PEDRO CAPACIO AND FLORENTINA UNABIA CAPACIO, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. DR. JOSE RIVERA, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

A feature which, to say the least, is rather unusual, distinguishes
this litigation from other forcible entry suits.  Both the City Court of Cagayan
de Oro as well as the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental were as one in dismissing a complaint for
forcible entry precisely because, on plaintiffs’ own pleadings, it would appear
that the lot, the possession of which was allegedly entered into by force by
defendant, is different from that made the basis of the complaint.  This appeal, then, from the order of dismissal
of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental,
must fail.

The complaint for forcible entry was filed by plaintiffs Pedro Capacio and Florentina U. Capacio, spouses, against defendant Jose Rivera in the City
Court of Cagayan de Oro on February 20, 1967.  After alleging the ownership and possession
of a certain parcel of residential land located in such city, it set forth that
on August 15, 1966,
defendant, with the help of hired men, unlawfully entered a portion thereof, an
illegal possession which had continued notwithstanding the demands made by
plaintiffs for him to vacate the same.^[1]
The answer was duly filed on March 6,
1967 by defendant denying the truth of the allegation and setting
forth as one of the affirmative defenses that the land in question was owned
and occupied by him in the concept of owner, publicly, openly, continuously and
adversely as far back as 1938.

Then came, on April 17,
1967, the order of dismissal by the City Court of Cagayan de Oro, the relevant
portion of which was quoted in the brief for plaintiffs-appellants.  Thus: 
“From the evidence adduced by defendant during the trial of the
latter’s affirmative defenses, it has been found that defendant’s land is known
as Lot No. 4349, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3111 of the Cagayan de Oro Cadastre, whereas
that of the plaintiffs is a portion of Lot No. 4359 of the Cagayan
de Oro Cadastre as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by Placido Bagting
in favor of plaintiffs, dated September 6, 1941, marked as Annex ‘B’ to
plaintiffs’ complaint.  It is therefore
glaring that plaintiffs’ land is different from that of the defendant (p. 48,
record on appeal).”^[2]
An order of dismissal was thus entered.

What transpired next was set forth in the aforesaid brief as
follows:  “On April 25, 1967
plaintiffs thru their Counsel moved for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal on April 27, 1967 and prayed to the Honorable City Court to conduct
an ocular inspection of subject land to view its identity and the damages
caused by defendant on improvements of plaintiffs, but the City Court summarily
denied said motion on May 10, 1967 without hearing.  Whereupon, plaintiffs appealed to the Court
of First Instance of Misamis Oriental.”^[3]
There was a pre-trial before the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental, after which the order of dismissal, now on appeal, was issued on September 21, 1967.  It was therein stated:  “This case is before this Court for
preliminary hearing on the allegations of the complaint and in the answer
wherein both parties claim ownership of the land in question.  Plaintiffs claim having bought the land from
a certain person, whereas defendant likewise claims having acquired ownership
of this parcel of land from a person whose ownership was evidenced by a Torrens
title, so that the defendant is now the owner under a certificate of title in
his name.  From the allegations of the
complaint and the answer, there seems to be a difference between the parcel
that the plaintiffs are claiming and that claimed by defendant Dr. Jose
Rivera.  This difference was, noted by
the City Judge who, after conducting a preliminary hearing of the case,
dismissed it on the ground that the land claimed by plaintiffs is different
from that claimed by defendant.”^[4]

The Court then ordered the dismissal of the case.  It is from such order, as mentioned earlier,
that an appeal on a question of law was elevated to us.  On the above facts, again as made clear at
the outset, plaintiffs-appellants cannot possibly hope to succeed.

They would rely, in this appeal, on the applicable Rules of Court
provision.  It reads thus:  “A perfected appeal shall operate to
vacate the judgment of the justice of the peace or the municipal court, and the
action when duly docketed in the Court of First Instance shall stand for trial de
novo upon its merits in accordance with the regular procedure in that
court, as though the same had never been tried before and had been originally
there commenced.  If the appeal is
withdrawn, or dismissed for failure to prosecute, the judgment shall be deemed
revived and shall forthwith be remanded to the justice of the peace or the
municipal court for execution.”^[5]
Their insistence is that a trial de novo implies that what was
done in the City Court could not be taken into account by the Court of First
Instance which is required to hear the case anew.  As noted in their brief:  “The lower court, in dismissing the
instant case on appeal, mainly relied on the oral remarks of counsel for both
parties.  It has not conducted a hearing
either on the main issues of the case or on the affirmative defenses alleged by
defendant-appellee. 
It must be noted that defendant-appellee has
raised questions of facts in his affirmative defenses and which questions of
facts, particularly the identity of the land in dispute, were properly ventilated
in the City Court where it originated. 
By virtue of the appeal to the Court of First Instance, the latter Court
should have conducted a hearing, either on the main issues of the case or of
the affirmative defenses pleaded by defendant-appellee
in order that it could arrive at a fair and just appraisal of the facts wherein
it could anchor its findings and conclusions. 
To this end, the trial Court failed, but had rather disposed of the
instant case summarily, thereby skipping a thorough and judicious appraisal of
the issues involved.  It merely affirmed
the findings of facts of the City Court with respect to the identity of the
land in dispute.”^[6]

The contention of plaintiffs-appellants is not sufficiently
persuasive.  Such an approach could not
be devoid of merit if there were no basis for the finding that the lot alleged
by plaintiffs-appellants to have been entered into forcibly by defendant is
different from that occupied by him.  The
very Annex B attached to their complaint, whose existence cannot be ignored by
any one reading it, speaks of Lot No. 4359 as distinguished from defendant’s
land known as Lot No. 4349.  Moreover, it
is inaccurate to assert that the lower court Judge relied merely on what was
done by the City Court.  He did hear the
parties on pre-trial.  It would thus be
undeniable that even prior to such a stage in the proceeding, that fatal dis­crepancy
could be duly taken note of by the lower court and would call for the dismissal
of the case.  It cannot be said then that
the conclusion arrived at by the lower court is bereft of support in law, the
very pleadings of plaintiffs-appellants demonstrating the inherent weakness of
their suit.  Hence, the order of
dismissal, which we must uphold.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of the lower court of
September 21, 1967 is affirmed.  With
costs against plaintiffs-appellants.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Complaint, Record on Appeal, pp. 1-7.

^[2]
Statement of Facts, Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 3.

^[3] Ibid.

^[4] Ibid,
p. 4.

^[5] 2
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 342 (1963).

^[6]
Arguments, Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, pp. 7-8.