SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RAYMOND C. VIRAY, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 75, OLONGAPO CITY, AND ASIA INTER…
SALAZAR-FERNANDO, J.:
a) Order dated November 27, 2013
“WHEREFORE, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is granted. The Order of July 22, 2013 (amended on September 18, 2013) is set aside, and the Order dated January 3, 2013 is confirmed.
SO ORDERED.”
b) Order dated March 24, 2014
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.”
The facts are:
In 1992, Republic Act No. 7227 was enacted creating the Subic Special Economic Zone consisting of the City of Olongapo, the Municipality of Subic in the Province of Zambales and the lands occupied by the former Subic Naval Base. Said law also created the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA for brevity) to oversee the development and conversion into alternative productive uses of the Subic Special Economic Zone, now more particularly known as the Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ for brevity). In supervising and managing the development and conversion into “alternative productive uses” of the SBFZ, SBMA was given the mandate to develop SBFZ as a “self-sustaining, industrial, commercial and investment center to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone.” SBMA finances its own operations and the development of SBFZ from its own funds without any assistance or subsidy from the national government. However, it cannot and does not impose taxes and does not receive any internal revenue allotment. It is, however, empowered by Section 13 (b) (3) of R.A. No. 7227 and Section 10 (c) and (k) of its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) to fix and impose just and reasonable rates, fares, charges and prices from its tenants for, among others, services that it provides at SBFZ. Among the services being rendered by petitioner SBMA at SBFZ are four (4) municipal services of providing: (I) Security Services or Law Enforcement (ii), Fire Protection and Prevention Services, (iii) Street Cleaning, and (iv) Street Lighting. In order to recover its expenses in providing for the four (4) services, petitioner SBMA implemented the Policy on Common Use Service Area (CUSA) Fee. Before the implementation of the Policy on CUSA Fee, the basic requirements for an administrative measure to be valid and effective were observed, viz., 1) it was promulgated pursuant to petitioner SBMA’s charter and its IRR; 2) the rate of CUSA Fee is reasonable; 3) the prescribed procedures were followed; and, 4) the Policy on CUSA Fee was registered with the UP Law Center, pursuant to the requirement for its effectivity under the Administrative Code of the Philippines. The Policy on CUSA Fee was approved by petitioner SBMA’s Board of Directors on April 13, 2012, however, it was only on August 3, 2012 that the same was finally approved for implementation.
Private respondent Asia International Auctioneers, Inc., (AIA for brevity) a corporation engaged in the business of importation, trading and auctioning of used motor vehicles, is a current tenant/lessee of petitioner SBMA. In connection with the implementation of the Policy on CUSA Fee, private respondent AIA was charged for its share of the costs incurred by petitioner SBMA for providing for four (4) of the several municipal services that the latter directly provides at SBFZ. On December 13, 2012 private respondent AIA filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City a Petition[4] for Injunction with Application for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against petitioner SBMA, seeking among others, to enjoin the latter from assessing or continuing with the assessment and/or collection of the CUSA Fee. Acting on the application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 72 issued on December 17, 2012 an Order[5] with the following disposition:
“IN VIEW THEREOF, the application for the issuance of temporary restraining order is hereby granted. Accordingly, the respondent SBMA, its agents, representatives, or anyone acting for and in its behalf are temporarily enjoined from implementing or continuing to implement by causing the assessment, and collection of CUSA fees on the petitioner pursuant to SBMA Resolution No. 12-08-45 for the period starting December 2012 onwards, for a period of twenty (20) days.
SO ORDERED.”
On the same day, petitioner SBMA filed a motion to inhibit the Presiding Judge of RTC of Olongapo City Branch 72, claiming that it had reservations that he will not be able to hear and act upon the instant case with utmost objectivity. Also, on the same day, the parties agreed to submit, as they later filed, their respective position papers,[6] in lieu of testimonial evidence, in support of their respective stands on private respondent AIA’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. In an Order[7] dated January 3, 2013, RTC of Olongapo City Branch 72 resolved private respondent AIA’s prayer for injunctive relief, in this wise:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby GRANTS the prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin and restrain respondent Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority from implementing or enforcing SBMA Resolution No. 12-08-4505 on the Imposition of the Common Use Service Area (CUSA) Fee upon the petitioner Asia International Auctioneers, Inc. (AIA) starting December 2012 onwards pending the resolution of the main case for injunction by the Court, provided that the petitioner will post an injunction bond in the amount of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.”
On January 18, 2013, petitioner SBMA filed a Motion for Reconsideration[8] of the Order dated January 3, 2013. In an Order[9] dated January 25, 2013, the Presiding Judge of RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 72 inhibited himself from further hearing the case. The case was subsequently re-raffled to RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 74, which, in an Order[10] dated July 22, 2013, resolved petitioner SBMA’s motion for reconsideration of the Order dated January 3, 2013 in the following manner:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the ORDER dated January 3, 2013 is set aside and the prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction by the petitioner is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.”
On August 29, 2013, private respondent AIA filed its Motion for Reconsideration[11] of the Order dated July 22, 2013. However, the Presiding Judge of RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 74 did not resolve said motion. Instead, she voluntarily inhibited herself from further handling the case, citing private respondent AIA’s allegation about her “bias and her desire to please respondent SBMA for issuing the Order under consideration with undue haste.” The case was again re-raffled, this time to public respondent Judge of RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 75, who issued the first assailed Order on November 27, 2013. Petitioner SBMA’s Motion for reconsideration[12] of the Order dated November 27, 2013 was denied in the second assailed Order dated March 24, 2014. Hence, this petition based on this lone ground:
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED ORDER UPHOLDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT AIA WHEN THE REQUISITES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE INJUNCTIVE WRIT ARE LACKING.
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner SBMA argues that: private respondent AIA is not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, since it failed to prove that it has a clear and unmistakeable right that was violated and that there was an urgent necessity for its issuance; the issuance and implementation of the Policy on CUSA fee were in accordance with the express powers granted to petitioner SBMA under R.A. No. 7227 and its IRR, thus it is valid and legal; specifically, under Section 13 (b) (3) of R.A. No. 7227, petitioner SBMA is authorized to “undertake and regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of utilities, other services xxx in the Subic Special Economic Zone xxx, and to fix just and reasonable rates, fares, charges and other prices therefor.”; thus, in the exercise of its powers and functions under R.A. No. 7227 and its IRR, it formulated and came up with the Policy on CUSA Fee to charge SBMA’s direct tenants of their proportionate shares on costs incurred by the latter for four (4) services that it directly provides, namely: street lighting, street cleaning, law enforcement and maintenance of firefighting facilities; said Policy on CUSA Fee is also in full accord with Administrative Order No. 31 which took effect on October 1, 2012 directing and authorizing the heads of all departments, bureaus, commissions, agencies, offices and instrumentalities of the National Government, including Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, which include SBMA, to rationalize the rates of their existing fees and charges, and if found necessary, increase such rates and impose new fees and charges; the provisions of R.A. No. 7227 and its IRR, including Administrative Order No. 31 are incorporated in the lease agreements between petitioner SBMA and private respondent AIA, thus the latter is deemed to have recognized the power of the former to implement the Policy on CUSA Fee; the issuance by petitioner SBMA of the Policy on CUSA Fee enjoys the presumption of regularity, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, for which reason, public respondent Judge should have upheld its validity and effectivity; petitioner SBMA’s interpretation and application of the provisions of R.A. No. 7227 and its IRR deserve great respect and should ordinarily control the construction of statutes by the court, unless it is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with governing statutes, the Constitution and other laws; public respondent Judge’s finding that private respondent AIA would suffer irreparable injury which is incapable of pecuniary estimation is a mere speculation, in the absence of proof to the contrary; on the contrary, the CUSA fee to be billed is fixed in nature and in cases where surcharges and penalties were to be imposed, the amount is still quantifiable, thus the damages cannot be considered as grave and irreparable as contemplated by law for the issuance of a writ of injunction; and, contrary to the finding of public respondent Judge, there is no threatened cancellation of the lease agreement with private respondent AIA if it fails to pay the CUSA Fee since the first offense would only subject it to payment of surcharges and interests and, while continuous non-payment may eventually lead to cancellation of the lease agreement, the same does not warrant the issuance of a writ of injunction since said cancellation is not the immediate injury or damage being claimed by private respondent AIA.
In its Comment,[13] private respondent AIA counters that: the two (2) requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in this case exist, namely: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakeable right that must be protected, and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage; private respondent AIA has a right to the continuous use and possession of all its leased properties and conduct its business operations thereon, it being a holder of valid and subsisting Lease Agreements, Certificate of Tax Exemption, Certificate of Registration and Building Permit to Operate, which are enforceable against petitioner SBMA and could not be revoked without compliance with substantive and procedural due process; petitioner SBMA could not take refuge from R.A. No. 7227 and its IRR for its unilateral and arbitrary imposition and enable it to simply stop private respondent AIA’s business operations in the event of non-payment thereof pending resolution of the issues being raised against said imposition; said unilateral and arbitrary imposition is violative of the principle of “mutuality of contract” as embodied in the lease agreements; Administrative Order No. 31 which is also being invoked by petitioner SBMA was issued on October 1, 2012, while Resolution No. 12-08-4505 was issued on August 3, 2012 or six (6) months prior to the issuance of said administrative order, thus petitioner SBMA could not claim authority thereunder; petitioner SBMA did not comply with the publication, hearing and public consultation requirements under the Revised Administrative Code before it implemented Resolution No. 12-08-4505; private respondent AIA never recognized the power of petitioner SBMA to implement the Policy on CUSA Fee and/or impose CUSA Fee, which is a form of tax that petitioner SBMA has no authority to impose under R.A. No. 7227; there is ample evidence to overthrow the presumption of regularity and validity of petitioner SBMA’s Policy on CUSA Fee as embodied in Resolution No. 12-08-4505 since it did not undergo the required publication, hearing and public consultation as required by the Revised Administrative Code; in this case, private respondent AIA has clearly established an unmistakeable right with its valid and subsisting Lease Agreements, Certificate of Registration, Certificate of Tax Exemption and Business Permit to Operate on which its continuous use and enjoyment of its leased properties and business operations are heavily dependent; and, with the imposition of the Policy on CUSA Fee and its corresponding penalties, private respondent AIA is set to close down its business and lay off its workers.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not public respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted private respondents AIA’s motion for reconsideration of the Order dated July 22, 2013, thereby affirming and reinstating the Order dated January 3, 2013 which granted private respondent AIA’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
At the outset, it bears to note that under R.A. No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion Development Act, it was a declared policy of said law to develop the Subic Special Economic Zone into a “self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to attract and promote productive foreign investments. Under Section 13 (b) (3) of R.A. No. 7227, SBMA was granted the following authority:
“(3) To undertake and regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of utilities, other services and infrastructure in the Subic Special Economic Zone including shipping and related business, stevedoring and port terminal services or concessions, incidental thereto and airport operations in coordination with the Civil Aeronautics Board and to fix just and reasonable rates, fares charges and other prices therefor.”
Likewise, under Section 10 (b) and (k) (5) of the IRR of R.A. No. 7227, petitioner SBMA is empowered:
“b. To undertake and regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of utilities, other services and infrastructure in the SBF including shipping and related business, stevedoring and port terminal services or concessions incidental thereto and airport operations in coordination with the Civil Aeronautics Board, and to fix just and reasonable rates, fees, charges and other prices therefor;
X x x x x x x x x
k. To raise revenues from among, but not limited to, the following: x x x x
5. service and utility charges, xxx xxx.”
According to petitioner SBMA, the above provisions of the R.A. 7227 and its IRR are incorporated in the lease agreements with private respondent AIA, through the following stipulation:
“The LESSEE shall use the Leased Property in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Lease Agreement and such additional rules and regulations as may from time to time be reasonably imposed by the LESSOR and its authorized representative for the general safety, comfort and convenience of the occupants and lessees of the SBF, x x x x x x x x x (Section 2.1 of Article IV)
LESSEE shall comply with, and shall cause all Sub-lessees, assignees and other transferees to comply with all Applicable Laws, Rules and Regulations adopted by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, x x x” (Section 3 of Article IV)
x x x The LESSEE shall comply with any and all rules and safety regulations which may be promulgated from time to time by the LESSOR, together with all the rules, regulations, ordinances, or laws made by the duly constituted authorities, by the national of city government, arising from or regarding the use, occupancy and sanitation of the Leased Property.” (Section 1 of Article IX)
“The Implementing Rules and Regulations of the SBF as promulgated by the LESSOR is incorporated herein by reference and made an integral part of this Lease Agreement.” (Section 15 of Article XIV)
While private respondent AIA does not question the powers and functions granted to petitioner SBMA under R.A. No. 7227 and its IRR, including the authority to undertake and regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of utilities and to fix just and reasonable rates, fees, charges and other prices therefor, it challenged the imposition of the Policy on CUSA Fee, alleging in essence in its Petition,[14] that:
In granting the application for injunctive relief, public respondent Judge found that: first, private respondent AIA has unmistakeable right to adequate enjoyment of the properties subject of the lease agreements; second, the unilateral imposition of the Policy on CUSA Fee by petitioner SBMA may amount to a material and substantive invasion of private respondent AIA’s rights under the lease agreements; and:
“Third, there is an urgent need for the Court to issue the writ of preliminary injunction to prevent irreparable injury to the petitioner AIA considering that the payment of the CUSA Fee is due and demandable on October 28, 2012 and every month thereafter and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court shall expire on January 6, 2013. While it is true that the CUSA Fee is a fixed amount as argued by the respondent, which is capable of pecuniary estimation, the Court takes note of the penalties which may be imposed by the respondent upon the petitioner in case the CUSA is not paid as shown in the letter of the defendant to all locators dated August 24, 2012. Under said letter, upon non-payment of the CUSA Fee, apart from surcharges, the respondent may impose the penalty of the cancellation of the lease agreements with its locators. Thus, the Court finds that such threatened cancellation of the lease agreements may lead to an inestimable injury on the part of the petitioner which may even ultimately lead to the cessation of its business inside SBFZ.”
The foregoing ratiocination is bereft of merit. Public respondent Judge failed to recognize some factual matters obtaining in this case that would lead to a denial of the application for injunctive relief. Both requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are not present in this case.
Sections 3 and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on preliminary injunction, pertinent to this case, provide the requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or a TRO:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
The requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[16]
The principal issue raised before the lower court by private respondent AIA’s petition, which sought to enjoin petitioner SBMA from implementing Resolution No. 12-08-4505, was whether or not the imposition and collection of CUSA Fee by petitioner SBMA are prejudicial to the rights of the private respondent AIA and violative of its contractual rights. The act complained of in said petition is the collection or continued collection during the litigation of CUSA Fee which private respondent AIA claimed would work injustice and cause irreparable damage to it.
As stated above, public respondent Judge justified the issuance of an injunctive relief because, among others, private respondent AIA has unmistakeable right to adequate enjoyment of the properties subject of the lease agreements. There is no question that private respondent AIA, as a lessee, has unmistakable right to the enjoyment and possession of the leased properties. However, perusal of the records shows that private respondent AIA’s use and enjoyment of the leased properties are not being threatened to be terminated by petitioner SBMA. Not even the letter[17] dated August 24, 2012 constitutes a “threat” to terminate private respondent AIA’s lease agreements with petitioner SBMA. Said letter merely notifies the locators and residents of SBMA of the imposition of CUSA Fees they would pay pursuant to Resolution No. 12-08-4505. While the letter enumerates the possible consequences for non-payment of CUSA Fees, namely: 1st Offense – 10% surcharge + 12% interest per annum; 2nd Offense – 20% surcharge + 12% interest + suspension of Permit to Operate for locators, non-collection of garbage for residents; and, 3rd Offense – 25% surcharge + 12% interest + cancellation of Certificate of Registration and Tax Exemption, Certificate of Registration or Residential Lease Agreement, there is nothing on record showing that private respondent AIA was even assessed of the penalties for the first offense. Even the letter[18] dated November 16, 2012 of Paulita R. Yee, Manager of petitioner SBMA’s Treasury Department, demanding payment of CUSA Fee from private respondent AIA, does not even impose surcharges and interest on the amount due. Clearly, there was no threatened cancellation of the parties’ lease agreements, contrary to the finding of public respondent Judge, when he issued the writ of preliminary injunction. As correctly pointed out by petitioner SBMA, the alleged threatened cancellation of the lease agreements is a mere speculation.
Thus, anent the first requisite for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the existence of a clear unmistakable right should not pertain to the use and enjoyment of the leased properties. For purposes of granting the writ prayed for, private respondent AIA should have shown that it had a clear and unmistakable right to refuse to pay the CUSA Fees. Unfortunately for private respondent AIA, the evidence is specious to show that its non-payment of CUSA Fee was justified. First and foremost, the issuance of Resolution No. 12-08-4505 by petitioner SBMA was pursuant to its powers and functions under R.A. No. 7227 and its IRR, thus it enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity, and private respondent AIA failed to adduce evidence that would overturn said presumption. Contrary to the allegation of private respondent AIA, the records show that there was compliance with public consultation and publication[19] requirements before the implementation of Resolution No. 12-08-4505.
The allegation of private respondent AIA that CUSA Fee is a form of tax is negated by the undisputed fact that its purpose would only be to recover a portion of petitioner SBMA’s expenses for street lighting, street cleaning, law enforcement and maintenance of firefighting facilities. Private respondent AIA does not deny that those services are being rendered by petitioner SBMA and the latter only seeks to recover its costs therefor when it imposed the Policy on CUSA Fee.
Private respondent AIA’s allegation that the imposition of the Policy on CUSA Fee is a unilateral imposition, constituting a violation of the principle of mutuality of contract, is untenable. The lease agreements of the parties contain stipulations incorporating therein the provisions of R.A. No. 7227 and its IRR which authorize petitioner SBMA to promulgate “such additional rules and regulations as may from time to time be reasonably imposed by the LESSOR and its authorized representative for the general safety, comfort and convenience of the occupants and lessees of the SBF x x x.” Neither can the Policy on CUSA Fee be considered a unilateral amendment of the lease agreement, as it is only an additional rule and regulation that petitioner SBMA could impose pursuant to R.A. No. 7227 and its IRR.
As regards the second requisite, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is no urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of writ to prevent serious damage.
In Barbieto v. Court of Appeals,[20] the Supreme Court stated the general principles in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction:
“A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.
At times referred to as the “Strong Arm of Equity,” we have consistently ruled that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than the issuance of an injunction. It should only be extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages; “in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant’s favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation.”
For the writ to issue, two requisites must be present, namely, the existence of the right to be protected, and that the facts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. x x x.”
In this case, there exists no emergency or extraordinary situation that should be avoided, otherwise the outcome of the litigation would be rendered nugatory on the part of private respondent AIA. Private respondent AIA was only being asked to pay the CUSA Fee due petitioner SBMA and there is no showing that the former would suffer great and irreparable injury if it would pay the same.
It is settled that a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent grave and irreparable injury, that is, injury that is actual, substantial, and demonstrable.[21] In this case, there is no “irreparable injury” as understood in law. Rather, the damages alleged by private respondent AIA arising from alleged cancellation of the lease agreement is speculative and has no factual basis. Granting that it would suffer damages if it pays the CUSA Fee being demanded by petitioner SBMA, the same is easily quantifiable and certainly does not fall under the concept of irreparable damage or injury. In Social Security Commission v. Bayona[22] the Supreme Court described irreparable damage or injury in this wise:
Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. “An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement”. An irreparable injury to authorize an injunction consists of a serious charge of, or is destructive to, the property it affects, either physically or in the character in which it has been held and enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Even public respondent Judge acknowledged in the assailed Order dated January 3, 2013 that the amount sought to be collected by petitioner SBMA is fixed and could easily be computed, even if it went further and found, albeit erroneously, that there was a threatened cancellation of the private respondent AIA’s Lease Agreements.
In sum, public respondent Judge’s issuance of the Orders dated November 27, 2013 and March 24, 2014 is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, being contrary to law and established jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Orders dated November 27, 2013 and March 24, 2014 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered REINSTATING the Order dated July 22, 2013 of the RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 74.
SO ORDERED.
Garcia, and Bueser, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-32
[2] Rollo, pp. 202-204
[3] Rollo, pp. 212-213
[4] Rollo, pp. 117-130
[5] Rollo, pp. 133-134
[6] Position Paper In Opposition to Petitioner’s Application for Preliminary Injunction, Rollo, pp. 135-155; Position Paper for the Petition (In Support of Application for Preliminary Injunction), Rollo, pp. 157-169.
[7] Rollo, pp. 170-176
[8] Rollo, pp. 177-184
[9] Rollo, p. 185
[10] Rollo, pp. 186-188
[11] Rollo, pp. 189-197
[12] Rollo, pp. 205-211
[13] Rollo, pp. 223-244
[14] Rollo, pp. 117-130
[15] G.R. No. 192885, July 4, 2012
[16] Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118249, February 14, 2003, 397 SCRA 348, 359.
[17] Rollo, pp. 107-108
[18] Rollo, p. 357
[19] As per Affidavit of Publication dated September 17, 2012, Rollo, p. 112; Affidavit of Publication dated September 21, 2012, Rollo, p. 113.
[20] G.R. No. 184645, October 30, 2009, 604 SCRA 825.
[21] Power Sites and Signs, Inc. vs. United Neon, G.R. No. 163406, November 24, 2009
[22] 115 Phil. 105, 110 (1962).