductors, and laborers increase in
salaries and wages at average rates of five and ten pesos, representing an
annual total of some P14,940; (2) to grant, under certain conditions, per diems
at P2 per day to its drivers, conductors, mechanics and other workers; (3) to
grant, under certain conditions, its employees and laborers 15 days vacation
with pay and 15 days sick leave with pay.

The petitioner contends that the Court of Industrial Relations made a mistake
in conceding salary or wage increases, after being “convinced that the basic
salary of P100 for drivers and P80 for conductors is just taking into
consideration the financial condition of the corporation just now,” and merely
because such increases will enable the workers “to meet the high cost of living
now in Tacloban in order to help them buy the necessities for a decent
livelihood.” It is intimated in this connection that the total amount of the
increases, “if added to the crippling losses will throw the Company into
bankruptcy.”

There can be no doubt about the propriety of the action of the Court of
Industrial Relations in taking into account the “high cost of living” as a
factor for determining the reasonableness of any salary or wage raise, since
said court is impliedly empowered to do so under section 20 of Commonwealth Act
No. 103 which provides that “in the hearing, investigation and determination of
any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this
Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits
of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms,” not to mention
section 5 which provides, in connection with minimum wages for a given industry
or in a given locality, that the court shall fix the same at a rate that “would
give the workingmen a just compensation for their labor and an adequate income
to meet the essential necessities of civilized life, and at the same time allow
the capital a fair return on its investment.” It cannot be supposed that the
Court of Industrial Relations is powerless to adopt the latter criterion, simply
because it is called upon to fix a minimum wage to be paid by a specific
employer, and not by all employers engaged in the transportation business.

Whether or not the ruling of the Court of Industrial Relations will allow the
petitioner a fair return on its investments or result in its bankruptcy is a
factual inquiry which we are not authorized to make, (Commonwealth Act No. 103,
section 15, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 559, section 2; Rules of Court
44; National Labor Union vs. Philippine Match Co., 40 Off. Gaz., 8th
Supp., p. 134; Bardwell Brothers vs. Philippine Labor Union, 39 Off.
Gaz., p. 1032; Pasumil Workers’ Union vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 6th Supp., p. 71; Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Kahoy
sa Pilipinas vs. Gotamco Saw Mill, G. R. No. L-1573, March 29, 1948.)
Even so, it is not amiss to point out, by way of preserving petitioner’s peace
of mind, that the increases in question are, under the express terms of the
appealed decision, merely temporary, with the result that the petitioner may
reopen the question at any proper time.

This Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the power of the Court
of Industrial Relations to determine and fix minimum wages for workers (Antamok
Goldfields Mining Company vs. Court of Industrial Relations 40 Off.
Gaz., 8th Supp., p. 173; The International Hardwood and Veneer Company
vs. The Pañgil Federation of Labor, 40 Off. Gaz., 9th Supp., p. 118;
The Central Azucarsra de Tarlac vs. The Court of Industrial Relations,
40 Off. Gaz., 9th Supp., p. 146), thereby making it unnecessary for us to
discuss at length the arguments of the petitioner on the point. Indeed, the
power in question was said to have been granted to the Court of Industrial
Relations in virtue of the constitutional mandates that “the promotion of social
justice to to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people
should be the concern of the State” (Constitution, Article II, Section 5); “the
State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women and minors,
and shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor
and capital in industry and in agriculture” (Id., Article XIV, section 6); “the
State may provide for compulsory arbitration.” (Id.).

The authority of the Court of Industrial Relations to order the petitioner to
grant its employees and laborers vacation and sick leaves with pay is clearly
included or implied from its general jurisdictions to consider, investigate,
decide and settle all questions, matters, controversies, or disputes arising
between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the
relations between them (Commonwealth Act No. 103, Section 1, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 559), and to take cognizance of any industrial dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as
regards, among others, wages or conditions of employment. It is needless to
remind all employers that the concession of vacation and sick leaves in the long
run redounds to their benefit, for as well remarked by Professors Watkins and
Dood in “Labor Problems” (1940), pages 330-331, quoted in the memorandum of the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations, “when there is an assurance of
holidays and vacations, workers take up their tasks with greater efficiency and
tend to sustain their productiveness for longer periods.”

In answer to the contention of the petitioner that the doctrine laid down in
the appealed decision in effect “has deprived the Company of its rights to enter
into contract of employment as it and the employee may agree,” it is sufficient
to quote the following pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court: “The
fact that both parties are of full age and competent to contract does not
necessarily deprive the State of the power to interfere where the parties do not
stand upon an equality, or where the public health demands that one party to the
contract shall be protected against himself. The State still retains an interest
in his welfare, however reckless he maybe . The whole is no greater than the sum
of all the parts, and where the individual health, safety and welfare are
sacrificed or neglected, the State must suffer.” (West Coast Hotel Company
vs. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 394, 81 Law ed. 703, 710, quoting Holden
vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 42 Law ed. 780. The former, by the way,
expressly overrules the case of Adkins vs. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 67 Law ed. 785, cited by the petitioner.) With respect to the decision
in People vs. Pomar, 46 Phil. 440, also invoked in petitioner’s behalf,
we merely recall what Mr. Justice Laurel stated in his concurring opinion in the
case of Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No.
46496, quoted in Antamok Goldfields Mining Company vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 8th Supp., pages 173, 193; “In the midst of
changes that have taken place, it may likewise be doubted if the pronouncement
made by this Court in the case of People vs. Pomar (46 Phil., 440) —
also relied upon by the petitioner in its printed memorandum — still retains its
virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent
given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even
in contractual relations affected with public interest.”

Criticism is addressed to the extension of the increases and other benefits
in question to employees and laborers who were not made parties hereto and who
did not join the seventy-six drivers and conductors who had made corresponding
demands upon and declared a strike against the petitioner. Aside from the fact
that the Court of Industrial Relations is authorized to act according to justice
and equity without regard to technicalities or legal forms (Commonwealth Act No.
103, section 20), the criticism is answered in the decision of this Court in
Parsons Hardware Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No.
48215, wherein it was held: “Even assuming that the eighteen laborers were not
members of the union at the time its petition for a general increase in salaries
was submitted, we are of the opinion and so hold that as they are laborers of
the company, they are entitled to the increase, * * * It has to be so, because
to accord such increase only to members of the union would constitute an unjust
and unwarranted discrimination against non-members.”

The petitioner alleges that the lower court erred in fixing a scale of
salaries, wages and per diems higher than that adopted by the National
Government and its subdivisions. The comparison is rather sad because, the
Government, unlike the petitioner, is not established for profit and mainly
derives its income from the taxes paid by the people. Moreover, we can take
judicial notice of the fact that the Government, within the limits of its
finances, has already strived and is still striving to raise and standardize the
salaries and wages of its employees and laborers, especially those in the lower
brackets.

The decision appealed from is, therefore, hereby affirmed, with costs against
the petitioner. So ordered.

Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, and
Tuason, JJ., concur.