THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. URBANO DAMASO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

People versus Damaso

The Case

This is People versus Damaso, a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Urbano Damaso for the killing of his own wife, Raymunda Pascua, and the trial court convicted him of parricide. The case matters to a reviewee for two reasons. First, it is a clean illustration of how the Supreme Court treats the factual findings of the trial judge, especially on the credibility of witnesses. Second, it shows how the alibi of an accused collapses when the place he claims to have been in is only a short distance from the scene of the crime, and when the prosecution's evidence is woven together by corroborating circumstances. The defense did not deny the death. The only question was who caused it.

Procedural History

Urbano Damaso was charged before the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. After trial, the court convicted him of parricide and sentenced him to life imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Raymunda Pascua in the sum of 6,000 pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The case was first heard in 1961 by Judge Bernabe Aquino, and later, upon his retirement, by his successor in office in 1963. Damaso appealed the judgment directly to the Supreme Court, seeking its reversal.

Facts

Urbano Damaso was married to Raymunda Pascua. In the evening of February 10 to 11, 1959, Raymunda died in her house in the barrio of San Agustin, municipality of Victoria, Tarlac, from four stab wounds in the thorax on the left side of the mammary line, aside from several injuries on other parts of her body.

The prosecution's main direct evidence came from Antonio Valdoz, who was about seven years old at the time. His mother, Consolacion Pascua, was a sister of the deceased, and he lived with the couple because they were childless. He testified that Raymunda was crying when the appellant returned home late that evening; that the spouses soon quarreled; that in the course of the quarrel the appellant held Raymunda by the neck and wounded her several times with a scythe; and that the appellant then put off the lamp and left. Overcome with fear, the boy also left and went to the house of his aunt Magdalena Damaso, telling her that Raymunda was already dead, but Magdalena told him to sleep, which he did.

The defense was alibi. Damaso claimed that from eight in the evening of February 10 until five the next morning he was in the house of his brother, Macario Damaso, about a kilometer away, helping butcher, slice, and cook a pig and two goats for a baptismal party. He said he reached his own house at about six in the morning, found his wife dead, and later noticed that 200 pesos in cash kept at the foot of a cardboard were missing. The trial court gave no credence to the defense witnesses and accepted the prosecution's version.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in relying on the testimony of the seven-year-old witness Antonio Valdoz to identify the appellant as the killer of his wife.
• Whether or not the appellant's alibi should be credited over the prosecution's evidence.
• Whether or not the judgment of conviction for parricide should be affirmed.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory text; it applies the law of parricide and the settled rules on alibi and on the review of findings of fact. The governing principle on alibi, as the Court applied it, is that the defense must show that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Here, the Court found that the house of Macario Damaso was only a kilometer away, so the appellant could have slipped away after midnight, committed the crime, and returned to bolster his alibi.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found no plausible reason to disturb the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial judge, who was in a better position to pass upon the veracity of the opposing witnesses. Antonio Valdoz had no possible motive to falsely incriminate the appellant; in fact, he owed the appellant gratitude for having in effect adopted him and treated him as his own son. His testimony was corroborated by circumstances about which there could be no doubt. He left the house on the evening of the occurrence out of fear, and told Magdalena that Raymunda was already dead. The next morning, upon seeing his mother on the way to the appellant's house, he embraced her and said, weeping, that his Aunt Andang was dead and that his uncle Banong had killed her. Patrolman Pacheco found him at his natural parents' house, where the boy said he was afraid to go back, and that Tatang Banong had killed Nanang Andang. When brought back to the house, the boy cried and said, "Tatang co Banong patay na Nanang co Andang," and described the killing as "dugsol, dugsol, dugsol, Nanang," meaning stabbed and stabbed and stabbed. Pacheco found a wet scythe with blood stains tucked into a wall, and upon seeing it the boy said, "That is the instrument with which my uncle stabbed my Aunt." The boy repeated his account in an affidavit before the justice of the peace, at the preliminary investigation, and before both trial judges.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the alibi. The house of Macario Damaso was only a kilometer away, and the appellant could have slipped away after midnight, committed the crime, and returned to mingle with those preparing for the baptismal party. The Court also noted that the appellant could have returned home earlier than he claimed.

On the third issue, the Court affirmed the conviction. It listed the circumstances confirming the prosecution's theory. There was an ecchymosis on the deceased's left forearm, showing she had struggled, matched by a scratch on the appellant's left forearm, which he tried to explain as caused by the pig. Clotted blood of the deceased was found on his shirt pocket and on his trousers, which the doctor testified came from the spurting blood of a person still alive or dying. The appellant did not report the death to the authorities or even to his father-in-law, whose house was a few meters away, and he objected when the father-in-law wished an investigation, saying, "Why should you ask for the investigation when she is already dead?" The scythe was found washed but still with traces of human blood. The alleged loss of 200 pesos had never been mentioned to the investigating officers. And the defense witnesses were relatives of the appellant, with contradictory testimony, including Magdalena, his alleged mistress.

Doctrine

First, findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a plausible reason, because the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses. Second, alibi is a weak defense and must fail where it was not physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime; proximity of the place where he claimed to be defeats it. Third, the testimony of a child witness may be given full credit where it is clear, consistent, and corroborated by circumstances and by the absence of any motive to falsify. Fourth, circumstantial evidence that dovetails with direct testimony may sustain a conviction for parricide.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction for parricide, with costs against the appellant.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that alibi cannot prevail where the accused could have been at the scene of the crime, and the trial court's assessment of a witness's credibility will not be overturned without a plausible reason. Examiners like to use this case on the weight of a child's testimony and on the requisites of alibi.