ANTONIO C. OGNIR, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

Ognir versus Director of Prisons

The Case

This is a petition for the writ of habeas corpus filed by Antonio C. Ognir against the Director of Prisons. Ognir had been convicted by a general court-martial convened in Lanao during the year 1943, during the Japanese occupation, and sentenced to life imprisonment for violation of the 93rd Article of War of the Philippine Army. He now claims that his imprisonment is null and void because the general court-martial that tried and sentenced him was not legally constituted, the officer who convened it having had no authority to do so. The case matters because it fixes the rule on when a military tribunal is legally constituted, and it confirms that the writ of habeas corpus may be used to test the legality of a detention under a court-martial sentence.

Procedural History

The petitioner was convicted by a general court-martial appointed or convened in 1943 in Lanao by Colonel Wendel W. Fertig, Commanding Officer of the 10th Military District of Mindanao, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. From that sentence he filed this petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court against the Director of Prisons, raising the sole question of whether the court-martial that sentenced him was legally appointed or convened. The Supreme Court rendered its decision on February 27, 1948, ordering his release. The Judge Advocate General of the Philippine Army and Solicitor Antonio A. Torres then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Supreme Court resolved on May 12, 1948, denying it and maintaining its original ruling.

Facts

During the year 1943, in Lanao, a general court-martial was convened by Colonel Wendel W. Fertig, Commanding Officer of the 10th Military District of Mindanao. That court-martial tried the petitioner, Antonio C. Ognir, together with one Private Elino Pagaling, for violation of the 93rd Article of War of the Philippine Army. Ognir was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Ognir was thereafter confined by virtue of that judgment of conviction. Claiming that his detention was illegal, he petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of Prisons, arguing that the general court-martial that sentenced him was not legally constituted because the district commander who appointed or convened it had no authority to do so, and that its judgment was therefore void for want of jurisdiction.

After the decision was rendered in his favor, the Judge Advocate General of the Philippine Army and Solicitor Antonio A. Torres moved for reconsideration. They alleged that the court-martial had been convened not by Colonel Fertig but by Lieutenant Colonel Hodges of the 108th Division, 10th Military District; that Colonel Fertig had in fact been expressly authorized by General MacArthur to convene such a court; and that the court-martial's decision should be given the same effect as the actuations of the civil courts during the Japanese occupation. The Court found the first ground contradicted by the return itself, which stated that the court-martial was appointed by Colonel Fertig, and found the supporting affidavit unsigned and unreliable, and the analogy to the occupation courts untenable.

Issues

• Whether or not the general court-martial that sentenced the petitioner to life imprisonment was legally appointed or convened.
• Whether or not the judgment of a court-martial that was not legally constituted is void and subject to collateral attack.
• Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus may be availed of to inquire into the legality of a detention under a court-martial sentence.

Applicable Provisions

Article 8 of Commonwealth Act Number 408, on general courts-martial, provides:

General Courts-Martial—The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, and, when empowered by the President, the Provost Marshal General, the Commanding Officer of a Division, the District Commander, the Superintendent of the Military Academy, the Commanding Officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may appoint general courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed by superior competent authority, and no officer shall be eligible to sit as a member of such court when he is the accuser or a witness for the prosecution or for the defense.

This provision is the measure of the case: only the President and the Chief of Staff hold the power to convene a general court-martial inherently, while all other officers may do so only when expressly empowered by the President, and the record showed no such empowerment.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the general court-martial was not legally constituted. There was nothing in the record or in the return of the respondent to show that Colonel Fertig had ever been empowered to appoint a general court-martial by the President of the Commonwealth, or by General MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the United States Army in the Southwest Pacific Area, even assuming that the military powers of the President as Commander in Chief had been transferred to that Supreme Commander when the Commonwealth Government evacuated to Australia and then to the United States. The appointment of Colonel Fertig as Commander of the 10th Military District did not carry with it the power to convene a general court-martial. Under Article 8 of Commonwealth Act Number 408, the only officers who have that power inherently by virtue of their position are the President of the Commonwealth and the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army; all other officers, including a district commander such as Colonel Fertig, cannot appoint a general court-martial unless expressly empowered by the President to do so.

On the second issue, the Court applied the well established rule that a judgment rendered by a military court which is not legally constituted is treated not only as voidable but void and subject to collateral attack. Since the court-martial had no jurisdiction to render the sentence, its judgment was null and void.

On the third issue, the Court held that the writ of habeas corpus may be availed of by a prisoner claiming to be illegally detained under the trial or sentence of a court-martial, and that in that proceeding the legality of the action of the court, including whether it was legally constituted, had jurisdiction, or imposed a sentence authorized by the code, may be inquired into. The Court quoted Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents:

While courts-martial, not being 'inferior courts' to the Supreme Court under the Constitution, cannot be appealed from to any civil court, or controlled or directed by the decree or mandate of such a court, yet in our U. S. Courts, similarly as in the English tribunals, the writ of habeas corpus may be availed of by a prisoner claiming to be illegally detained under trial or sentence of court-martial, and in this proceeding the legality of the action of the court—as whether it was legally constituted, or had jurisdiction, or its sentence was authorized by the code—may be inquired into.

On the motion for reconsideration, the Court rejected the claim that Lieutenant Colonel Hodges had convened the court, since the return stated that it was appointed by Colonel Fertig, and the return is prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint. It likewise rejected the claim of authorization by General MacArthur, the supporting affidavit being unsigned and based on recollection rather than on the records themselves, and Circular Number 34 of the Philippine Army Headquarters providing that general courts-martial appointed by district commanders from 1942 to 1944 are not covered by the order empowering district commanders to convene them, and that those appointed by recognized guerrilla district commanders prior to June 6, 1945, must show authority for the appointment. Finally, the Court held that there was no analogy between the decisions of the courts established by the military government or the so-called second Republic, which were legally created by laws the military occupant had the right under international law to promulgate, and the decision of a general court-martial convened by an officer having no power or authority to do so.

Doctrine

A general court-martial is legally constituted only when convened by an officer empowered to do so. Under Article 8 of Commonwealth Act Number 408, only the President of the Philippines and the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army possess that power inherently; every other officer, including a district commander, may appoint a general court-martial only when expressly empowered by the President. A judgment rendered by a military court that is not legally constituted is not merely voidable but void, and is subject to collateral attack. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to test the legality of a detention under a court-martial sentence, and in that proceeding the civil courts may inquire into whether the court-martial was legally constituted, whether it had jurisdiction, and whether its sentence was authorized by the code.

Disposition

The petitioner won: the Supreme Court held the judgment of the general court-martial null and void, and ordered the respondent Director of Prisons to release him immediately, a ruling maintained on the denial of the motion for reconsideration.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a judgment of a military court not legally constituted is void, not merely voidable, and is subject to collateral attack through habeas corpus. Examiners use this case to test the appointing power over general courts-martial under Article 8 of Commonwealth Act Number 408 and the scope of habeas corpus as a check on military tribunals.